

SECTION II: THE MOZAMBIQUE COMMUNITY SURVEY

Executive summary

This document presents the findings from a field case study carried out by ANSA (Food Security and Nutrition Association - Mozambique) in October/November 2002 to collect information about post-emergency recovery interventions and their impact on households affected by the 2000 floods in Mozambique. The study is part of a wider review of post-emergency recovery interventions in Bangladesh, Honduras, India, Mozambique, and Turkey coordinated by the World Bank and the ProVention Consortium. Field work for the Mozambique community survey was carried out in the southern provinces of Gaza, Maputo, and Inhambane, which were areas affected by the 2000 floods. Community interviews and exercises were conducted and a wide range of key informants interviewed during the field work, including government officials, international NGOs, and national NGOs. The areas of inquiry were: role of intervening institutions; changes in household livelihoods; gender questions; and the impact of recovery interventions.

The main findings from the study show that:

- The level of coordination among institutions improved in the recovery period (in comparison with the relief period), but local authorities remain under-prepared for mitigation and preparedness for future disasters.
- In remote rural areas the level of confidence between the intervening parties was higher than in communities closer to urban centers, where a climate of mistrust was often found.
- Knowledge by intervening agencies does not necessarily translate into measures that support livelihoods. This led to a failure to adequately address asset depletion in the affected communities with subsequent implications for increased vulnerability to disasters. Communities where households have complex livelihood strategies are not well served by agencies in the post-emergency period due to the difficulties of tailoring interventions that take into account numerous different livelihood strategies.
- Communities and the local authorities were consulted extensively about interventions; however, the balance of power continues to rest with the external agencies that are less than transparent about program possibilities.
- Extensive social and economic infrastructure rehabilitation and construction was carried out with positive impacts on communities, in particular the remote rural communities.
- Questions arising around resettlement varied in each of the areas studied. Problems arose due to the resettlement of urban households in rural areas; resettlement of peasant farmers to high ground distant from farms; and the loss of land by farmers due to resettlement programs.
- Community groups in Chokwe accredited changes in gender relations to the floods, citing exposure to outside influences as the main reason for change. However the overall consensus was that sustainable change will only be possible when women are exposed to educational and capacity building opportunities.
- In terms of the impact on livelihoods, asset depletion was the most important negative factor not tackled in the post-emergency period. Increased social capital was the most important positive aspect and was achieved through the rehabilitation and construction of social infrastructures, such as schools and health facilities.
- Beneficiaries continue to be victims of a lack of information about issues that concern them and their families. The lack of information led to a sense of powerlessness and dependency.
- There were low levels of targeting due to the nature of the disaster and the low levels of inequality in the affected areas. Livelihood analysis did not lead to improved targeting, but rather a better selection of intervention.
- Many of the agencies involved in the post-emergency phase of the disaster have established contingency plans including reinstating emergency departments within the organizations; training of staff; and establishing written procedures for emergency response. Local government may be aware of the need for contingency planning but there has, to date, been little real capacity building

to support the good intentions. Communities were able to state clearly the safe areas (above flooding) in the vicinity of the villages. However, in the areas covered by the fieldwork no agency was working with the communities to carry out vulnerability assessments on which to base mitigation plans.

The study found the following examples of good practice in the recovery period:

- good coordination mechanisms between all of the institutions;
- delivery mechanisms that emphasized the use of community groups for targeting support had the added value of knitting the communities together after the disruption of the disaster;
- gender-sensitive land tenure questions were tackled by the local authorities and external agencies thereby ensuring access by women to secure habitation; and,
- extensive infrastructure rehabilitation was generally carried out to high standards.

The lessons learned during the field exercise can be summarized as:

- the need for intervening agencies to maintain good coordination mechanisms;
- the best-placed NGOs are those already working the area;
- there were missed opportunities in the recovery period for capacity building;
- inadequacy of measures to alleviate household level asset loss increased household vulnerability;
- institutions that have a longer term strategy will make better use of the available resources;
- recovery interventions should take into account the importance of social capital and explicitly work towards enhancing social capital in affected communities;
- the lack of transparency and sharing of information creates a culture of passive acceptance and a climate of misinformation;
- there is still a gap between consultation and participation;
- breaking the isolation of the rural communities through the provision of roads and bridges may be judged at a later date to be the single most important, long-term achievement of the post-emergency interventions; and finally,
- breaking the isolation for rural communities can be a boon for gender relations but needs to be backed by capacity building measures.

Chapter 9.

Introduction

9.1 Overview

The following field case study was carried out under the auspices of the ProVention Consortium. The field case study was undertaken in the southern provinces of Mozambique to collect information about post-emergency recovery interventions and their impacts on households affected by the 2000 floods. Field work was carried out in the provinces of Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane approximately two years after the disaster. The results of the fieldwork are described and aspects of best practice identified. The last section of the document presents lessons learned as identified by the people interviewed and the team of researchers during the field work exercise.

The study is part of a larger review that intends to examine how patterns of recovery assistance have evolved following major natural disasters, and the strengths and weaknesses of such patterns in terms of their furtherance of disaster reduction and sustainable development in these countries. The lessons learned and good practice identified through this analysis are intended to be of use to the donor community and governments in developing more effective policies and procedures and in crafting future disaster assistance programs. The exercise will focus on how replicable good practice is achieved and how constraints to overcoming good practice are overcome. The lesson learning exercise is comparative; it is intended to draw out similarities and differences between the different experiences of recovery.

9.2 Background

The national poverty rate in Mozambique is 69.4 percent. Two thirds of the population lives in absolute poverty with income below the established poverty line of US\$0.40 per day. The poverty rate is higher in rural areas (71.2 percent) compared with urban areas (62 percent) and about 82 percent of the poor live in rural areas. Mozambique has a total population of 17,656,150.⁷

In the past ten years, since the end of the 17-year civil war, Mozambique has shown a tendency for strong economic growth. The government's main economic policies, as outlined in the poverty reduction strategy paper (PARPA) (GoM, 2001), are to achieve high rates of economic growth, consolidate macroeconomic stability, and improve the delivery of social services.

However, in January 2000, Mozambique was hit by devastating floods affecting the southern provinces of the country. In late February when Cyclone Eline hit the coast, there was a second wave of flooding in the provinces of Inhambane, Gaza, and Sofala. The dramatic nature of the floods resulted in an outpouring of goodwill and support; large amounts of emergency relief and recovery money were pledged to the victims of the disaster.

The floods caused over US\$750 million worth of damage and affected 2 million people. An estimated 500,000 people were left homeless or displaced. The large amounts of money received directly by the government of Mozambique or channeled through international agencies allowed the government and relief agencies to offer immediate support to the affected populations and also plan an extensive rehabilitation exercise.

⁷ World Food Summit Document. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development /FAO, 2002.

9.3 Methodology

The study was carried out in October and November of 2002 in three of the provinces most affected by the 2000 floods, namely, Inhambane, Gaza, and Maputo. The fieldwork was coordinated by ANSA (Food Security and Nutrition Association), an NGO based in Maputo. The team consisted of three nutrition and food security consultants and local researchers. ANSA was previously involved in the DEC evaluation (Cosgrove 2001)⁸ and has extensive knowledge of the areas visited for the case study. ANSA worked with the NGOs active in each of the study areas, namely; Vukosa in Chokwe; Action Aid and Kulima in Marracuene; and CARE and Intermon in northern Inhambane. The NGOs helped to contact community leaders and facilitate the field work.

Selected areas

The rationale for the selection of the areas was as follows:

Province of Gaza: Chokwe District

The district of Chokwe and the town of Chokwe were extensively damaged during the floods. The town was completely submerged, and the surrounding rural areas were cut off for a number of weeks. A large camp at Chacalane was created and housed over 70,000 displaced people. The camp attracted worldwide attention and support from over 30 international organizations.

Chokwe, a previously under-funded district, received attention and finances from a wide range of sources. Parts of the district of Chokwe have high agricultural potential due to an extensive irrigation scheme. However, during the war the irrigation scheme was destroyed and was not rehabilitated. The interior of the district is semi-arid, suffering from periodic droughts and food shortages. Household livelihood strategies are based around subsistence agriculture, migratory labor (South African mines), and cattle.

The district of Chokwe was selected to represent:

- Isolated rural communities
- High profile during the emergency
- High levels of damage
- Limited livelihood strategies

Province of Maputo: Marracuene District

Marracuene district is situated approximately 30 km from Maputo city. The district was affected by flooding with hundreds of families displaced from low-lying farm lands. Marracuene lies on the main north-south highway. Displaced populations from the city of Maputo were resettled in Marracuene. There is a certain level of population pressure on land in Marracuene. The district has a high level of female-headed households with a strong tradition of migratory male labor to South Africa⁹ and the city of Maputo. The livelihoods of the residents of Marracuene are varied, with petty trading being an important aspect of economic survival for the poorest households.

The district of Marracuene was selected to represent:

- Accessible rural community

⁸ The DEC joint agencies appeal for the Mozambican floods raised over US\$35.5 million. An independent evaluation of all NGO programs funded by DEC was carried out by Valid International and ANSA in 2000/1.

⁹ Figures for migration to South Africa are extremely difficult to find. Some illustrative statistics from the Mozambique Labor Department (1997): 52,919 Mozambicans in the South African mining industry; 29,020 Mozambicans in the South African agricultural sector; and 5,007 in the South African service sector. These figures are not representative of the real numbers of migrant workers as they represent only the officially registered and contracted workers. More realistic numbers could be as high as 900,000 workers, predominantly from the southern provinces of Mozambique.

- Lower profile during the emergency
- Population pressure on land
- Internal resettlement
- Urban overflow (social disruption)

Province of Inhambane: Districts of Vilanculos, Govuro, and Inhassoro

The northern districts of Inhambane are highly vulnerable areas, prone to drought, cyclones and flooding. In the last four years, these districts have suffered from two floods, a cyclone, and a drought.

The districts have low population density and limited livelihood strategies based around subsistence farming, small scale fishing, and hunting. The communities in the northern districts of Inhambane are isolated with poor internal access and communication.

The districts were selected to represent:

- Isolated communities
- Poor infrastructures
- Fishing as a livelihood strategy
- High disaster profile
- Lower international agency profile during the emergency

All three provinces have high levels of female-headed households and a strong tradition of male out migration. The Masculinity Index (NIS, 1997) for the three provinces is extremely low; Inhambane 77.1; Gaza 75.6; and Maputo 87.3. Although this cannot be attributed solely to migration, demographers consider that this is the main contributing factor to the provinces' gender imbalance.

Field work guides

For each of the issues below, interview guides were used to direct the discussions with key informants. The topics were covered by talking to key informants from the government and local and international agencies working in the districts.

The topics covered under the interview guides include:

- Institutional involvement in recovery activities
- Implementation strategies, including, participation of the communities in decisionmaking
- Gender issues around recovery activities and implementation strategies
- Livelihood considerations
- Impact of the interventions on communities.

PRA tools were used with community focus groups and are described in detail below.

a. Institutions

Resource maps before and after the floods were used to discuss the interventions of the various institutions. Additional questions are asked (using the map as a point of reference) about the effectiveness of the institutions in the post-emergency situation. The discussion focused around institutions also provided information about infrastructure rehabilitation – an aspect of the work that seems to have been very important in terms of post-emergency intervention as is shown in the results section of the study. The infrastructure rehabilitation was marked in all areas visited and was generally coordinated by the local government institutions and the NGOs. Discussion of institutions also allowed space for a discussion about intervention delivery; individual/household beneficiaries through to creation or use of associations.

b. Livelihoods

The resource maps explored the livelihoods of the community members. General information was gathered about the livelihoods of the communities and the discussion allowed for discrimination of livelihoods by

wealth category. This was done through questioning the focus group about habitation, income-generating activities, farming practices, and savings and credit (traditional and formal).

c. Gender

Gender was discussed at the community level using activity matrices, before and after the flood, highlighting control and access to resources. The exercises were successful and generated lively discussions about the changing roles of women. Emphasis in the discussions was put on the control of resources (and not merely access to resources) by gender.

d. Impact

Impact is always one of the hardest aspects to measure. Using the resource maps and the discussion generated by asking about the post-emergency interventions, we discussed with the community groups the levels of participation and control they had over the interventions. This generated interesting information that will contribute to the debate about participation of beneficiaries in emergency situations. In addition, using the resource maps, we asked the groups about how their lives have changed from one "map" to the other "map" and whether this was brought about through external intervention or internal organization, and whether the changes have been positive or negative.

e. Field work experience

The interview guides used for key informant interviews worked well, and people were able to respond without difficulty. A mixture of key informants from the local government, local NGOs, and international NGOs working in the area were interviewed. This enabled the team to understand the scope of the post-emergency interventions that were carried out. There was a wide range of interventions, from institution based (hospitals) activities and infrastructure rehabilitation to community-based interventions that focused on re-establishing livelihoods.

f. Community interviews

Resource maps were created with the communities to discuss their before and after situations with respect to the floods. Activity matrices, by gender, examined activities, resource access, and control by men and women before and after the floods.

Individual interviews were carried out with members of the focus groups (for example, 6 interviews were carried out in Chokwe in each of the communities visited) to ask about people's experiences after the floods, touching on all aspects of participation, impact, interventions, relationship with the institutions, and any changes in gender relations.

Livelihood information was crosschecked with existing information from the fieldwork areas (NGOs, Food security and Nutrition profiles, reports before and after the flood, DEC evaluation).

People were willing and able to discuss the issues, and the technique of moving chronologically from the floods to post flood yielded positive results. We found that many of the issues were reiterated from different sources, and we were able to follow through and crosscheck during the five to seven day period spent in each of the areas.

In rural Chokwe, there was very little variety in terms of livelihood strategies; the mapping techniques were adequate to capture the information. In the post fieldwork discussions, it was decided that in Marracuene more emphasis needed to be put on complex livelihood strategies and social and economic differentiation. Marracuene has more access to city markets and more varied livelihood options.

Another conclusion from the post fieldwork discussions was that in the gender matrices it was necessary to probe more deeply about access and control of resource issues. Background information suggests that land tenure is more problematic due to land pressure in Marracuene, raising issues linked to female control of land and produce.

A longer period of time was spent in Inhambane in order to cover the three districts selected for the fieldwork and carry out the key informant interviews.

g. Focus groups

Mozambique has a long tradition of using discussion groups as part of a community mechanism for communication and problem solving. Rural communities use this mechanism to transmit information, discuss issues pertaining to the communities and organize for communal work or events. Government services, such as the health service and NGOs, use community groups extensively to carry out their work (vaccinations, child health care, etc.) and achieve consensus (community priorities for development). With the advent of the NGOs in the communities, these discussion groups have become more inclusive, guaranteeing the participation, in particular, of women.

The participants in the focus groups interviewed during the study were invited by the NGOs, in collaboration with the local community leaders, to participate in the discussions. They were selected by the NGOs and the community leaders in order to reflect the experience of the communities. Individual interviews were carried out with members of the focus groups in order to collect more detailed information. We felt that in general the focus groups were representative of community opinion. Information from the focus groups was crosschecked with the key informants in order to resolve any contradictions and explore anomalies. The focus group discussions were always lively, with people openly expressing opinions about their lives, external influences, and changes that had been brought about by the floods. No significant discrepancies were registered within the communities, but there were significantly different experiences from one community to another within the same area. This has been reflected in the findings section of the study.

Government officials were not included in the focus group discussions but were interviewed separately as key informants.

The focus groups were mixed in terms of age and sex, and varied between 7-15 participants. In each of the areas two focus groups were formed to discuss the livelihood issues and the gender aspects of the post-flood interventions. The occupations of the participants were not registered. The members of the groups were largely farmers, as was seen from the livelihood maps produced by the groups.

The focus group discussions were generally carried out in shady spots in the center of the village (habitual meeting areas). In one case (Chokwe), the meeting was held in the garden of one of the participants of the group as the suburb did not have a regular meeting spot for community meetings.

The exercises were carried out in local languages, using diagrams to illustrate livelihoods and the differences before and after the floods. The senior researchers sat in on all of the focus group discussions, clarifying points as they were raised. Meetings were held between the local researchers and the senior researchers at the end of each day to compare notes and discuss the day's findings.

It was not possible, given time and resource constraints, to use control groups during the study. The extensive nature of the impact of the disaster meant that the communities in the areas selected were all affected by the floods. In order to find a control group it would have been necessary to match characteristics of the communities studied with similar communities in other areas of the country; this would have involved resources in terms of funds and time that were not available to the team.

Strengths of the research approach

- Some common themes appeared during the fieldwork and were crosschecked in each of the different areas.
- Crosschecking of information was possible given the length of time spent in the area.
- Area specificities were probed.

Weaknesses of the research approach

- The specificities of each area may lead to over-attention to detail and the inability to draw out general lessons/best practice.
- The current drought (particularly in the north of Inhambane) may make the identification of post-flood lessons more difficult. Care was taken during the fieldwork to try to distinguish between the events; however impact on livelihood strategies may be problematic.

Apart from NGO evaluations of specific emergency programs, ANSA is not aware of any other post-emergency research that was carried out to looking at the recovery program and the impact in communities.

Communities were selected through consultation with the collaborating NGOs who have continued to work with the communities since the floods. ANSA provided the NGOs with characteristics and then jointly discussed the selection before making the final decision. The NGOs also helped to make contacts with the communities and requested that people come to discuss the floods and post flood situation with the research team. The areas visited (listed below) were chosen to represent the characteristics of the flood-affected areas.

Chokwe

- Remote rural areas affected by the floods
- Rural area, closer to roads, affected by the floods

Marracuene

- Rural area affected by the floods, with resettlement
- Resettlement area (urban overspill)

Northern Inhambane

- Remote rural area affected by the floods with resettlement
- Rural area, resettlement close to road rehabilitation

Chapter 10.

Main Results

10.1 Institutions

The 2000 floods in Mozambique engendered a significant amount of positive publicity, with dramatic film footage. Emergency relief organizations arrived in force in Mozambique, overwhelming the fragile government's disaster management capacity. Many of the organizations left after the initial emergency relief phase (approximately 6 months). The organizations that remained in country generally had existing development programs or worked through local NGOs to complete the interventions. This led to a more consistent approach to interventions, with the organizations generally committed to the development of the affected areas.

The main actors in the areas covered during the survey were international NGOs working through partners, such as Intermon (Oxfam Spain) working with Farmers Associations; implementing international NGOs such as CARE International in Mozambique, World Relief, Action Aid and Jesus Alive Ministries; and small local NGOs that were either directly supported by the International NGOs, (for example Kulima) or working with their own funds. The local government was also able to contribute directly to the rehabilitation phase with some funds made available from the General State Budget. This money was limited, arrived late, and was generally applied to larger infrastructure rehabilitation projects.

The agencies that intervened in the recovery period worked closely with the local administration leading to a generally positive appreciation by the government of work carried out.

In Chokwe the administration was clearly involved in the plans for the rebuilding of the district and took on a strong coordinating role. One of the reasons for this may be due to the large amounts of capital investment that were carried out in the recovery period, which required close cooperation with all the district authorities to identify priorities for infrastructure development. The collaborative work resulted in extensive rehabilitation of the social and economic infrastructures in the district.

However, in Marracuene, fewer organizations intervened in the post-emergency period, resulting in lower levels of investment in rehabilitation. The complex resettlement issue (urban overflow and internal resettlement) resulted in considerable land pressure and was generally considered to be a government responsibility; the external agencies did not work directly with the local authorities on this issue. Action Aid (a British NGO) was involved with titling of land in order to ensure that women were given rights to the redistributed land. In northern Inhambane, even though the number of intervening organizations in the recovery period was low, there were high levels of coordination with the local authorities. The external agencies met regularly with the local authorities to coordinate recovery, mitigation, and development programs. The organizations interviewed during the field work stated that they recognized the need to continue with collaboration in the post-recovery period due to the high risk of subsequent disasters that require long-term, sustained input to reduce vulnerability. The onset of the present drought further deepened commitment to coordination.

Institutional collaboration

The agencies involved in post-emergency recovery activities recognized and worked with the local government structures. In some areas that were included in the field work, collaboration has been institutionalized. For example, in northern Inhambane the coordinating committee meets regularly to discuss the post flood situation. The north of Inhambane continues to suffer from natural disasters and is at present

in the grip of a severe drought. This is no doubt one of the reasons that the coordination mechanism has survived the initial post flood period. In general there was a willingness by NGOs to work under the chairmanship of the district authorities in the recovery period, a situation not necessarily true of the emergency period. This may be for a number of reasons:

- NGOs working in the recovery period usually have a history in the area or have the intention to stay in the area for longer than a brief relief effort. It is therefore important to create and maintain good relations with the local authorities.
- During the relief period there is pressure both to spend money and save lives. Due to a lack of time, often collaboration is one of the aspects of work that is sacrificed. Therefore, if there is not a strong, pre-existing coordination mechanisms the majority of the relief agencies will not be concerned to try and set one up. However, in the recovery period it is necessary that interventions are durable, emphasis begins to change, and collaboration become essential to ensure program success.

In the isolated rural areas of Mozambique, the interior of Chokwe and Inhambane, the delivery mechanisms for the interventions were accepted by the communities, and generally consisted of local authorities, traditional leaders and external agencies working together to distribute goods and direct interventions. However, in the more densely populated areas, on the main roads (Chokwe and Marracuene) there was less trust within the communities and between the communities and the local government representatives. People complained of a lack of coordinated responses and suspected corruption. The differences may be attributed to the relative complexity of the livelihoods and livelihood strategies in the different areas and the breakdown of traditional trust bonds in the more urban influenced areas.

In the remote rural areas the communities necessarily rely on one another socially and economically, and livelihood strategies are relatively less complex. Households in these communities generally know about the livelihoods of the different families in the community and are easily able to identify the richer and poorer members of the community. As was stated in Lhate (Chokwe), "we are all the same family, same culture and tradition." Local leaders in this situation are bound by strong ties to the community, creating, in general, higher degrees of trust. However, in the more densely populated areas (usually closer to cities) this homogeneity is not apparent. Households have more diverse livelihood strategies, including trading, and the communities are not as stable. The local leaders are often secluded from the households and are treated with suspicion. Unclear delivery processes and communities' lack of information can lead to distrust and the community feeling as if it were not included in the decision making process. A community member in Chokwe stated, "We just see construction material passing us by, to and fro, to and fro, and never staying with us, it seems to stop in one of the homes of the leaders, who knows!"

Institutions and implementation strategies

In general the levels of participation in the recovery period were higher than in the relief period. This will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections. External agency and local government collaboration was generally good, with agencies consulting the local authorities on key issues. In particular there was excellent collaboration on infrastructure rehabilitation where educational and health facilities were all built in compliance with government standards and complied with local authority priorities in terms of service provision.

Communities were involved in needs assessments but the response of the agencies was generally dependent on institutional bias; for example, agencies that were willing to work in the water sector or in the education sector. The final response was not necessarily linked directly to the needs assessments as expressed by communities or the local authorities. Communities were generally involved in delivery of interventions (either through distribution or participation in rehabilitation and construction) but not necessarily involved in decisions about targeting mechanisms. The majority of organizations chose to

deliver higher value assets (cattle, fishing boats, and nets) through farmers, fishing associations,¹⁰ or community groups and not directly to individual households. If associations did not exist there was considerable pressure from the agencies to form groups in order to benefit from the support offered. There are a number of reasons for the choice of delivery mechanism by the international agencies, namely;

- **Logistics:** It is very difficult to deliver high value items to individual households as this requires sophisticated targeting mechanisms that are costly and time consuming.
- **Approach:** Use of associations or community group is seen as a way of obliging communities to organize their own targeting mechanisms and take responsibility for distribution.
- **Perceived added value:** There is a widely-held view within the international agencies that, by working together in associations, fishermen and farmers with low bargaining power and few assets can increase their livelihood security.

10.2 Livelihoods

The agencies present in the three areas during the recovery period were aware of the livelihood strategies of the populations with whom they were working. However, although the agencies and the government authorities were aware of the strategies, this did not always translate into interventions that would help to restore or improve those livelihood strategies.

Agriculture-based livelihoods. In general rural communities that were agriculturally based, with low levels of capital investment or agricultural inputs, were better served, and livelihood strategies were restored rapidly after the floods. Seeds and rudimentary tools were distributed; people resettled and plots of land were distributed for farming. The seeds and tools distribution was well coordinated and adapted to the realities of each of the areas covered. The introduction of new crops was sensitively carried out with extensive consultation and follow-up by the agencies. For example the introduction of the orange flesh sweet potato was widely carried out in the flood-affected areas. The sweet potato plants distributed had been tested for suitability and acceptability before the floods as part of an ongoing food security and nutrition initiative by the Agricultural Research Institute. Work was carried out in communities to discuss dietary uses of sweet potatoes (in particular in infant feeding), and staff from the agencies received training about the sweet potato. As a food security crop with high potential for improving infant feeding, women were particularly involved in the extension work, which included planting techniques and preparation of the potato (with emphasis on weaning foods for young infants).

Animal husbandry. Many households in the southern provinces of Gaza and Maputo and in northern Inhambane (Govuro) lost significant numbers of large livestock. Poorer households lost chickens and ducks. Livestock is an important part of a household livelihood and acts as a hedge against crop loss. Cattle are symbols of wealth and power within the community. The re-stocking of high value animals such as cattle was less common in all of the areas visited. When cattle were distributed, it was always through a formal association or group distribution system. Small livestock were distributed with varying degrees of success. A number of villages were decimated by Newcastle's disease in chickens shortly after the restocking had been completed.

The inability of the government and/or agencies to address the question of asset depletion in the form of cattle loss has meant that the rural communities of Chokwe, Marracuene, and Govuro are significantly more vulnerable than before the floods.

¹⁰ Farmer or fishing associations that existed in the area, officially registered as non-profit organizations or in the process of registration. Many of these associations had been created with international NGO encouragement through development programs.

Non-agricultural income sources. Communities reliant on fishing as part of their livelihood strategy (north of Inhambane in particular) suffered from the same constraints identified for the cattle rearing communities. Due to the cost of the capital equipment for fishermen, asset replacement was generally carried out through associations and not individual households. The nature of the distribution process may have long-term effects on the structure of the small scale fishing industry. People interviewed in these communities described fishing as a household activity before the floods; however, with the association-bias of organizations, households began to work together in order to access the boats and nets offered. It is not clear whether the associations will continue to exist in the long-term or were merely convenient distribution mechanisms.

Credit and savings. Generally in emergencies there is little emphasis on credit and saving programs, which are seen as development initiatives. However, there were some interesting examples of how organizations supported livelihoods through existing savings and credit programs. In Chokwe, an NGO called World Relief has a well-established small credit scheme. After the floods, cash grants were given to clients in order to restock their businesses and begin repayment of the loans. The micro-finance scheme supported by World Relief has a specific female focus (supporting female-headed households); therefore the grant scheme particularly benefited women. The intervention was highly successful as businesses were kick-started and the debtors did not default on their loans to the World Relief Fund. Other organizations gave cash grants to supplement the distribution of construction material. Credit has also been extended to fishing communities in Govuro, although only a minority of fishermen has taken up the loans through the fishing association.

Skills training and alternative income sources. In all the areas visited this was the weakest area of intervention. Post-emergency training and capacity building was minimal with very few organizations working with the communities to identify existing skills for re-skilling, marketing opportunities, or alternative income sources. It appears that interventions to tackle these issues are seen as the prerogative of the development programs. This resulted in missed opportunities of restoring and enhancing livelihoods for the affected communities. For example the extensive infrastructure rehabilitation did not maximize impact on the communities by using intensive labor-based construction, skills of local craftsmen/women, and the creation of skills inventories for future use. This may have been due to the lack of standard contracts with social clauses including the use of labor-intensive techniques rather than equipment. The National Roads Administration is considering introducing social clauses into all road building contracts in order to maximize the impact on local communities.

Highlighted interventions

Infrastructure rehabilitation and construction. One of the major areas of intervention in the recovery period after the initial emergency was infrastructure rehabilitation and construction. The extensive nature of the infrastructure investment was possible due to the large amounts of money donated to Mozambique. Communities readily identified social infrastructures as priorities post-floods, both in cases where social infrastructure was destroyed and also in areas where schools and health centers had not previously existed. Remote rural communities (for example in Guevara and Late) identified roads and bridges as major priorities post-floods. This was confirmed by the NGOs and the communities interviewed during the field work. Additional facilities were usually provided due to the influence of the local district authorities (Education and Health) in accordance with previously identified priority areas and the human and financial resources available to staff the new facilities. Building roads and bridges was always carried out in coordination with the local and provincial authorities in accordance with provincial and district plans.

In all of the areas visited during the research, it was clear that this was one of the main positive outcomes of the devastating floods.

Social infrastructures. The areas affected by the floods were poorly served by both the health and education network before the floods. The floods destroyed many existing buildings that were often made from traditional material. During the recovery period, the local authorities and the communities coordinated

with one another to renovate and construct schools and healthcenters. This was seen by communities as an important asset for future development. Mozambique has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world and an extremely high infant mortality rate. The provision of these basic social infrastructures, plus the the local authorities' pledge to staff them, is very important.

Box 10.1: Chokwe District: social infrastructure development

Education: 249 new classrooms were built during the recovery phase. In total, 101 schools were rehabilitated and constructed, and equipment for the schools provided. An additional 4,500 children are now at school in the district.

Health: 2 new health centers were built with the prospect of one more. All the damaged health centers were rehabilitated and a new maternity block was built. The rural hospital and the hospice were also rehabilitated with recovery funds.

Commercial infrastructures. The floods destroyed vast tracts of roads and bridges. In the government Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARPA), isolation is seen as one of the major contributing factors to rural poverty. Rural communities in the south were cut off from markets, social services, and relief efforts. During the recovery period funds were used to rehabilitate roads and bridges and improve access to the remote rural communities. The majority of the work was carried out in coordination with the National Roads Authority, the provincial public works departments, and the district administrations. Funds were provided by donors. NGOs were not as involved in these interventions, although in the north of Inhambane and Gaza, part of the tertiary road network was restored by international NGOs.

There were some lost opportunities to maximize the impact of infrastructure works in terms of use of labor intensive methods, creation of off site jobs, and skilling of local communities. This is being looked at by DFID with the National Road Authority as part of a mitigation strategy where standard contracts for road works will ensure the maximum use of local labor, take into account gender, create the maximum number of off-site jobs for the elderly and the disabled, leave skills in communities as the roads pass through, and reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission. The objective is to produce a viable labor-intensive standard contract with social clauses, enforceable by local authorities, as part of a national emergency response/recovery strategy. This program is likely to be piloted in the drought-prone areas of the country.

Habitation. During the recovery period one of the most positive interventions across the board was the provision of housing for the affected populations. The general housing stock was improved in the hardest hit areas. In the towns and villages closer to the main roads, housing was generally made from conventional material blocks and tin roofing. In the rural areas traditional housing material was provided (thatch and poles) with tin roofing. Beneficiaries in Lhate (Chokwe district) stated that the tin roofing was extremely important because it reduced insect damage to the poles and wall thatching, which cut down on housing maintenance and improved their longevity. In all of the areas visited, all families that had lost their homes have received improved housing since the end of the floods. There were delays in the construction of houses from conventional material, but at the time of the field work, the majority of households had moved into their new homes. In northern Inhambane, Intermon were improving the houses by adding latrine blocks to each home. Families benefiting from improved traditional housing had received materials during the first six months after the floods. The areas visited for the field work were largely rural areas, and there appear to have been very few problems in terms of households not being provided with housing. However, this was not the case in urban areas or in resettled areas close to cities, where there were numerous problems linked to households not wanting to relocate; or relocating with only part of the family; building delays and sub-standard housing; and lack of planning for sewerage, rubbish collection, and infrastructure provision.

Participation. There was no standard plan for housing construction. Some NGOs required that communities organize themselves to build houses using a rotating system and mutual support. For example

in Marracuene, Action Aid¹¹ provided all of the housing materials, and the community was expected to provide labor to build each others' houses. The houses were made from traditional material. In other areas construction firms were hired to build the houses with a community housing committee formed to supervise the works (for example, Caritas in Chokwe District). The houses were made from conventional material. In northern Inhambane households were provided with materials and cash in order to pay for labor. This was considered, by the beneficiaries, to be a good mix of support as it allowed people to decide on the way they wanted to construct, how quickly and who to employ. One of the elderly female beneficiaries in Govuro stated that, "with the money I was able to complete my house, I had the material but without any sons or a husband I could not build." This allowed a certain level of control and choice over their lives.

Some of the common problems that occurred:

Building standards and dimensions. In contrast to the education and health sector there are no standardized plans for low cost housing. The type of housing provided was largely decided by the NGOs and external agencies and was dependent on the amount of money available. Houses made from conventional materials required approval from the local authorities. However, there were cases of houses already constructed that were rejected by the authorities, and the construction firms were required to change the dimensions of the rooms before the houses could be inhabited.¹² Houses made from traditional materials were generally built by the communities and therefore conformed to traditional standards. There was little attention paid to flood resistance in terms of building materials or design by either using conventional or traditional materials; the main hedge against destruction was location, i.e., on high ground.

Sanitary facilities. Surprisingly, many of the agencies failed to take into consideration sanitation facilities, and houses were rebuilt or constructed without latrines. This is being rectified in Govuro where Intermon is now building latrines and carrying out an education campaign.

None of the new housing complexes that were built to house displaced populations contemplated alternative low cost sewerage options, such as septic tanks. Given the period of time between the floods and the building of the new suburbs, this constitutes a missed opportunity in terms of durable sanitation options for the new resettlement areas.

Planning. Land for new settlements was allocated by the municipal or district authorities. The criteria for land distribution were based on safety (highlands), provision of social and commercial infrastructures, and availability. In effect, new villages were often created with radically different settlement patterns. In the rural areas in Inhambane, households live on isolated homesteads with considerable distance between them, while in the new areas, villages are formed from clusters of houses and social infrastructure. Resettlement raised a number of issues for the displaced populations.

Displaced populations within a district. Many of the resettled populations have had to move a considerable distance from their farms, as was seen in Marracuene and in northern Inhambane. This has led to the households taking one of two options; refusing to move and maintaining their homes in the lowlands but not receiving any official support; or living in the resettled areas and building temporary shelter near the farms during peak agricultural work periods. Two years after the floods, this situation is still apparent and may be the basis of a new type social production. When questioned, the families in northern Inhambane stated that they preferred to keep the houses in the resettled areas as there are also schools and health clinics for the children and sick members of the household. They recognize that these facilities will not be provided in the lowlands to dispersed homesteads.

¹¹ Action Aid is a British NGO that has worked in Marracuene for 10 years and was active during the emergency and the recovery periods.

¹² This occurred in the new suburbs built for displaced people in Maputo city.

Displaced populations from the city to the rural areas. In a reversal of the above mentioned situation, the populations resettled from the city of Maputo found themselves with more space and privacy than previously experienced in the overcrowded suburbs. This was mentioned as a positive aspect. One of the women in Mumeme stated, “we are better here, we have space, there are no criminals and the girls dress more modestly. We also have better latrines. I am pleased with the move.” However, these families were faced with reinventing livelihood strategies; becoming farmers instead of petty traders; and social disruption with the male members of the household staying in the city during the week and only returning home at weekends in order to maintain jobs and other income earning opportunities. The majority of households in Marracuene was pleased with the new housing arrangements and felt that the fresh start may help to create a community spirit not apparent in the city, where crime was a major risk to household livelihood security.

Resident populations losing land to displaced people. In both Chokwe and Marracuene the host communities had to absorb displaced and affected households. However, the reaction to the disruption was different in the two areas.

In Chokwe, villagers from a neighboring area were seamlessly absorbed into the village of Lhate. Houses were built for the newcomers and land was distributed. When asked whether this has caused any problems, the interviewees said that the newcomers were “family.” “We speak the same language, have the same surnames and the same customs.” When asked further about the problem of land, they merely waved at the surrounding countryside and said there was plenty to go around.

In order to resettle families from flooded suburbs in Maputo, land in Marracuene was allocated for new housing schemes. The land had previously been used by resident populations for farming. Although standard compensation was given to the farmers for the land, many were not satisfied. For the resettled population it is also difficult to find land for farming in the area. They stated that they were “borrowing” land from residents as they have no farm land of their own, which appears to be a type of sharecropping. Initially in the resettled areas, resident families did not benefit from new housing, which created conflict within the communities. Kulima (a national NGO) decided to expand the re-housing program to include all affected residents in the settlement areas.

Food security. The introduction of short-growing seasonal crops by NGOs and farmers associations already working in the affected areas was successful. In all of the areas visited during the field work, orange flesh sweet potatoes had been distributed and harvested by the affected populations. Orange flesh sweet potato is being promoted in Mozambique as part of the fight against Vitamin A deficiency, which lowers immunity to disease and can cause blindness. The ability of NGOs to follow-up the distribution of new crops with extension services and nutrition counseling was crucial to the success of the initiative.

The seeds and tools distributions that carried through from the relief period into the recovery period were widely acclaimed as successful by the beneficiaries and the NGOs working in the distribution chain. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was involved in the coordination of this initiative. Beneficiary lists used for food distribution were used as a basis for the seeds and tools program. In households of more than one wife, generally, tools were distributed to each adult woman. Where this did not occur there were serious problems, as women of polygamous marriages all have their own plots to take care of and need independent means to farm.

One of the key household food security strategies in the Gaza and Inhambane is livestock rearing. Livestock acts as a hedge against bad times and a critical element of social capital for the families. With the loss of nearly all the cattle in the worst hit areas, this strategy was severely compromised. The loss of cattle has increased the vulnerability of rural communities to future disasters.

Health and sanitation. Water contamination was one of the major problems immediately after the floods. The water restoration work continued into the recovery period and was mainly led by organizations that were involved in the water sector before the floods (for example, CARE in northern Inhambane). Efforts

were redoubled to provide water to the resettled communities in order to encourage the families not to return to their previous homes. In northern Inhambane some of the water points initially opened during the recovery period are now non-functional, having run dry during the drought. In other areas, for example in Chokwe, rapidly established water points that had not involved community negotiation are not in use. In general access to water in the new resettlement areas has been adequate and the cleaning of already existing wells was effective.

One of the health measures introduced during the recovery period when people returned home or were resettled was the introduction of bed-nets as an anti-malaria measure. The head of World Relief in Chokwe stated that over 80 percent of households are still using the bed-nets and that demand has grown for the purchase of these items over the last two years. Initially in the relief phase after the floods, one bed net was distributed to households, and as was pointed out in the DEC evaluation often meant that men would sleep under the net and women and children would be unprotected. In subsequent programs the agencies distributed (or encouraged the buying of) two nets in order to overcome this problem.

Livelihood issues during the recovery period

Asset depletion. During the floods the majority of affected families lost all of their household goods. During the recovery period these assets were, in general, not replaced, leaving the households more vulnerable to subsequent disaster episodes.¹³ Due to the drought (2001/2), many households are now totally dependent on relief since traditional coping mechanisms are not available, based on sale of assets and mutual support within the communities.

Cash distribution. A number of cash distribution schemes were piloted after the 2000 floods, namely by USAID, CARE, and World Relief. This mechanism shows considerable promise in terms of allowing people to recover businesses and assets. The introduction of choice for affected populations (how to spend the money) could be an important element in restoring confidence after devastating events. In specific circumstances this could become the intervention of choice in the future.

Complex livelihoods. Communities with complex livelihood strategies, such as urban households, semi-rural and fishing communities, are not generally as well catered for in the shopping list strategies used by donors. These communities often lose out as the types of interventions needed to support or restore their livelihoods are dependant on significant investment and/or local economic recovery (petty traders, craftsmen/women). Many agencies, even during the recovery period, do not have a logistical system that can cope with the needs of varied livelihoods. For example, in fishing communities that were devastated by the floods, the needs will range from boats with engines, nets and fishing equipment, utensils for fish preparation, bicycles to sell fish in neighboring areas, salt, drying racks, etc. (Govuro, northern Inhambane). As mentioned by one of the members of the fishing association, "each family lost everything in the floods, but we all lost different things." The lists and the individual household demands are detailed and expensive. Furthermore targeting mechanisms are complex and many agencies are not sufficiently skilled to manage the process. In a more rural area, basic livelihoods can be minimally restored through seeds and tools programs, and road building to support commercial linkages and longer-term investment in extension activities and income generation.

The difficulties in responding adequately to complex livelihoods may be another plus for a cash injection that could be used to kick start affected communities, allowing households to replace lost equipment and goods without the need for complicated targeting strategies.

¹³ See above section on asset depletion for reasons that external agencies generally do not replace high value assets to individual households.

Land allocation. As mentioned in the previous section the question of land allocation and resettlement was one of the major livelihood issues faced by the population interviewed during the field work. Two years after the floods a number of these are still not resolved, namely the lack of farming land for resettled populations and the problem of families that have not taken up options on housing situated far from farmlands.

Social capital. Education and health facilities were greatly improved, and the post-flood period provided capital expenditure that is otherwise difficult to raise through development programs. In the medium - to long-term, this will improve the social capital in the affected areas through improved health status and educational opportunities. There were some missed opportunities in terms of improving the skill base in the remote rural areas through the infrastructure programs, which should be addressed in contingency planning for disasters in the country.

Access to remote rural areas will, without doubt, improve food security in the rural areas. This will have a long lasting effect on household livelihoods as well as improving access for relief agencies if the area is affected by subsequent disasters

Habitational security of the affected households was generally higher after interventions in the recovery period. Although there were problems with building standards in some cases, in general all the people interviewed were satisfied with the new housing provided. There were missed opportunities to improve sanitation and planning (particularly relevant in the peri-urban areas where sanitation, drainage and sewerage were generally ignored).

Box 10.2: Gaza Province - Chokwe District: Lhate Village

Villagers in Lhate were evacuated during the floods and returned to their homes after the flood waters retreated. The remote rural community relies on small-scale subsistence farming and trading of agricultural products in good years. After the war, a number of families had invested in cattle.

During the recovery period, after their return home, the people of Lhate benefited from housing materials, seeds and tools, and basic domestic utensils. Small livestock (chickens and ducks) were also distributed, although the chickens died of Newcastle's disease during the first year.

Vukoxa (a local NGO for the elderly) helped the community set up a farmers' association, including the elderly of the village. While the association was provided with cattle for ploughing and breeding, individual households were not provided with livestock to replace cattle lost during the floods. The village also benefited from a new school and health post.

In general it is probably fair to state that the people of Lhate benefited from post-emergency interventions in terms of habitational security and infrastructure development that will bring longer-term benefits for the population. However, this poor rural community is without doubt poorer, and households have reduced options in terms of coping strategies.

Optimism rests with the ability of the villagers to work together in the newly formed associations and take advantage of the social and economic infrastructure now available in the area.

Box 10.3: Maputo Province: Marracuene District

Marracuene District lies 30 km from Maputo city and received displaced families from the flooded areas of Maputo as well as resettling families living in the low-lying areas of the district.

Families living in Marracuene before the floods were small farmers, fisherfolk and petty traders, taking advantage of the proximity to Maputo city in order to sell farm produce and fish. Many of the males in the community worked in South Africa or Maputo and would send remittances home to their families. Remittances continue to be one of the main post-flood livelihood strategies. After the initial relief period, many of these families were resettled on highlands at a considerable distance from their farmlands. The fishing families received some support to restart their activities but expensive equipment for deep-sea fishing was not replaced. Many of the new settlements are close to the road and therefore provide trading opportunities. The men have returned to their migratory labor patterns. Livelihood strategies have not changed radically for this group, although many are now spending only part of their time in the new houses, and the rest in small dwellings on or near the farmlands. This has made questions of childcare, education and health care more complex as all these services can only be provided in the new settlements. The occurrence of the drought immediately after the floods means that it is difficult to judge whether agriculture will be re-established on the scale previously seen in the district, or whether the families will take advantage of other livelihood options brought about by the proximity to the road.

Families displaced from Maputo city faced considerable challenges in their new environment. The majority of the families had survived in Maputo through petty trading and daily labor. Disease incidence was high, as was the rate of criminality. The households did not have links with the rural areas and did not practice urban farming. Men worked in the factories, the security industry, or carried out jobs for a daily wage. In the resettlement area, the families were lifted out of the overcrowded conditions in the city but were placed in an area where fewer livelihood opportunities existed. Many of the women have "borrowed" a plot of land and are beginning to farm. The men have not found work in the area and generally live in the city during the week and return on weekends. The livelihoods of the city dwellers begin to look like the livelihoods of the Marracuene residents.

The considerable rapid social changes that have taken place in the district are recognized by the Administrator of the district and the NGOs working in the area with the different populations. In the next few years the management of this change will be crucial for the stability of the population. The resettled urban populations stated that they were happy to be in a crime free environment and felt that the commitment to social organization was higher in the new areas than previously experienced in the inner-city suburbs. These attitudes indicate that with careful management, the transition could be positive.

Box 10.4: Inhambane Province - Govuro District: Nova Mambone

Communities in Nova Mambone were resettled onto higher ground. Previously their livelihoods had consisted of farming, fishing, informal trading, handicrafts, brewing of traditional alcohol, wood cutting and charcoal making, working on the salt flats, and livestock (cattle). The women did the agricultural work, the trading, and the production of the traditional alcohol. Men worked on the salt flats, fished, and kept livestock.

After the floods, the majority of the population received improved housing but had lost their livelihoods. Fishing activities have declined, and farming has been difficult due to the drought. Because of a lack of money in the economy, petty trading has not been revived. The families are mainly surviving on food for work projects two years after the floods. Women continue to try to farm. And some are beginning to keep chickens again. Some of the women said they had started a new business of selling meat from game hunted by the men. Men are unable to find work or alternative income sources so they work on the roads in the food for work programs; they no longer have boats or cattle, as they were lost in the floods.

Box 10.4: Inhambane Province - Govuro District: Nova Mambone (continued)

The positive aspects of the recovery process are that they live in areas that are more secure and people are less vulnerable to future flooding. There has been considerable investment in the economic, commercial and social infrastructure, and the road building has brought greater access to previously isolated areas. Some very remote areas are now reachable by boat, and the ferry has linked two potential markets. The district now has electricity, considered to be an important development step. The improved housing has been very important, as people now have greater access to social infrastructure and water supplies. The attitude of people has changed and people are less aggressive, they are pleased with the new plots and want to maintain the new environment in which they live.

10.3 Gender

External agency driven recognition of women appears to have led to some changes in some of the areas visited. This was particularly evident in Chokwe where focus groups and key informants claimed that gender relations had changed since (and due to) the disaster. We were given a number of examples from community members and agencies about the changes that have taken place. A member of the Lhate community group said that "previously women would not sit with us, on chairs, and discuss these issues, now they are with us and we are happy to listen." They said that this had come about because of the outside influences (when they were in the camp for displaced people) and through the visits from external agencies that showed them that things did not have to be as they had always thought with "men and women living separate lives, eating separately and working separately." The District Administrator said that women were more willing to take up the offers for training and forming of craft associations. He stated "they trust each other more than men and are productive when they work together." Although it is probably true that the floods merely provided a defining moment in a situation that was gradually changing, people strongly believe that the floods brought about a shift in gender relations.

It is clear the external agencies pushed the gender agenda to cause change. Housing committees to supervise the construction works were formed with obligatory female participation, and in some cases, leadership (Caritas, Chokwe). The insistence on associations as delivery mechanisms for aid also favored female participation as the women were more willing to give time to association activities. Some of the training courses held in Chokwe city for craftsmen insisted on female participation, and there is now a female carpenters association in the city.

In Marracuene, an area less isolated than Chokwe, people did not believe that the floods had brought about changes in gender relations. One of the elderly men interviewed in Marracuene stated that "things (gender relations) have been changing here for years, for the younger generation, in my generation we are too old to change." They recognized that changes have gradually occurred in the district but believe that this has been brought about through necessity (male migration) and some support from the local authorities and NGOs on issues concerning land titling. In Marracuene land titles were issued to families and not exclusively in the name of the male head of household (Action Aid – Marracuene).

Sustainability

The sustainability of the changes in gender relations will depend on educational opportunities offered to women. The Director of World Relief in Chokwe stated that "changes in the status of rural women is changing as they have access to education, either through formal schooling or through capacity building, this is the way to increase their status in the communities" (World Relief, Chokwe 2002). Women, at present, are extremely disadvantaged with high levels of adult illiteracy and high female teenage dropout rates from schools. In the recovery period, these issues were not explicitly tackled by agencies. However, there were some examples of long-term thinking by the agencies in the implementation of the activities that would influence gender relations, for example:

- Joint titling of land

- Houses registered in the name of the couple or the female in female-headed households
- Women's obligatory participation in construction committees
- Investment in capacity building for women

10.4 Impact

As previously stated, in the areas studied, local authorities were able to maintain a certain level of coordination of post-flood interventions through committees and regular meetings with external agencies. However, the balance of power was always with the agencies. The commitment to the coordination measures in the post-recovery period is due to the philosophy of the agencies involved and not necessarily the organizational ability of the local government. The exception was in Chokwe where in the post-emergency period, the local government maintained a level of control over the process due to the massive investment in the irrigation scheme and the economic infrastructures that require governmental permission and oversight. However, in general, the local government does not have the resources or experience to put into place mitigation and preparation strategies. The sense is of fragility, systems that are not backed by strong policies (or resources) and are dependent on the goodwill of the external agencies. There is a need to capitalize on positive experiences of coordination and generally good donor impression to build robust institutional mechanisms for disaster management.

Some policy issues have been brought to the forefront during the recovery period and could form part of contingency planning for future disasters:

- Intensive infrastructure-based works for disaster mitigation
- Seeds and tools policies
- Cash compensation
- Land tenure issues
- Urban planning

Livelihoods

In terms of the impact on livelihoods, asset depletion was the most negative factor not tackled in the post-emergency period. This is extremely serious due to the fragile nature of the rural economies. Increased social capital was the most important positive aspect and was achieved through the rehabilitation and construction of social infrastructures, which provided access to schools and health facilities. There are some indications that some of the new social structures created (associations, community committees, and resettlement areas) will strengthen the safety net for future disasters, but it is too early to state categorically that this will be a lasting effect of post-emergency interventions.

Participation and communication

Beneficiaries continue to be victims of a lack of information about issues that concern them and their families. The situation is tolerated as people have very low expectations and very little awareness of possible rights to information. Communities were never informed about the amount of money offered to their communities and were rarely informed about what they could expect to receive. The lack of information causes passivity and a lack of critical faculties in the recipients; they are grateful but not sure whether they have received all that is available. For example people were often called to meeting to be counted and put on lists, but not told what for; there were whisper campaigns in Chokwe about the distribution of money that are still carrying on two years after the distribution. Nobody in the communities visited was aware of the full picture. The lack of information led to a sense of powerlessness and dependency.

The problem originates in the lack of transparency from all the agencies involved, both government and NGOs. NGOs do not generally reveal their budgets to the local government; the local government does not share financial information with the NGOs; the central government does not reveal the amounts sent to the local government; and, nobody tells the recipients about the possible goods and funds that may be

available. Beneficiaries are generally asked to make a shopping list without knowing the amount that can be spent or the range of goods available. The weight of power over information rests squarely with the “giver” and not the “receiver.”

Participation remains in its infancy and generally consists of providing a basis to build participation in committees and compliance with a set of rules decided by external agents. For wider participation to take place all the elements involved in decision-making need to strive towards power sharing, including sharing of responsibilities, information, and resources. In the words of one of the beneficiaries in Chokwe, “we were asked to stand in queues to leave our names, we didn’t know what we were queuing for, just left our names and waited.”

Targeting

In the initial recovery period very little specific targeting within communities was carried out due to the nature of the disaster (blanket damage over large tracts of land). Subsequently, organizations began to target the most vulnerable groups; the elderly, the very young, and the homeless.

The livelihood analysis carried out did not lead to the targeting of the poorest households. This may, once again, have been due to the nature of the disaster where the floods indiscriminately destroyed all homes and assets, and unlike in a slow onset disaster (drought) the richer households were not able to resist the devastating effects of the event. Although the inequality rate as represented graphically in an analysis of the determinants of poverty carried out by the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MFP, IFPRI 2002) indicates that there is some level of discrimination between better-off households and poorest households in the areas studied, the ratio is still low and probably would not warrant expensive targeting mechanisms.

Preparedness and mitigation

Agencies (national and international): Many of the agencies involved in the post-emergency phase of the disaster have established contingency plans including reinstating emergency departments within the organizations; training of staff; and establishing written procedures for emergency response. Two years after the event agencies were still sensitive to issues concerning emergencies; however, as levels of funding for emergency contingency begin to wane, they may not be able to support the measures they have put into place (i.e. funding of emergency officers, regular training updates for staff).

Local government: The four District Administrators interviewed during the field work were enthusiastic about the coordination and collaboration that was apparent during the post-emergency period. In northern Inhambane the coordination mechanisms still exist and the main agencies meet regularly. However, it appears that there is still much to be done to increase the capacity of the District Administrations to prepare for future disasters. The overall impression is that although the local government maybe aware of the need for contingency planning there has, to date, been little real capacity building to support the good intentions.

Communities: Communities were able to state clearly the safe areas (above flooding) in the vicinity of the villages. They were also clear that they would respond to flood warnings in the future. However, in the areas covered by the fieldwork, no agency was working with the communities to carry out vulnerability assessments on which to base mitigation plans. Questions of mitigation were not raised by the communities who saw themselves as victims of the “acts of god” and not as active players in the prevention of future disasters. The only exception to this was found in Nova Mambone where environmental work is been carried out by the communities to prevent erosion.

Chapter 11.

Examples of Good Practice

11.1 Coordination mechanisms

Coordination between the local authorities and external agencies was seen as one of the positive aspects of the post-emergency period by all key informants. Agencies felt they were able to reach more affected people, reduce duplication, and increased accountability by working together. The challenge now is to strengthen and institutionalize the relationship as has happened in Inhambane. More sharing of information on budgets and planning with local authorities would begin to create capacity in the local authorities to plan and implement emergency plans.

The preparation of standard beneficiaries lists in collaboration with the external agencies, the communities and the local authorities was extremely important and a step towards transparency. This was achieved by Action Aid and the local authorities in Marracuene and Manhica. Time was taken to ensure the accuracy of the lists and this proved to be extremely important. The list was a consensus list used by all agencies and government and regularly updated for the resettlement of the population

11.2 Delivery mechanisms

Short-term delivery mechanism or long-term social changes? Many external agencies, outside of the government and communities, insist on collective distribution mechanisms for capital items, for example, cattle. Households generally needed to be part of an association or a trust group to receive livestock. In the area of housing construction committees were formed to allocate, inspect and implement the work. The external agencies generally insisted on a gender balance in decision-making positions. It is difficult to judge whether this will result in new social grouping and ways of working in the communities or whether the communities will return to previous social organization. However, from the field work carried out beneficiaries saw the changes as positive and had the added value of knitting the communities together after the disruption of the disaster.

11.3 Gender-sensitive land tenure

One of the best practices highlighted in the field work was the insistence of agencies to register land and housing in such a way that women's rights were recognized. This is extremely important as a first step towards increasing women's habitat ional security.

11.4 Existing standardized architectural plans

For schools and health posts, this meant that reconstruction and construction of health and education facilities was quicker, standardized and less likely to result in inadequate buildings.¹⁴ This was not true for the construction of houses and resulted in time and resource wasting.

¹⁴ The Ministries of Health and Education have standard drawings and specifications for schools, health posts/centers, and hospitals. Agencies were able to obtain the plans at the provincial level.

11.5 Infrastructure rehabilitation

Most of the infrastructure rehabilitation was carried out using conventional material and high quality engineering works. This helped to ensure good quality structures and therefore sustainability. In the recovery period this is extremely important, when value for money is important and there is more time to contract the works out professionally.

Chapter 12.

Lessons Learned

12.1 Institutions

Coordination is essential during emergency periods, and organizations generally will form alliances in order to deliver relief. However, in the post-emergency period, the need to fulfill individual agency agendas supercedes the need to coordinate. In Vilanculos, the mechanism for coordination has been institutionalized and now is aiding the drought relief activities in the province.

Best placed NGOs are those already working in an area. If “new” international NGOs can establish relationships with agencies already active in an area, the likelihood of the interventions having a sustainable impact is much higher. Time should be taken in the recovery period to identify partners, establish relationships with the local authorities, and identify key capacity building needs. The laying of firm groundwork will pay dividends in terms of the quality of the intervention.

Missed opportunities for capacity building were evident when discussing with communities the implementation of interventions in the recovery period. This was true of both capacity building within communities and for the local authorities. The transfer of skills was often not apparent in the design of interventions, where output-driven agendas focused on the houses, the health center, or the wells. By not involving local authorities in budgetary and planning processes, many of the District Administrations emerged from the floods with little or no knowledge of how to face the next disaster. These issues need to be seriously addressed by agencies intervening in post-emergency situations and should become part of a standard package of interventions.

12.2 Livelihoods

Although asset loss is recognized as one of the major problems faced by households post-emergency, there is still reluctance among agencies to replace capital items for individual households. Capital items were distributed to associations or groups of households but generally not on an individual basis. The one example where capital was replaced directly, e.g., cash distribution in Chokwe, the results were positive; households were able to restart businesses and repay loans. Further discussion about the barriers to asset replacement in developing countries would be valuable. The same barriers do not exist in developed countries where the insurance industry is based on the recognition of the need to replace items lost, damaged, or stolen.

In the recovery period communities benefit from institutions that are prepared to invest in the medium to long term, i.e., health, education, and communications. Agencies involved in recovery period activities need to take into account the impact and sustainability of their activities and need to look beyond immediate needs. The agencies need to be skilled not only in emergencies but also in development in order to use resources effectively and efficiently.

Recovery interventions should take into account the importance of social capital and explicitly work towards enhancing social capital in affected communities. The researchers note the following positive examples from the field work: in the new resettlement areas of Marracuene where residents' committees were beginning to organize the “new” communities; in the associations formed by Vukoxa to guarantee the care of the elderly within the community; and in the farming associations formed in Nova Mambone to encourage innovation in farming practices. These measures may change and improve the social safety net available to households,

if they are sustained after the initial input from external agencies. The building of schools and health posts with recovery money also positively reinforces social capital in previously under-resourced areas.

The lack of transparency and sharing of information creates a culture of passive acceptance and a climate of misinformation. During the 2000 floods, this did not result in major conflicts but potentially this is an explosive situation. Agencies involved in post-emergency intervention should explicitly recognize the need for improved communication with beneficiaries and take measure to promote a culture of openness.

Breaking the isolation of the rural communities through the provision of roads and bridges may be judged at a later date to be the single most important, long-term achievement of the post-emergency interventions. The importance of infrastructure construction and rehabilitation should not be underestimated when preparing contingency plans and developing a set of post-emergency interventions.

12.3 Gender

In isolated areas the influx of new ideas introduced during a stressful period seem to have changed some of the social behavior patterns, due probably to increased exposure to other ideas and the insistence of the external agencies in specifically targeting women. New patterns have been generated. In areas such as Marracuene that were not as isolated and with more general exposure to external influences any changes in gender relations in recent years were not attributed to the emergency or the recovery period. However in rural Chokwe exposure to outside ideas was seen as fundamental to change.

12.4 Impact

The 2000 floods in Mozambique demonstrated clearly that it is easier to make an impact and carry out extensive recovery period activities when the disaster is high profile and the amount of money donated to the affected populations is large. In lower profile emergencies all the donated money is usually absorbed during the expensive relief period, leaving little room for maneuver in the recovery period. This was not the case in Mozambique where resources were pledged and have continued to arrive over the two year period post-floods.

One of the main factors contributing to poverty in Mozambique has been identified as isolation¹⁵ leading to lack of social infrastructure and restricted economic opportunities. The improvement in the infrastructures after the floods has led to real changes in household livelihood security.

Although asset loss was a serious blow for households the improvement in the houses of people displaced through the floods has had a lasting positive psychological effect on the beneficiaries. Without fail, people were appreciative of the improved living conditions.

True participation of affected populations continues to be a goal worth chasing but not yet reached. In the recovery period there is more time to allow for consultation. Consultation improved the nature of the interventions in this period, but participation leading to empowerment was rare, mainly due to the lack of transparency and equity between negotiating bodies. Government and the agencies hold the balance of power and are not willing to openly discuss development needs and the resources available to carry out the interventions.

¹⁵ PARPA – Poverty Alleviation Action Plan and the Mapping of Poverty in Mozambique. Ministry of Planning and Finance.

In2. Did the institutions function well during the recovery period, in terms of addressing the needs of the affected populations? Are there differences between the institutions? If so, describe them. What are the reasons for such differences?

- 2.1 Does the institution still have a presence in the district?
- 2.2 Did the programs or interventions change during the post-emergency period?
- 2.3 What led to the changes?
- 2.4 Describe current programs.
- 2.5 What are the population's needs at the present time?
- 2.6 Is someone addressing those needs?
- 2.7 Are there links between the institutions in the zone - how do they collaborate?

In3. Have the institutions created an opening for popular participation during the project cycle? Have the institutions undertaken any advocacy work? Or have they helped populations to gain access to resources?

Interview institutions that still have a local presence - take care to avoid repeating questions that have already been asked.

Institutions

- 3.1 Describe interventions carried out and how they were selected.
- 3.2 Describe how the priorities were chosen.
- 3.3 Describe the implementation process.
- 3.4 Was there coordination between the institutions involved? - Give positive and negative examples.
- 3.5 What was the most important aspect of the interventions?
- 3.6 What aspect of the interventions is still functioning?

In4. Have the external interventions created local preparedness, response and recovery capacity?

Institutions: (Select the key institutions using the information in the Venn diagram)

- 4.1 Describe your institution's response and preparedness plans.
- 4.2 Is the institution involved in recovery activities? Describe any such recovery measures.
- 4.3 What are the planning constraints?
- 4.4 Were some of the activities supported by external organizations? Describe the constraints and positive aspects of these experiences.
- 4.5 What could be done differently? If the interventions were identified at grassroots level, how can this be considered to have a long-term benefit?

In5. What can be done to improve the functioning of these institutions in terms of post-emergency recovery?

Interviews with institutions and communities

5.1 What areas need improvement in institutions that work in post-emergency recovery (ask an open-ended question - but make sure the following issues have been addressed)

- Politics
- Information (statistical database before and during the emergency)
- Resources (financial/material)
- Capacity (training, quality of personnel)

L1. What role have livelihood strategies played in the recovery process? Analyze the types of strategies used in the short or long term, and their impact. Analyze the resources of the affected populations and how they were used. What lessons did populations learn from previous disasters?

For institutions:

- L1.1. Describe the post-emergency interventions that were carried out (see In 1-6).
 L1.2. What was the aim of these interventions?
 L1.3. Did the institutions know about the populations' livelihood strategies before the emergency (i.e. how the communities lived)?
 L1.4. To what extent was this information used in designing the intervention strategy?

L2. Did livelihood strategies differ between men and women, or between socio-economic, age or ethnic groups? Are there differences between mutual-support-group strategies and individual strategies? Why?

L3. Did the external support take livelihood strategies into account; did the intervention support the populations' strategies? If yes, how? If no, why? Are there any examples of good practices?

Institutions

Categories

- Financial: Income
- Physical: shelter, infrastructures, land
- Human:
- Social capital
- Natural

L4. What are the main problems faced by the different groups? Which problems can be resolved by the people themselves, and which need external support?

L5. How can preparedness and recovery activities be carried out while taking livelihood strategies into account and supporting them? How can communities and institutions be strengthened to face disasters?

Institutions

(Ask the above questions)

L6. To what degree have the affected populations participated in the recovery initiatives? Who participated and why? Identify one or more examples of livelihood strategies to illustrate this point.

G2. Did the recovery (rehabilitation) interventions promote greater gender equality? For example, do women have greater control over decision-making areas, use and control of resources, changes in the domestic sphere?

G3. Are there significant differences in terms of recovery between women from different groups (for example ethnic or generational groups)?

G3.1 Describe how the interventions were chosen, and how the target (beneficiary) group was selected.

T.1. What happened to the affected population during the recovery period? Did some people improve their living conditions? Did others see their conditions worsen? If yes, what happened? Were there changes in power relations? If yes, why?

Use the list of interventions in the recovery period, in questioning institutions and beneficiaries. (See Livelihood card - In + L)

List of interventions in the recovery period

- Infrastructures: roads, irrigation
- Social infrastructures: water, schools, health centers, etc.
- Housing
- Income-generating activities
- Re-stocking of animals
- Introduction of new crops (sweet potato for example)
- others

Ask (T2-T5). Hold interviews with institutions.

T.2. Who benefited, or could still benefit from external support, and why?

T.3. Were the resources made available in a timely manner? Questions can be asked about the intervention phases: when each intervention began and ended (during this 18-month period).

T.4. Was there a balanced relationship between population needs and supplies (material-financial)? Were the interventions appropriate?

T.5. Are the benefits of these recovery interventions sustainable in the medium-term (3-5 years)? What impact have the recovery interventions had on the local environment?

Guide for the communities

EXERCISE 1

L1. What role did livelihood strategies play in the recovery process? Analyze the types of strategies used in the short or long term, and their impact. Analyze the resources of the affected populations and how they were used. What lessons did the populations learn from previous disasters?

For the communities

(i) Make a resource map - before and after the floods; use this map to ask about the different types of family and how they lived before and after the floods.

(ii) Identify different sources of income from the resource map (among the different types of families).

Complete the exercises, using the information with the following questions:

L1.5 Describe life before the emergency. In terms of natural resources, physical resources (roads, markets, housing, etc); human resources (education levels, distribution in age-sex groups, etc.); social resources (social cohesion); financial resources (employment, income, saving, etc).

L1.6 Describe life since the emergency (up to the present day) in terms of recovery of resources and livelihood changes in the various families in the zone.

L2. Did livelihood strategies differ between men and women, or between socio-economic, age or ethnic groups? Are there differences between mutual-support-group strategies and individual strategies? Why?

(Use the maps made for question L1 to answer the questions above.)

L2.1. Have family characteristics been changed as a result of the emergency? Describe any such changes.

Be careful to ask about post-flood interventions. If people refer to interventions carried out during the current year, they can be recorded but make a note that they relate more to the drought.

Identify interventions that have supported and strengthened population livelihood strategies (use the maps made in L1)

L4. What are the main problems faced by the different groups? Which problems can be resolved by the people themselves, and which need external support?

Priority problems faced by the communities

L5. How can preparedness and recovery activities be carried out, while taking livelihood strategies into account and supporting them? How can communities and institutions be strengthened to cope with disasters?

L6. To what extent did the affected populations participate in the recovery activities? Who participated and why?

Identify one or more examples of livelihood strategies to illustrate this point.

Discuss the key strategies with the communities (irrigation, agricultural crops, income generation, etc.). Describe these strategies. Find out whether all families of different levels participate in these strategies. Find out whether men and women are involved in these strategies.

Interviews with the community group

Ask about their activities and the extent of popular participation in deciding on the interventions.

- How were the interventions chosen? Who was involved in decision-making?
- Were the interventions effective?
- How sustainable are the interventions?
- Did these priorities change? Explain (take drought problems into account)

Who did they work with in the post-emergency situation?

For example:

Institutions

- District administration
- District directorates: health, education, social action
- INGC - District delegation
- NGOs working in the district
- CBOs in the district (OMM, OJM etc.)
- Churches
- Informal institutions of any type - savings and loan, labor unions, etc.
- Private sector

Name of Institution/Description	Activities in recovery period	Comments

In2. Did the institutions function well during the recovery period, in terms of addressing the needs of the affected populations? Are there differences between institutions? If so, describe them? What are the reasons for such differences?

- 2.8 Is the institution still present in the district?
- 2.9 Did programs or interventions change during the post-emergency period?
- 2.10 What caused such changes?
- 2.11 Describe current programs.
- 2.12 What are the population's needs at the present time?
- 2.13 Is someone addressing these needs?
- 2.14 Are there links between the institutions in the zone? How do they collaborate?

Note that this section highlights the issue of "gender" as such, and not women specifically.

In4. Have the external interventions created local preparedness, response and recovery capacity?

In5. What can be done to improve the functioning of institutions that work in post-emergency recovery?

Interviews with the communities

Identify **areas for improvement** in institutions that work in post-emergency recovery (ask an open-ended question - but make sure that the following issues are addressed).

- Politics
- Information (statistical database before and during the emergency)
- Resources (financial/material)
- Capacity (training, quality of personnel)

Exercise 2

G1. Did gender relations change after the disaster? If so, how?

With the communities

- Mapping of men's activities: (machamba, income from social and domestic activities). Identify the resources that are controlled and/or used by men (distinguish between use and control).
- Mapping of women's activities (machamba, income from social and domestic activities, farm, income generation; social and domestic). Identify the resources that are controlled and/or used by women (distinguish between use and control).

Make a map for before the floods and another one for after (or else note on the first map the changes that have taken place since the disaster).

On the map:

- Identify changes in activities: positive and negative
- Discuss the reasons for the changes
- Identify changes in the use and control of resources
- Discuss the reasons for changes in the use and control of resources
- Identify changes in social behavior
- Discuss the reasons for such changes

Carry out this exercise in groups of women and men

Try to identify changes that happened as a result of external intervention (government and donor NGOs, etc.) and changes arising from the effects of the floods.

G2. Have the recovery (rehabilitation) interventions promoted greater gender equality? For example, do women have greater control over decision-making areas, use and control of resources; changes in the domestic sphere?

Using the maps, ask the following questions:

- Indicate who makes decisions in each area identified in the map. Ask if this has changed as a result of the post-emergency interventions.
- Questions relating to control of resources:
 - Land

- Housing
- Income
- Food
- Questions on areas of social control:
 - Health
 - Education
 - Domestic issues/marriage/childcare

In families of different socio-economic levels

T.1. What happened to the affected population during the recovery period? Did some people improve their living conditions? Did other people see their conditions worsen? If so, what happened? Were there changes in power relations? If so, why?

Ask the interviewee about their post-flood experience

- Type of interventions
- Levels of participation
- Opinion of the interventions
- Opinion of the institutions involved
- Opinion as to who benefited/and who was made worse off in the process
- Ask about preparedness/mitigation for future disasters.
- Ask about changes in socio-economic relations.
- Ask about changes in gender relations.

T.2. Who benefited, or could still benefit from external support, and why?

T.3. Were the resources made available in a timely manner? Questions can be asked about the intervention phases - when each intervention began and ended (during this 18 month period).

T.4. Was there a balanced relationship between population needs and supplies (material-financial)? Were the interventions appropriate?

T.5. Are the benefits of these recovery interventions sustainable in the medium-term (3-5 years)? What has been the impact of the interventions?

SUMMARY - QUESTIONS THAT MUST BE ANSWERED:

(Aide memoire to be used in fieldwork - verify that the topics were discussed).

L1. What role did livelihood strategies play in the recovery process? Analyze the types of strategies used in the short or long term, and their impact. Analyze the resources of the affected populations and how they were used. What lessons did populations learn from previous disasters?

L2. Did livelihood strategies differ between men and women, or between socio-economic, age or ethnic groups? Are there differences between mutual-support-group strategies and individual strategies? Why?

L4. What are the main problems faced by the different groups? Which problems can be resolved by the people themselves, and which need external support?

L5. How can preparedness and recovery activities be carried out while taking livelihood strategies into account and supporting them? How can communities and institutions be strengthened to cope with disasters?

L6. To what extent did the affected populations participate in the recovery activities? Who participated and why?

In2. Did the institutions function well during the recovery period in terms of addressing the needs of the affected populations? Are there differences between the institutions? If so, describe them? What are the reasons for such differences?

In4. Have the external interventions created local preparedness, response and recovery capacity?

In5. What can be done to improve the functioning of institutions working in post-emergency recovery?

G1. Did gender relations change following the disaster? If so, how?

G2. Have the recovery (rehabilitation) interventions promoted greater gender equality? For example, do women have a greater control over decision-making areas, use and control of resources, changes in the domestic sphere?

T.1. What happened to the affected population during the recovery period? Did some people see their living conditions improve? Did other people see their conditions worsen? If so, what happened? Were there changes in power relations? If so, why?

T.2. Who benefited, or could still benefit from external support, and why?

T.3. Were the resources made available in a timely manner? Questions can be asked about the intervention phases - when each intervention began and ended (during this 18 month period).

T.4. Was there a balanced relationship between population needs and supplies (material-financial)? Were the interventions appropriate?

T.5. Are the benefits of these recovery interventions sustainable in the medium-term (3-5 years)? What has been the impact of the interventions?

EXERCISE 1

Communities

(i) Make a resource map for before and after the floods; use this to ask about the different types of families and how they lived before and after the floods.

(ii) Use the resource map to find out about different income sources (among different types of families).

During the exercise ask the following questions:

L1.5. Describe life before the emergency. In terms of natural resources; physical resources (roads, markets, housing, etc.); human resources (education levels, distribution in age-sex groups etc.); social resources (social cohesion); financial resources (employment, income, saving, etc.).

L1.6. Describe life after the emergency (up to the present day) in terms of the recovery of resources and livelihood changes among the different families in the zone.

L2.1. Have family characteristics changed as a result of the emergency? Describe any such changes.

Be careful to ask about post-flood interventions. If people refer to interventions carried out during the current year, they can be recorded, but make a note that they relate more to the drought. Identify interventions that supported and strengthened population livelihood strategies (use the maps made in L1).

Identify the priority problems faced by the communities

Identify one or more examples of livelihood strategies to illustrate this point. Discuss key strategies with the communities (irrigation, agricultural crops, income generation, etc.). Describe these strategies. Find out whether all families of different levels participate in the strategies. Find out whether men and women are involved.

Interviews with the community group

Ask about their activities and **levels of participation by the people** in deciding on the interventions.

- How were the interventions chosen? Who was involved in decision-making?
- Were the interventions effective?
- How sustainable are the interventions?
- Did these priorities change? Explain (take the problems of drought into account)

Who did they work with in the post-emergency situation?

For example:

- District administration
- District directorates: health, education, social action.
- INGC - District delegation
- NGOs working in the district
- CBOs in the district (OMM, OJM etc.)
- Churches
- Informal institutions of any type - savings and loan, labor unions, etc...
- Private sector

Name of Institution/Description	Activities in recovery period	Comments

- 2.15 Is the institution still present in the district?
 2.16 Did the programs or interventions change during the post-emergency period?
 2.17 What caused such changes?
 2.18 Describe current programs.
 2.19 What are the population's needs at the present time?
 2.20 Is someone addressing these needs?
 2.21 Are there links between the institutions in the zone? How do they collaborate?

Identify **areas for improvement** in institutions that work in post-emergency recovery (ask an open-ended question - but make sure that the following issues are addressed).

- Politics
- Information (statistical database before and during the emergency)
- Resources (financial/material)
- Capacity (training, quality of personnel)

Exercise 2

With the communities

Mapping of men's activities: (machamba, income from social and domestic activities). Identify the resources that are controlled and/or used by men (distinguish between use and control).

- Mapping of women's activities (machamba, income from social and domestic activities, farm; income generation; social and domestic) identify the resources that are controlled and/or used by women (distinguish between use and control).

Prepare a map for before the floods and another one for after (or else note on the first map changes that have taken place since the disaster).

On the map:

- Identify changes in activities: positive and negative
- Discuss the reasons for any changes
- Identify changes in the use and control of resources
- Discuss the reasons for changes in the use and control of resources
- Identify changes in social behavior

- Discuss the reasons for such changes

Carry out this exercise in groups of women and men. Try to identify changes that happened as a result of external intervention (government, donor NGOs, etc.) and changes arising from the effects of the floods.

Using the maps, ask the following:

- Indicate who makes decisions in each area identified in the map. Ask whether this has changed as a result of post-emergency interventions.
- Questions relating to control of resources:
 - Land
 - Housing
 - Income
 - Food
- Questions on areas of social control:
 - Health
 - Education
 - Domestic issues/marriage/childcare

Exercise 3

In families of different socio-economic levels

Ask the interviewee about his/her post-flood experience

- Type of interventions
- Levels of participation
- Opinion of the interventions
- Opinion of the institutions involved
- Opinion as to who benefited/and who was made worse off in the process
- Ask about preparedness/mitigation for future disasters
- Ask about changes in socio-economic relations
- Ask about changes in gender relations

Annex F.

List of People Interviewed for Community Survey

(In addition to community focus groups)

Name of Interviewee	Organization/ Community	Function
Alberto Malolele	Vucoxá	Director
Anne Merceir	Cuso Suco – Vucoxá	Technical Support
Maria Gina Mauaie	LWF	Project Officer
Peter Ernest	World Relief	Coordinator
Maria Elisa	Hospital – Carmelo	Coordinator
Albino Mabunda	Community Nhate	
Kelda Lhongoane	Community Nhate	
Rita Dzovela	Community Nhate	
Fabião Chauque	Community Nhate	
Delfina Macheque	Community Lionde	
Jose Mucavele	Community Lionde	
Dinis Macamo	Caritas	Coordinator
Amelia Cossa	Red Cross/Chokwe	Delegate
Sr. Mucavele	District Government	Administrator
Bernardo Manejo	Nova Mambone	
Rabeca Jaime	Malovane	
Sr Sulemane	Municipal Concil /Vilanculos	Mayor
Lucia Fabiao	Nova Mambone	
Sr. Siteo	Nova Mambone	
Bendito Banze.	Forum de Natureza em Perigo	Officer
Father Tiago Prado	Jesus alive Ministry	
Euvarista Frange	Health Centre	Director
Ma. Sendela Vilanculos.	Red Cross Vilanculos	Head of Delegation
Bro. Xavier Ramirez.	CARITAS: Vilanculos	
Sr. David	Ass. of fishermen/Govuro	Member
Dietier Kreps	AAA/Vilanculos	
Sra Ivone Pascoal	Action Aid	
Dinis Zacarias	Primary/Vilanculos	Director
Sister Madelena	Mumeme/Marracuene	Fransicano Project
Celina Marcia Fernando	Mumeme	
Claudia Furteknecht	CARE/Vilanculos	Coordinator
Alexandre Nhaumenchiula	Melhalhe/Maimelane/Inhassoro	Secretary
Sr. Timtoeo	Vilanculos	Subs. Administrator
Antonio Cumbe	Red Cross	Delegate
Luis Balate	Kulima	Delegate
Angelina Malavele	Mumene /Marracuene	
Lisboa Martins	29 Setembro /Marracuene	
Mafalda Tovela	Mumene/Marracuene	