Introduction
The European Union has made a positive contribution to trade liberalization and development in recent years. The 2002 World Trade Organisation's Trade Policy Review on the EU's trade policies (WTO Secretariat, 2002) points out that the EU played a leadership role both prior to and during the Doha negotiations and has contributed significantly to the successful launching of the Doha Development Agenda. The EU and the European non-governmental organisation (NGO) community in particular contributed considerably to the most significant breakthrough made at the Doha WTO Ministerial Conference held in November 2001 - the adoption of the Declaration on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health. The EU's "Everything But Arms Initiative" has also led the way in providing increased market access for least developed countries. Many have also acknowledged the European Commission's leadership in prompting EU Member States to begin serious debate on the need for the radical reform and adjustment of their agriculture and trade policies-most importantly through the introduction of the Mid-Term Review of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
This background article begins by outlining two policy perspectives-that which informs EU trade policies, and a development perspective which is employed in examining those policies. The article then discusses the issue of adjustment in the EU and evaluates the EU's track record in the liberalisation of key industries of interest to developing countries. Finally, the article evaluates the EU's commitment to environmentally sustainable policies, reviewing various EU technical regulations.
Policy perspectives
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The EU Policy Perspective
How does the EU see the world and the challenges we confront? On 25 June 2002, Pierre Defraigne, Chef de Cabinet of Commissioner Lamy, presented his analysis of the global challenge as follows. He argued that the EU saw the need to balance the drive to increase the efficiency of the market with policies that promoted sustainable development. He argued that, whilst globalisation has resulted in rapid flows of trade and finance, norms for the environment and consumer protection, animal and human health and food safety were being given less attention in the multilateral system. In his view, the real challenge was to encourage and develop effective policies-in both the North and the South-to increase adjustment capacity to cope with globalisation. In this way, developing countries "can get a fair share of world growth-and turn this into social progress and environmental sustainability" (Defraigne, 2002).
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Development Perspective
The last two decades have ushered in the rapid expansion of global markets, presenting both new challenges and new opportunities for social progress for all of humanity. However, while some developing countries have benefited from rapid flows of trade, finance and information technologies, most have been largely excluded from the potential gains and remain economically marginalized (UNCTAD, 2002).
For most developing countries, the single most important challenge remains that of poverty. The negative effects of globalisation-environmental degradation, terrorism, disease and the spread of HIV/AIDS-have alerted all to the interdependence of our world. World leaders recognized these challenges when they agreed at the UN Millennium Summit to improve the lives of the poor by the year 2015 by implementing the Millennium Development Goals (see UN, 2000). This commitment was re-affirmed at the World Food Summit in 1996, at the UN International Conference on Financing for Development Summit in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, and again at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa in September 2002. The Report of the World Health Organisation Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (WHO, 2001) has also reminded us of the inextricable relationship between poverty, health and economic development. The Report argues that the burden of disease (especially the AIDS pandemic) in some low-income countries is one of the primary barriers to economic growth and development.
How can trade policies best help to address the fundamental challenge of poverty alleviation? The Doha Development Agenda recognized that there are critical links between trade liberalisation, the more efficient functioning of global markets, economic development and poverty alleviation. The EU is the largest trading partner for a vast number of developing countries. For most of these countries (especially in Africa), their main exports are in those sectors where the EU retains high tariffs, tariff escalation 2and tariff peaks. While these sectors represent only a marginal proportion of output and employment in the EU, they account for a high share of the total trade, output and employment for most developing countries, making them particularly vulnerable to EU trade policies.
There is no doubt that developing countries need appropriate policies to develop their competitiveness and adjust their economies for engagement with globalisation. These issues, while important, are beyond the scope of this article. Here, the focus is instead on the responsibilities of the EU. As the largest exporter and the second-largest importer in the world, the EU has a leading role to play in advancing and shaping the processes of globalisation, multilateral rules and economic development. To contribute to this in a meaningful manner, it needs to make major adjustments in its own internal markets.
Adjustment of EU agriculture and industries
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Agriculture
Increasing the pace of adjustment in agriculture and labour-absorbing industries in the developed countries will allow developing countries to export more, increase growth and improve the prospects for development. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, has argued that the lack of such adjustments is "crippling Africa's chance to export its way out of poverty" (Kristhof, 2002).
Two-thirds of all poor people in developing countries live and work in the agriculture sector, depending on agriculture for their livelihoods. In the EU, by contrast, less than 5% of the population works in the agriculture sector (agriculture accounts for just 4,3% of both the EU's output and employment; see Messerlin, 2001). EU trade policies provide an overwhelming level of support to protect these farmers. The EU dedicates billions of dollars of domestic support, export subsidies and extremely high tariffs to them-with the majority of benefits going to large-scale farmers. In 2000, the EU provided at least $90 billion in assistance to its farmers through a variety of measures included in its Common Agricultural Policy (such as domestic support and export subsidies) (WTO Secretariat, 2002). This support amounts to more than two-thirds of the gross value-added of EU agricultural production (Messerlin, 2002). Tariff escalation, tariff peaks and import quotas often further support these subsidies.
For small and poor farmers in the developing world, these policies have a devastating impact. They contribute to a vicious cycle of dwindling livelihoods, the decimation of national productive and export competitiveness, higher national debt levels and increasing poverty rates (Page, 1999; Oxfam, 2002a). Whilst "the sustained vitality of its rural communities" (WTO Secretariat, 2002, p. 9) is clearly an important societal goal for the EU, its Members need to take into account the impact of its policies on the livelihoods of rural communities in developing countries.
Liberalisation of the EU's trade policies-and in particular the removal of subsidies-could have important positive development effects for developing countries. A few are noted here to illustrate this point.
The EU maintains high levels of tariff escalation. A study conducted by the Swedish Board of Agriculture (2001) affirmed that tariff escalation is particularly prevalent when the EU does not produce these products. Whereas the EU imposes no tariffs on unprocessed products, it imposes high tariffs of 9-12% in the case of cocoa and coffee (even allowing for preferences under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)) (Page, 1999). The effect is to protect the EU's domestic industries against foreign competition. The Swedish study argues that if "this tariff escalation were to be dismantled, this would give developing countries better conditions for processing the raw material themselves, and export the processed product instead".
High EU tariffs similarly inhibit developing country production and exports of fruit. To protect producers in Southern Europe, the EU imposes exceptional tariffs of up to 19% on tropical fruit such as citrus. Cut flowers also face high tariffs of 15-17%. Even those supposed to benefit from a lower GSP rate still face a tariff of around 15%.
The following three examples highlight how domestic and export subsidies provided under the CAP have similarly perverse and devastating impacts on many developing countries.
In Jamaica, the 1990s were marked by an intense period of liberalisation. Following the liberalisation of the Jamaican dairy industry, exports of EU milk powder to Jamaica subsequently grew from 2 000 tonnes per year in 1990-1993 to 4 000 tonnes per year in the period 1995-1998. European milk exporters benefited tremendously from subsidies, receiving more than Ђ 4 million per year in export subsidies in the 1990s. This cheaper European milk quickly undercut and replaced locally-produced fresh milk, devastating the small Jamaican dairy market and putting many small enterprises, mainly owned by women, out of business (Oxfam, 2002b). In 2001, an EU Court of Auditors Report (2001) found that the EU's milk quota regime was resulting in huge surplus stocks. Between 1997 and 2000, the quantity of skimmed milk powder in storage, for example, rose by 60%. In 2000, some of this stock was reduced with the use of export subsidies (WTO Secretariat, 2002, p. 76).
In South Africa, sugar prices are much lower (less than half) than in the EU. However, EU sugar subsidies mean that European confectionary producers obtain sugar inputs for their exports at about one-third the price of their South African counterparts. Between 1997 and 2000, an increase in South African imports of EU sugar and chocolate confectionary contributed to a 21% decline of consumption of domestically produced sweets and chocolate, reducing production and employment in South Africa's domestic industry. Beacon Sweets, for example, the largest employer in the industry, retrenched 1,000 employees between 1997 and 2000. In addition, the industry reduced its use of local sugar from 40 000 tonnes in 1995 to 35 000 tonnes in 1999, provoking significant losses in employment, mainly in rural areas (Oxfam, 2002b).
EU sugar subsidies have an even more profound impact on the economic development of South Africa. In 2002, the Wall Street Journal (2002) published a case study which demonstrated that EU subsidies to its sugar producers substantially reduced global sugar prices. This decline in prices reduced by one-third the income of small-scale South African sugarcane growers and cost South Africa an estimated Ђ100 million in potential export earnings. More than one-half of the country's 2,6 million tonnes of sugar production is exported. The cost of producing in the EU is two to three times that of producing in developing countries. If the EU were to cut its sugar subsidies and production, and stopped dumping on the world market, sugar prices are estimated to improve by about 20%, generating at least Ђ40 million more for South African sugar exports. These improvements would enable further expansion of cane growing, generating the potential for South African sugar exports to earn a further Ђ60 million per year.
In Senegal, tomato cultivation was introduced in the 1970s. By 1990, Senegal was producing about 73 000 tonnes of tomato concentrate and was a significant exporter to its neighbours. Over the past few years, this production fell to less than 20 000 tonnes due to unfair competition by the EU-the world's second-largest producer of tomato concentrate. Under the EU's CAP, EU tomato farmers earn a minimum price which is higher than the world price. In addition, the EU's tomato processors are paid a subsidy to cover the difference between the domestic prices they pay for inputs and world prices. In 1997, this subsidy amounted to about $300 million.
With increased liberalisation of access to Senegal's market, EU exports of tomato concentrate increased from 62 tonnes in 1994 to 5,348 tonnes in 1996. Since then, low prices of tomato concentrate and the subsequent lack of credit and investment available to processors has resulted in the decline and stagnation of Senegal's tomato processing industry (UNCTAD, 2002, p. 160).
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Clothing and Textiles
European countries have historically based their industrialisation on labour-intensive production in sectors such as clothing and textiles. In terms of employment and production in the EU, these sectors now play relatively insignificant roles, as the EU economies have graduated to higher value-added sectors such as manufacturing and services. By contrast, clothing and textiles are sectors of natural comparative advantage for developing countries. Nonetheless, the opportunity for developing countries to promote employment and exports in these sectors has been severely stifled by a combination of high tariffs, tariff peaks (triple the simple average), tariff escalation and import quotas. Added to this is an arsenal of contingent protection measures (mainly anti-dumping) that continue to stifle the growth and industrial development of many developing countries.
The clothing and textile industries have been subject to the highest levels of protection (by product and country) through the use of tariffs and quotas. The WTO's Trade Policy Review of the EU (WTO Secretariat, 2002) notes that, while the EU has taken measures to liberalize its quantitative restrictions (quota system) as required under the WTO's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (previously known as the Multi-Fibre Agreement), it significantly back-loaded the actual process of liberalisation to the very end of the eight-year transition period - i.e. to 2004. In addition, the EU has maintained an escalating tariff structure - imposing tariffs of 0% for cotton seeds and waste, 5% for yarn, 9-10% for cloth and 12-13% for most clothing. The GSP rates for yarn and cloth are only slightly lower.
Finally, the EU remains the second-largest user of anti-dumping measures (WTO Secretariat, 2002). Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and anti-dumping measures raise the overall levels of EU protection for industrial goods by one-third to two-thirds-from 6,7 to 11% in 1995 and from 4,3 to 7,7% in 1999. The EU's use of these measures is concentrated, most commonly impacting on labour-intensive sectors where developing countries have a comparative advantage. Messerlin (2001) observes, for example, that of a total of some 11 000 tariff lines, anti-dumping has been used in only 350 to 450 (farm, food, textiles and apparel). Between 1993 and 1999, the EU lodged a large number of anti-dumping cases. About fifteen of these cases were lodged in the textiles and clothing sectors (Messerlin, 2001).
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The Costs to Developing Countries of the EU's Failure to Adjust
For developing countries, exports are a critical factor to reduce poverty. Simulations conducted by some studies suggest that a 1% growth in the world export share of developing countries could reduce world poverty by 12%. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, this impact would be much greater (Oxfam, 2002b). Increased adjustment and liberalisation in the EU and other major developed economies would contribute significantly to the achievement of the Millennium goals of reducing poverty levels by 50% by 2015 (UN Millennium Declaration, 2000). The failure of EU industries to adjust and integrate into the global economy imposes devastating constraints on the economic prospects of developing countries and their efforts to compete in global markets (see Messerlin, 2001, p. 35).
Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, estimates that EU farm subsidies cost poor countries about $50 billion a year in lost agricultural exports (Kristhof, 2002). The cost of EU protection accounts for a full one-half of the total estimated costs to developing countries of agriculture protection by Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (estimated at $100 billion a year; see Oxfam, 2002b). Significantly, the total cost to developing countries of this agriculture protection is twice the amount that these countries receive in development assistance-about $50 billion a year. These figures are even more striking when one considers that the total amount spent by OECD countries in subsidies across all sectors amounts to more than $350 billion per year (WTO, 2002).
The EU is currently the most generous contributor of global development aid, committing about $26 billion of the total of $50 billion. However, the EU's aid budget still falls far short of the UN target of 0,7% of gross national income. The current EU development assistant budget is just 0,33% (though EU Member States have agreed to increase this to 0,39% by 2006; also see WTO, 2002). By putting these various statistics side by side, one can clearly see the sad reality that EU subsidies undercut the current levels of EU development assistance. In the South African case, for example, the roughly Ђ120 million that the EU provides the country each year is almost entirely erased by the estimated losses of Ђ100 million in potential export revenues due to sugar dumping (Wall Street Journal, 2002).
The cumulative impact of tariff peaks, tariff escalation and EU trade remedies on the imports and productive capacity of developing countries has, unfortunately, been under-studied. The impacts of these policies are undoubtedly negative and large-scale. They should be reformed-along with the CAP-and the options for compensating developing countries for the serious impediments to growth and development carefully considered.
The EU commitment to environmentally sustainable policies
Are EU trade policies environmentally sustainable? The EU commitment to sustainability impact assessments of its trade policies is an interesting and innovative initiative, although too little is known by developing countries about the methodology employed and the results of these studies. The EU commitment on the world stage to environmental sustainability will be treated with scepticism if it fails to fulfil its responsibility in an area in which it so clearly has competence.
Trade liberalisation has the potential to contribute to improved environmental performance (Page, 1999). Where sound environmental management regimes are in place (assuming that liberalisation shifts production to the most efficient producers), it can help promote the more efficient use of resources and minimize environmental waste. There is increasing evidence that in some sectors, where inefficient production processes exist and are causing damage to the environment (such as agriculture, fisheries and energy), liberalisation could result in a win-win situation.
To what extent do EU trade policies and subsidies in agriculture contribute to environmental degradation? How can the situation be improved? The following discussion highlights three examples where the possibility of a win-win outcome for both environmental protection and increased development are very high.
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Meat
The EU protects its meat producers (beef, pork, poultry and lamb) through a combination of high tariffs and subsidies and restrictions implemented under the CAP. High levels of support for this sector fuel highly intensive land use. Excessive agricultural production has damaged the quality of the soil, water, and air and threatens biodiversity (Page, 1999). Relocating some of this production to more suitable environments in developing countries has the potential to both support more environmentally sustainable production practices and to reduce the price of food.
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Sugar
The EU is the second-largest sugar producer in the world market, following Brazil. The EU sugar market is tightly regulated by the CAP-it imposes quotas on sugar imports and tariffs of as high as 85%. On 1 July 2001, these high trade barriers were extended to 2006. This EU sugar regime is responsible for the chronic oversupply of sugar in the world market and for depressed world prices. In 2000, an EU Court of Auditors Report noted that EU sugar is not competitive on world markets-requiring subsidies in the order of 75% (WTO Secretariat, p. 77). The Report notes the high cost of the EU sugar regime to consumers. It also highlights the regime's limited benefits, noting that the major beneficiaries are a small number of sugar beet farmers and sugar processors in the EU. From an environmental perspective, the EU sugar regime has important costs. Intensive sugar beet cultivation in the EU has contributed significantly to land degradation (Page, 1999). Reducing protection in this area could stimulate relocation of production to developing countries with greater comparative advantage, again with the added benefit of reducing environmental degradation.
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Fishing
In 1999, the European Community's fishing fleet consisted of 99 000 vessels. Greece, Italy and Spain have the highest number of vessels, and Spain has the highest tonnage (WTO Secretariat, 2002). Employment at sea was estimated at 244 000. With the addition of jobs in the processing industry, total employment in this industry totalled 600 000. Fishing is particularly important for certain regions within Europe-Galicia in Spain, the Hebrides in Scotland, Brittany in France and the Aegean in Greece. The EU is a net importer of fish, with imports valued at Ђ10 billion and exports at Ђ1,9 billion in 1999 (see WTO, 2002).
The main policy instrument for EU fisheries is the Common Fisheries Policy. The unsustainability of current fishing trends within the EU is a subject of considerable concern in the region. The European Commission, in a recent Green Paper, itself reported that "from a biological point of view the sustainability of a high number of stocks will be threatened if the current levels of exploitation are maintained" (WTO, 2002). Although the number of vessels has been declining, the EU admits that due to technological improvements "the EU has twice the capacity needed to catch the available fish".
One way in which the EU has attempted to deal with its problems of fishing overcapacity is to negotiate fishing access agreements with third countries (mainly African and Indian Ocean countries) in which it exchanges nominal financial assistance to the contracting country and the promise of fees from vessel operators for access to the third country's fisheries. The EU now has such fishing access agreements with nineteen African countries. Much of the fishing is, however, conducted in an uncontrolled and unsustainable manner-EU vessels persist in over-fishing and in encroaching on fisheries important to local livelihoods. Few African or Indian Ocean countries have the capacity to monitor or enforce sound fisheries management regimes on their waters - a situation which the EU fishing industry wilfully exploits. The terms of the EU fishing access agreements are such that they provide further large subsidies to European fisheries, enable excessive depletion of marine resources and inhibit the development of local fishing industries and exports from developing countries.
In a range of sectors, reduced EU protection-both in terms of subsidies and tariffs-would help fulfil the EU's oft-stated commitment to environmental protection while contributing to increased opportunities for economic development and poverty reduction in developing countries.
Technical regulations of the EU
What kinds of technical regulations, standards, and other social policies does the EU employ? Is the EU's laudable commitment to social policies serving those in need or is it captured by protectionist lobbies? From a development perspective, do these policies exacerbate the EU's protection regime, further delaying the EU's stated commitment to liberalisation and the advancement of economic development in the South?
Many EU technical regulations and standards are a source of NTBs for developing country exports to the EU. These NTBs can have a devastating impact on the capacity of developing countries to export into the EU market. A recent case study of Ghana undertaken by Lifeonline reviewed the experience of Ghanaian exporters facing EU NTBs. Ghanaian producers of bananas complained that their attempts to export into the EU were frustrated by EU regulations on the length and size of bananas. The EU regulations require bananas of a longer size-a technical standard which small Ghanaian producers failed to meet. In addition, Ghanaian fish smokers from the Lake Volta region explained how they had attempted to meet the health and hygiene standards of the EU. Despite repeated efforts-including the development of a standardised facility for smoking the fish-the EU continued to insist that they did not meet EU standards.
Technical regulations and standards in the EU have proliferated over recent years. These measures raise the costs for foreign or third-country producers more than for domestic firms. The impact of an EU directive on producer responsibility for waste could, for example, have a disastrous impact on small producers from developing countries. In the context of the EU internal integration process, these regulations can be a source of trade diversion-diverting production toward those producers that are capable of meeting these high standards. For this reason, these regulations have been regarded suspiciously as protectionist instruments or as the "new protection" (Messerlin, 2001).
In addition, the EU has made its mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) for conformity assessment procedures available only to a few trading partners. While the EU's conformity assessment procedures are conducted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, there is considerable doubt as to the consistency of these MRAs with the most-favoured-nation principle-that any advantage given to one trading partner must be given to all other WTO trading partners automatically and unconditionally. Indeed, the list of trading partners (Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Israel) who currently enjoy these MRAs with the EU suggests special and differential treatment in reverse.
The EU frequently uses standards-based on the controversial "precautionary principle"-to impose import bans. This principle requires action if there is a risk, as long as there is no scientific certainty that the risk will not exist in the long run. In other words, with regard to food safety, any possibility of a food scare is "guilty, until proven innocent". The huge popular appeal of this principle among European populations allows for its misuse by both vested interests and politicians. This tendency for abuse requires careful monitoring and vigilance by the EU.
Finally, the EU policy with respect to international standard setting also raises concern (WTO Secretariat, 2002, p. 44). On the one hand, the EU recognizes the need to participate in international standard-setting bodies. On the other hand, it asserts the right to develop its own standards in terms of its own policy objectives, provided these are not developed in a "discriminatory and arbitrary manner". This tension reflects broader challenges with respect to the relationship between international and national regulatory systems and the issue of sovereignty.
In terms of EU technical regulations, several issues regarding governance and participation in decision-making processes arise. The EU's own Government Report for the WTO's EU Trade Policy Review (see EU, 2002) touches on this concern (p. 14), raising the need for transparency and participation by civil society in standard-making processes. However, to advance its stated goal of policy coherence in terms of its policies toward developing countries, the EU must devote attention also to increasing the transparency of the regulatory decision-making process and to expanding its view of an inclusive process. What about the voices of foreign producers and other parties whose interests are directly affected by EU trade policies? These interests would also need to be considered.
In summary, EU social polices need to be inclusive, transparent, and consistent with the increased openness of its markets so as not to increase the barriers to entry for the products of other countries, especially those from poor developing countries.
Conclusion
This article has asserted that poverty and development are the most urgent and fundamental challenges for developing countries. From this development perspective, it has argued that the EU must undertake major reforms of its agriculture sector and trade policies in order to fulfil its commitment to the global trading system, trade liberalisation and efficient global markets. The removal of distortions in global markets-the large proportion of which are due to existing EU trade policies-is essential to enable developing countries to exploit their comparative advantages in agriculture and other labour-intensive industries and to "export their way out of poverty".
This article has engaged with the EU policy concerns to balance trade liberalisation with social and environmental policies. It contended that the EU commitment to environmental sustainability will be viewed sceptically if its own trade policies continue to contribute to environmental degradation, particularly in agriculture and fisheries. In addition, the article argued that EU technical regulations run the risk of being captured by rent-seeking protectionist interests unless there is great vigilance, transparency and participation by all other interest groups, both within the EU and outside it.
References
Defraigne, Pierre, 2002: Trade Governance and Sustainable Development, speech delivered at DG Trade Breakfast, Brussels, 25 June.
European Union, 2002: Report by the Government to the WTO Trade Policy Review, June.
European Union Court of Auditors, 2001: Annual Report of the EU Court of Auditors.
Kristhof, Nicolas D., 2002: Americans Sow Subsidies, Africans Reap Death: Agricultural Absurdity, International Herald Tribune, p. 8, 6 July.
Messerlin, P., 2001: Measuring the Cost of Protection in Europe: European Commercial Policy in the 2000s, Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C..
Idem, 2002: Market Access: Agriculture, paper presented to the Conference on New Trade Research for Developing Countries, Cairo, Egypt, May.
Oxfam International, 2002a: Time for Coherence: CAP Reform and Developing Countries, Oxfam Discussion Paper, Oxford, U.K., June.
Idem, 2002b: Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight against Poverty, Oxford, U.K., November.
Page, 1999: Environment Benefits from Removing Trade Restrictions and Distortions: Background for WTO Negotiations, Overseas Development Institute, London.
Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2001: Tariff Escalation for Agricultural and Fishery Products, Stockholm.
UN (United Nations) 2000: United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the 55th Session of the General Assembly, A/RES/55/2, 18 September.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), 2002: The Least Developed Countries Report, United Nations, New York and Geneva.
Wall Street Journal, 2002: EU, U.S. Sugar Subsidies Leave a Sour Taste, p. A6, 16 September.
WHO (World Health Organization), 2001: Macroeconomics and Health: Investing in Health for Economic Development, Report of the Commission on Macro-Economics and Health.
WTO (World Trade Organization), 2002: Trade Policy Review-European Union, Report by the Secretariat, WTO/TPR/S/102, 26 June.
Footnotes:
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The Head of the South African Delegation to the World Trade Organisation. He joined the new democratic government of South Africa in 1994 as it began its transition to re-integrate with the world economy and led the South African negotiations with the European Union. These negotiations resulted in the conclusion and implementation of a Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement with the EU (a free trade agreement), which took effect on 1 January 2000. Mr Ismail was a discussant for the WTO's Trade Policy Review of the European Union in 2002. This article is based on his presentation made on the occasion of the Review and a paper he presented at the 10th European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes General Conference, held in Ljubljana, Slovenia, 19-21 September 2002.
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Where countries impose higher tariffs on the value-added or processed products of developing countries than on the unprocessed goods.
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