



SEMINAR PAPER

The Democratic Republic of Congo Political Transition and the  
Postponement of the Human Security Issues

SEMINAR

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1.0 Introduction

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is the third-largest country in Africa, with more than 50 million inhabitants and covers a total of 2,345 million square kilometres. The invasions (1996 and 1997) of the DRC by foreign armies have created one of the world's worst humanitarian catastrophies. Since the 90's there has been a greater attention than before in policy circles and inter-governmental fora to the multitude of internal and external factors that threaten lives and affect the overall safety, physical integrity, and well being of vulnerable individuals and their communities.<sup>1</sup> The humanitarian crisis in the DRC has not received the necessary attention it requires from the international community.

This short paper is not an attempt to analyse and understand the concept of human security which is still very much an evolving concept. This paper is concerned with the consequences of neglecting human security issues broadly defined in the democratic transition unfolding in the DRC. It interrogates the transitional government's efforts to deal with the social fallout of years of dictatorship and a decade of violent conflict.<sup>2</sup> The thrust of the argument is that human security concerns in the DRC remain the biggest security threat to the current political transition. In the confines of this paper, human security is understood as ways of protecting and empowering people so that the safety and well being of individuals and marginalized communities are not subordinated to a narrowly defined "state security" agenda.

## 2.0 Political Transition: Not different from the past

The transition process in the DRC is taking place within a war situation. The conclusion of the peace agreement in 2003 and the withdrawal of foreign troops did not usher in a new era for the Congolese people. The Congolese citizens continue to face inhuman social treatment and suffer serious human rights abuses at the hands of unidentified armed groups and neglect from their own government. There are reports of sporadic violent conflicts across a great part of the country. It is hard to predict whether the current sporadic violence will continue and lead to resumption of hostilities. The process of disarmament and integration of the different armed groups have not been smooth and is far from being completed.

Despite the small successes achieved by the South Africans and the Belgians who are working together with the government of transition to create a republican army, all former factions still largely control (politically, economically, and military) the regions they administered during the war. This simply means that citizens continue to be at the mercy of these groups who operate with no clear rules and respect for human rights. Despite the fact that all former rebel leaders are part of the transitional government, there are practically no efforts coming from the central government to counter human rights abuses. Instead the perpetrators of these abuses are being incorporated in government structures.

“Same brothel different prostitutes” could this be the best way of describing the prevailing behaviour and attitude of the new political elite vis a vis issues of social redress confronting the Congolese society? It seems in the DRC as things change everything remain the same. Just as King Leopold II, the Belgians and Mobutu before them, the new elite has deliberately decided to deploy its energy on the maintenance and control of political power which gives them access to resources and powerful international network and they have neglected to confront the human security issues facing the people. The assumption behind political transitions is that they enable societies to proceed in a different way from the past because the new injections of ideas and the appearance on the political scene of new social groups.

The political transition in the DRC ‘successfully’ mediated by South Africa in 2003 has indeed injected new ideas of negotiation, consensus and inclusiveness. It has also brought in new social groups. However, there is a mixed output coming from the current transition. On the one hand, politically the transition continues to follow its normal course and it seems democratic elections which is the primary objective of the transition will indeed take place. On the other hand, the transition is happening with no debate at all on the changes that need to occur with regards to economic policies of the country. There has not been discussion on the economic program as we saw it with the negotiation around the Constitution of the third republic in the early 1990s.

The impression one has is that the new elite prefer to put great emphasis on the importance of political stability which will create necessary conditions to fight poverty. Rather, they should be aware of impulses that sometimes accompany such an approach. We need to observe that no society can leapfrog its way into democracy overnight, not even by holding multiparty elections. Many new-and, perhaps, established-democracies on the continent find it more difficult to perform tasks expected of democratic states. The number of formal democracies in the SADC region and the continent that are failing to address human security challenges does suggest that it is not given that the DRC will succeed where others

are failing. The argument I am driving home is that while democracy matters for development, resolving human security depends much on the leadership disposition to fight these social problems. But the leadership in the DRC faces a fundamental structural problem which is the result of the bargain during the negotiation process. As Xolela Macgu argues, referring to transitions on the continent, specially the South African transition, "For reasons of political exigency, newly democratising societies had to postpone the substantive social questions to find a procedural accommodation for everyone"<sup>3</sup> for the sake of reconciliation. In the absence of a strong social movement and civil society in the DRC, it does seem that it would be a difficult task to put the social question on the national agenda.

### 3.0 Causes of poverty in the DRC

The root causes of poverty in the DRC are not directly linked to the two wars and occupation of the territory by foreign troops. The two wars simply accelerated and increased the dimension of suffering of the Congolese people.

Poverty has its origin in the malfeasance of the Mobutu's regime which stayed in power for 32 years. The Mobutu's regime deliberately created poverty and injustice as a strategy to maintain power. Mobutu understood that poor people have no power to claim and fight for their rights. Indeed the day to day survival kept Congolese people away from politics. It is not surprising that when faced with an invasion in 1997 the Congolese people opted to support foreign armies instead of their own government. They allowed Rwandan and Ugandan troops to march 2000 km from the east of the country to Kinshasa to overthrow Mobutu without any serious resistance. This shows one important thing, the security of any nation rests with its people first. It is the people that identify threats against the state and opportunities for the state to capitalize on to increase its power. A government that does not empower its people is built on a very weak foundation. The new political leadership unfortunately is falling into Mobutu's trap by attempting to keep the people poor.

The growing barricade that separates the state and society is undermining state- and nation-building projects in the DRC. The consequence of such an approach is that social, economic, and political exclusions breed a sense of deprivation and popular discontent. The aggrieved produced by political exclusion, social neglect and poverty could either take upon themselves to revolt against the central government or simply be used by the enemies of the state to undermine the state. Both situations are sources of violence and possible ethnic clashes such as the Lendu and Hema conflict that has left thousands of people dead and displaced. There are many ethnic gangs and militias turning villages into battle field in the DRC which are not reported. This could also explain the great number of child soldiers. There are more than 10,000 child soldiers. Over 15 per cent of newly recruited combatants are children under the age of 18. A substantial number are under the age of 12.

The AU has emphasized that in order to prevent conflict, issues such as poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation need to be addressed.<sup>4</sup> In the DRC the emphasis is on taking the country to elections. There is no doubt the democratic approach to dealing with state collapse is the correct one. "A democratic solution is the most desirable and probably the only viable option in the long run..."<sup>5</sup> While elections remain a noble mission for people who have never experienced democracy but dictatorship and wars, there is also no guarantee that

those who will be elected would pay serious attention to social conditions of citizens.

The leadership that controls the transition is almost assured of continuing at the helm of government in the post election period. This leadership, unfortunately, has not shown any sign that it is different from its predecessor and it is willing to change. It is corrupt and manifests tendencies to personalize political power. The corrupt system with all its wicked and ugly manifestations, its chronic mismanagement and fraud would destroy all endeavours for change. The tragedy is that corruption facilitates the diversion of public resources into private hands.<sup>6</sup> Schatzberg's and Callaghy's discussion of class consciousness and class formation in the former Zaire which suggests, that "authority and political order were institutionalised through increasingly visible patterns of inequality and corruption" can still be made today. When we speak of transition we presuppose moving away from one period to a new one which is different from the past. The new elite behaviour does not suggest that the DRC is moving at all. Corruption, bad governance and the personalization of political power remind Congolese of the old Mobutu's days. The DRC remains locked in the past where people were sidelined with no say on the major policies that affected their lives. It is not surprising therefore that the issue of poverty alleviation has not received the necessary attention.

There cannot be peace and stability if a minimum level of consensus is not reached on how to respond to the social question facing the country. In the DRC the political realities are such that it is difficult to see where the political movement for good governance will emerge from. There is no doubt good governance contributes to conflict prevention. As citizen participation in governance increases, the state strengthens internally, particularly through reduced corruption, zero tolerance for impunity and increased respect for the rule of law. This will in turn start to create a social cohesion and build state capacity to face social challenges in a coordinated and collective fashion. One key observation has been that while many states have embarked on reconstruction and democratization, ownership has been a critical factor. This is the missing link in the process currently unfolding in the DRC.

#### **4.0 Human security problems facing the DRC**

The human security in the DRC is closely linked to the collapse of the state. The state in the DRC has collapsed to such an extent that it is incapable of responding to the level of human and infrastructure destruction it has undergone under decades of dictatorship under Mobutu coupled with a decade of war.

##### *6.1 The absence of Peace and Stability*

In the DRC there are wars within wars. Despite the fact that the transition government has been installed in Kinshasa peace has not been recovered through the entire territory. There are still no go areas for government. In these areas insecurity and violent conflicts continue to displace thousands of civilians from their homes. Many people live in the forest, they have been forced there by armed groups as a strategy to increase insecurity and undermine the work of humanitarian agencies and the peace process itself.

The displacement of masses of people also prevents communities to engage in any stable activities to feed themselves. Humanitarian agencies' figures point to 80 per cent of families in rural areas of the two Kivu Provinces to have been displaced at

least once in the past five years. It is impracticable to cultivate the soil. People live under inhuman situations with no water, shelter and food. A sedentary population has become nomad. According to Oxfam 2003 report, more than two million people are internally displaced; of these, over 50 per cent are in eastern DRC. More than one million of the displaced have received absolutely no outside assistance. It is estimated that up to 2.5 million people in DRC have died since the outbreak of the war, many from preventable diseases.<sup>7</sup> The International Rescue Committee published a study in 2004 and revealed that 31,000 die monthly in the DRC conflict and 3.8 million have died in the past six years. The difficulty of bringing about sustainable peace across the territory while recognizing the difficulties of peace-building is also characterized by a lack of commitment to peace by the Congolese political and military leaders and landlords. In 2004 the United National Security Council reported that "regular Democratic Republic of the Congo military troops and armed groups continue to be the main perpetrators of human rights abuses, frequently turning to criminal activities to assure their livelihoods."<sup>8</sup>

The biggest challenge in the DRC is that it is not easy to report on all that is happening on this vast territory. The government has no adequate information system or intelligence services to collect reliable information. Furthermore, the humanitarian agencies do not have access to the most vulnerable displaced people who find themselves pushed deep into the forest fighting against nature: rain, bushfire, dangerous animals and insects. There exists no investigation into bringing the perpetrators, who are well known to the victim to book. The central government in Kinshasa has not shown any sign that it is willing to deal with this form of abuse; instead it has rewarded leaders involved in such atrocities with positions in central government and other state institutions, especially the army. It is this manifestation of the transition, where perpetrators of sexual violence are integrated in government institutions, suggests that for the political elite political stability must take pre-eminence over social stability.

The inability to prosecute could also suggest the powerlessness of the transitional government and the international community. The transition government is confronted with internal contradictions that do not permit it to intervene to stop the impunity. It is too weak to take up such challenges. The "1+4 formula"<sup>9</sup> while having afforded all important political figures the opportunity to be President it has also at the same time rendered government ineffective. The President has no power to introduce dramatic changes in the system which could incriminate his Vice Presidents or members of their groups or alliances who are linked to serious human rights abuses in the country. It is unfortunate that in dealing with transitions from authoritarian rule to democratic governance, those on the mediation table face the dilemma of a potential "trade off" between accountability and punishment on the one hand, and impunity and reconciliation on the other. Like in many other cases around the world, players in the DRC sacrificed human rights standards in order to grant each other concessions and preserve the fragile peace process. In the DRC security defined in military terms continues to take pre-eminence over human security.

The conclusion of the negotiations and the start of the transition created hope for over 50 million Congolese. The much publicized transition has not brought uhuru and there are no signs that uhuru would come even in the post election period. For most Congolese on the ground hope is fading away quickly and a more sober assessment of the situation is taking place in the face of growing evidence of corruption, poverty and state arrogance. Those who control government continue

to sideline the people and enrich themselves. These are the same people in connivance with foreign armies who committed atrocities against the Congolese people.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)<sup>10</sup> was supposed to be the conduit for the development and implementation of effective transitional justice policies in the DRC. But this commission has not been operational. This could also be said of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and Human Rights Commission (HRC). This has prevented and limited the transition government's ability to deal with past and new growing human rights abuses. These institutions have been deliberately undermined and prevented to operate efficiently. This is a manifestation of a transition that lacks a minimum of consensus on key issues. It is not surprising that there is no clear policy discussion and debate in the current transition around human rights.

Logically, this has its origin in the way the negotiations were conducted. There was a lack of sufficient consultation in the country which has resulted in weak legislation and frustration among important sectors of civil society.<sup>11</sup> Although civil society was included in the institutions of transition, those individuals selected to lead critical and strategic institutions for the support of democracy have strong political allegiance that prevents them from doing their work rigorously and honestly. Only one Commission, the Independent Electoral Commission, seems to be operating at its full capacity. This should not be construed with Congolese elite belief in democratic elections. The electoral process is moving forwards under external pressure. It would be contradictory for a leadership that does not show commitment to human rights, protection of civil liberties and citizen participation to believe in democratic elections. The two must go hand in hand.

What is peculiar to the transition in the DRC is the fact that little attention is paid to the justice system. MONUC, the United Nations bodies and international donors have taken steps including providing some kind of justice system, especially in the East of the country. This initiative is not working due to the absence of the central government's involvement. There are indications of a slow engagement to deliver justice for many crimes committed during the war. The Congolese government has started to rebuild its fractured justice system. Its most notable success thus far was the restoration of functioning court of Bunia, in Ituri district of Oriental province.<sup>12</sup> But, the state justice system remains quite ineffective, under-resourced and filled with corrupt elements. This is why as reported by humanitarian agencies operating on the ground the few cases brought before the court end up with the violation of rights of the accused and victims. It is imperative, just as much as securing peace, to also pay attention to the protection of human rights in all its manifestations. Justice is an essential element in the rebuilding of the DRC and ending impunity.<sup>13</sup>

## *6.2 Poverty and malnutrition*

In 2001, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that the proportion of undernourished people grew from 35 per cent from 1990-1992 to 64 per cent in 1997-99 (during the war) making the DRC the world's poorest country in this respect.<sup>14</sup>

Poverty and malnutrition are closely linked to the absence of peace and bad governance. The major problem in the DRC is the gap between available resources and challenges. There exists no health facility to take care of the victims. One

woman who spoke to Human Rights Watch said her daughter of 13 was raped by four armed men of the rebel movement. The girl later died in the hospital.<sup>15</sup> There have been thousands and thousands of reports like these since 1996 when Rwanda and Uganda invaded the DRC. Sexual violence is destroying families. There are reports of husbands abandoning their wives because they were forced into sexual relationships. These husbands with no education, in most cases, confronted with the day to day survival react to such abuses with no compassion. There is also an increase in sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis and HIV/AIDS. Today, HIV/AIDS provides an important example of a human security challenge. Girls are becoming mothers to children born of their sexual enslavement; some have contracted AIDS.<sup>16</sup> The strategy for the fight against HIV/AIDS is non-existent because of lack of resources. Officially, between 800,000 and 900,000 children have been orphaned by AIDS in the DRC, but Malaria, according to Oxfam, continues to be the most common cause of illness and death across the country. There is very little reliable data on the HIV/AIDS. But as Doctors without Borders put it "The disease is taking a massive toll on the DRC."<sup>17</sup> Water-related diseases, such as diarrhoeas, worms, and cholera, are on the increase.

The war and increasing armed groups have made certain communities especially in the East of the country to remain permanently on the move. Communities and families who used to feed themselves and export some of their produces are incapable of doing so today. The response to this social calamity from government is poor and non-existent. Individuals in the transition government have been concerned for the past two years with cementing their presence and influence over the political process to create space for themselves to continue holding political position in the post transition period. The meagre resources that government collects from the selling of diamonds, export of electricity and other minerals are not reaching state coffers. The government of transition has not shown that it is prepared to move away from the malfeasance of the past regime. Corruption is siphoning off the promised benefits of development and reconstruction. The endemic nature of corruption that continues to plague the DRC affects the success of outcomes of every public project and provision of every public service. Corruption does not only have significant economic consequences but also undermines human rights protection and post conflict peace-building efforts.<sup>18</sup> As such, "corruption is a human security issue because it undermines progress and economic development by leading to the depletion of resources for the disadvantaged."<sup>19</sup>

According to Oxfam, at least 37 per cent of the population, approximately 18.5 million people, have no access to any kind of formal health care; 16 million people have critical food needs. There are 2,056 doctors for a population of 50 million; of these, 930 are in Kinshasa. Infant mortality rates in the east of the country have in places reached 41 per cent per year. Severe malnutrition rates among children under five have reached 30 per cent in some areas. National maternal mortality is 1837 per 100,000 live births, one of the worst in the world. Rates as high as 3,000/100,000 live births have been recorded in eastern DRC.<sup>20</sup> The IRC recent report suggests that over 30,000 people die every month from easily preventable and treatable diseases such as diarrhoea, malaria and measles.<sup>21</sup> The Oxfam report estimates that 2, 5 million people in Kinshasa live on less than US\$ 1per day. In some part of the eastern DRC, people are living on US\$ 0.18 per day.

A state in reconstruction cannot do it alone in terms of fighting poverty and malnutrition. Fighting poverty requires the rehabilitation and building of basic infrastructure—including roads (of 145,000 km of roads, no more than 2,500km are

asphalt); health system (40 per cent of health infrastructure has been destroyed in Masisi, North Kivu) the provision of clean water (only 45 per cent of people have access to safe drinking water. In some rural areas, this is as low as three per cent) and sanitation and education (Four out of ten children are not in school. 400,000 displaced children have no access to education). International assistance play a critical role in this process but internal efforts must be mobilized to support external efforts, in some instances initiate reconstruction. This is not apparent in the case of the DRC. The central government has been sleeping on its laureates waiting for outside assistance. No major social initiatives have come from the government of transition. There are no efforts coming from the Congolese leadership both in government and outside in terms of policy proposals on how to deal with poverty in the short and long term. Government activities continue be ad hoc with no coordination at all.

It seems for the political elite poverty is not an issue that can break their political career. The political elite perceive no uncertainty in the political system that can threaten their political survival. They are assured of their position well beyond the elections. It makes no difference to them whether the people eat or do not eat because their political position does not depend on how the people, at least for the coming elections, vote but on the understanding that *after elections equals before the elections*. They are all working to ensure that the current balance of power in state institutions is maintained after the elections no matter who wins.

If we accept that democracy represents the only hope to fight poverty, it is important therefore to start creating a sincere movement towards democratic and stable government in the DRC. How much democracy, effective and responsive government, credible leadership do we have and need in place to face this challenge? An answer to this question simply calls for a monitoring system of the transition, peace-building and the democratization process.

## 5.0 The impact of human security on the political transition

The Sun City negotiations did not discuss the social dimension of peace during the transition. The Constitution of transition does not refer anywhere how the government must address the social challenges people are facing on the ground. The transition was more about ending the war and creating political stability. It seems a deliberate position was taken to postpone the human security issues. This in a way suggests that "individual, parties and movements are constrained in their choices by their institutional locations and the balance of power."<sup>22</sup> This is echoed by the words of Karl Marx's maxim enunciated in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past"<sup>23</sup>

Although circumstances and the past influences political leaders' decisions and behaviour experiences from other similar transitions show that a transition that is not accompanied by social rewards find it difficult to succeed. Political stability and stable democratic dispensation can not be achieved in the absence of tangible efforts to fight poverty and bring back human dignity to the Congolese people. This is why the social question should have part of the peace mediation or peace-building response the country's crisis. The provision of some economic empowerment and improvement of the lives of people cannot wait for a full blown democratic state. A transition and a democracy that cannot meet the basic needs of the people will be short-lived. The sustainability of the transition and poverty



alleviation must go hand in hand. Put differently they are mutually reinforcing. It is therefore logical to argue that the DRC transition is not on the right track since it is not serving the interest of the poor Congolese.

It is important to use a more complex but more useful conception of stability - one which stresses not just the legitimisation of a government, but its ability to operate as an autonomous and independent entity that controls the entire country's territory and its resources and reflects the values, aspirations and identities of the people it governs. A government can be stable only if it is legitimate (accepted by its people as the rightful power. The Sun City Accord has set the process in motion to achieve this), and effective (capable of protecting the state and meeting its citizens' needs and aspiration (this has not started and remains the biggest challenge). These two are not exclusive. Even with an elected government in place, it does not necessarily mean it will be effective. There exist deep seated internal causes for the dysfunctionality of the Congolese state to which the new Congolese leadership is not capable of responding in a positive way. The leadership that emerged from Sun City has no political vision and has no ideology on which to build a state.

## 6.0 Conclusion and way forwards

The Sun City accords opted to focus mainly on peace conceived as the absence of military confrontation. It failed to deal with the main cause of the war, poverty. There would not be peace in the DRC if serious attention is not paid to human security challenges.

The DRC transition can only survive by identifying emerging opportunities internally, regionally and internationally that can bring back the social question in the political changes taking place in the country. Internally, the adoption of political negotiation as a model of resolving differences, ability to reach consensus and possibility to create new institutions and laws that reflect to some extent the countries' dynamics and realities has set a foundation on which to initiate the transformation of the state. Regionally and continentally, the new vision of the African union and its economic project NEPAD which focuses on democratisation and good governance would serve as the main point of reference in applying pressure to sustain the transition and force government to pay attention to social issues. NEPAD is concerned with human security. Its big strategic issues include among others:<sup>24</sup> reducing poverty, social development, including addressing HIV/AIDS, unemployment, and illiteracy, ending wars and conflicts, promoting human rights and democratic governance

Internationally, the changing nature of international relations with democracy and good governance taking pre-eminence in international discourse, the alleviation of poverty has gained momentum and the DRC will remain for sometime under the radar of the international community. The Congolese civil society must take cognizant of this and use the opportunity to mobilise citizens on social issues.

The current transition may offer unique opportunities to the DRC. But it can also pose unique dangers. The DRC could profit from the democracy and governance drive happening on the continent and internationally to establish strong democratic institutions that would force leaders in the post-elections period to be in tune with social challenges. But it could equally see the transition reproducing an uncaring and depleted society that would replicate the failures of the past and keep in total collapse institutions which are expected to extend social benefits of democracy to

all the citizens. This is why there is an urgent need to pay attention to the issue of leadership during this transition and post transition period. Efforts to improve human security will only bear fruits under a caring leadership that is prepared to introduce accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs. But the challenge for the DRC as it is for many countries on the continent is how to generate approaches with the potential to address poverty while sustaining the democratic process. The only way is to introduce what Adam Habib qualifies as “substantive uncertainty into the political system which will allow the vote to be enhanced as leverage and thereby re-establish the accountability equation between political elites and citizens.”<sup>25</sup>

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#### End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Norah Niland; Human Security: Safeguarding Lives and Livelihoods Insights from the Taliban-era Afghanistan, Scholar practitioner paper No 3, 2003, p2

<sup>2</sup> Sedako Ogata and Johan Cels “ Human Security-Protecting and Empowering the people”, Global Governance, Vol 9, No3, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Co, USA, July-September 2003, pg 273-282

<sup>3</sup> Xolela Mangcu; Our Leaders Postponed and then abandoned the social Question, Business Day, 17 August 2005

<sup>4</sup> See, Report on the International Consultation and Workshop on Regional Human Security, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 26&27 May 2005.

<sup>5</sup> The New Partnership for Africa’s Security, Seminar report, centre for Conflict Resolution, Vineyard Hotel, Cape Town, 21-23 May 2004, 24.

<sup>6</sup> Noel Kututwa; Africa Anti-Corruption Commitments: A review of Eight NEPAD Country,

<sup>7</sup> See No End In Sight: The Human Tragedy of the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Oxfam, 2001

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Security Council, Third Special Report of the Secretary-General of the UN organization mission in the DRC, 16/08/2004

<sup>9</sup> In the DRC President Kabila who heads the transition government is seconded by four vice Presidents.

<sup>10</sup> The law establishing TRC was adopted on July 30, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Federico Borello; A First few Steps; the long road to Just Peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo; Occasional paper, International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2004

<sup>12</sup> Human Rights Watch, research report, 2005

<sup>13</sup> Democratic Republic of Congo: The Curse of Gold. Human Rights Watch, 2005, p127

<sup>14</sup> FAO (2001) “ The state of food insecurity in the world’

<sup>15</sup> D.R. Congo; Tens Thousand Raped, Few Prosecuted.

<http://hrw.org/english/doc/2005/03/07/congo>

<sup>16</sup> Report on the Situation of Human rights in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Ms Lulia Motoc. See: <http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf>.

<sup>17</sup> A Never Ending Health Crisis, Medecins sans Frontieres, International Activity Report, 2004.

<sup>18</sup> Abdul Lamin quoted in the Report on International Consultation and Workshop on Regional Dynamics of Human Security. Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, may 2005

<sup>19</sup> Noel Kutukwa: African Anti-Corruption Commitments: A review of Eight NEPAD countries, African Human Security Initiative, paper N07, January 2005, p2

<sup>20</sup> Mortality in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, IRC, May 2001

<sup>21</sup> See IRC’s [latest Congo mortality study](#).

<sup>22</sup> Adam Habib; The Politics of Economic Policy-Making: Sustainable Uncertainty, Political Leverage, and Human Development, Presentation made to diverse constituencies, from on the one hand the Board of Anglo-American, to on the other, academics, both from South Africa and the continent through the conference hosted by the Africa Institute on march 24-26, 2004

<sup>23</sup> Ibid

<sup>24</sup> Chris Landsberg and Shaun Mackay; Engaging the New Pan-Africanism: Strategies for \civil Society, Action Aid and OSISA, 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Adam Habib; Ibid