



HONG KONG TRADE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE OUTCOMES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR POVERTY REDUCTION IN SADC

6-7th April 2006 - Gauteng, South Africa

REPORT¹

*Hong Kong
Trade
Ministerial
Conference
Outcomes:
Implications
for Poverty
Reduction in
SADC*

REGIONAL
MEETING

6-7 April
2006

Burgers Park
Hotel,
Pretoria
South Africa

DAY I: WELCOMING CEREMONY AND OPENING SESSION

In the opening session, participants were welcomed and given an overview of the objectives and guiding questions for the workshop. It was suggested that while the focus of the workshop was on trade, any discussion on poverty reduction had to trace and connect the various linkages between trade, economic justice and sustainable development.

Three objectives were identified for the workshop:

- To review the outcomes of the Hong Kong Ministerial (HKM).
- To analyse their impact on poverty reduction policies in our region.
- To evaluate how effective our strategies are in influencing the WTO. Since we are all working towards a more just and better world, we need to critically reflect how we are engaging and what progress we are making.

Furthermore, it was suggested that the following questions should frame the discussions:

- How do we build momentum to ensure a consistent focus on trade issues and the WTO? Thus far, our engagement has been *ad hoc* and too reactive prior to ministerial meetings.
- How do we engage with our governments on trade and influence them to adopt strong developmental positions (and keep to them)? At the HKM, many African NGOs were part of government delegations. How do we empower these NGOs so that they are not co-opted, but strengthen the delegations?
- How do we broaden and build a movement around trade justice? Since trade is a very complex and technical matter, we need to focus more on its political and social basis and thus involve more people.
- How do we discuss trade in its broader context? It is not only about the WTO, but also about bilateral and regional negotiations (such as the US-SACU FTA and the EPAs).

Participants raised various expectations for the workshop. These included the following:

- To provide a political economy analysis and understanding of the HKM outcomes.
- To bring the poor back into the debate, and to integrate issues of human rights, gender and social justice.
- To build networks and alliances in the trade sector and assist with regional coordination.
- To develop more sustainable, home-grown solutions to the trade crisis.

¹ Rapporteur: Brendan Vicker, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) Johannesburg, South Africa

- To understand how better to engage with national governments.
- To share experiences, learn what others are doing, and develop practical campaign strategies.
- To identify strategies to influence the policies of the industrialised countries, and work with UNCTAD to protect developing countries.
- To provide a business perspective on the WTO.
- To ensure that HIV/AIDS is brought to the fore in discussions on trade and the WTO.

SESSION 1

The politics of the HKM and the Doha Round

Participants at the meeting agreed that our main concern is not simply trade, but equitable and sustainable development. Since trade is the dominant paradigm in the world today, we need to focus on how trade impacts on the development process.

The HKM text is incomplete, vague on many issues, and open to different interpretations. Rather than focusing on the technicalities of the text, our analysis should be framed by broader strategic questions relating to the exercise of global political and economic power. This includes the exclusionary and manipulative processes that led to the adoption of the HKM text. If we are going to effectively intervene and shape the trade agenda, we need to understand the real nature and exercise of this power.

Although Africa had developed sound positions prior to the HKM, there are many weaknesses and vulnerabilities built into this position. These include the perennial plea by Africa for aid, the fragility of African unity, and the limitations of human, financial and technical resources.

It should be recalled that in 2003, developing countries successfully blocked the major's trade agenda at Cancún. Some hoped that this blocking strategy would replay itself at the HKM, should unacceptable decisions be foisted upon developing countries. The Cancún episode should be used as an illustration to governments to identify and stand by their interests.

At the HKM, the G33 had good positions on special products and a special safeguard mechanism (SSM). The key concern for the G20 was agriculture and for the G90, special and differential treatment (SDT). While developing countries do not uniformly share the same interests, there was mutual support for their respective concerns. In this regard, the G20, G33, Africa Group and LDCs came together in a grand alliance called the G110. However, this grand alliance did not manage to produce the desired outcomes from the HKM. Africa was only nominally represented at green room meetings, where Egypt represented the Africa Group and Zambia the LDCs. A major challenge was mandating these representatives and keeping them accountable to their members (unlike Cancún, which proved highly effective in this regard). At the HKM, our key concerns were sidelined, given formal gestures, or simply postponed to be dealt with later.

The meeting noted that a major challenge is the nature and functioning of the alliances and coalitions among developing countries. The majors are encouraging the leadership roles of the new powers of the South, who are then subsequently co-opted. It was agreed that South Africa played a uniquely positive role at the HKM as part of the group resisting Annex C on services and the NAMA-11. But the content of what South Africa was promoting requires further debate. Another critical issue raised was how the broader family of developing nations should relate to these new Southern powers, such as India, Brazil and South Africa, and intermediate powers like Indonesia and the Philippines. We must keep these powers on our side, and prevent them from being co-opted and made sub-imperialists of the South (doing the job of the North or pursuing their own interests).

It was noted that the struggle for trade justice continues, with the majors refusing to move on

agriculture. The US has imposed an absolute fraud on Africa with cotton: we are being asked to pay a second time for what they were supposed to do in terms of the Uruguay Round.

For Doha to be developmental, all WTO agreements have to be reformed, rectified and re-balanced. Some agreements, like TRIPS and TRIMS, should be removed from the WTO's ambit. SDT has to be made real and effective: countries at different levels of development must have the policy space to decide what is appropriate for their development. Even the World Bank (WB) is now recognising that single formulas do not work for development.

Developing countries should stand firm on their needs and interests, even if this causes an impasse in the Doha Round and ultimately its collapse. The developed countries will have to concede as they heavily depend on an integrated global economy and integrated global rules to continue their domination and advance their corporations (although regionalism and bilateralism are an adjunct to this optimal strategy).

Each *impasse* in the Doha Round represents part of an ongoing struggle to shift the global balance of power in favour of developing countries. Social movements can also help to shift this balance of power by winning over popular and progressive social forces in North.

TRIPS and Public Health

Participants at the meeting investigated the impact of TRIPS on public health, particularly its relation to HIV/AIDS and access to treatment. The Southern African region is home to 2% of the world's population, but has 70% of global HIV/AIDS cases.

TRIPS did not constitute a main part of the HKM. The decision to amend TRIPS and permanently extend the August 2003 temporary waiver was taken prior to HK. But unless we amend domestic legislation (as Norway, Canada and India did, at great cost) and build strong capacity to be able to utilise the August 2003 decision to enhance access to generic drugs, developing nations - SADC included - will face more failures in the fight against HIV/AIDS and other epidemic diseases.

A second important issue was the relationship between TRIPS and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Developing countries called for TRIPS to be in line with the CBD, while developed countries hold that the two should be interpreted as complementary and mutually supportive. The HKM reached no decision on this matter.

On the way forward, the meeting noted the need to:

- Raise local awareness on the importance of protecting traditional knowledge and plant and animal species.
- Influence policy-makers and researchers so that farmers are protected from the unjust effects of the WTO.
- Urgently remove barriers that hinder countries from taking advantage of the TRIPS flexibilities.
- Ensure that public health takes precedence over profits; we should accordingly:
 - develop capacity on the linkages between TRIPS, HIV/AIDS and poverty;
 - intensify advocacy to change trade laws and practices, and debt cancellation;
 - strengthen government, NGO and private sector partnerships; and
 - look at how countries can be assisted to utilise the flexibilities.
- Pull TRIPS from the WTO.

SESSION 2

NAMA and its impact on poverty reduction in SADC

The NAMA talks outcomes are heading towards a development disaster. The developed countries are forcing the developing countries to massively cut (or even altogether eliminate) industrial tariffs on a line-by-line basis in an irreversible manner. This will deny developing countries the right to industrial policy space and the prospect of industrial development. This is most alarming, since there is an historical case for tariff protection for industries that are not yet profitable, especially in developing countries. Moreover, virtually all of today's developed countries built up their economies using tariffs and subsidies.

Premature liberalisation in sub-Saharan Africa has been devastating: in Malawi and Uganda, for instance, the manufacturing sector has contracted dramatically. De-industrialisation, the loss of much needed tariff revenue and economic collapse are some of the likely outcomes of the NAMA negotiations.

The HKM text absolutely ignored the erosion of preferences. Non-agricultural products of LDCs remain at a disadvantageous position. Although LDCs are exempted from negotiations now, their commodities will have to compete with other highly sophisticated developing countries, such as Brazil. The HKM decision to grant 97% duty and quota-free market access to LDCs is meaningless. Only 20% of Malawi's trade falls within this 97% category; the remaining 3% translates into 389 tariff lines that constitute 80% of Malawi's most competitive exports. We must resist the trade off between agricultural export preferences and industrial tariff cuts.

On the way forward, the meeting identified three issues arising from the HKM:

- Immediate steps:
 - Assess the effectiveness of the market access granted in HK by analysing export trends, tariff peaks and export destinations. This will be an important lobby tool, since the 3% excluded is exactly where most of our competitive advantage lies.
 - Strengthen the political unity and technical cohesion to present a common view on the important issues.
 - Special efforts are needed to keep the group united and voice the position of the group in unison.
 - Widen consultations on WTO issues within countries and build strong social movements for trade justice.
- Mobilise resources for adequate and continuous technical preparation in order to protect areas of interest. We need concrete evidence of the negative implications of NAMA cuts (e.g. job losses, factory closures, etc), not simply generic statements.
- Research based advocacy to not only provide government with readymade negotiating briefs, but to inform officials about trade-offs they face; likely costs and benefits of different options; technical solutions to practical problems; and insights into various linkages that exist in an issue area. The purpose of these studies will be to analyse the impact of various proposals so far submitted and to prepare inputs.

Agriculture and its impact on poverty reduction in SADC

The meeting concurred that the industrialised countries, particularly the EU, ambitiously seek to protect their own farmers and constituencies. Developing countries want agriculture to be in line with the Doha mandate and are seeking SDT for food and livelihood security, while addressing the needs of their rural communities. We need to debate how best to promote agricultural development in the South and ensure a pro-poor agricultural trade regime.

The view that developing countries do not have the financial resources to support their farmers was contested. We must draw a clear distinction between the subsidies used in the developed countries and the *de minimus* support that we are entitled to. It is critical that we defend the right to support our own producers. Agriculture once flourished in Africa, but collapsed following the withdrawal of subsidies under SAPs. If developed countries insist on their subsidies, so must we. Developed countries are producing and competing on huge subsidised platforms and on this basis, will continue dumping into the future.

The meeting noted that under the current situation, food insecurity and poverty will persist. Since women are the custodians of food sovereignty in many countries, the development box urgently needs a gender dimension.

Participants also paid particular attention to cotton, which is an important source of livelihood. 15 million people are directly employed in the cotton industry: in SADC, 3 million largely small-scale farmers support an estimated 15 million dependants. The HKM undertook to eliminate export subsidies by the end of 2006, with duty and quota-free market access for LDC from the implementation period. However, there are some gaps in the HKM deal: export subsidies are insignificant compared to total trade distorting subsidies and the removal of export subsidies per se will have minimal effect on international prices.

Although Africa has a comparative advantage for cotton production, we process less than 5% of our crop. Hence, there is an urgent need for beneficiation and value addition. Other challenges are that: Africa lacks internal (regional or national) strategies for the development of the cotton sector; domestic markets for textile products are low and fast shrinking (worsened by concessions on NAMA and China); and there is a lack of processing technology. Given these challenges, it was noted that there are limited cotton-induced prospects for poverty reduction in Africa.

On the way forward in agriculture, we need to:

- Build strong developmental states rooted on the principle of agriculture.
- Rebuild constituencies that are pro-agricultural development.
- Remain consistent on a pro-poor agricultural trade regime at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
- Revamp synergies on pro-poor trade participation.
- Form and build alliances for robust involvement in the bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations.
- Bring the poor constituencies to the centre of trade negotiations.

SESSION 3

Services and its impact on poverty reduction in SADC

The meeting noted that services now dominate international trade and investment. Developed economies, such as the US and EU, are moving towards services, with a decline in manufacturing. They are the main services *demandeurs*. Part of their strategy of mass distraction is to overload and obfuscate the WTO's agenda, thereby challenging developing countries' ability to thoroughly reflect on services liberalisation outcomes.

Since regulations are impediments to services trade, liberalisation means the removal of the right to regulate, which we must oppose. The meeting concurred that we need to protect and preserve services as instruments of development. We usually think of GATS as a bottom-up agreement: you choose which sectors to liberalise. But there is also a top-down element with domestic regulation and MFN. Unless we have strong states and regulatory authorities, we will not be able to address many of our developmental challenges.

The HKM proposed a change to the GATS negotiating methodology, from bilateral request-

offers to multilateral benchmarks and plurilateral agreements. Notwithstanding strong opposition from developing countries to Annex C, all countries are now obliged to *consider* plurilateral requests.

It was argued that the powerful services sectors in northern economies have to expand overseas to keep up profitability. This is mainly through commercial presence, that is GATS mode 3, which is effectively tantamount to a disguised investment treaty. Developing countries have an interest in GATS mode 4 on the movement of natural persons, but developed countries are frustrating our attempts to benefit from this services supply as a way of reducing poverty.

The meeting also discussed the brain drain of African students and experts. This represents a qualitative loss on our future, since we will not be able to transform our economies without these skills. Their remittances from overseas do not match what governments have spent on their training.

Interestingly, Zambia believes it has more to gain from WTO liberalisation than from the IMF and WB. Zambians believe they have more control in the WTO, particularly in alliance with other like-minded countries, than under IMF liberalisation. Participants opposed this view: it was pointed out that relations with the IMF and WB are contractual and end once financial problems are settled; by contrast, the WTO is irreversible and multilaterally agreed. Zambia has liberalised considerably and will be giving up its policy space and deepening dependency. Zambia has identified GATS mode 3 as important to attract FDI, particularly for tourism development, and for offensive purposes, GATS mode 4. The former has led to some serious problems, such as the displacement of people around Victoria Falls, and access to rivers and grazing cut off by fences.

The meeting briefly discussed what is meant by a 'developmental state'. It was agreed that a developmental state must maximise its ability to provide for its people. Its economic system must increase the size of the economic pie, and increase productivity and wages. With productivity gains will come a long-term reduction in prices. We want a state with a plan, not a plan that says that our development strategy is determined by international trade.

On the way forward, we need:

- Impact studies of liberalisation in services sectors and a strategy to develop appropriate safeguard measures.
- A mechanism for capturing data on trade in services generally and migrant remittances in particular.

SESSION 4

Civil society organisation (CSO) mobilisation and strategies pre, during and post-HKM

Participants shared their different experiences in mobilising for the HKM. The meeting was open and critical about the lessons learned from Hong Kong, and how this should inform our future strategies.

The meeting identified ten key lessons in this regard:

- There should be better linkages and cooperation between inside and outside participants.
- We need to more effectively use different spaces and fora to broaden our networks; we also need to look to the AU/SADC meetings.
- Meetings and consultations need to be institutionalised - at Cancún, CSO's made use of the same hotel, had specific meeting spaces, etc.
- We need better communication between different groups, delegations and CSO's.
- A good media strategy is crucial.

- It is critical that CSO's meet and organise before the ministerials.
- We need to balance the success of NGO's on government delegations with monitoring and challenging governments.
- There is no substitute for working at home nationally.
- We need to focus more on trade unions and other forces for economic and social justice.
- A division of labour is key: we must identify who can do what, and spread our roles.

--- END OF DAY I ---

DAY II

SESSION 5

The Doha Development Package and conclusion of the Round

Participants were presented with a methodology and set of questions to gauge whether the HKM did in fact bring the Doha Round closer to a conclusion. Although the language of development runs through the HKM declaration, it is indeed very thin when the development package - i.e. Aid for Trade, cotton, SDT, etc - is cast in relation to the other outcomes in services, NAMA and TRIPS. It would seem that the majors have nicely packaged 'development' and are now moving forward on technical issues, modalities, etc.

A far more fundamental question to be asked is what is development and what do we mean by it? The Doha Declaration speaks with certainty about the link between trade and development. We need to go back to the fundamentals and ask: should development or trade be at centre of our strategies? Development has largely been sidelined in this Round. It is perhaps time to look at a more development-minded agenda with trade complementary to that.

The discussion heard that we have not yet had a detailed analysis of the development package. We need to understand what it exactly entails. The duty and quota-free access for LDCs is fraudulent, since the majors have clearly identified what competitive products to keep out using the 3%. In addition, they will always raise quotas through bilateral pressures, as the experience with China suggests. This offer to the LDCs is also divisive, since not all African countries fall into this category, nor would LDCs want to remain in that status forever.

Aid for Trade is an exercise in constructive ambiguity: is it new money or existing money; if it is new, is it concessional loans or deeper debt? Is support for supply-side capacity just to bring raw materials to ports for export? Aid for Trade will be used to help developing countries deal with the adjustment costs of implementing the trade rules. The majors will provide technical support and funds to implement these rules, not challenge them. This will lock governments further into the existing trade rules and loss of policy flexibilities.

On the way forward, it was agreed that development must be ratcheted up and brought back more forcefully. Empirical analyses of possible positions and outcomes are crucial; but if time is limited, we should continue to employ political economy analyses to strengthen the hand of our governments with arguments.

GROUP WORK

The participants formed four groups to investigate the relationship between poverty and TRIPS, NAMA, GATS, and Cotton, Agriculture and Development. The discussions were framed by four guiding questions:

- What is your understanding of TRIPS/NAMA/GATS/etc and its impact on poverty?
- What are your priority areas for engagement on these issues? Country, regional level, etc.

- How can we build sustainable actions for trade justice around these issues?
- How should we deal with the challenges of influencing WTO processes at the following levels: national, regional and international; and possibly other processes too.

Supplementary questions were added: are we working within the dominant paradigm or shifting it; what, then, are our minimal positions? The dominant paradigm argues that free trade creates growth, and growth equals development. A paradigm shift would involve fairer trade and trade justice. An alternative perspective would be that development is the dominant paradigm and trade is part of development. What we need is production, which will create trade.

Participants were also asked how to better position the ATN in Southern Africa.

Group Reports

1. TRIPS

Ultimately, we should work to remove TRIPS from the WTO. But if it remains, then:

Priority areas for engagement on TRIPS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIV/AIDS: access to treatment for people living with HIV/AIDS. • Capacity to produce drugs (regional level, one country that produces for the region, how to produce that capacity). • Regulatory framework to import raw materials (linked to issues of treatment and technology). • Removal of Article 27.3b on patenting of plant and animal life species. • Consistency with the CBD. • Reviewing of polices that impact on the implementation of flexibilities. • Reference to the African Charter on Intellectual Property. • Expanding and developing our <i>sui generis</i> as countries at national level. • Forging strategic linkages with women's organisations and people living with HIV/AIDS.
Sustainable actions for trade justice
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creating linkages between international policies and adoption of national policies (bridge gap between the two, bring them in line). • The role of CSO's working on trade/TRIPS/intellectual property, and how it impacts on sustainable livelihoods, poverty and HIV/AIDS. • Broadening the actors working on HIV/AIDS and poverty. • Link between TRIPS and access to education, copyrights, etc. • Bringing to life existing policies. • Awareness and engagement on TRIPS Plus and monitoring US FTAs and EPAs.
Challenges of influencing WTO processes
<p><i>National level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination. • Simplifying available information. • Strengthening domestic frameworks. • Proactive involvement with government departments responsible for intellectual property and ensuring they follow policies. • Information dissemination (e.g. community radio, etc). • Consultation with national players. • Strengthening of domestic networks (e.g. grassroots, social movements, etc). <p><i>Regional level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination. • Strengthening and expanding networks. • Information dissemination. • Taking a human rights-based approach (all levels).

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status analysis of regional platforms, networks and agendas. <p><i>International level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination. • Strengthening networks. • Lobbying and pressuring international companies deriving wisdom from our knowledge. • Strengthening South-South connections. • Log into struggles and issues in the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).
Alternative paradigm?
Is knowledge really tradable? Can we trade indigenous knowledge?

2. NAMA

NAMA impacts on poverty through de-industrialisation and the destruction of local industries; by losing jobs and opportunities to create jobs; and eroding policy space to use industrial policy for poverty reduction. The experience of SAPs shows that NAMA aggravates poverty.

Priority areas for engagement on NAMA
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country impact assessments with concrete data on job losses, factory closures, etc, to arm our negotiators and defend our interests. • Engage with local industry. Local industries need to understand the issues and realise that they are going to be eroded and wiped out.
Sustainable actions for trade justice
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity-building and constituency building processes from now on. • Need to participate in space provided by government. • Identify opportunities and key moments to engage at these key moments. • Develop a global movement on the WTO and "Say NO to WTO" or "Say NO to NAMA" days. • Need for efficient information flow and sharing.
Challenges of influencing WTO processes
<p><i>National level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage further with government, parliamentarians, labour movements and business community (especially local industries). • Impact assessments - more figures to better influence the WTO. • Need a national campaign on NAMA. • Engage with academia and influence the curriculum. <p><i>Regional level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage regional bodies concerned with NAMA: SATUCC, SADCNGO, SADC regional chamber of commerce, etc. • Southern African People's Solidarity Network (SAPSN) should coordinate on NAMA/WTO. • Need regional campaign. • Empowerment through structured courses, such as winter school programmes. <p><i>International level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audit of who is doing what on NAMA? • ATN should still be main focal point. • Need for further collaboration and solidarity with other global networks, like "Our World Is Not For Sale" - get on list-serve and make inputs.

3. GATS

Priority areas for engagement on GATS
<p><i>Water and sanitation:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • water is life; • no to privatisation of water and sanitation services; • take water out of WTO. <p><i>Health</i></p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • health is a human right; • health before profits; • stop brain-drain of African skills and talent. <p><i>Education:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • knowledge is power; • power is the ability to think creatively and freely. <p><i>Financial services:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • access to affordable credit is critical for development. • Other sectors are also being prioritised for GATS liberalisation: telecommunications, transport and distribution, which are the very sinews of our development.
<p>Sustainable actions for trade justice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuous mobilisation of mass movements on the above issues. • Need to have evidence-based advocacy. • Trade literacy for mass movements. • Form alliances with stakeholders at national level, especially with labour movements, faith-based organisations, women’s movements, resident’s movements, the youth, and the private sector. • Engage government in trade justice issues.
<p>Challenges of influencing WTO processes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government’s ability to understand the WTO processes. • Lack of political will by governments to address trade justice issues. • Shrinking of policy space to design national development policies. <p><i>National level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Evidence-based advocacy that will deal with government’s inability to understand the WTO process. • Strengthen the oversight role of the Parliament in addressing the trade justice issues. • Continuous mobilisation of mass movements. <p><i>Regional level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen sub-regional and regional institutions (SADC Parliamentary Forum and the Pan-African Parliament). • Civil society should build alliances and networks at sub-regional and regional level. <p><i>International level:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Link up with the United Nations and related international organisations. • Link up with the World Council of Churches (WCC), Third World Network (TWN) and like-minded alliances and organisations. • Legally challenging the WTO at the International Court of Justice? • Continuous popular protest against the WTO.

4. Cotton, Agriculture and Development

<p>Priority areas for engagement on cotton, agriculture and development</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Need to understand what is currently in the work programme. • Better research and understanding of proposals that may come through (e.g. cotton). • Agriculture: monitor discussions and research in an interdisciplinary manner. • Monitoring and dialogue on the development package. • Understand the time-lines and be mindful that they bring about different responses. The substantive issues and timelines are the primary areas of focus.
<p>Sustainable actions for trade justice</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multidisciplinary approach - not only whether welfare benefits accrue or are denied. • Capture stories and put them out (e.g. gender and trade). • Relations and alliances within CSO movements - play to strengths and identify weaknesses. • Look inwards as organisations - is it possible to coordinate around donor funding and programme development, and avoid competition?
<p>Challenges of influencing WTO processes</p>

<i>National level:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CSO involvement in the trade formulation process, trade negotiations and trade remedies. • Problems of access: to individuals, to proposals in Geneva, and to the media. • Parliamentary process: we need to understand how trade agreements become part of law. • Use constitutional provisions with reference to human rights and administrative justice to challenge decisions by trade authorities where there has not been sufficient consultation. 	
<i>Regional and International levels:</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The regional imperative should not dilute the multilateral. • Use the SACU WTO Trade Policy Review next year to make direct presentations to WTO secretariat • Access to make presentations to SACU/SADC secretariats, which are in disarray. 	

COUNTRY STRATEGIES

Participants identified the following strategies and projects that their organisations would take forward or be engaged in during the post-HKM period:

BOTSWANA	
<i>Botswana Council of Churches (BCC)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explain the implications of privatisation to lay people, and work on agriculture and the cattle industry.
<i>Citizen Empowerment Development Agency (CEDA)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Working on an economic diversification policy (i.e. agriculture).
MALAWI	
<i>Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trade (WTO) literacy workshops with the media, CSO's and labour unions. • Research on effectiveness of market access. • Trade weather stations (with Christian Aid UK).
<i>Action Aid Malawi</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Week of the WTO" campaign (with MEJN).
MOZAMBIQUE	
<i>Economic Justice Coalition Mozambique</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-HKM, engaged with cotton farmers on importance of HK for their sector. • Postcard campaign to G8 leaders. • Investigating pro-poor policies and budgets in cotton, sugar and cashew nuts.
SOUTH AFRICA	
<i>ACCORD</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training in May for Botswana government officials on trade negotiations. Pilot, later take to others.
<i>Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "PHANTSI WTO" campaign. • For the public role, not privatisation (regional). • Regional alternatives to neoliberal globalisation. • NAMA and GATS in relation to jobs and unemployment campaign ("right to work").
<i>Economic Justice Network (EJN)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convene similar process in Pretoria in August. • Process on EPAs in Maputo (before August). • Mobilise civil society in Maputo on Stop EPAs.
<i>Gender and Trade Network in Africa (GENTA)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social Forum participation. • Stop EPA/WTO (gender biased campaign). • Water campaign. • VAT campaign being formulated.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ongoing engagement in ATN campaigns. • Trade capacity workshops ongoing.
<i>Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare SARP/EJN conference report. • Secretariat for Trade Strategy Group. • Research and analysis on WTO, EPAs and FTAs. • Capacity-building with NEDLAC community constituency and Mozambican trade officials.
<i>Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • "Agriculture is our livelihood" campaign. • Impact of agricultural policies on rural women in Limpopo, Mpumalanga and Kwazulu-Natal. • Collaborate with trade CSO's in Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe.
<i>South African Council of Churches (SACC)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand the People's Budget campaign to include trade and economic justice - a model for other countries in the region? • Strengthen Western Cape Trade Strategy Group.
<i>Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continue activities using the dominant discourse but not necessarily operating from the dominant paradigm. • Capacity-building projects - post-HKM conference. • BLNS anti-dumping course. • US-SACU FTA workshop with reference to an intellectual property rights chapter. • Workshop on competition and development before the International Competition Network (ICN) conference of competition regulators.
SWAZILAND	
<i>Council of Swaziland Churches (CSC)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop EPAs campaign: mobilisation. • Civic education on economic justice and human rights. • Dialogue with CSO's, trade unions and churches on WTO.
ZAMBIA	
<i>Civil Society for Trade Network Zambia (CSTNZ)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carrying out provincial sensitization workshops on EPAs. • Planning workshop on regional integration to help government decide on SADC or COMESA membership. • With One World Action, piloting a project on linking small scale farmers and trade negotiators. • With TROCAIRE, planning work on small scale farmers' access to the local market. • CSTNZ Has difficulty obtaining funds for WTO related work. • Many CSO's in Zambia taking up work on trade justice issues.
ZIMBABAWE	
<i>AFRODAD</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Critically analyse aid for debt.
<i>MWENGO</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Week of Action (23-29 April 2006): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mock soccer match to highlight WTO related unfair trading rules. ▪ Debt, trade and development inter-

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> linkages. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ TRIPS and access to treatment (HIV/AIDS). • Ongoing cotton campaign (“Defending our Livelihoods, Defending the Cotton Farmer”): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Trade aspects. ▪ Sustainable development of the industry. ▪ Alternatives for long-term development and poverty elimination. • Stop EPAs campaign • Trade Strategy Group.
<i>SAFAIDS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIV/AIDS and trade workshop planned for June/July. • Material development, production and dissemination on TRIPS and HIV/AIDS. • Regional conference on universal access to treatment.
<i>ZIMCODD</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global Week of Action. • Cotton and focus on women’s needs on cotton trade. • Host of SAPSN. • Invite CSO’s to have activities coordinated under SAPSN network.

--- END OF DAY II ---

Southern African Regional Poverty Network
 1250 Pretorius Street, Office W2, Pro Equity Court, Hatfield 0083
 PO Box 11615, Hatfield 0028, South Africa
 Tel: +27 (0) 12 342 9499
 Fax: +27 (0) 012 342 5636
 Email: info@sarpn.org
 Website: www.sarpn.org