

# FAST Update

## Mozambique

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**Semi-annual Risk Assessment**  
June to December 2005

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
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### Conflictive and Cooperative Domestic Events (relative)



Average number of reported events per month: 90

Indicator description: see appendix


#### Risk Assessment:

- The second half of 2005 has seen the end of President Guebuza's period of grace after his electoral victory earlier in the year. The new President had started his term with bold rhetorical moves to shake up the state apparatus and fight corruption and crime, but above all place the eradication of absolute poverty high on his agenda. Initially, his ministers responded to this with public shows of their intention to discipline their workforce. The minister of health, for instance, won both public acclaim and disapproval for his nightly surprise visits to hospitals to check up on staff. In the course of time, however, the new government seemed to lose momentum. Observers complained that there was more talk than real action. In several meetings with his cabinet and party, the new President appeared to agree with critics by criticising his own government for not doing enough to root out the problems hindering the fight against absolute poverty.
- The long awaited report on public perceptions of the state apparatus saw the light of day. It confirmed the general perception of rampant corruption. While the study on which the report was based inquired into perceptions of corruption, many observers read it as a factual statement. Some newspapers paid considerable attention to the report, but the reaction of political parties was generally subdued. No political party drew institutional consequences from the findings of the report and the government was not challenged to make clearer statements about how it intended to address the negative perceptions entertained by the public.
- The elections of November notwithstanding, there were few events in the second half of the year of any significance to short-term political developments in Mozambique, which would suggest the relative autonomy of the principal political actors, even from major formal events. While the most significant political event consisted of protests by the major opposition party against the results of the Mocimboa da Praia by-election in May 2005, undue significance should not be accorded these events. Generally speaking the protests were peaceful and even the public pronouncements made by the opposition leader, Mr. Afonso Dhlakama, threatening to set up a parallel government in the municipality, went largely unnoticed in the country. The more serious threat made by a former Renamo General, Herminio Amaral, who was protesting against what he saw as the discrimination of Renamo officers within the national army, did not provoke much reaction. Although he threatened a return to arms, the reaction of the media was to criticise him for being "outdated". Nearly all the other political parties distanced themselves from the threat, which found no public support or endorsement from other leading Renamo figures. Both events were short-lived and

had little or no impact on the quality of exchanges between the ruling Frelimo party and Renamo. This may be due to the attitude of the new government which has been less forthcoming towards Renamo demands than the previous government under Chissano's leadership. In fact, its reaction to disturbances in Mocimboa da Praia was to see them as breaches of the law requiring no consultation with Renamo at the political level. While the Renamo leadership continues to look for ways of profiting politically from such events, it is also noticeable that it has become more cooperative. A clear example of this was its leader's decision to join the Council of State, even though he had vowed not to do so in protest against alleged electoral fraud.

- There are several ways in which these developments could be interpreted and observers in Mozambique are indeed taking different views on the matter. Some consider Frelimo too arrogant, while others feel that its stance is appropriate. Two events can illustrate this. The agreed constitutional reform foresaw the changing of national symbols (flag, coat of arms and anthem). To this end competitions presided over by members of parliament and other public figures were launched. However, as the deadline drew nearer there were radical voices within the ruling Frelimo party arguing against changes which, according to them, would amount to a "denial" of history and Frelimo's role therein. Although no final decision has been taken yet, Frelimo's official position – voiced during initial hearings in parliament – endorses the radical view. The case for changing was seen by many Mozambicans not so much as a new reading of the history of the country, but rather as the exercise of the democratic right to decide on the symbols that should represent the country. What many observers fear is that Frelimo may have shown, once again, its stronger position in relation to Renamo and other political parties by undermining people's faith in the possibility of change through consensus-building procedures. Another indication of this heavy-handed attitude was the refusal by the Prime Minister to disclose before parliament the contents of an audit into the financial management of the home ministry under Almerino Manhene, the former interior minister under Joaquim Chissano. In December, the current interior Minister, Mr. José Pacheco, made the contents available to the public. While observers commended the minister, they also drew attention to the perceived arrogance of the government and expressed fears that it might undermine the government's purported commitment to improving efficiency.
- Frelimo's attitude to its political opponents remains an incipient problem in establishing a democratic political culture. The relative weakness of the opposition is in part structural, as evidenced in the massive advantage of the ruling party that is able to acquire discretionary power over the use of state resources for party political ends and is in a position to attract the support of private businesses that are willing to pay into the party's treasury. Frelimo's solid financial position partly reflects this private sponsorship, which at times is at the expense of favours as far as tenders and import duties are concerned. This may be normal practice in democracies more stable than the Mozambican, though it may still have undesirable effects on the achievement of public accountability.
- During the last six months there were several defections from Renamo to Frelimo. Some of these were presented publicly in a mass rally in the northern province of Nampula by the local governor. Opposition members have suggested that the reasons for joining Frelimo were less ideological than material. In the long run, continued dominant-party rule threatens to exclude the opposition from significant participation in the political arena of membership.
- At a time when the opposition is weak, denunciation and mistrust cannot provide a useful framework for a more substantive intervention. The inability of the opposition to challenge the government with proposals of its own, does not only confirm the well known weaknesses of the opposition. It is also an expression of the nature and quality of public debate.

### Conflictive Domestic Non-government and Government Events (relative)



Average number of reported events per month: 90


Indicator description: see appendix

#### Risk Assessment:

- The graphs for Conflictive Domestic Events show a general decline, government and non-government levels of conflict mirroring each other. This reflects the general atmosphere in the country which, with the exception of a few events, was calm and stable. Two single events that captured public attention were the trial of the suspected mastermind of the murder of investigative journalist Carlos Cardoso, and the violent public protests over fuel price increases.
- The much awaited re-trial of Anibalzinho, the suspected murderer of Carlos Cardoso, started in December 2005 following his extradition from Canada where he had sought political asylum. While this trial was not shown on television as was the case the first time round, it still attracted considerable media attention amidst fears by many observers that authorities had taken precautions to protect "higher-placed" suspects in the murder case. The presiding judge decided, for example, not to call certain key people to testify, such as António Frangulis, the police officer who initially investigated the murder, and seemed to grant the accused many liberties during the trial. Observers saw these decisions as proof that the trial had been carefully prepared by unnamed people with strong political affiliations in order to return a verdict that would not compromise the ruling Frelimo party. Several editorials in leading newspapers insisted on this "conspiracy theory", raising fears that whatever the outcome of the trial doubts would still persist over this murder case. This trial probably provides useful hints on Mozambique's present political climate. More than the rivalry between Frelimo and Renamo, it would appear that the idea entertained by many observers, especially in the independent media, that Mozambique is run by people allied to organized crime and with obscure interests, is likely to undermine the democratic process in the long run. Indeed, while there may be reasons to be sceptical about the government's commitment to fighting corruption and inefficiency, the attitude adopted by many critical observers that events that draw public criticism are merely the work of these obscure interests, acts to promote a climate of denunciation and mistrust. This does not necessarily contribute towards the emergence of a more accountable polity and constrains public debate in that overarching matters such as accountability, efficiency and responsibility merit less attention than questions concerning who embezzled what funds. Moreover, they blunt the critical edge of government action because they address the government on matters that carry much emotional substance, but are not adequately substantiated.

- The public protests that took place mainly in the outskirts of Maputo were a response to the new pricing system introduced in the wake of dramatic increases in the price of fuel. Commuters blocked the national highway to prevent "chapas" – Mozambique's privately run public transportation – from circulating in town. The government responded to the disturbances in a measured manner, negotiating with private transporters and promising no further fuel increases. Later in the year there was a further increase in fuel prices, but there was no noticeable public reaction.
- The media association elected a new chairman amid accusations of financial mismanagement and fraud. This was perhaps the most significant conflictive non-government event, especially as the media has been an important watchdog of government actions. Mozambican media is highly competitive, but often this competition is not fair. The usual accusation is that some sections of the media are paid by the ruling Frelimo party to portray a positive image of the work of the government. The elections within the association were marred by such accusations. In an interesting development the director of the daily Notícias newspaper complained in his weekly column about what he saw as an intrusive cabinet attitude into the media. Observers have been remarking that the new government is very sensitive to media coverage and has made indirect attempts to influence reporting.

## Country Stability and Cooperative International Events (relative)



Average number of reported events per month: 90

Indicator description: see appendix

### Risk Assessment:

- The Country Stability index over the past six months is the most consistently high for some time. While the new government has given the impression of a substantial break with the previous government – at least judging from strong statements against practices that the general public associates with Chissano’s government – most observers agree that this is a government of continuity. Guebuza has retained several ministers from the previous cabinet. In the course of the second half of the year he did, however, undertake a major reshuffle of key chief executive positions in those companies with state shares. The media has tended to present this reshuffle as a crackdown on corrupt officials, an interpretation that donors like to hear. While some donors may fear that the country is losing the fight against corruption, there is nothing to indicate that Mozambique might see foreign assistance diminish in the near future.
- Having issued strong signals of its commitment to maintaining continuity in terms of political developments and economic policy, the new government has spent much of the year documenting its will to a cautious but receptive audience. Much like his predecessor, the new president, Mr. Guebuza, has adopted a strategy of direct diplomacy.
- Guebuza’s major achievement in the second half of the year was agreement with Portugal for the purchase of 85% of the Cahora Bassa hydroelectric dam. The deal was sealed during a much publicised visit by the President to Portugal, and earned him a considerable degree of acclaim in the country, opposition parties included. The dam had always been a major bone of contention between Mozambique and Portugal and very few people from either country thought that any form of understanding could ever be reached between the two. Economic analysts have hailed the agreement as a major step forward, and it is expected to strengthen the government’s ability to deliver on economic growth.
- Within the region he has visited Mozambique’s major partners, clinching very important deals. Chief among these was the waving of visa requirements for Mozambicans wishing to travel to South Africa and Swaziland. Kenya Airways started a weekly flight to Maputo and the Angolan government is considering doing the same in the near future. Other significant economic initiatives include agreements with Brazilian companies to take over coal exploitation in Tete as well as the extension of SASOL’s, South Africa’s energy giant, gas exploration in Pande. Another major undertaking by the new government is the construction of bridges over the Zambeze and Rovuma rivers, both of which have secured substantial support from major donors.

- Mozambique's major international financial partner, the IMF, has indicated an optimistic view of the country's economic prospects. During its third review under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the IMF promised Mozambique a further disbursement of US\$2,3 million while at the same time commending central government institutions such as the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance for their tight grip on money flows within the economy.
- The drought that hit the South of the country, leaving well over 800,000 people in need of food aid, as well as the rains which started towards the end of the year and brought the threat of floods to the central region, has been met with a considerable degree of sympathetic concern by major donors. In a sign of a new attitude to its donor relations, the government resisted the urge to make an international appeal for assistance, hoping to be able to manage these challenges alone.
- While the general attitude of donors, including that of the IMF and the World Bank, is positive towards the country, some donors, notably Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have voiced concerns that the government is not living up to its commitment to root out corruption. However, it is fair to conclude that they do this mainly to encourage the government, which for its part seems to have realized that the stability of the country rests on its ability to continue attracting foreign assistance. As is evident in President Guebuza's speeches, the government realises the importance of concrete actions that reflect its commitment to the transparent use of foreign funds.
- Mozambique is reaping benefits from the emphasis placed on diplomacy by the previous executive under Chissano. In recent months a handful of Mozambicans landed positions in international organizations. Two former Chissano ministers, Tomás Salomão and Hélder Muteia, joined the SADC secretariat and FAO in senior positions, respectively. Former President Chissano himself was appointed by the UN Secretary-General as his special representative to Guinea-Bissau. Chissano's decision to step down from active politics has won him a lot of international acclaim, and to the benefit of the country. Indeed, President Guebuza has seen his political legitimacy boosted in nearly all important gatherings – the World Economic Summit in Davos, at the African Union, as well as the SADC Summit meetings. During the discussion of Tony Blair's Africa Initiative, Mozambique was repeatedly cited as a good example of a democracy in the process of consolidation.
- Considering that the period under analysis is still part of the immediate aftermath of general elections, it is fair to conclude that it has been relatively smooth and a period during which the new government was able to win the confidence of its donors. Rhetorically, Guebuza and his team have been making the right noises and while perceptions of corruption and inefficiency are still strong, donors appear ready to give the new government time to establish its position. Major internal events such as disturbances in Mocímboa da Praia over allegations of fraud, as well as the uprisings against fuel price increases in Maputo, have not undermined international confidence in the ability of the Mozambican government. This is likely to prevail in the near future.



<b>Cooperative International Events (relative)</b>	Number of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where at least one actor comes from outside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
<b>Conflictive Domestic Non-government Events (relative)</b>	Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale*; (ii) where all actors come from inside the country and (iii) where at least one Initiator is a non-government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
<b>Conflictive Domestic Government Events (relative)</b>	Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale*; (ii) where all actors come from inside the country and (iii) where at least one Initiator is a government actor divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
<b>Cooperative Domestic Events (relative)</b>	Number of Events (i) that have a positive value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
<b>Conflictive Domestic Events (relative)</b>	Number of Events (i) that have a negative value on the IDEA conflict-cooperation scale* and (ii) where all actors come from inside the country divided by the number of all reported events. The Indicator has a range between 0 and 1.
<b>Country Stability</b>	The Country Stability index reflects three independent factors: (i) challenges by non-government actors to the state's monopoly of force; (ii) state repression; and (iii) violence entailing physical force against persons or property. The index is scaled between 0 and 1, where 1 means high and 0 low stability.

\* The IDEA cooperation-conflict scale is a general weighting that attaches a weight to every event. The scale has a range from -13 to +8. Event types that are regarded as cooperative have positive values, conflictive event types have negative values.

**Who are we?**

FAST International is the early warning program of swisspeace, based in Bern, Switzerland. The program is funded and utilized by an international consortium of development agencies consisting of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

**What do we want to achieve?**

FAST International aims at enhancing political decision makers' and their offices' ability to identify critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent political strategies can be formulated to either prevent or limit destructive effects of violent conflict or identify windows of opportunity for peacebuilding.

**How do we work?**

FAST International uses both qualitative and quantitative methods, with the combination of methods being determined in each case by customer needs. The centerpiece of FAST International is the collection of single cooperative and conflictive events by means of a web-based software, applied by local staff using a coding scheme called IDEA (Integrated Data for Event Analysis), which is based on the WEIS (World Interaction Survey) coding scheme. The monitoring by FAST International is done independently from Western media coverage, thus providing for a constant influx of information. This information is collected by FAST International's own Local Information Networks (LINs). The quantitative empirical analysis is based on composed indicators developed within the IDEA framework. Since even the most profound quantitative analysis requires interpretation, FAST International cooperates with renowned country/area experts.

**What are our products?**

FAST International offers different early warning products tailored to customer needs. The only standard product available to the general public is the FAST Update, which provides the reader with an overview of developments on a semi-annual basis. It consists of three to five tension barometers (graphs), displaying cooperative and conflictive developments, which are analyzed by FAST's country/area experts on the basis of specific indicators. Whenever major changes occur in one of the countries or regions under scrutiny, FAST releases Special Updates, which follow the structure of the regular FAST Updates. FAST Updates are available in either hard copy, in electronic form on the respective country page or by subscription.

**Which countries do we currently monitor?**

**Africa:** Angola, Burundi, DRC/Kivu region, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia  
**Asia:** Afghanistan, India/Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan  
**Europe:** Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Russian Federation/North Caucasus region