

SCOPING STUDY
TOWARDS
DFIDSA'S
REGIONAL HUNGER AND
VULNERABILITY PROGRAMME



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prepared by



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The original report submitted by SARPN to DFID contained a number of recommendations for DFID in designing their Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme. These recommendations are currently being considered by DFID and cover the four key areas outlined in section VII of the strategy paper (online: <http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000869/index.php>).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Analysts generally agree that the poor weather that was the immediate cause of the harvest failures of 2002 was not the only cause of the crisis. Its depth owed a great deal more to underlying problems that left poor households and governments more vulnerable to shocks than they had been in the past. The extent of harvest failure in 2002 was far less than in 1991/92 when one of the worst droughts of the C20 struck the region. Yet the scale and depth of the crisis in 2002 was far greater. Moreover, it has lingered on with food aid shipments continuing through 2003 and into 2004.

DFID contributed to alleviating the crisis; and has subsequently implemented a process to develop a longer-term regional hunger and vulnerability programme. Part of the process has been drawing up DFID's Regional Hunger and Vulnerability (RH&V) Strategy, which outlines four areas where DFID will deliver support through a three-year Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) to improve regional food security. The four pillars of the strategy are:

- Strengthening vulnerability monitoring and assessment systems;
- More effective safety nets;
- Promoting the role of the private sector and enhancing regional trade; and
- Strengthening regional policy discussions.

The Scoping Study towards the RHVP is based on the premise that there are policy and institutional limitations across the region that, if satisfactorily addressed, will enhance poor people's access to food and thereby meet a key objective of DFID strategy.

The framework within which the scoping study was carried out was based on an outline narrative summary of the RHVP. This included the goal of the RHVP: *"To reduce vulnerability to food insecurity in the Southern African region"*. The purpose is: *"to promote region-wide adoption and implementation of coordinated policies with respect to the availability, access and utilisation of food"*.

The proposed outputs on which the scoping was based included:

- Regional information systems to support policies for humanitarian and development assistance improved;
- Understanding and dissemination of effective instruments for social protection of those at risk of food insecurity enhanced;
- The factors that inhibit regional food trade understood, and solutions developed; and
- Regional policy research and advocacy networks contributing to addressing key policy issues in the region strengthened.

The purpose of this scoping project is to inform the design of DFIDSA's RHVP by identifying opportunities for DFID to support national or, particularly, regional initiatives that will enhance food security through policy or institutional interventions in one or more of the four priority areas.

The core process of the methodology involved two regional scoping studies run in parallel around which the other activities focused. The project ran continuously over June and July 2004, and consisted of the following main activities:

- Literature reviews for both studies;
- Attending the DFID supported RVAC process;
- Interviewing key regional stakeholders/informants in South Africa;
- Visiting countries in the region including Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique;
- Visiting SADC and regional players in Gaborone, Botswana;
- Holding an advisory meeting with regional specialists; and
- Drafting and submitting a report.

SARPN was the regional institution responsible for the design, management, co-ordination and quality of the outcome of the project, working from its offices in Pretoria, South Africa. Mike de Klerk directed the project, and James Carnegie of Khanya – managing rural change, co-ordinated the process. Study Team 1 was led by Nick Maunder supported by Ben Roberts, and Steve Wiggins supported by Reuben Mokoena and Norma Tregurtha, of the DFIDSA-supported ComMark Trust, led Study Team 2.

SARPN reported to a DFID Steering Committee, which was responsible for giving guidance to, and ensuring the focused direction of, the scoping studies. The Steering Committee included a small team of DFIDSA Advisors led by Tom Kelly, Regional Humanitarian Advisor with representatives from SADC DFID country offices, the London Policy Division and John Howell, the Programme Design Consultant.

Concepts

Key concepts for the scoping project are those of food security and vulnerability. Food security is commonly said to exist when people at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Achieving this is understood to involve:

- Ensuring that a wide variety of food is available in local markets and fields (availability);
- People have enough money to purchase a variety of foods (access); and
- Food is eaten in an environment that supplies appropriate care, clean water, and good sanitation and health services (utilization).

Vulnerability refers to the degree of exposure to factors that threaten well-being and the extent to which individuals, households and other social groups can cope with these factors. In the case of vulnerability to food insecurity an important distinction is drawn between transitory and chronic food insecurity. Transitory food insecurity occurs when there is a temporary inability to meet food needs, usually associated with a specific shock or stress such as drought, floods or civil unrest. In contrast chronic food insecurity occurs when people are unable to meet their minimum food requirements over a sustained period of time. This is usually associated with slowly changing factors which have increased people's exposure to shocks or else decreased their ability to cope with the effects of these shocks – essentially increased their vulnerability.

Key Findings

The widely shared perception is that vulnerability to food insecurity has increased significantly in southern Africa over the last decade. Over this period the impact of structural adjustment has led to a withdrawal of the state from the local level and, along with HIV/AIDS, this is seen to have precipitated a long-term livelihoods decline (CARE, 2003). The 2001/02 drought and poor policy choices compounded the underlying problems and precipitated a major food security crisis.

The perception of increased vulnerability is borne out by unacceptable regional stunting rates amongst children under five. There is a high, and increased, level of vulnerability to future shocks. Therefore the next regional drought, in five or ten years, can be anticipated to generate an even larger need for emergency support.

The Vulnerability Assessment Committees (VACs) established through an SADC initiated process have been at the heart of efforts to understand food insecurity in the region. However, their activities have been dominated by the need to provide analysis for emergency response planning. As the crisis recedes it is essential for the VAC system to focus on the longer-term more developmental goal of overcoming chronic food insecurity while continuing to help people overcome short-term crises.

Priorities for the VAC system include:

- Maintaining a focus on improving food insecurity and vulnerability data quality, integrating and exchanging this information and promoting the better use of information to improve action;
- Moving away from a focus on data collection towards working with, and supporting government data collection systems;

- Greater emphasis on the analysis of food insecurity and vulnerability, its occurrence and causes;
- Greater emphasis on relating this information to the needs of decision makers, government and donors, at policy level; and
- Capacity building within the system to improve the ability of stakeholders to engage with the debate on food insecurity and vulnerability.

Ultimately the success of the VAC system will be determined at the national, rather than regional, level. NVACs will require national level support, from Governments in conjunction with donors, to achieve these goals. There are encouraging signs of growing multi-donor support at the national level. It should be acknowledged that regional support cannot substitute for sustained national level commitments.

Another important area is that of social protection, which is increasingly seen as a precursor to effective growth, providing an essential boost to human resource development, rather than a competitor for investment. From this perspective a social protection framework, can provide an important part of the search for solutions to food insecurity and poverty. A number of key needs emerge. The first is a requirement for better information to underpin planning. This would be met through the VAC system providing information and analysis of those affected by chronic and transitory food insecurity and a better understanding of risks and shocks.

There is a need to exchange information within the region on existing social protection mechanisms, their successes and failures and the necessary pre-conditions to bring these pilots to scale. It is notable that there is no regional, or even national, institution or organisation currently tasked with this responsibility. There was a strong demand across all stakeholders for the establishment of such a regional facility.

Trade can play an important role in making food available. The scope for trade in most years is limited, since in much of the region the lowest cost staple foods are those grown domestically, given the cost of transport that applies to imports. But when harvests fail, as they typically have done at around twice a decade in recent times, there are only two options: draw down of stores, or else import. Storage is generally more expensive than imports.

Trade in basic foods is thus erratic. When imports are needed, they are often needed in large quantities that strain the capacity of transport routes and require large amounts of foreign exchange to finance them. Keeping financial reserves is one response to the latter problem, another, untried and innovative, possibility is using weather-based insurance. Futures and options markets may one day have a role to play, but for the moment the scope for their use is limited.

Three sets of obstacles hinder trade in basic foods: the high cost of transport, in part owing to the parlous state of many of the region's railways; arbitrary government interventions to restrict or control trade; and, the diverse difficulties that traders face in accessing information, completing paperwork, meeting (often disparate) standards, getting credit and making international transfers.

Trade is somewhat segmented between the bulk shipments made by public agencies and large-scale traders, on the one hand; and the many petty movements made by small-scale operators on the other. In some parts of the region, the combined weight of the small-scale movements probably constitutes the majority of food traded. By and large, small-scale traders face more severe restrictions to their operations, as listed above, than larger companies.

Considerations of food security tend to be dominated by food availability concerns, seen at national level, in years of poor harvests. Issues of access to food, and of its utilisation, are less well attended. Individual and household perspectives, social differentiation, and the fate of the chronically poor tend to get second-best attention.

To influence food security policy effectively it is necessary to generate more evidence in the fields of trade and markets for basic foods, vulnerability and the management of social risks, and the interactions of health, sanitation with food intake. Equally, there is a pressing need to improve the way that evidence is disseminated to those making policy decisions, a task that calls for more understanding of policy processes.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context of the Regional Food Security Crisis

1. The poor maize harvest of 2002 in southern Africa triggered a food and humanitarian crisis across the region.¹ Between February and May 2002 several governments declared emergencies. In July 2002 the UN issued a consolidated appeal for US\$ 611million to address the crisis in the six countries most affected: Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. By the end of 2003 it was estimated that more than 15 million people were in need of assistance, and that more than 1 million tons (Mt) of food aid was needed to help fill the 3.3Mt cereals gap.
2. Most, if not all, analyses² agree that the poor weather that was the immediate cause of the harvest failures of 2002 was but one trigger³ of the crisis. Its depth owed a great deal more to underlying problems that left poor households and governments more vulnerable to shocks than they had been in the past. The extent of harvest failure in 2002 was far less than in 1991/92 when one of the worst droughts of the 20th Century struck the region. Yet the scale and depth of the crisis in 2002 was far greater. Moreover, the crisis has lingered on. The international appeal for assistance in 2002 was followed by another appeal in mid 2003, and large-scale food aid shipments continued into 2004 – although much of this prolonged assistance went to Zimbabwe.
3. Why has the region apparently become so much more vulnerable to food insecurity? The following factors have contributed:
 - Economic setbacks since the 1980s, if not earlier, have led to faltering economic growth, with increasing urban unemployment, falling real wages, and stagnating rural incomes. Some of the mining industries in the region have declined with accompanying loss of jobs. Manufacturing industry that depended on protection was hit hard by economic liberalisation from the mid-1980s onwards with resulting loss of formal employment. These blows to the mining and urban economies have meant less work for migrants leading to reduced remittances to rural areas, and an increasing fraction of the urban population dependent on badly paid informal sector work.
 - At the same time agricultural development has faltered. By the end of the 1980s governments in the region had abandoned state-led strategies for smallholder development owing to their high cost and inefficiencies. Yet farming – outside specially favoured enclaves – failed to flourish under the liberalised markets that replaced these strategies.
 - Policy failures seem to have become more common as some governments take more reckless measures in the face of economic setbacks. Some analysts see this as symptomatic of deep-rooted problems in policy-making:⁴ others wonder to what extent the extraordinary difficulties of Zimbabwe constitute an isolated case, but one with heavy ramifications for the region.
 - The scourge of HIV/AIDS has pushed many affected and afflicted households into poverty and left them unable to cope with further shocks.
 - In some areas, the combination of rising populations and stagnating rural economies has led to heavy pressure on natural resources with signs of falling soil fertility and consequent loss of agricultural productivity.
4. All told, the crisis seems to have been one that, while provoked by an initial shock to the *availability* of food, has become more one of *access and entitlements* for the majority of the affected population. This has made the degree of social differentiation in the rural areas –

¹ Malawi's problems began a year earlier, with a low harvest in 2001 that triggered extraordinary rises in maize prices through to early 2002.

² This section is based largely on the syntheses found in IDC 2003, FFSSA 2004, Mano et al 2003, and Wiggins 2003. Much of this thinking is reflected in DFID's Regional Hunger & Vulnerability Strategy.

³ There were other triggers. For example, stocks of grains had been run down prior to the 2002 harvest, in at least one case, that of Malawi, rather wilfully. The difficulties of Zimbabwe, with a shrinking economy and the major disruption to the economy of fast-track resettlement can be seen as important as any rainfall failure.

⁴ See, for example, Bird et al. 2003.

something not always clearly appreciated in official policy thinking – more apparent. Those vulnerable to food insecurity, it seems, fall into one or both of two marginalised groups. One group is made up of the economically marginalised who lack land, capital and tools, livestock; literacy and other formal skills. They make up a ‘working poor’ and an ‘under-employed poor’. The other group is socially marginalised by gender (women and girls), age (children, elderly), and by illness or disability. Often also economically marginalised, they form the core of the chronically poor, often unable to work, and usually having fewer coping options. The marginalised are usually net buyers of food, even in a good farming year. Although their numbers are not well known, they may represent from one- to two-thirds of the rural population.

5. Public response to the crisis has had its failings. Governments were slow to declare emergencies, delaying by three months or more beyond the point when the early warning systems sounded a clear alarm. Responses focused heavily on food availability, despite the evidence that the emergency was more complex. This evidence included the increasingly sophisticated livelihoods analyses presented by the Vulnerability Assessment Committees (VACs). Subsequently it has become clear that the cereals gaps seen in national food balances were far from being filled either by imports or food aid, and yet almost all nutrition surveys have failed to find any significant rise in indicators of malnutrition.
6. There was also a marked reluctance in the cases of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe to allow the private sector to play a role in solving the problem. The governments of these countries repeatedly either prevented private trade in grain, or interfered in the market and sent confusing signals to traders that seem to have stalled the private sector response.
7. To sum up, the crisis has complex origins not all of which are well understood at present. This presents a challenge in trying to take action to ensure that a similar crisis does not occur the next time there is a shock to the food economy.

1.2 DFID’s response to the crisis

8. DFID contributed to alleviating the crisis, and has implemented a process to develop a longer-term regional hunger and vulnerability programme. Part of the process has been the drawing up of DFID’s Regional Hunger and Vulnerability (RH&V) Strategy in response to the issues outlined above and to the Report of the International Development Select Committee (IDSC) of the British House of Commons on the crisis. The report made 67 recommendations on improving the food security situation in southern Africa based on a wide range of consultations with DFID, NGOs and academics⁵. It highlighted that vulnerability to shocks has increased as coping strategies have progressively weakened, and stressed the need for more effective, multi-sectoral interventions to tackle food security, both in emergency and development programmes.
9. The RH&V Strategy sets out DFID’s assessment of the main factors contributing to food insecurity in the region and builds on the analysis in *Eliminating Hunger*, DFID’s food security position paper. The strategy provides a framework to guide DFID policy at regional level around these issues, and a basis for engagement with national governments, UN agencies, NGOs, and other donors on regional food security issues. It has served as a guiding framework for this scoping study (refer section 1.3).
10. The strategy outlines four areas where DFID will deliver support through a three-year Regional Hunger and Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) to improve regional food security. The four areas are:
 - Strengthening vulnerability monitoring and assessment systems;
 - More effective safety nets;
 - Promoting the role of the private sector and enhancing regional trade; and

⁵ Report of the International Development Select Committee into the Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa. HMSO, March 2003.

- Strengthening regional policy discussions.
11. The programme will contribute to a better understanding of vulnerability, food security and livelihoods, and how these are connected. This in turn can feed into DFID programming in the region around pro-poor growth policy through mechanisms such as PRSP discussions.

1.3 RHVP Scoping Study

12. The RHVP is based on the premise that there are a number of policy and institutional limitations across the region that, if satisfactorily addressed, will enhance poor people's access to food and thereby meet a key objective of DFID strategy. This scoping study has been developed on the assumption that the RHVP's starting premise is a correct, if insufficient, explanation of the apparent lack of capacity of existing policy and institutions to respond to food insecurity in the region.

1.3.1 Purpose of the Scoping Project

13. The purpose of the project is to inform the design of DFIDSA's RHVP by identifying opportunities for DFID to support national or, particularly, regional initiatives that will enhance food security through policy or institutional interventions in one or more of the four priority areas.

1.3.2 Project approach

14. SARPN's approached the task based on the direction given in the terms of reference (TORs, see Annex 10) and initial meetings with DFIDSA, with the aim of ensuring that the project:

15. *Builds on existing work in the region by including:*

- SADC country programmes that focus on hunger and vulnerability issues
- Work being done in a number of the DFID country offices in the SADC region that are providing strategic support to these programmes.
- The ODI Forum on Food Security⁶ being undertaken in SADC
- The DFIDSA supported Technical Assistance to the Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee (RVAC) and the National VACs (NVACs) in Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique
- A three-stage consultation process with the VACs that DFIDSA has fast-tracked, and
- Other donor supported initiatives, notably those by USAID and the EU.

16. *Positions the programme in the region, by:*

- Recognising that the theme of regional hunger and vulnerability is being driven by multilateral organisations and aid agencies and that information and knowledge appears to be held by northern organisations and individuals. Therefore it will be an objective to engage and consult with national and regional stakeholders in order to create broader ownership, nationally and regionally, of initiatives by DFIDSA arising from the scoping studies.
- Taking into account that the RHVP is intended to be a regional programme. The RHVP will not in the first instance seek to undertake country level interventions – this remains the domain of DFID country programmes. However, in some instances elements of national support will be necessary, for example in building local capacity.

17. *Ensures adequate geographical and national coverage, noting that:*

- While the RHVP is intended to be a SADC-wide programme, the RH&V strategy is focused on those countries most affected by the recent humanitarian crises

⁶ Forum for Food Security in Southern Africa covers the region as a whole and five specific countries: Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. www.odi.org.uk/food-security-forum

- Existing vulnerability in particular countries not currently covered by the DFID RH&V strategy, such as Angola, and the influence and impact of countries in the region such as South Africa highlights the need for the programme to consider wider inclusion.

18. *Considers the financial framework, since:*

- In the context sketched above, and in the four priority areas outlined in the RH&V strategy, the scoping studies must identify what needs to be done, what is best done at regional level, and where DFID can best contribute. This clearly needs to take into account what governments and other donors are doing, and the resource envelope of the RHVP.

1.3.3 Scoping guiding framework

19. The RHVP design team considered several elements in developing a working framework for the study, including:

- The recent programme development history;
- The RH&V Strategy and earlier DFID design notes;
- The Team's discussions with the DFID Regional Humanitarian Advisor (Tom Kelly) and the Programme Design Consultant (John Howell); and
- Internal discussions within the team on key issues including the definition of 'food security' and 'the value added by a regional approach' (refer section 2: Concepts).

The draft framework outlined below was developed to guide the scoping studies and serves as a basis for additional comment from DFID and partners. This is refined into the suggested logframe of this scoping study in Annex 8.

20. The **Goal** for the RHVP is taken directly from the regional strategy, namely "**to reduce vulnerability to food insecurity in the Southern African region**".
21. Several **working hypotheses** underlie the development of the scoping framework. Principal amongst these is the assumption that **policy failures** amongst the range of stakeholders in the region have been a major cause of the southern African food security crisis.
22. This framed the definition of the **project purpose**: "**Region-wide adoption and implementation of co-ordinated policies with respect to the availability, access and utilisation of food.**"
23. The proposed **Outputs** remain closely tied to the four pillars identified in the RH&V Strategy, namely:
- National & regional information & analysis systems to support policy making and programming for humanitarian & development assistance institutionalised;
 - Information on social protection mechanisms to reduce chronic food insecurity & vulnerability of those at risk of food insecurity disseminated and better understood in the region;
 - The volume and efficiency of trading in basic foods among small-scale traders is increased; and
 - Evidence generated on key policy issues for food security, and disseminated to policy-makers and stakeholders.

1.3.4 Methodology

24. The core process involved two scoping studies run in parallel around which the other activities focused. The main activities of the scoping study included:
- Literature reviews for both studies (refer Annex 9 for references & bibliography);
 - Attending the DFID supported RVAC process;
 - Interviewing key regional stakeholders/informants in South Africa (Annex 1);

- Visiting countries in the region including Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique (Annex 1);
 - Visiting SADC and regional players in Gaborone, Botswana (Annex 1);
 - Holding an advisory meeting with regional specialists (Annex 1); and
 - Drafting and submitting a report.
25. The project ran continuously over two months from the beginning of June until the end of July 2004. Table 1.1 presents an outline schedule of the two teams' activities.

Table 1.1: Schedule of scoping team activities

Time	Activities
Week of 31 May	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Project planning ▪ Literature reviews for both studies
Week of 7 June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Core team assembled – joint planning ▪ Attended DFID supported RVAC workshop ▪ Reviewed secondary information and literature reviews ▪ Finalised research materials and interview guidelines ▪ Interviewed key regional stakeholders/informants in South Africa
Week of 14 June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Planning continued (as above) ▪ DFID Steering Committee Meeting ▪ Visits/interviews with SA-based regional institutions
20-23 June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Zambia country visit – whole team
23-27 June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Malawi country visit – whole team
28-29 June	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lesotho country visit – Reuben Mokoena and Ben Roberts
4-7 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Zimbabwe country visit – whole team
7-9 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Mozambique – Steve Wiggins and Nick Maunder ▪ Swaziland – Ben Roberts and Reuben Mokoena
Week of 12 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ SADC visit, Gaborone – Steve Wiggins and Nick Maunder ▪ Collate and verify findings ▪ Follow up interviews – region and in-country ▪ Draft report
Week of 19 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Advisory meeting ▪ Finalise reports
Week of 26 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 27/07: Present draft final report to DFID and brief DFIDSA advisors on process
Week of 2 Aug	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 04/08 Final Steering Committee Meeting, DFID ▪ Submission of final report

26. The scoping teams each comprised two permanent members, one as the team leader:
- **Study Team 1** was led by Nick Maunder supported by Ben Roberts; and
 - **Study Team 2** was led by Steve Wiggins supported by Reuben Mokoena and Norma Tregurtha of the DFIDSA supported ComMark Trust
27. SARPN was the regional institution responsible for the design, management, co-ordination and quality of the outcome of the project, working from its offices in Pretoria, South Africa. Mike de Klerk directed the project, and James Carnegie of Khanya – managing rural change, co-ordinated the process. Logistic and administrative support was provided by Ilona de Villiers & Ingrid du Toit.
28. SARPN reported to a DFID Steering Committee, which was responsible for giving guidance to, and ensuring the focused direction of, the scoping studies. The Steering Committee included a small team of DFIDSA Advisors led by Tom Kelly, Regional Humanitarian Advisor with representatives from SADC DFID country offices, the London Policy Division and John Howell, the Programme Design Consultant.

2 CONCEPTS

2.1 Defining key terms

29. DFID's mission is the reduction of poverty. It is committed to improving the economic situation of the poor through economic activity in general and through adequate access to food, clean water, sanitation, health care, education and political empowerment. This commitment is at the heart of the Millennium Development Goals, which specifically link the elimination of poverty with targets to reduce extreme hunger and improve access to services.
30. Concepts of food security are important in framing action on hunger. The definitions used in this report broadly follow those of the 1996 World Food Summit. Food security is commonly said to exist when people at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Achieving this is understood to involve:
- Ensuring that a wide variety of food is available in local markets and fields (availability);
 - People have enough money to purchase a variety of foods (access); and
 - Food is eaten in an environment that supplies appropriate care, clean water, and good sanitation and health services (Haddad and Frankenberger, 2003).
31. Food security interventions may be conceptually organised under these headings, with an important concern being the interactions between these factors in achieving the desired state of food security. Adequate nutrition is a specific concern within food security. Micronutrient deficiencies may occur even when sufficient dietary energy is available.
32. Vulnerability introduces a dynamic element into the discussion of poverty and food insecurity. It conceptualises the risk of future food insecurity. Vulnerability is usually defined as both the exposure of people to risk and stress, and the ability to cope with the consequences of this risk.
33. In southern Africa the VACs have been important in introducing this concept of vulnerability at national level. They have generally adopted a specific definition of vulnerability from Save the Children, United Kingdom (SC-UK) (see Box 2.1), which interprets food insecurity as a function of both external hazard (an external event) and vulnerability (measured by the exposure to the event and ability to cope). The important refinement of this definition is that vulnerability is assessed in the context of a specific shock – the question asked is 'vulnerable to what'?
34. Vulnerability analysis can be applied to non-food issues such as security, health, nutrition and other measures of general welfare. However, in the context of this report and the regional strategy the focus is on vulnerability to food insecurity.
35. This goes to the heart of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The first goal is to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, with targets of halving the proportion of people with incomes of less than US\$1-a-day, and of people suffering from hunger by 2015.⁷

Table 2.1: Dimensions of food security

Dimension	Food security issues:	Sub-elements, issues
Food availability	Food production and agricultural development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Input • Production • Storage • Processing
	Trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Domestic production versus inter-national trade • Annual variations: storage versus trade
	Markets / physical infrastructure	Liberal markets or state control

⁷ As measured by the prevalence of underweight children under five years of age; and by the proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

Dimension	Food security issues:	Sub-elements, issues
Food access	<i>All the above plus the following:</i>	
	Prices	Often key area of policy
	Incomes	Chronic and transitory poverty
	Intra-household distribution	
Food utilization	<i>All the above plus the following:</i>	
	Care	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food preparation • Child care
	Interactions with hygiene / sanitation	
	Interactions with disease	HIV/AIDS a particular challenge
	Education	

Box 2.1: The VAC definition of vulnerability

Vulnerability refers to the degree of exposure to factors that threaten well-being and the extent to which individuals, households and other social groups can cope with these factors. Vulnerability thus has two sides: an external side (exposure to shocks and stresses) and an internal side (ability to cope). The concept of vulnerability can be applied to a wide range of issues under the general heading of “well-being”. In the context of household food security, vulnerability refers to the degree of exposure to factors that threaten household food security and the extent to which people can cope with these factors.

When thinking about vulnerability, it is useful to distinguish between vulnerability to slowly changing trends and vulnerability to shocks. Slowly changing trends would include such factors as gradual demographic changes, gradual rural – urban migration, gradual land degradation, and the gradually debilitating effects of chronic disease. Shocks can be further disaggregated into slow-onset and rapid-onset. An example of a slow onset shock would be crop failure following poor rains, and an example of a rapid onset shock would be an un-announced currency devaluation.

Source: Food Security And Vulnerability To Shocks: The SADC FANR VAC Conceptual Framework

36. An important differentiation is drawn between transitory and chronic food insecurity. Transitory food insecurity occurs when there is a temporary inability to meet food needs, usually associated with a specific shock or stress such as drought, floods or civil unrest. In contrast chronic food insecurity occurs when people are unable to meet their minimum food requirements over a sustained period of time. This is usually associated with slowly changing factors which have increased people’s exposure to shocks or else decreased their ability to cope with the effects of these shocks – essentially increased their vulnerability.
37. Exploring the inter-relationships between these issues lies at the core of hunger and poverty reduction. The scoping study considers potential food security interventions against this background. In particular it focuses on examining opportunities for linking vulnerability reduction to the overall goal of hunger reduction.

2.2 The case for a regional programme⁸

38. While the characteristics of vulnerability and food insecurity may be specific to localities, the risks faced have dimensions that are common to the region and that relate to the interdependency of countries, and the shared historical experience of the region.
39. Regional dimensions include:
 - The HIV/AIDS pandemic;

⁸ John Hansell, DFID Zambia, provided helpful comments for this section

- Variable weather brought about by a mono-seasonal rainfall pattern;
 - Most countries are landlocked with poor communications;
 - Weak governance; and
 - Insecure land tenure.
40. Interdependency between the countries in the region can be seen in:
- Safety and security issues;
 - Cross border trade, facilitated by many borders do not present natural physical barriers to movement;
 - The deficiencies of physical infrastructure such as ports and railways, which usually affect more than one country;
 - Shared watercourses and catchments; and
 - Animal disease transmission.
41. Many of the countries have experienced similar patterns of development with economic development based largely on mining, enclaves of large-scale farms and estates, and large areas of smallholder farming. There is also experience of regional co-operation through SADC and more recent co-operation through COMESA.
42. While the interactions are clear, when looking for policy responses to food insecurity the starting point has to be the principle of subsidiarity: that policies should be decided and implemented at the national and local levels whenever possible, with regional actions only when there are clear benefits to be gained that could not be realised at a less aggregate level. In this light, what kinds of the things can best be done regionally, and why? Table 2.2 below sketches a reply, looking at the advantages of regional action from the standpoint of national governments, donors and NGOs.
43. Of the possible reasons for actions at supra-national scale, those that typically apply to food security actions are those that:
- Produce economies of scale in data collection and sharing of experiences, and
 - Reduce information costs that would otherwise impede trade.

Table 2.2: Types of regional collaboration for governments, donors and NGOs

Typical regional action with examples	Justification
<i>National governments</i>	
Research and information networks, for example <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Remote sensing • Meteorology • Agricultural research 	Economies of scale in data collection and analysis: applies where results apply across borders [Smaller countries may simply not have the capacity to carry out these functions.]
Learning networks, for example <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty policies • Health practice 	Economies of scale in sharing experiences: applies where the lessons from country programmes may be applicable, with due modification, in other countries
Co-ordination mechanisms <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security • Trade • Disease control • Migration • Water resources (river basins and catchments, pasture, etc.) 	To reduce costs of information, increase certainty by harmonising definitions, standards, norms, and laws. To facilitate negotiation where there are cross-border externalities.

Typical regional action with examples	Justification
Negotiating bodies • Trading areas and blocks	To gain advantages of numbers in bargaining with other trading blocks.
Mutual insurance against hazards	By managing risk on a larger, multi-national scale, the extent of co-variant risk that is difficult to insure against, may be reduced.
Donors	
Mirror inter-governmental institutions	Allow donor response and support to activities of official regional bodies
Cross-donor co-ordination • RIACSO	Allow the sharing of information, experience and plans with other donors working the same region
Internal organisation of donor agency	Allow for co-ordination and control of agency operations
Internal competence of agency	Allow for sharing of agency experiences that may apply across countries within the region
Procure and supply goods and services	Economies of scale in logistics
NGOs and CSOs	
As for donors, plus: Regional networks for advocacy	Empowerment and confidence, joining forces for greater impact

3 KEY FINDINGS AND ISSUES

3.1 Vulnerability Analysis

3.1.1 Food insecurity and vulnerability

44. The widely shared perception is that vulnerability to food insecurity has increased significantly in southern Africa over the last decade. It is argued that structural adjustment has led to a withdrawal of the state from the local level and, along with HIV/AIDS; this has precipitated a long-term livelihoods decline (CARE, 2003). The 2001/02 drought and poor policy choices compounded the underlying problems and precipitated a major food security crisis.
45. The nutrition data indicates that this food security crisis is widespread throughout the region (Table 3.1). Furthermore this crisis has both acute (evidenced by the proportion underweight) and chronic (as evidenced by the stunting data) dimensions. The data is less clear in supporting the hypothesis that this crisis has developed in the last decade. For example longitudinal data for Malawi records a high but constant rate of stunting since 1992. Certainly it seems that while absolute levels are at unacceptably high rates, the *process* of impoverishment is not uniform either between, or within, countries. The general conclusion requires closer examination.

Table 3.1: Nutritional indicators for children under five

	% of children under five underweight	% of children under five stunted
Zimbabwe	17.2% (national Nutrition Survey Feb 2003)	26.5% (National Nutrition Survey Feb 2003)
Zambia	30.8% (DHS 2001)	51.2% (DHS 2001)
Mozambique	26.1% (DHS 1997)	35.9% (DHS 1997)
Malawi	27.8% (DHS 2000)	53.6% (DHS 2000)
Lesotho	17.9% (National Nutrition and EPI Survey 2002)	34.4% (National Nutrition and EPI Survey 2002)
Swaziland	11.9% (MICS 2000)	31.2% (MICS 2000)

46. Given this context, the immediate improvement in regional food security can only be seen as a temporary upturn based on improved crop performance. Emergency relief operations tend to have limited success in protecting assets and even less in building them. There is little evidence to suggest that the southern Africa operation was an exception. Two main conclusions follow which should shape the design of continuing food security interventions in southern Africa.
47. Firstly, there is severe under-nutrition, as evidenced by the unacceptable stunting rates amongst children – most notably in parts of Zambia and Malawi. Large proportions of the population are extremely poor and consequently remain unable to consistently meet their regular food needs. This group, the chronically food insecure, were beneficiaries of the regional emergency relief operation – although perversely the drought which triggered the response may have had little to do with their hunger. While attention on food security may ebb, and responses are scaled down, a large number of people remain deeply food insecure and in need of assistance.
48. Secondly, even amongst the population who are once again judged currently ‘food secure’ there is an extremely high level of vulnerability to future shocks. Insufficient action has been taken to bolster people’s resilience. Therefore the next regional drought, in five or ten years, can be anticipated to generate an even larger need for emergency support.
49. The challenge is to determine how policies, strategies and programmes can be adapted to work towards the *elimination* of food insecurity. This more ambitious goal requires not just treating the symptoms of food insecurity, but identifying the causes and implementing remedial actions.
50. An understanding of vulnerability lies at the heart of this agenda. A better understanding of risks and people’s susceptibility can help to explain causes of food insecurity. It can also help to identify a wider set of complementary options for response, which aim to *reduce* the exposure to stress, *mitigate* the potential impacts of shocks and *enhance coping strategies* to relieve the impact once it has occurred.
51. It is recognized that the agenda of reducing risk and vulnerability demands enhanced collaboration, and a pooling of resources between disaster and development institutions and professionals. This challenges relief workers to ensure that interventions do not compromise future food security – and that livelihoods are protected. On the converse side development workers are challenged to ensure that their activities specifically factor in the reduction of vulnerability to future food insecurity. Progress in achieving this collaboration has been elusive, and remains an important goal.

3.1.2 Vulnerability Assessment Committees

52. Improved capabilities to generate sustainable improvements in food insecurity lie, in part, with an improved understanding of the dimensions of vulnerability. Considerable attention has been paid to generating improved information on vulnerability. Basic questions include identifying who is food insecure and vulnerable, understanding why they are in this condition, and identifying what can be done about it.
53. At the global level the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability Information Mapping System (FIVIMS) has spearheaded this conceptual effort, supported by a wide alliance of UN agencies, bilateral aid agencies and NGOs. A review of the global FIVIMS process is underway and until this is completed it may prove difficult to establish more robust links with national systems.
54. Within southern Africa, vulnerability information has been the responsibility of national and regional VACs. The VAC process was initiated through SADC, with the region supporting the establishment of NVACs. Founded in some countries in the late 1990’s, NVACs came to prominence during the 2001/02 crisis providing critical analysis for emergency response planning. NVACs were established in the six countries that constituted the 2001/02 appeal (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique). A Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee (RVAC), which supports the NVACs, is located in Gaborone, Botswana, with the SADC FANR. VACs bring together a wide range of technical collaborators from various government departments, the UN system and civil society. They generally operate

on a voluntary basis with no dedicated staff. DFID has been a significant supporter of the VAC system since 2002. This support has largely been provided by the DFID regional advisor, and channelled through the RVAC.

55. This scoping study was asked to examine the operations of the VACs and identify areas where improvements are needed. The study benefited considerably from being conducted in parallel with a three-stage VAC consultation process. This exercise, coordinated by the RVAC, set out to review the sustainability of the VAC process and develop a longer-term vision. This has involved consultation within and between the national and regional levels. The key issues debated in this consultation include:
 - Defining mandates at national and regional level;
 - The relationship between countries and the region;
 - The relationship to policy, and
 - Institutional issues and definitions of vulnerability.
56. Various RVAC reports are available documenting the full outcome of these consultations (see bibliography). This scoping exercise builds on this consultation and examines methodological, institutional and policy aspects.
57. The RHVP is by definition a regional programme. Therefore this study considers how the region (RVAC) can support the national systems. However, to answer the question involves a careful examination of issues at the national level. This is presented in the section below.

A focus for the VACs: disasters or development?

58. This question of *purpose* lies at the heart of the discussion about VACs, preceding methodological and institutional concerns. The VAC system was first established to contribute to the longer-term goal of reducing vulnerability to food insecurity. It was designed to bring food security and vulnerability information into the development sector. While many information systems existed at national level, none specifically sought to introduce concepts of vulnerability across the disaster-development divide.
59. As the 2001/02 crisis unfolded the emergency community engaged strongly with the VACs to conduct *needs analyses* as a means of informing their food assistance operations. Essentially the VACs have continued with a needs assessment focus up until the current 2003/4 assessment cycle with relatively minor modifications.
60. As the immediate crisis recedes the VACs have begun to re-examine their mandates and determine whether they should return to a more developmental focus. From the evidence of the NVAC consultations there is consensus that VACs need to refocus on the longer-term goals. This would have methodological and institutional implications, and the consequences need to be clearly thought out.
61. It is important to recognize that they enjoyed a number of pre-determinants of success working within a disaster management system. They had a clear clientele (WFP, donors and governments) able to articulate their information needs and then use the results of the analysis. There were pre-existing methodologies that could be rapidly introduced. These advantages do not apply in the longer-term context. However, the ability to create awareness of concepts of vulnerability amongst a wider client group is critical.
62. Even while the long-term goal may be overcoming chronic food insecurity, it is obviously necessary to help people manage short-term crises. This is a pre-requisite for achieving the longer-term goal. The same basic information is required to work in both arenas including the location and characteristics of food insecurity and vulnerability. The difference is in the analysis and conclusions for action.
63. This study examined the role and functioning of the VACs within the broader national institutional landscape. There are considerable overlaps in the generation of data related to

understanding food insecurity. This includes diverse information systems related to sectoral Ministries (agriculture, health, water, etc.), poverty monitoring and early warning/disaster management systems. However, none of these national systems are currently providing an analysis of the extent and causes of chronic food insecurity with the goal of identifying appropriate responses. Even if this will be a difficult challenge for the VACs given their genesis and composition, there are no alternative groups engaged with this goal.

64. In summary an effective VAC must engage with both short-term relief and long-term development. It would be a mistake to neglect an engagement in disaster management, even while prioritising an increased engagement with poverty reduction and development. The ideal would be a flexible system that has capacities to contribute in both areas, but could easily shift the balance of activities in response to the demands of the specific situation.

Use of VAC information in disaster management

65. Typically VACs operate in a context where national Early Warning Systems (EWS) are fragile or even failing. Consequently they fulfil a critical information need and provide a unique source of information. The VACs have developed specific research tools, organised and mounted large annual assessments, and produced annual reports based on these assessments.
66. The core question that the VACs have attempted to answer on an annual basis is the number and location of food insecure people and the size of their food deficit. The VACs have moved towards adopting a common methodology to support this – the Household Economy Analysis (HEA) piloted and developed by SC-UK. There has been a degree of local adaptation, most notably in Mozambique. Conversely, in Malawi, Swaziland and Lesotho application remains close to the original SC-UK model. Box 3.1 highlights some of the issues surrounding the use of HEA.

Box 3.1: Household Economy Analysis

HEA provides a framework for identifying food deficits, based on livelihoods. It involves constructing a 'baseline' of the rural economy. Using qualitative enquiry methods, in combination with existing secondary datasets, relatively homogenous food economy zones are defined at national level. Within these areas, wealth groups are defined, the various sources of food and income identified, links to markets explored and coping strategies identified. The product is designed to allow the analyst to model the impact of a shock, such as a harvest failure, on the ability of households to meet basic food needs. Data to define this shock may come from existing data channels (such as crop production estimates and price data) or require local collection through qualitative methods.

HEA introduces an expanded, and more systematic, understanding of household food security. Previous food security analyses were limited to a consideration of food availability – as typified by the CFSAM process. HEA has increased the understanding of *access* issues at the national level. It provides a framework for analysing the impact of a wider range of shock factors (including economic shocks) and consequently the underlying rigor of beneficiary estimates has improved. However, a number of operational limitations have been observed in its application:

- A lack of statistical confidence associated with the qualitative methods used to construct the baseline
- Reconciling the food economy zones (the unit for reporting results) and administrative boundaries used for targeting and decision making
- The expense involved in establishing the system at the national level
- Limited success in building national analytical capacity due to its complexity and a continuing reliance on external analytical resources
- Limited relevance to urban situations
- Limitations in capturing and analysing multi-year shocks (including HIV and AIDS)
- National, community and intra-household issues around food security are not addressed
- The garbage in – garbage out syndrome – a misleading sense of precision in results based on poor input data

A willingness to adapt methods is required to address these practical constraints. The Mozambique VAC has made conscious attempts to address these constraints with some success – including ensuring that reporting is done on an administrative basis and incorporating statistical rigor into the reporting.

There are also inherent constraints within the method that need to be appreciated. HEA is specifically designed as a calculator of food deficits. Naturally it is most effective in suggesting a deficit filling solution, either in cash or kind. It is *less effective* in designing *actions to address causes*.

In conclusion the HEA framework has had a positive impact on the interpretation and analysis of food insecurity. However, like all models, a keen appreciation is needed of the limits to its application. While it has a role to play in VAC analysis it should not be seen as a magic solution. Rather its advantages and limitations appreciated should be appreciated and it should be integrated into a larger toolkit of vulnerability analysis methods.

67. Study interviews briefly assessed the uptake of the VAC information. In all countries the VAC provides the accepted *national estimates* of food aid and beneficiary numbers. Importantly, the derivation of the results through broad consensus amongst the VAC partners means that the results are generally acknowledged as authoritative. The figures are widely used as an advocacy tool for fund raising. VAC results are used for planning detailed emergency responses by disaster agencies such as the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU) in Zambia, the INGC in Mozambique and the National Disaster Task Force (NDTF) in Swaziland.
68. However, there were common concerns over the usability of VAC information. Many clients (WFP in several countries, CARE and UNICEF) commented that the figures were unreliable at sub-national level. This prevents applications for planning food relief programmes. Consequently, local level surveys by individual organisations are the norm. The issue was not just at the level of *community targeting* mechanisms, where the NVAC is not expected to have a role. A problem was also apparent at the *geographic targeting* level.
69. One of the main limitations is that the basic units of analysis used – the food economy zones – cut across multiple administrative boundaries. Results are typically expressed by food economy zone, making it difficult for administrators to interpret. There are relatively simple methodological changes, which could be incorporated to improve the relevance to geographical targeting. One option, as adopted by Mozambique, is to compromise by fitting the food economy zone boundaries to fit within lower level administrative boundaries. Alternatively an intermediate analytical step can occur, that reconfigures the outcome of the analysis by administrative boundary.
70. At the same time it is important to acknowledge that a national level analysis is inherently constrained in resolution and accuracy. The goal of the NVAC is to inform national level decisions. This includes information that can assist with the targeting of resources. However, it is unlikely to provide an adequate resource in itself for detailed local level planning.
71. NVACs have limited success in identifying alternatives to specific recommendations to food aid as an emergency response. However, the HEA model does have the capacity to estimate cash transfers as an alternative to food aid. The Malawi 2004 VAC report successfully made this calculation at national level and the EU is using these conclusions in planning their national cash transfer programme. Similar applications were undertaken in Swaziland. This is an important innovation and this analysis should be extended to other countries.
72. The VACs need to play a more proactive role in opening up the debate on how emergency resources can contribute to long-term goals of vulnerability reduction, and alternatives to food aid. As well as cash transfers other possible social protection mechanisms include public works programmes, fee waivers (for health and education), micro-finance and small micro-enterprise and food and agricultural based safety nets. Increasingly the VAC analysis should consider a wider set of alternatives; the analysis of cash transfers is one practical illustration of this.
73. In conclusion, given southern Africa's heightened vulnerability to food insecurity, it is important to maintain capacities to identify and estimate food insecurity at national level. In the absence of effective national systems, the VACs successfully generate national level estimates

of food aid needs. In turn these have been influential in mobilizing a response. To date VACs have been less successful in addressing the question of alternatives to food aid.

VAC influence on sectoral programmes and policies

74. There are a limited number of examples of the VACs working directly with sectoral ministries. During the current round, the Mozambique VAC identified a number of key development options that could reduce vulnerability aimed principally at the different ministries (Info Flash June 2004). The livelihoods analysis contained in the baselines underpins the analysis, although the recommendations are very general. Several NGOs reported drawing on these results in 'general orientation' and fund raising.
75. VACs have had a variable record in engaging sectoral policy makers. In Mozambique there is a major effort to identify targeted decision makers and package products specifically for their use. This may provide a useful model for other NVACs to consider. Additionally Mozambique VAC members have a close relationship with the GTZ group in redrafting the food and nutrition security policy. However, it is hard to determine whether this was in their personal capacity or through the VAC as a corporate entity. In Zambia the NVAC is engaging with the EU team working on the (lengthy) redrafting of the national food security policy.
76. One of the constraints to the use of vulnerability information is the lack of understanding of food security and vulnerability concepts amongst the sectoral decision makers that the VACs are interacting with. Broad education on these concepts is needed. It should extend to a wide group of stakeholders, and not just be targeted at governments.
77. Allied to this is the need to complement the conceptual arguments for risk reduction, with hard evidence. If decision makers are to be convinced of the need to shift to a risk reduction framework they will require quantitative evidence. There is a relative dearth studies on the economic impacts of risk reduction and mitigation programmes. Consequently arguments the relative merits of this against growth focussed objectives remain highly subjective.
78. Less attention is given to the policies of donors and interactions with the VACs. Meaningful change of the relief system is highly dependent on the policies of the financiers. Direct engagement between the VAC and donors is essential.

Improving the vulnerability information system

79. One of the starting points for analysing the VAC operations is to situate it in a broader information system. Maxwell (2002) outlined the components of an effective humanitarian information system – applicable in both chronic and acute contexts. He argues that all parts need to be present if the information system is to operate effectively. An analysis of VAC operations against this model system identifies possible priorities for future VAC activities.
80. To date VACs have worked largely on the *livelihood baselines* and *needs assessment*. These are both costly exercises, but are not required on an annual basis. The livelihood baselines have been particularly useful and influential VAC products, with application in both emergency and development contexts. There is a strong justification for completing these exercises, which remain incomplete in many countries.
81. There should be greater emphasis on *early warning/ monitoring/ surveillance systems*. National early warning systems (EWS), including crop forecast systems, are typically extremely weak despite sustained donor support over many years. VACs increasingly depend on outputs from national systems for their analysis (thinking beyond HEA) and need to advocate for their strengthening.
82. The monitoring methodology needs careful consideration. Traditional EWS are based on trend analysis of key indicators, for example food and livestock prices. A better understanding of livelihoods (as offered by the VACs) can help to refine the choice of the most informative indicators in specific livelihood areas. Ultimately the EWS should remain simple, cheap and light to operate.

83. The specific early warning indicators, and the systems that most justified support, will vary from Country to Country. The starting point for determining the national priorities will be the livelihoods baselines. The indicators need to be matched to the key sources of income and expenditure patterns of the most vulnerable households. Crops, livestock, casual labour and remittances will play a varying role. However, information on crop production, staple food prices and nutritional status will be of broad relevance and concern across all Countries.
84. HEA advocates have suggested a shift from traditional EWS to a 'rolling assessments' approach. The argument is that the 'so what' question needs to be answered, along with the EWS data. This may not be the most appropriate use of VAC time and energy. Firstly, there are questions of practicality. The HEA assessments have relied on large-scale primary data collection to underpin their analysis. Even then, the limitations associated with the model imply that the conclusions only have limited application. The data streams to support regular assessment do not exist and significant investment is needed to make this a feasible proposition. Then there is the question of sustainability. Most national EWS, despite large-scale donor support, are foundering. Institutionalising the capacity required to undertake a 'rolling assessment' is a daunting proposition. Secondly, there is the desirability of focusing on such a process. This approach may unwittingly further emphasize emergency response at the expense of addressing causes of food insecurity.
85. Generating sustainable improvements to EWS is a formidable task, especially given the limited success of previous programmes of support. Both the SADC Regional Early Warning System Unit and the USAID FEWS NET project have been supporting the development of national capacities, from the regional level, over many years. USAID will continue to support regional early warning, with FEWS NET due to be extended through to 2010. The RHVP will have to work closely with FEWS NET in particular, although with the new phase still under design and no details available yet, it is hard to say what form this collaboration will take.
86. Improving national EWS capacities has both technical and political dimensions. Generally donor projects have had more success in technical innovation. This continues to be so; for example new technologies offer the possibility of using remote sensing applications to estimate crop production. FEWS NET and the EU MARS unit, under the Joint Research Service, are leading this work. However, the systems have generally failed to be sustained because of limited political commitment. It is therefore proposed that the VACs need to be effective advocates for these systems, as much as technical resources.
87. *Needs assessments* should be an ad hoc activity triggered by an impending crisis. As the crisis recedes there is less justification for large-scale annual surveys and expenditure on these should decrease rapidly.
88. A number of other important weaknesses are apparent in humanitarian information systems. These include:
- A weak and inadequate *programme evaluation and lessons learnt* component remains a major concern across the humanitarian sector. A failure in feedback contributes to the persistently poor use of emergency resources. While not exclusively a VAC role, the VACs may be a useful platform to assist in evaluation exercises;
 - A significant professional and analytical divide exists between food security, and nutrition and health. The consequence is over emphasis of availability and access, but the relative neglect of the *utilization* aspects. Interventions are frequently planned and implemented in isolation. We still lack the ability to determine the relative importance of, and inter-relationships between, food, nutrition, health and education interventions;
 - There is a large gap in the *monitoring of urban populations*. This is an obvious priority, especially given that the highest rates of increase in HIV-AIDS are occurring in urban areas. The Zimbabwe NVAC has developed useful experience in urban monitoring systems; and
 - Additionally there is a concern to capture the social and political dimensions of vulnerability. The existing methodology operates an economic model at the household level.

89. The VACs can play an important role in addressing some of these shortcomings. In particular there is an obviously link to evaluation and lesson learning. The emerging argument is that the VAC needs to identify the incidence of food insecurity; the underlying causes and then links this through to the design of more appropriate interventions. Engagement in the evaluation process would be a natural complement, with strong feedback to future planning cycles. At the highest level the VACs should be providing longitudinal data on food insecurity. Intra-annual changes should be accompanied by an analysis of the impact of risk management interventions at the macro-level. The VAC should also participate in strategic project-level evaluations – especially where these inform key choices between alternative safety net mechanisms.
90. This study suggests the organisation of a ‘research’ fund, which will be linked to the VAC framework (refer section 4.1.4), and provide additional short-term resources to address the problems identified in paragraph 88. Specific research priorities could be identified in collaboration with the VACs. The VACs would provide a channel to feed the conclusions into policy.
91. At the heart of this discussion lies the thorny issue of the extent to which the VACs should operate as *data collection* platforms as opposed to *data analysis* platforms. The VACs have established their reputation through collecting information when no other reliable sources were available. However, preceding arguments suggest that the greatest potential value from the VACs lie in an analytical role.
92. Much of the data necessary for the VACs to undertake this analysis should be available from alternative sources. Annex 3 provides a detailed listing of these systems. This makes it clear that there are an extensive number of national data collection systems. In some cases there is already a surfeit of information providers; Zambia being a prime example. However, these systems may be inactive or else the data is of inadequate quality and timeliness.
93. It makes sense for the data collection function to be handled by government institutions with an existing mandate. The solution is complicated by the deep institutional weaknesses in national data collection systems, and the urgency of information for emergency planning needs. However, as a general principle, priority should be given to capacity building rather than capacity substitution. The VACs would help to coordinate the various information sources, identify gaps and improve quality.
94. Such an approach would clarify some of the concerns over overlapping institutional mandates for data collection. Given the immediate problems in the wake of the crisis the VACs have established a substantial independent data collection capacity. The proposition is that they should not continue with this direct responsibility. On an occasional basis the VACs may initiate specific field qualitative enquiries to fill important gaps. However, they should not be perceived as the ‘system’ for the routine collection and dissemination of this information. The VACs do offer a framework that can rapidly mobilize and coordinate non-government resources to supplement government systems in a crisis.
95. In conclusion, VACs are concerned with improving food insecurity and vulnerability data quality, integrating and exchanging this information and promoting the better use of information to improve action. This entails a shift from serving as a primary data gatherer to one where the VACs are more reliant on national systems.
96. The development of the VACs to date has focussed considerable energy on the question of the selection of an appropriate *methodology*. There were indications that this has been at the cost of an adequate consideration of purpose. The scoping study therefore concluded that at the design stage the key question is the overall VAC purpose and how this can be incorporated in national mandates.

TABLE 3.1.1: Different forms of vulnerability information systems			
Component	Information Categories/Questions Addressed	Frequency of Analysis	Links to Program and Policy
1. Baseline Vulnerability and Poverty Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the basic livelihoods of groups? • What are known or likely hazards: natural and environmental; social, economic and political? • What is the likelihood of these occurring, and what indicators would predict? • Who are the most vulnerable groups? • What capacities, services and resources (physical, human, social) exist to mitigate vulnerability? • What are coping and risk minimization strategies? • Baseline information against which to analyse trends? 	Infrequent (Every five years, or when context changes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Long-term development/vulnerability reduction planning • Emergency Preparedness planning • Mitigation planning • Community-based preparedness activities
2. Early Warning	<p>Indicator trend analysis: is there a problem shaping up?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where and how quickly is it developing? • What are the geographic dimensions of the problem? • In what areas should an in-depth assessment be concentrated? 	Continuous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activate and focus needs assessment • Contingency and scenario planning • Activates mitigation plans • Geographic targeting • Mobilize community/public awareness
3. Emergency Needs Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is nature and dimensions of the problem? • How long is it going to last? • Who are the most vulnerable groups? • What and how much is needed; what is the best response? • To what extent is local coping capacity and provision of services overwhelmed? • What are major logistical and resource considerations? 	As needed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed emergency response plans and programs • Detailed targeting • Mobilize resources • Mobilize public awareness
4. Program Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are inputs accounted for (logistical accounting)? • Are outputs achieved (end-use monitoring)? • Pipeline analysis: is the pipeline “flow” adequate for meeting upcoming requirements? 	Continuous (While program is on-going)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adjust inputs or logistics • Adjust targeting • Adjust pipeline
5. Impact Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the intervention achieving the intended result? • What adjustments are necessary (response, quantity, targeting)? 	Regular Intervals (While program is ongoing)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase or decrease levels of delivery • Change targeting criteria • Change activities
6. Context Monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the possibilities for exit, recovery, or transition for longer-term responses? • What are institutional capacities and vulnerabilities? • What are the risks of transition? • Does situation require re-assessment? 	Continuous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transition to rehabilitation/development programming • Re-assess situation • Institutional capacity building
7. Program Evaluation and Lessons Learned	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How can overall program (information system, preparedness, response) be improved? • Are humanitarian principles being upheld by programs • What lessons can be learned from experience and mistakes? 	Periodic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improvements to overall system:

97. A standardized approach and analytical framework is desirable this does not imply a standardized methodology. It is proposed that the choice of methodology is more appropriately dealt with at the national, rather than regional level. It should be acknowledged that a variety of methods may be usefully employed in answering the same question. The choice between methods may be most appropriately made at the national level. The role of the region should be to provide flexible technical support in accordance with national needs, not to promote the adoption of a single uniform method.
98. Given fundamental weaknesses in national systems the VACs need to advocate for the improvement of these systems. However, the focus should be on the analysis of the information and ensuring the use of this information in decision making.

Vulnerability, poverty and growth

99. A strong relationship exists between vulnerability, poverty and growth. There has been a resurgence of interest in vulnerability, as risk and vulnerability have been rediscovered as key features of rural livelihoods and poverty. Better management of damaging fluctuations and risks by those in or near poverty is seen, together with growth and redistribution, as one of the three mechanisms for poverty reduction. This has placed vulnerability reduction as a central aspect of development policy (Prowse 2003). Efforts to converge the poverty reduction and vulnerability agendas have followed.
100. National poverty reduction strategies (both the World Bank/IMF PRSPs and national strategies for non qualifying countries) are an attractive target for co-operation. These direct both poverty focused development and social protection activities. The growing emphasis on the PRSP as a budgetary framework and the basis for accessing concessional funding from the Bank and donors provides a further argument for working within this framework.
101. While most NVACs have greater co-operation with the poverty reduction strategies as an explicit goal, only limited progress has been made so far in this regard. In part this is due to the uneven status of poverty reduction policies across the region (see Annex 5).
102. In most of the countries visited, the links to the national poverty reduction strategies and associated poverty monitoring units (where they exist) are underdeveloped. In Lesotho, one of the members of the PRSP Secretariat has been assigned to attend Lesotho VAC meetings and workshops and the Lesotho VAC did make a submission on vulnerability during the PRSP formulation process. However, the link still remains tenuous and the extent to which the information produced by the LVAC will inform the operations of the poverty monitoring unit once it is established remains unclear. In Swaziland, the Poverty Reduction Unit, which is based in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and tasked with the production of the PRSAP, has recently taken the initiative and approached the Swaziland VAC to explore potential areas of collaboration. However, for those countries that have well-established poverty reduction strategies, such as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, the relationship has apparently not been developed.
103. This is an area of concern for a number of reasons. The NVACs produce information that is not produced by other institutions in the region and that could be useful for the ongoing monitoring and evaluation of poverty reduction strategies (PRS). As the suite of policies and interventions contained in the PRSs are implemented over forthcoming years, we might expect to see the ability of households to withstand shocks improve if the policies are effective. These improvements in chronic and transitory poverty should be captured, in part, by the NVACs. Conversely, the survey-based and administrative data collected and analysed by poverty monitoring units could be used as important contextual material for the NVACs.
104. The desire among many NVACs to broaden their mandate beyond emergency relief to longer-term development also suggests a natural relationship with the PRSs and associated institutional structures.

105. One reason why the suggested expansion of the VAC activities should be treated with caution is that the units could end up being too generalized and fail to develop and refine their specialized focus on vulnerability and livelihoods assessment. Therefore, formalizing linkages with the PRSs would be mutually beneficial enabling the VACs to incorporate more of a developmental focus without compromising their existing mandate. Those overseeing the PRS would benefit from the opportunity to expand the poverty reduction evidence base.
106. Specific areas of collaboration with the poverty reduction structures could include:
- Improving, or in some cases introducing, the discussion of the concept of vulnerability in PRSP policy documents. The treatment of vulnerability issues within the PRSPs is summarized in Annex 5; generally it is under discussed. In Mozambique there is an opportunity for collaboration as the new policy is currently under revision;
 - NVAC participation in poverty monitoring. While acknowledging the mandate of the poverty monitoring unit (PMU) in this area, the VAC may have a preceding or complementary role. Where PMUs are yet to be established the VAC information is particularly useful. The critical refinement is the disaggregation of the numbers of food insecure into *transitory and chronic*, where the chronically food insecure could be closely correlated with the poor. For established PMUs, NVAC livelihood information adds insights to poverty dynamics; and
 - Using NVAC baselines to model the impact of policy shifts and suggest policy refinements. The example of how the Malawi baseline has been used in examining income transfers illustrates this point. However, the limitations of the HEA methodology should be borne in mind. As NVACs widen their enquiries into vulnerability alternative and complementary methods should be considered. The Swaziland NVAC study “*The links between HIV-AIDS, demographic status and livelihoods in rural areas*” is a good example. Previous attempts to assess HIV/AIDS impacts with HEA tools have had limited success.
107. Overall, while there is genuine potential for collaboration with poverty reduction strategies, expectations should be pragmatic. The relevant skills within the VAC are limited and demands are high. The VAC role will be one of adding insight to the dimensions and dynamics of poverty and hunger. It will not be, nor should it be seen as, an alternative to the role of bureaus of statistics within the PMUs. NVAC information and analyses should be used to add depth to official poverty statistics.
108. A sustained dialogue between the NVAC and poverty reduction strategies on mutual areas of reinforcement is a necessary starting point. The form of the collaboration will be determined by the national context and is likely to be highly variable.

Institutional arrangements for the VACs

109. The VACs were originally founded as independent committees. One of the common discussions amongst VACs is a push to formalise their position in government. There are significant advantages:
- The inclusion of the VAC within regular budget lines. If a core secretariat could be established this would take the burden from the over stretched (voluntary) members of the VAC;
 - A more stable source of finance would improve the ability of VACs to plan their activities. As the crisis recedes there is a real danger that donors will lose interest. Too often in similar contexts the interest wanes, funding fails and capacities are lost. The best remedy is inclusion in regular government budgets;
 - The lack of official status makes it hard for donors to buy-in to the VAC process – there is no official ability to receive, expend and account for funds; and

- There have been examples where the lack of formal position of the VAC (Swaziland) has affected the credibility, or official endorsement, of VAC information. It also makes it hard for government staff to justify the use of their time on VAC activities.
- 110. Reflecting the inter-sectoral nature of food security, the VACs work with a large number of government ministries. This includes disaster management units and poverty monitoring units in ministries of economic planning and national development. The ministries from which the VAC chairs are drawn vary (see Annex 4). In nearly all cases there was a strong logic at national level that justified the decision.
- 111. As can be seen from the table in Annex 4, the institutionalisation of VACs within government is an on-going process in most countries. The various NVACs are developing along differing lines, taking best advantage of the national situation. Attempts to standardize the location, and by extension the mandate and even methodology, would undermine the strong and positive relationships that have been established with the current hosting institutions. The general observation was that there appeared to be a genuine interest in governments to gain ‘ownership’ of the VAC process at the national level. The extent to which this was underpinned by an appreciation of the VAC role (beyond a food aid calculator) is not so clear.
- 112. There is a concern that the very success of the VAC may have been due to its independence from government structures and the active participation of partners. Institutionalisation has to be carefully managed to garner the benefits and minimise the risks. It is important that the unique networking and collaboration that has driven the VACs is not lost.
- 113. There were suggestions that the membership of the VACs might need to be formalised. The current situation where self-appointed members wield significant influence on national policy and programme decisions is questionable. This process would also allow the VACs to bring in much needed skills including nutrition and health, where UNICEF is an important member. Expanding the mandate to include social protection (Section 3.2) will have direct consequences for membership, including both government departments and key NGOs such as CARE.
- 114. A pervasive concern is the dearth of professionals at national level with an understanding of the importance of vulnerability. The ability to sustain a national debate on issues of vulnerability depends on a quorum of competent individuals, both technicians and decision makers. This lack of capacity contributes to the continued marginalisation of governments in humanitarian affairs.
- 115. The VAC process to date has trained a cadre of enumerators rather than analysts. It has also enabled a number of mid-level government individuals to engage with, and advocate for, the VAC process and results. However, analytical capacity remains minimal. To a very large extent the VAC process remains highly reliant on technical assistance located in other countries.
- 116. Similar concerns exist at the regional level, with SADC also highly reliant on external skills. This position may have been exacerbated by the FANR move from Harare and the disengagement from the Regional Early Warning Unit where capacity-building efforts had been located.
- 117. There are many arguments for national capacity development. However, achieving this, given the experience required and the relative sophistication of the skills involved, is not straightforward. One element of the solution might be a wider dispersion of knowledge to include politicians, the media and civil society. Increasingly there are examples of local NGO coalitions engaging in both food security and poverty monitoring and providing an important complement to Government capacity.
- 118. The VACs have important relationships with a large number of existing data collection systems. A summary of related data collection systems is itemized in Annex 3. Related data systems considered include those which collect data for diverse purposes including early warning and disaster management monitoring, crop performance monitoring, climate monitoring and forecasting, HIV-

AIDS surveillance, nutritional surveillance, market prices, poverty monitoring, income expenditure surveys and other regular statistical surveys.

119. The variety and wealth of data providers emphasizes the need for VACs to serve as *analysts* rather than merely another data collection system. The study ToR (Annex 10) asked the team to investigate the relationship of the VACs to these national systems and recommend future interactions. At the generic level the important conclusion was that the variety and wealth of established data providers emphasizes the need for VACs to serve as *analysts* rather than an additional data collection system.
120. More specific recommendations cannot be appropriately made under this scoping study for three reasons. Firstly, such a task is in itself a major undertaking given the large number of national systems (this is estimated to be in the order of 50 related national data collection systems across the six scoping countries) which VACs interact with. Even a relatively superficial, but systematic, examination of all of these systems was beyond the capacity of this mission. Secondly, this task is more appropriately approached at the *national* level. The NVACs need to own this process, which should link a prioritisation of which data systems to support with their nationally defined NVAC mandates. This cannot be appropriately defined at the regional level, or using purely technical considerations. Instead this needs to be a process that takes into account institutional realities.
121. A good start has already been made in analysing these relationships in the NVAC studies conducted as part of the DFID funded three-stage VAC review. This can be developed further. The DFID national support to the development of the Zambia NVAC is explicitly promoting these linkages at the national level. This anticipates a six-month consultative process, engaging with these national institutions and systems, as part of the NVAC project design.
122. While the VAC process has been highly reliant on DFID resources this is not exclusively so (Annex 4). Not least is the time and energy expended by various VAC members. Large in-kind contributions in the form of consultancy support have been made by the USAID FEWS NET project. WFP is also heavily engaged through the Vulnerability Assessment Mapping Unit. UNDP and the EU supported the Zimbabwe NVAC. The EU in Malawi is supporting technical assistance to the Malawi VAC.
123. It is notable that the objectives and methods of the VACs are entirely consistent with the operation of the UN Food Insecurity Vulnerability Information Mapping System (FIVIMS). Currently FIVIMS is not represented in any of the six ‘priority’ countries. A FIVIMS is being set up in South Africa. Additionally the South African government has allocated R10 million for establishing a regional food security system in southern Africa. This offers a potential collaborative source of finance.
124. In conclusion, the VAC may fulfil an important analytical role that is not addressed by existing government institutions. Institutionalisation of the VACs is an important priority, but must be done in a way that preserves the partnerships that have energized the VACs. Given the inter-sectoral nature of the VACs there is unlikely to be a single best institutional home and this will be decided best at country level. A wide process of capacity building is required amongst all stakeholders to promote a wider discussion on vulnerability and support the attainment of the overall objectives.

Relationships between the NVAC and RVAC

125. From the national perspective the RVAC was seen to provide support in two key areas. The first is as a channel of resources. In the absence of alternative funds the NVACs were originally funded through the regional mechanism. While this was a necessary interim measure to establish the VACs, the clear desire from all partners is that Governments with donor support should increasingly fund NVACs at the national level. The consensus is that the NVACs should be a nationally owned and

driven system. The financing arrangements need to support this, by encouraging local control and building sustainability.

126. The RVAC channel (specifically DFID funded) is not the only way that financial needs are currently met. There are significant contributions from other partners, USAID/FEWS NET and WFP across the region, and increasing national level buy-in, DFID in Zambia, and the EU in Malawi. In terms of long-term sustainability it is desirable to encourage diversification of support, including contributions by Government. However, that several of the national VACs remain highly reliant on external support. Therefore continued gap filling is required from the regional level to maintain the system until it is fully institutionalised and national support comes on stream.
127. The second broad area for regional support is in facilitating an exchange of ideas, experiences and professionals. The closely related need for capacity development was also mentioned widely. This role of information exchange is important in promoting national systems and keeping the VAC goals broadly comparable across countries.
128. One of the big debates centres on the desire for *regional comparability*, an important agenda from the regional perspective. Ideally information on food insecurity would be available in exactly the same format at the sub-national level. This would facilitate prioritisation of relief programming across the region. While desirable, achieving regional comparability remains problematic for practical reasons. This approach was adopted in early rounds of the VAC assessments with standard instruments and analytical procedures proscribed by the region. However, this proved problematic given; differences at the national level in the institutions involved, their competency and contribution; differences of opinion on the role for quantitative and qualitative methods of enquiry; investigating income and expenditure sources which vary by Country; and problems of scale – the same approach is unlikely to work equally well at the national level in Swaziland and Mozambique.
129. Therefore, strengthening national ownership and quality of analysis may be more relevant short-term objectives. A regional programme can equally well support appropriate national adaptation and does not have to be linked to a standardized methodology.

3.1.3 Conclusions

130. Long-term trends and short-term shocks have combined to increase vulnerability to food insecurity in southern Africa. While emergency programmes may have treated the symptoms, little has been done to address the causes. A better understanding of vulnerability and risk is required for an improved response.
131. The VAC system has spearheaded attempts to improve information on food insecurity and vulnerability, offering an important complement to existing national systems. In the context of the recent crisis its focus has been to identify food deficits and recommend response requirements. This important function needs to be institutionalised and sustained. But as the immediate crisis recedes the VAC system is grappling with its longer-term mandate. Some broad priorities may be identified:
 - VACs should maintain a focus on improving food insecurity and vulnerability data quality, integrating and exchanging this information, and promoting the better use of information to improve action;
 - A move away from a focus on data collection (especially large annual surveys), and a greater reliance on working with, and in sport of, government data collection systems;
 - A greater emphasis on the analysis of food insecurity and vulnerability, its occurrence and causes;
 - A greater emphasis on relating this information to the needs of decision makers, government and donors, at policy level; and

- Capacity building within the system to improve the quality of conversations on food insecurity and vulnerability.
132. This is a challenging agenda and may take the VACs out of their comfort zone. Grappling with these issues calls for methodological innovation and the VACs need to diversify their analysis from a narrow focus on HEA based analysis. The methods should follow from the agreed purpose and objectives, with room for a more eclectic and innovative approach. This will require external support and a role for the region.
133. In the short term the objectives of support should include:
- The institutionalisation of VACs within government structures, including defining national VAC mandates;
 - Establishing new partnerships, both within the VAC system, and between the VACs and national institutions that reflect its new mandate;
 - The completion of livelihood baselines;
 - Transferring the skills and data for national baselines and needs assessments into government systems, as outlined in Annex 3;
 - Developing an agenda for future research (on the incidence, causes and appropriate responses to food insecurity) and a strategy for linking this to decision makers at all levels; and
 - Developing a methodological toolkit, as opposed to reliance on a single method, to support these objectives.
134. This will necessitate targeted resources from the region to countries, which will be limited to short-term support within the current resource envelope. This is intended as a transitional measure until national support from both governments and donors can be generated.
135. Pragmatism over the VAC role should be maintained. The system still operates on a largely voluntary basis with limited resources and has to maintain a tight focus. Complementary research, advocacy and training activities are advocated to enhance and synergise the VAC work.

3.2 Social Protection

3.2.1 Social safety nets and social protection

136. Although welfare programs have been long established in southern Africa, *social safety nets* gained prominence following the publication of the 1990 World Development Report. This included them as one of the three pillars of the new poverty agenda. In this context, safety nets were conceived as ‘some form of insurance to help people through short-term stress and calamity’ (World Bank, 1990:90). Safety nets were introduced as a means of addressing *transitory poverty* rather than *chronic poverty*. For most of the 1990s, development policy makers focused on safety nets to support those that would otherwise fall below a minimum acceptable standard of living. Of special concern was offering protection or compensation to the losers from structural adjustment and other macroeconomic reform processes.
137. In more recent years the notion of safety nets has received renewed interest, driven predominantly by donor agencies (notably the World Bank) and repackaged *as social protection*. This entailed broadening the concept to include interventions directed at both chronic and transitory poverty by:
- Protecting poor people who have a chronic incapacity to work or earn (for reasons of age or health), and
 - Mitigating the vulnerability of the working poor to short-term shocks such as droughts, floods and illness.

138. The Social Risk Management (SRM) framework further disaggregates social protection activities in response to short term shocks. Interventions may be considered under the general headings of:
- **Risk reduction strategies**, which reduce the exposure to risk;
 - **Risk mitigation strategies**, which reduce the potential impact of shocks; and
 - **Risk coping strategies**, which relieve the impact once it has occurred.
139. These strategies can be either informal, market based or public in nature. An important design feature of public strategies is ensuring that they don't crowd out beneficial informal risk management strategies.
140. There is a long running debate underlying social protection on the implicit trade-off between the desire for social justice and economic growth. Social protection can be perceived as expensive, with a high opportunity cost to growth, and a disincentive to work for both taxpayers and recipients.
141. However, there is a growing argument that advocates social protection as an integral part of growth strategies, not an alternative. Haddad (2002) argues that adequate nutrition underlies mental, physical and social development. While large numbers of people remain malnourished and ill growth may remain illusory. Social protection can therefore be viewed as a precursor or investment in growth, which contributes to asset protection and social cohesion, and facilitates households engaging in productive activities that have higher risk. Establishing the links between social protection and growth is taken as one of the key areas of enquiry for this scoping study.

Table 3.2: Social protection arrangements and strategies

Arrangements & Strategies	Informal	Market-based	Public
Risk Reduction			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Less risky production <input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Proper feeding and weaning practices <input type="checkbox"/> Engaging in hygiene and other disease preventing activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> In-service training <input type="checkbox"/> Financial market literacy <input type="checkbox"/> Company-based and market-driven labour standards 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Public labour standards <input type="checkbox"/> Pre-service training <input type="checkbox"/> Labour market policies <input type="checkbox"/> Child labour interventions <input type="checkbox"/> Disability policies <input type="checkbox"/> Good macroeconomic policies <input type="checkbox"/> AIDS and other disease prevention <input type="checkbox"/> Legislation to remove gender inequalities in property rights, marriage, and access to labour markets.
Risk Mitigation			
Portfolio	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Multiple jobs <input type="checkbox"/> Investment in human, physical and real assets. <input type="checkbox"/> Investment in social capital (rituals, reciprocal gift-giving) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Investment in multiple financial assets <input type="checkbox"/> Micro-finance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Multi pillar pension systems <input type="checkbox"/> Asset transfers <input type="checkbox"/> Protection of property rights (especially for women) <input type="checkbox"/> Support for extending financial markets to poor people.
Insurance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Marriage/family 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Old-age annuities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <input type="checkbox"/> Mandated/provided

Arrangements & Strategies	Informal	Market-based	Public
	<input type="checkbox"/> Community arrangements <input type="checkbox"/> Share tenancy <input type="checkbox"/> Tied labour	<input type="checkbox"/> Disability, accident and other personal insurance <input type="checkbox"/> Crop, fire and other damage insurance	insurance for unemployment, old-age, disability, survivorship, sickness and so on.
Risk Coping			
	<input type="checkbox"/> Selling real assets <input type="checkbox"/> Migration <input type="checkbox"/> Borrowing from neighbours <input type="checkbox"/> Intra-community transfers/charity <input type="checkbox"/> Sending children to work <input type="checkbox"/> Dis-saving in human capital	<input type="checkbox"/> Selling financial assets <input type="checkbox"/> Borrowing from banks	<input type="checkbox"/> Transfers/social assistance <input type="checkbox"/> Subsidies <input type="checkbox"/> Public works

3.2.2 Social protection applications in the region

142. A preliminary mapping of social safety nets and social protection is presented in Annex 6. This focuses on the larger programmes including all the national initiatives. The Annex does not capture the multitude of smaller local activities.
143. An examination of the list of projects and programmes documented for the six country case studies provides unequivocal evidence that a wide range of safety net initiatives are ongoing in the region. Very few of these are in the form of cash transfers, with examples including Mozambique’s Food Subsidy Programme, an urban-based cash transfer programme for the destitute, and Malawi’s pilot studies in Dedza as a basis for its Direct Transfers Programme. Lesotho also intends to introduce a modest old age pension scheme in November 2004. In-kind transfers are the predominant form of formal safety net. Of particular note are food related programmes such as supplementary feeding, education programmes such as fee waivers and the provision of materials, health programmes including fee waivers and free basic health care, and public works programmes (food-for-work and cash-for-work).

In some of the countries visited there is some experimental safety nets work being undertaken in response to the mounting impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Perhaps the most notable example comes from Swaziland, where the Indlunkhulu project is attempting to building on existing structures and re-establish Indlunkhulu fields, which are the chief’s fields for members of the community that are unable to support themselves. The intention is to provide food for orphaned and vulnerable children (OVC). Also educational programmes have been introduced with the aim of getting OVCs back to school.

144. Despite these diverse programmes in many of the region’s poorer nations, there are lingering questions about coverage, integration and targeting. Moreover, many of these initiatives lack systematic mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating whether objectives are being achieved or missed. A prime example of this is Zambia’s Public Welfare Assistance Scheme, a social safety net initiative that has existed for around fifty years but has never had any in-depth evaluation. As a result policymakers can only provide anecdotal evidence on how well the programme meets the needs of the poor and vulnerable, and no lessons can be extrapolated and used to inform planning decisions.

145. Innovative safety nets, which explicitly link social protection programmes to growth and development objectives, are increasingly being developed. An example is the TAPS programme in Ethiopia (Box 3.2).

3.2.3 Constraints and opportunities for social protection

146. Based upon a review of evidence emerging from the six country visits and existing documentation, we can identify a number of constraints facing policymakers in southern Africa in the field of social protection.

147. Perhaps most readily apparent is the limited capacity to implement social protection (for example safety nets and non-contributory pension systems) given the co-existence of a high incidence of poverty and vulnerability with scarce government resources. While a wealthier country such as South Africa has the means to successfully provide, operate and sustain a suite of welfare benefits for vulnerable and impoverished groups, poorer countries in the region face fiscal and human resource limitations. Some of them have nevertheless begun to support modest interventions, as indicated in the preceding discussion.

Box 3.2: The Transitional Asset Protection System (TAPS) in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Government is in the process of developing the Transitional Asset Protection System (TAPS) safety net programme, in collaboration with donors (including The World Bank, DFID, USAID and EU). Under TAPS safety nets do not have a narrow welfarist objective, nor are they seen as a substitute for development. Instead they are designed to serve as a springboard for growth, working in concert with traditional development programmes.

Given fiscal realities TAPS is based upon an assumption of external funding. It is argued that this is largely a question of reorganising existing donor funding, rather than incremental funding. Current support systems revolve around annual emergency responses. However, funding could be reorganised between the chronically (or predictably) food insecure and the transitory (or unpredictably) food insecure. TAPS seeks to protect the assets of the predictably food insecure in a more effective and efficient manner, with asset protection as an explicit precursor to asset building. At their recent meeting the G8 leaders rallied behind the 'productive safety nets' approach to reverse 'decades of dependency and chronic hunger'.

Source: Raisin 2003

148. Questions of affordability mean that it is not realistic to expect comprehensive nationally owned social protection systems for many countries in the region in the medium to long-term. Therefore there is a need to advocate a more pragmatic, narrowly defined focus on those interventions that are likely to have the greatest impact in addressing chronic and transitory food insecurity within the fiscal and institutional realities of a given context and time.

149. Social protection occurs within a rather ad hoc framework. The institutions, programmes, and partnerships required to address concerns of food security and social protection in a coordinated, integrated framework are evidently weak or non-existent. Although there are some relatively robust partnerships and interventions in the region they mainly operate in a fragmented and ad hoc manner. This leads to various inefficiencies, such as duplication of efforts, overstretching of limited human resources, and uncoordinated policy and programme initiatives.

150. A great deal of consensus building on the approach and operational linkups among different technical groups is needed. As is true for all multi-sectoral initiatives, the social protection agenda requires a strong advocate to ensure that it becomes a core issue on the development agenda. Risk and vulnerability need to be at the core of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiatives. Sector strategies need to mainstream these issues.

151. Donors have supported many of the recent efforts to assist the poor to reduce, mitigate and cope with vulnerability and food insecurity without sufficient ownership by government and other key

local stakeholders. Governments are also struggling with capacity constraints in the delivery system. Zimbabwe reports close to 50% of positions in the key Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Education are vacant.

152. Information and administrative systems are inadequately developed to ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable are effectively reached or targeted by social protection efforts undertaken in the region. Despite notable progress over the last decade, problems with the regularity and reliability of data still persist, thus complicating the identification of groups at risk and making targeting especially difficult. Enhanced vulnerability information systems therefore need to produce data that can feed into the design of social protection interventions, better targeting the vulnerable with more effective interventions. Partly as a result of these information gaps, there is a bias towards crisis-driven social protection measures as opposed to longer-term, strategic interventions that improve the resilience of the poor and vulnerable in a systematic and sustainable manner.

3.2.4 Links with vulnerability information systems

153. As identified above, the links between vulnerability information systems and social protection are relatively weakly developed at both technical and institutional levels. In the current landscape one of the key information providers will be the VACs. The VACs are potentially well placed to provide the basic information that is needed for *targeting* social protection measures; including the occurrence, nature and causes of food insecurity.
154. However, the VACs have not generally established effective links on this agenda. The VACs currently focus on linking analyses of food insecurity to food aid requirements – one form of safety net. They generally do not analyse alternative social risk management options. Nor are institutional linkages well developed with agencies responsible for non-food based interventions, meaning that the potentially useful information is not adequately utilized.
155. VACs have an important role in analysing alternatives to food aid. This has both information and policy dimensions. The main concrete example of the VAC attempting a systematic analysis of alternatives was given in Malawi where cash for food was considered. In the Malawi context, where donors are prepared to fund cash safety nets, the information was well received and applied. Cash transfers were also considered in Swaziland. However, in other countries where food aid is viewed as the preferred or only option cash transfers will require an initial policy debate before they become a viable alternative.
156. On the information side a couple of critical opportunities stand out. The starting point for planning safety net interventions is an analysis of risk and vulnerability. Social protection planners need to know who is food insecure and where they are located. While VAC reports provide estimates of total numbers they generally fail to provide the differentiation required by social protection planners.
157. A basic disaggregation is required between *chronic* and *transitory* food insecurity. Understanding this distinction is intrinsic to many of the choices between safety nets. The VAC methodologies are currently geared to answer the question of who is currently food insecure and do not disaggregate these groups. Other information sources, such as income expenditure surveys and nutritional data, may have more specific application as chronic food insecurity is closely allied to poverty. VACs can attempt this analysis by bringing together various information sources, including the results of their own surveys. Indeed, the continuing relevance of VAC analysis depends on making this distinction and tracking changes over time.
158. As noted from previous discussions the VACs will be most effective at analysing this information either at national or meso scale. Their information is unlikely to have sufficient resolution to assist in local level planning. Instead it would help to move the debate forward at national level on the best mix of responses.

159. In addition the VAC analysis has largely concentrated on looking at the vulnerability side of the equation. There has been much less consideration of *risks and shocks*. The VAC analysis of food security is organised around modelling the impact of a limited number of large scale shocks such as drought or floods. The ability to analyse more diverse shocks, such as policy impacts is less evident. It totally fails to examine household level shocks. Interestingly, research from Bangladesh suggests that much of the risk that precipitates a serious decline into poverty is idiosyncratic (for example the death of a household member) rather than covariate (Hulme & Shepherd, 2002). This methodological weakness might explain why the impact of HIV/AIDS was not acknowledged sooner. By extension the VACs will consider risk reduction strategies that will be effective against the larger scale shocks. However, if the drivers of poverty and food insecurity lie elsewhere then different emphasises in vulnerability reduction strategies are warranted.
160. VACs are well placed to provide an understanding of the distribution, frequency and severity of risks – an important planning input. The Swaziland VAC has been requested to *map potential shock factors* to assist in planning vulnerability reduction based interventions. UNDP is also working to
161. One of the areas where the VACs have addressed particular attention is the relationship between HIV/AIDS, vulnerability and food security. To date, VACs in southern Africa have mostly only incorporated HIV/AIDS in a cursory manner:
- The **Lesotho** VAC acknowledges that links between HIV/AIDS and food security are not yet well established. It plans to undertake a special study on the impact of HIV/AIDS on food security before the end of 2004 to inform policy and programming. LVAC partners such as CARE and the National University of Lesotho are also analysing HIV/AIDS and food security.
 - In **Malawi** the VAC lists HIV/AIDS as a future priority, but believes it lacks capacity to deal with the issue at present. It sees extending its data collection to include new and emerging issues such as HIV/AIDS as critical for increasing interest among potential consumers of VAC data. The National Aids Commission (NAC), the government organisation coordinating HIV/AIDS related activities in the country), has no formal links with the MVAC either as an information user or provider. Although the VAC does not use the information collected by the NAC in assessing vulnerability to food insecurity, this type of information is very important since household food security is affected by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
 - In **Mozambique**, the GAV has identified HIV/AIDS and food security and nutrition as a topic requiring a specific thematic study. At present SETSAN is hosting a working group to discuss HIV/AIDS and food security and nutrition. The group will contribute to the final Strategic Plan to Combat STD/HIV/AIDS. There are no explicit references in the draft strategy to household food security and nutrition.
 - The **Zambia** VAC is considering broadening its mandate to incorporate multi-sectoral issues such as HIV/AIDS, poverty and macro-economic policies. There was an attempt to incorporate HIV/AIDS in the most recent 2004 VAC assessment, and a recent study looked at targeting and developing vulnerability criteria for HIV/AIDS. A concern, however, remains about the potential erosion of the VAC's core competency that could result from transforming its mandate.
 - Of the countries visited during the scoping exercise, **Swaziland** is exceptional in that HIV/AIDS has begun to feature prominently in NVAC operations. In May / June 2003, the Swaziland VAC conducted a Livelihoods Based Assessment that examined the food security situation and responses, the links between food security and HIV/AIDS, and other appropriate food and non-food interventions. The findings revealed the wide-ranging economic and social impacts of HIV/AIDS, and demonstrated links between food security and HIV/AIDS. In addition, a national survey to analyse the impact of HIV/AIDS on demography and livelihoods of the rural population was done in 2003 and the report was officially presented in mid-2004. The RVAC supported the Swaziland

VAC in conducting the HIV/AIDS assessment. The Swaziland VAC intends to produce detailed HEA studies on HIV/AIDS in the form of local community studies of 150 or so households over the next few years. The government parastatal National Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA) is a member of the secretariat of the Swaziland VAC, and has expressed interest in possibly funding the VAC to conduct a corresponding urban HIV/AIDS assessment.

162. Further concentration on thematic areas of vulnerability research, with HIV/AIDS standing out, may be the best future direction for VACs.
163. VACs need to forge expanded or strengthened linkages with new institutional partners to work effectively in the field of social protection. This would include links to ministries of social welfare, health and education. An expanded range of NGO partners would be appropriate. The current VACs have a limited exposure to, and understanding of, social protection issues and their links to vulnerability analysis. Training and capacity building for VAC members may be necessary as a precursor to more active engagement in this role.
164. It is notable that particularly innovative examples of vulnerability research and analysis, and the links to social protection are being done outside the VAC system at community, local, national and regional levels. The CARE studies of Zambia, Malawi and Lesotho are excellent examples. It is important to maintain space and support for other methods and institutions to engage in this work. However, the VAC could be a useful mechanism for sharing and disseminating this information.

3.2.5 Conclusions

165. A diversified set of safety nets, under the broad social protection framework, can provide an important part of the search for solutions to food insecurity and poverty. A number of key needs emerge. The first is a requirement for better information to underpin planning. There is a specific demand for disaggregated information on the chronic and transitory food insecure. There is also a need for a better understanding of risks and shocks.
166. The VACs are well placed to undertake this analysis. However, this will require capacity enhancement within the VACs to improve their understanding of social protection issues. It will also require stronger institutional links with the agencies responsible for social protection. The VACs should concentrate on providing an analysis of risks and vulnerabilities. This will be most useful for policy level debate and advocacy, rather than detailed local level planning.
167. A better analysis of vulnerability and risk is one part of the solution. This can help to identify the priorities for improved vulnerability management. However, the scoping study concludes that this needs to be complemented by an expanded knowledge of the various social protection options. There is insufficient knowledge in the region on a range of social protection mechanisms that can be taken to scale. This exchange of information needs to draw on both international and regional experience. This information is needed as an input to both policy and programme questions.

3.3 Trade in foodstuffs and food security

168. Trade in foodstuffs can contribute to food security, by improving both access to food and, perhaps more importantly, the availability of food.⁹

3.3.1 Improving access to food through trade

169. Trade in foodstuffs can help create jobs and incomes and thereby enhance access to food. For example, a liberal trade regime may allow the poor to grow cash crops for domestic markets and

⁹ The discussion here is, for the most part, limited to trade in basic foodstuffs — largely those of cereals, and mainly unprocessed cereals because most food security concerns are about assuring the main component of the diet.

export. Freer trade in inputs such as seed and fertiliser may encourage such cash cropping. There will also be some jobs created in trading itself.

170. Trade can allow specialisation of production, at higher productivity, with consequent increases in total output.
171. On the other hand, liberal trade may present a threat to some domestic enterprises that are currently protected. The main threats probably apply to protected manufacturing — import-substituting industry — including some food processing. But some farm activities may also face loss of market to imports. There are, for example, great concerns in Lesotho and Swaziland about the impact of imported food, including processed flour and cabbages, on their farm and milling industries. It is alleged that South African growers and millers enjoy advantages — including subsidies — that domestic industries do not.¹⁰ Policy-makers in these countries justify trade barriers on the grounds that they have infant industries that need protection, and that small-scale production lacks economies of scale.
172. Fears about freer trade are understandable. Sometimes the costs are more immediate and apparent than the benefits. This applies, for example, when a local factory closes down in the face of competition from imports. The countervailing gains to local consumers in terms of lower cost products or inputs to industries, and the opportunities for exports that arise when liberalisation is reciprocal, may take longer to materialise or be less obviously a result of trade reform.
173. A policy concern here is the understanding of how to make the best use of the opportunities of freer trade while finding ways to mitigate against its adverse impacts.

3.3.2 Improving food availability through trade

174. Trade can contribute to *food availability* in two main ways. First, it can reduce the cost of food, since food may be imported at lower cost than domestic supply with clear benefits to net food buyers, a category that probably includes many of the poor and those vulnerable to food insecurity. But in southern Africa trade in staple foods of this nature may be limited. Owing to the high costs of moving basic foodstuffs within the region,¹¹ and the often quite modest cost of domestic production of staples such as maize,¹² domestic supplies are usually available at lower cost than competing imports. Thus in years of favourable weather during the crop season, trade flows in cereals, above all maize, are low in the region (see Annex 7). For example, in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe less than 5% of the total maize used in a normal year would typically be traded.
175. Second, and more important, trade can even out inter-annual variations in domestic food supply. Most domestic food is produced on rain-fed fields, and so is particularly subject to the vagaries of

¹⁰ The converse has been argued for wheat milling: under the SACU rules, a tariff on imported wheat has to be paid by millers in South Africa, whereas a rebate applies to users in other parts of SACU, thus giving wheat millers in Swaziland, for example, access to lower cost wheat than that paid by their competitors in RSA. Although the duty-free wheat is meant only to be milled for domestic production, the milled flour leaks across the borders (Zunckel 2002)

¹¹ Typical costs of transport (from Imani 2003):

From	To	Cost, US\$/ton
US Gulf Ports	Durban	25.5
Durban	Gauteng	23.6
Gauteng	Harare	55.6
Gauteng	Lusaka	73.2
Gauteng	Lilongwe	50.6

Costs are sea freight for the first row, otherwise road transport in 32 ton trucks.

¹² In areas of moderate to high potential for arable farming that exist within several countries of the region — for example, parts of central Zambia, north-central Zimbabwe, northern Mozambique, the southern highlands of Tanzania, etc., food crops can be grown at relatively low cost — for example, maize for less than US\$100 a ton, well below import parity prices.

the weather. Drought is a recurring threat throughout the region and in some areas excess rains, floods and hail damage also threaten crops. Production of the main cereals crops is thus quite variable. Trade is one important way to even out year-to-year supply variations. Hence most of the cereals trade seen in southern Africa occurs in years of poor weather for farming. This makes trade in cereals decidedly erratic. For example, taking the case of maize, average imports between 1980 and 2001 into the region made up by the SACU member countries plus Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe were 1.36M tons a year: but the standard deviation was 1.47M tons — a coefficient of variation of more than 100% (see Annex 7).


176. The variability of the cereals trade implies that both private traders and the managers of public grain reserves have to be flexible and agile in their operations. The grains trade is anything but a routine, programmable activity. To meet this challenge dealers need good information on production, stocks, and prices as well as flexible access to credit, storage and transport. To this we can add a trade and customs environment that allows borders to be crossed with a minimum of delay and costs.

3.3.3 Physical storage as an alternative to trade

177. Trade, of course, is not the only way to even out yearly variations in domestic supply: an alternative is to store domestically produced food. Figure 3.1 sets out these options, summarises their advantages and disadvantages, and the complementary measures that might be taken to offset particular drawbacks.
178. Whether it is better to store or import depends in part on the relative costs, and in part on the risks arising when large-scale imports have to be arranged. In much of the landlocked part of the region the calculation may be quite finely balanced (see Box 3.3), although it does seem that storage is likely to be more expensive than imports sourced from Gauteng or some other part of the region.¹³
179. Annual variations in domestic supply can be extreme, so that in some years harvest failures create the conditions for food crises or emergencies – times when food simply is not available, or only at exorbitant prices. Some commentators see such years as qualitatively different to those of lesser harvest failures. They are right in as much as unusually large calls on imported food raise issues of access to finance to meet the costs, and the capacity of transport systems to handle exceptionally high volumes of freight within a short time. Such worries become arguments for holding physical reserves of food in country.

¹³ For Zambia and Malawi, for example, supplies from Southern Tanzania and Northern Mozambique are often available at an import parity price below that of maize sourced either from South Africa or from the international market.

Figure 3.1: Options for responding to the problem of fluctuating national supplies of basic foodstuffs



180. Owing to these concerns and others over the sheer availability and price of cereals, several governments in the region favour keeping *national grain reserves* under public ownership. There is little evidence to show that the reserves have been effective in achieving objectives of stabilising prices or of averting national food crises, although to be fair, when major shocks have occurred, the reserves have often been at a low ebb,¹⁴ and hence have not been able to prove their worth.
181. The costs of storage have been quite high as well. For example, holding three months' supply in any of the landlocked countries of Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe means investing in 500,000 tons of maize, at a cost of perhaps US\$50M (assuming a buy-in cost at store of US\$100 a ton); plus storage costs of a minimum of US\$15M a year, not including losses to spoilage or foregone interest on the capital.

¹⁴ Cases include the grain reserves in Zimbabwe in 1992 and in Malawi in 2001.

Box 3.3: Comparing costs of stored to imported maize for Harare, Zimbabwe

Producing maize for the market in natural region II of Zimbabwe in 1995/96 was estimated to cost US\$69 a ton on large-scale commercial farms, and US\$79 a ton on smallholder farms in the communal areas (Sukume et al. 2001). To these costs of production may be added some US\$15 a ton to cover an assumed average 150 km haulage to Harare. Domestic maize thus cost US\$84 or US\$94 a ton delivered to Harare – or a simple average of US\$89 a ton.

Imported maize costs US\$220 or more from international sources, and perhaps US\$160 from Gauteng, South Africa – both prices subject to variations depending on international maize prices and those applying on the Safex exchange in Johannesburg.

Storage costs between US\$30 and US\$60 a ton a year in Zimbabwe¹⁵ (Goedicke 2004), not including the opportunity cost of the capital invested in the maize. If the opportunity cost of capital were as little as 10% a year,¹⁶ then annual storage costs would come to US\$39 to US\$69 a ton. Some additional allowance needs to be made for losses of maize in store, perhaps 5% a year in a reasonably well-managed store, thus raising costs to US\$44 to US\$74 a ton a year.

If there is a low harvest twice a decade in Zimbabwe, then the cost of covering the deficit from grain stored in the years of good harvests will be on average the costs of local production plus 2.5 years of storage – that is from US\$199 to US\$274 a ton.

It seems that it would thus be cheaper to import maize from Gauteng than to store it, but the financial calculation changes if maize has to be acquired from the world market (usually US maize), when the decision will turn on the precise cost of storage.

Those considering storage versus imports in this case would also want to consider the uncertainty that might apply to the availability and price of imported maize, versus the risks of storage in terms of possible heavier losses in store, and varying costs of capital.

182. An alternative to national stores is to hold a *regional reserve*. The advantages of economies of scale are clear: there is less variation in the food production of a region compared to that of any individual country, so that the reserves necessary to cover for harvest failures would be less. Put otherwise, a regional reserve would benefit from pooling the risks.
183. Two recent sets of reports review the case for such reserves (the companion studies of Goedicke 2004 and Koester and Takavarasha 2004, produced for SADC; and the FAO/WFP-assisted study for NEPAD 2004). All three reports spell out the considerable challenges of establishing and operating such reserves, including:
- Deciding on contributions to be made by participating states, and their entitlements to use the stocks;
 - Agreeing on the location of the stocks (could be a single location, or a series of networked silos);
 - Defining and adhering to clear and transparent rules of operation covering procurement and release of stocks. Rules would need enforcement, with penalties for violations; and
 - Operating the reserve facilities effectively, implying the need for adequate physical facilities, and qualified staff.
184. The operation of such stocks would also need to be co-ordinated with food aid shipments. Given the magnitude of the challenges, two of the reports do not recommend establishing such reserves, while the other draws attention to the demanding nature of the conditions necessary to run such a

¹⁵ These costs are quite high: storage can currently be leased for R0.34 a day a ton in Gauteng – that is, about US\$20 a ton a year.

¹⁶ This may well be the economic opportunity cost of capital internationally. Domestically, interest rates in recent years have been far higher – pushed up by heavy borrowing by the government on domestic markets.

reserve successfully. As Goedicke (2004) points out, if countries have had problems in operating national reserves, how can they be expected to handle the additional co-ordination required by a regional reserve?

3.3.4 Additional measures to cope with uncertainty of food supply: financial reserves, futures, options, and insurance

185. Given the costs and difficulties of physical storage, the idea of holding a *financial reserve* sufficient to buy in imports at the first sign of a harvest failure looks attractive. The financial reserve would not require the costs of operation of large public silos, would not suffer losses in store, and could earn interest. But it does imply an opportunity cost to these funds: they would need to be set aside from scarce government revenues. A reserve sufficient to command say 200 000t of maize imported from the world market would probably need to be at least US\$44M.
186. An intriguing alternative is to take out *insurance* premiums against bad weather that would pay out when thresholds had been passed — for example, when an index of rainfall in the cropping season¹⁷ was below, say, 75% of the long-term average (Hess & Syroka 2004). What is contemplated here is the national counterpart to the farm-level insurance package mentioned in section 3.2. Such risks can be re-insured on international markets.
187. The beauty of such a scheme would be the automatic nature of payouts. A country would have immediate access to additional funds to buy imports of food to cover harvest losses, and an immediate source of funds to pay for relief for those most affected by the bad weather. There would be none of the delays that currently arise as governments seek extra funds, either by re-arranging their own finances, or appealing to donors. For the case of Malawi the study cited calculates that a premium of US\$7M a year might be the cost of insurance that would pay out up to US\$70M in a worst case scenario. This sum would be sufficient to import more than 300 000t from the international market in most years.

Another important benefit from weather-based insurance is that a bad harvest would not carry the risk of macro-economic instability as the exchange rate deteriorates in response to the demand for foreign exchange to cover additional imports. In the case of Malawi in 2001, for example, additional imports arranged by the NFRA required finding US\$75M. The Kwacha fell from September 2001 onwards, depreciating from less than MK65 to the US dollar to more than MK80 to the US dollar over the next year.¹⁸ This meant that when food supplies arrived, their values in Malawi Kwacha were that much higher owing to exchange rate depreciation. The same depreciation had inflationary effects throughout the economy.

188. Since donors often end up footing large bills for food emergencies, it might be simpler for them to contribute to the insurance premiums — thereby turning occasional large disaster budgets into routine and programmable spending. But they could also contribute to financial reserve.
189. How do financial reserves compare to insurance costs? Box 3.4 sets out a simple calculation. On the assumptions made, it seems the financial reserves are clearly considerably cheaper than the insurance premium.

¹⁷ Rather than total rainfall, rains in ten-day periods through the season could be monitored, and weighted by importance to the development of crops, to produce an index of rains. Hess & Syroka (2004) demonstrate just such a weighted index for Malawi, and find that it correlates well with typical yields harvested.

¹⁸ Thanks to Sarah Levy for pointing this out.

Box 3.4: Cost of weather-based insurance versus financial reserves

Suppose we have a country that requires 300kt of additional imports twice a decade to cover for bad harvests. Assume imports cost US\$230 a ton c.i.f., making a total financing need of US\$69M.

Weather-based insurance might involve a premium equivalent to the average loss for insurer — two times US\$69M a decade, times three (Hess & Syroka 2004, p. 36 considering Malawi). This would make an annual premium of **US\$41.4M** a year.

This seems steep. In another section of their report, Hess & Syroka (see page 61, Fig. 11) see premiums set as the expected annual loss, plus 25% of the standard deviation of losses. If we set the standard deviation equivalent to that for maize imports in Malawi 1980 to 2001, thereby using a coefficient of variation of 94%, then the premium might be **US\$17.04M a year**.

Financial reserves:

The financial reserve of US\$69M would cost an annual average of **US\$13.8M** a year in capital, plus the opportunity cost of reserving the funds. If they are kept in international securities they might yield 4% a year or more. This can be compared to the opportunity cost of capital invested domestically. Assume this to be 10%, making a net cost of 6% a year, then the reserve costs another **US\$4.14M** a year, giving a total cost of **US\$17.9M**.

The opportunity cost of domestic capital would have to rise around 40% before the cost of reserves equalled that of the insurance premium, well beyond any conceivable return to capital.

But, it does depend on how insurance premiums are computed: if the second method were realistic, there is hardly any difference between the costs of a financial reserve and an insurance premium.

190. If financial reserves or insurance would take care of the risk of not having funds to import food when harvests fail, what about the risk of high prices when imports are needed? Using **futures markets**, such as that operated by Safex in Johannesburg is one way to avoid these. In this case, a contract is made for future delivery of grains, with specified quantity, date, price and delivery point. Such a contract might be taken out when there is early warning of a crop failure. In southern Africa, the progress of the maize crop is usually apparent by February. If a poor crop is harvested additional supplies might be needed by as early as October in the marketing year, so there up to ten months of warning before supplies are physically needed: sufficient time to arrange contracts and take delivery. The drawback of a futures contract is that it locks the buyer in on price and quantity. It would mean taking an early estimate on the harvest shortfall, and a judgment on whether the future spot market price would be higher than the price on the futures market.¹⁹
191. An alternative is to use the **options markets** – again offered in the region by Safex – to lock in the price of a future grain delivery. In this case a call option is made for a specific quantity of grain at a particular price. The advantage here is that the call may or may not be taken up, depending on both the need to call on imports – perhaps the harvest was not as bad as expected – and the spot market price when supplies are needed – which could be lower than the call option price. If the call is not exercised the premium paid for the option is lost. This might be of the order of US\$1.6M for a contract worth US\$70M.²⁰
192. The possibility of using futures and options markets to insure against price risks when sourcing cereals internationally has frequently been mooted. In August 2001, for example, the SADC FANR ministers asked that the use of futures markets and options be explored, specifically examining cost savings, the physical capacity of SAFEX and any drawbacks of trading in futures (FEWSNET

¹⁹ The futures market is likely to move in concert with harvest forecasts. So if there were a region-wide drought, for example, the price on the futures market is likely to rise to reflect the expected upward pressure on the market in the near future. So an attractive price on the futures market may not be available when it is most valuable.

²⁰ Based on a 2.3% cost of the call option.

2002). Study tours to SAFEX for policy-makers to explore these possibilities have been organised. These have apparently not led to much, if any, use of options on that market; either by public agencies or by private traders. Box 3.5 discusses the reasons for this.

Box 3.5: Why are options markets not used more in Southern Africa (outside of SACU)?

Several reasons may explain why traders and public agencies north of the Limpopo make little or no use of the Safex options in grains:

The first possible reason is that the options market does not respond to the main problems that traders and agencies face. The options market allows hedging against price risks. But, as can be seen in section 3.3.5, and illustrated in Figure 3.1, these are not necessarily the main barriers to trade.

Second, even if one wanted to make use of the options markets, foreign exchange may be a stumbling block. Safex works in Rand — in accordance with South African monetary policy — and anyone trading in options has to be able to cover variation margins in Rand. That may be possible for large traders that operate internationally and have South African offices, but not for others who encounter problems in obtaining foreign exchange and making international bank transfers.

Third, and this affects futures contracts as well as options, is that market participants may need to be able to take physical delivery of grain. But this introduces another risk for traders in countries where governments control, albeit in some cases occasionally, the movement of grains across borders. What would happen, for example, if the government refused an import permit?

Fourth, and this may be a minor obstacle, there may also be issues arising with standards in as much as Safex deals with grains handled in bulk, not bagged. Most of the grain moved north of the Limpopo is in bags.

In general, futures and options markets are sophisticated institutions that require other institutions — such as banking services, telecommunications, storage operations, transport services (with bulk handling), standards and grading, etc. — to be in place to make them work. They cover certain risks and to a limited degree: they are not meant to be panacea. Safex, for example, could do nothing to prevent the spot market price of white maize in Gauteng doubling during the second half 2001. That was largely down to market fundamentals, and no amount of sophisticated trading could have prevented that price spike.²¹

For countries with less well developed markets, progress may lie in attending to the basics of markets — information, finance, transport and storage, standards and grades, predictable rules-based policy-making, etc. — and building up from reliable and effective spot markets.

Main source: Interview with Safex management

192. These measures for dealing with harvest failures are not necessarily exclusive. Hess & Syroka (2004), for example, propose that shocks to food availability be dealt with in sequence as follows:

- Relying on commercial imports;
- Drawing down on a small grain reserve;
- Using the pay-out from a weather-based insurance scheme; and
- Calling for food aid.

²¹ The late 2001 price spike for white maize reveals the downside of sophisticated markets — major players may either try to manipulate the market or make mistakes that others dare not challenge (floor traders are rarely criticised for following market leaders). In this case a major trader gambled on the market and lost heavily, leading to an official investigation and suspension from trading rights. The spike may have been exaggerated by such ill-informed trading.

On the other hand, when the markets fundamentals moved, Safex was effective in removing the price spike.

3.3.5 The scope for more trade in basic foodstuffs

193. Current levels of trade in basic foods are quite low, above all in years of normal farm weather. Is there scope for increased trade in foodstuffs? Weeks & Subasat (1998) have examined the degree to which countries in eastern and southern Africa have similar patterns of food production and consumption. They find that there is relatively little correlation and thus there is scope for complementarity – the exceptions to this include, however, the pairing of Mozambique with Tanzania, and the interactions between Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
194. Poulton & Dorward (2003) look at variations in maize production in the region from 1972 to 2002, and see correlations between production within two main groups of countries: one formed by South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe; the other by Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania. This suggests that there may be opportunities to trade grains between the two blocks.
195. Studies carried out by researchers at Michigan State University demonstrate the potential benefits of freer trade in cereals within the region. Arlindo and Tschirley (2003) show how trade in maize between northern Mozambique and Malawi benefits farmers in the former and consumers in the latter. Mwiinga et al. (2003) reports on the ways in which imports of yellow maize to Mozambique in 1992 helped hold down prices to poor consumers when white maize experienced a sharp price spike.
196. While it is commonplace in the literature and in discussion with informants to hear that freer trade would improve food availability and reduce the incidence of price spikes, there is little formal evidence to show how true this is.²² Just how much of a difference would freer trade in food make? The lack of studies that can provide an answer makes it that much more difficult to convince key policy-makers to liberalise their trade practices.

Obstacles to the regional trade in foodstuffs

197. There is widespread agreement that there are significant obstacles to trade in foodstuffs within the region – see, for example, Amani 2003, IF Malawi 2004, Imani/Kadale 2003, Maasdorp 1998, Madola et al. 2002, RATES 2003. The list of impediments includes:
 - Cost of transport that could reasonably be reduced by investment in improved and rehabilitated roads, railways, bridges, ports and other transport infrastructure;
 - Lack of information available to traders on trading opportunities, coupled with inadequate telecommunications;
 - Lack of credit and uncertainty about being paid for supplies by trading partners in other countries with imperfect banking systems and contract law, or saddled by restrictive foreign exchange rules. In some cases exchange rate volatility may introduce uncertainty into deals;
 - Too little capacity in storage and transport;
 - Border delays arising both from lack of capacity (staffing, opening hours, etc.), as well as from cumbersome procedures;
 - Trade policy and practice – tariffs, bans and quotas, customs charges, bribes, complex documentation, standards and technical regulations, rules of origin;
 - Market failures including those of co-ordination and imperfect competition; and

²² No one interviewed was able to point to more precise evidence on the benefits of trade, nor was any literature found on this. The working hypothesis, then, is that no one knows. This is reflected in the discussion of priorities for additional evidence in sections 3.4 and 4.1.4.

- Fears of arbitrary action by governments, including offloading reserves onto domestic markets when prices are not high and bans on moving grains that may wreck opportunities for profitable trade. In Swaziland and Zimbabwe state enterprises control the maize trade outright.

Again, while there is widespread agreement in both reports and interview on these obstacles, there is less evidence on their ranking.

198. From the interviews conducted it seems that different sets of traders may face different sets of problems. Large-scale, formal trading companies expressed concern over transport costs – specifically inability in some parts of the region to use the existing railways and the corresponding opportunity to use bulk handling, the uncertainties of being paid (at all, or at least on time) by partners, and the problems of arbitrary government action. Information was not a problem, since they have networks of personal contacts. Customs rules and regulations of customs were also not seen as problematic as they were well versed in meeting the requirements.
199. Small-scale traders, on the other hand, face precisely these latter two obstacles. Information may be difficult to come by, especially on the rules and regulations of formal trade. Fulfilling the demands of formal import-export business, above all getting the paperwork in order, is often daunting for small-scale operators. Consequently smaller traders tend to avoid controls, either by outright smuggling, or by disguising their shipments as small consignments for personal consumption — this latter involving costs of breaking bulk and hiring people to walk maize across borders bag-by-bag. (RATES 2003, Whiteside 2003)

They also often face limitations from lack of working capital, and find it impossible to make use of formal banking.

200. Finally an important caveat for Malawi — at least: it may also apply in other parts of the region. It has been argued strongly (see IF Malawi 2004, Madola 2002) that the main impediments to increased trade arise from domestic, supply-side limitations — and not the obstacles posed by trade policy and conditions in themselves.²³ For these authors, the first step towards taking advantage of opportunities to trade lies in macroeconomic reform and domestic investment in improved infrastructure and the like.

Obstacles: tariffs on basic foods

201. Table 3.5 shows the tariffs applied by SADC in 2003. Most tariffs on cereals are low at 10% or less, with the exceptions of those applied by Zimbabwe on items other than wheat, the duties imposed by SACU on wheat and maize — equivalent to 15% or more of the typical value of cereals landed at Durban — and those applied by Malawi and Zimbabwe on flour.
202. While the tariffs applying to most trade in basic foods could be reduced still further, in particular reducing the anomalously high rates indicated in the table, these duties do not constitute major barriers to trade. If they were the only costs of crossing borders, they would be small in comparison to the costs of transport within the region. But they are not the only costs: non-tariff obstacles are rife.

²³ Madola et al. (2002) interviewed agricultural traders. The main problem cited for exporting was high transport costs, followed by lack of transport, and, only third, lack of market information. In addition, those interviewed often saw poor quality and insufficient quantity of produce as barriers to their exports: information was less often mentioned; while duties and non-tariff barriers were hardly cited at all.

Table 3.5: SADC Applied Cereal Tariffs (2003)

Cereals	HS tariff lines	Malawi	Mauritius	Mozambique	SACU: RSA/Nam/ Swazi/Bot/ Les	Zimbabwe
		0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Wheat	100190	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	19.6c/kg [US\$31 ton]	5.0%
Oats	1004	0.0%	15.0%	2.5%	0.0%	15.0%
Maize seed	100510	0.0%	15.0%	2.5%	13.74c/kg [US\$22 ton]	30.0%
Maize other	100590	0.0%	15.0%	2.5%	13.74c/kg [US\$22 ton]	30.0%
Rice	1006	10.0%	15.0%	2.5%	0.0%	15.0%
Sorghum	1007	10.0%	15.0%	2.5%	3.0%	15.0%
Flour	1107	40.0%	15.0%	2.5%	0.0%	30.0%

Source: WTO, Unctad Trains database, SA Customs & Excise, taken from Charman & Hodge 2003; www.alfandega.org.mz for Mozambique tariffs. Rand: Dollar exchange taken as R6.25=US\$1.

Obstacles: non-tariff barriers to food trade

203. To what extent are non-tariff barriers blocking food trade? Three concerns can be highlighted:

- Sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) requirements and accompanying quality standards;
- Rules of origin (ROO); and
- The debate over genetically modified (GM) crops.

204. Most countries in the region have *SPS requirements* for maize. Typically these require fumigation against pests and certification that this has been carried out. Given that facilities for the former are not well distributed, and that certification centres are highly centralised, fulfilling these conditions can be onerous for small traders. (RATES 2003)

It is not clear, either, if border controls are necessary. They presumably would not be if bio-safety measures were harmonised across SADC.

205. *Quality standards* on maize – affecting, for example, moisture content – vary between countries (RATES 2003). Some countries require certification, and in general this introduces uncertainty for traders and probably scope for discretion and bribe taking by customs officials.

206. A particular standards issue concerns *genetically modified* (GM) maize. This bedevilled food aid supplies to Zambia and Zimbabwe in 2002. In the most alarming case an entire shipment of maize to Lusaka had to be re-exported. In other cases, maize kernels had to be milled before distribution; resulting in extra expense and delay in delivering food. At the time rules on GM plants were not clear in some countries let alone harmonised across the region.

207. In April 2003 SADC set up an Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and Bio-safety ‘to develop guidelines to safeguard Member States against potential risks in the areas of human and animal food safety, contamination of genetic resources taking into account ethical, and trade-related issues

including consumer concerns.’ (SADC PR Unit, 16 April 2003) By August 2003, the Committee had agreed on interim measures, as set out in Box 3.6.

Box 3.6: SADC Interim Measures on Bio-technology and Bio-safety

1 Handling of Food Aid

- SADC should develop and adopt a harmonised transit information and management system for Genetically Modified food aid designed to facilitate trans-boundary movement in a safe and expeditious manner;
- SADC is encouraged to source Food aid preferably from within the region, and advise all cooperating partners accordingly;
- Donors providing Genetically Modified food aid should comply with the Prior Informed Consent principle and with the notification requirements in accordance with Article 8 of the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety;
- Food aid consignments involving grain or any propagative plant material that may contain GMOs should be milled or sterilized prior to distribution to beneficiary populations;
- Food aid in transit that may contain GMOs should be clearly identified and labelled in accordance with national legislation;
- SADC countries managing or handling food aid in transit that may contain GMOs are encouraged in the absence of national legislation to make use of the requirements under the AU Model Law on Bio-safety and/or the South African Guidelines on the handling of transit material which may be GMO.

2 Policy and Regulations

- Each Member State should develop national biotechnology policies and strategies and expedite the process of establishing national bio-safety regulatory systems;
- All Member States should sign and ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety to the Convention on Biological Diversity;
- The region should develop a harmonized policy and regulatory systems based on the African Model Law on Bio-safety and the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety and other relevant international processes;
- Member States without a regulatory framework for GM crops should use approved guidelines and should not import GM grain for seed before approved guideline are in place;
- Risk assessments should be done on a case-by-case basis and every genetic modification should be tested in the environment under which it will be released.

3 Capacity Building

- Member States should develop capacities at national and regional level in order to develop and exploit the benefits of biotechnology;
- SADC should allocate resources for capacity-building in management of biotechnology and bio-safety;
- SADC should encourage Member States to commission studies on the implications of biotechnology and bio-safety on agriculture, environment, health and socio-economics as part of an integrated monitoring and evaluation system.

4 Public Awareness and Participation

- Member States should develop public awareness and participatory programmes on Biotechnology and Bio-safety that involve all stakeholders.

Source: http://www.sadc.int/fanr.php?lang=english&path=fanr/agres&page=sadc_biotechnology_gmo.

208. The main recommendations include that: any GM shipments of food aid need to be labelled and declared as such; any GM food aid has to be milled or sterilised before distribution; and, that countries need to adopt national regulations as well as ratify the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety.
209. Commercial trade in GM grains seems not have been explicitly considered and presumably would be subject to whatever national regulations are devised and applied. In the meantime, large amounts of maize are traded in the region, some of which could be GM. South Africa, for example, has for several years permitted the growing of GM varieties of maize. Shipments of maize from Gauteng are thus quite likely to contain GM maize – even if only a small fraction of the white maize crop is from GM plants. The same applies to US maize. To date, there are no reports that commercial shipments have been affected by bio-safety considerations. Whether this is because traders have taken care to avoid shipping GM maize internationally, or whether it is because the question of GM origin is simply not posed at the borders, is not clear.
210. The SADC Trade Protocol (TP) includes quite restrictive *rules of origin* (ROO) (Flatters & Kirk 2004). For agriculture such ROO are undemanding. Much of the maize traded, for example, has been grown within the countries covered by the TP. The issue begins to have an impact, however, the moment produce is processed. Wheat flour is a sensitive case in point, where ROO have not yet been agreed after several years of wrangling. At one end of the negotiating table is the requirement that the flour has been milled within the region, at the other is the suggestion that as much as 70% of the wheat must have been grown within the region. For mills outside South Africa and Zimbabwe this latter is such a restrictive proposal as to be impossible to fulfil. Millers in these two countries could thus continue to enjoy the heavy protection — 75% to 127% effective (Flatters & Kirk 2004) — that they had before the TP was signed.²⁴
211. Similar debates surround the ROO for biscuits and pasta, where some argue that local wheat must be used despite its unsuitability for making pasta. Whatever the merits of this discussion, wheat flour and further derivatives are marginal to food security. To be sure, some of the urban poor in the region do consume bread as a staple and are hurt by measures that raise wheat flour prices. But it is unlikely that this effect is marked: the urban food insecure are very probably sensitive to prices and if offered a cheaper staple will probably switch to that commodity. Evidence for this can be seen in the acceptance of hammer-milled maize meal in Lusaka and Maputo, and milled yellow maize, when such staples have been significantly cheaper than highly refined white maize meal (Mwiinga et al. 2003).²⁵

Obstacles: market failures

212. A concern arises with trade (and domestic market) liberalisation: will markets deliver the expected benefits? There are two reasons for concern that they may not. One is the issue of co-ordination failures: where actors in the food supply chain – including those growing, storing, trading and processing foods – may not invest sufficiently since they have incomplete knowledge about market opportunities and about the intentions of others in the chain. Lacking knowledge and reassurance, investors hold back from committing funds to increase capacity. (see Poulton & Dorward 2003)²⁶
213. The other is that of imperfect competition, where a few large suppliers dominate small markets and are able to collude and fix prices to their own advantage. Concerns in the region include the power of millers in South Africa (Traub & Jayne 2004, Flatters 2004), and road transport services in

²⁴ Zunckel (2002) provides a different perspective: he argues that it would be equally unfair if SA millers, who have to bear the costs of import tariffs on wheat, were open to competition from millers in countries such as Mozambique that enjoy access to wheat at zero tariff, and sometimes even to wheat from food aid donations sold at subsidized prices or distributed free.

²⁵ The rural counterpart to this is the way in which farmers in Northern Mozambique are prepared to switch their consumption between maize and cassava, depending on the opportunities to sell maize to Malawi (Arlindo & Tschirley 2003).

²⁶ For example, a would-be investor in a flour mill needs to be convinced that farmers will plant sufficient cereals to keep the plant running to capacity: if for reasons of ignorance or distrust, the miller is not reassured, the investment becomes risky.

Malawi (IF Malawi 2004). A common fear is that when prices rise grain traders will speculate on food markets and drive them still further upwards.

214. There is clear scope for governments to act to limit and correct such failures. In practice, governments see such failures as reasons for more comprehensive interventions to control trading both domestically and internationally. Devising more subtle ways to avert the dangers that work in harmony with the markets, and selling such ideas to policy-makers, remains an important policy challenge in food policy.

Obstacles: domestic protection and trade

215. To what extent does domestic protection affect and distort trade in food? Vink & Tregurtha (2003) conclude there is little in SADC country support to farmers that substantially affects trade. They computed aggregate measures of support (AMS) to farmers for Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa and Zambia. Varying levels of total spending per farmer were observed, from US\$15 a year in Malawi, to US\$66 in Zambia, to over US\$900 for Botswana. But almost all of the support was within the provisions of the Green Box or Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) allowed under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Only two measures exceeded the *de minimis* provisions – onion production and fertiliser subsidy in Mauritius. The AMS for all countries but Mauritius was thus zero. It is likely that the same result would apply to other countries in SADC.
216. In a similar vein, Charman & Hodge (2003) argue that domestic subsidies and market access are scarcely threatened by the provisions of the AoA. They fear, however, that future rounds of liberalisation may bite, in particular the EU-USA proposals for agricultural trade liberalisation in the current Doha Round of trade negotiations.
218. Notwithstanding the obligations of countries as WTO member states, the issue of domestic protection has been raised as a trade impediment within the region. The use of general and targeted distribution of small quantities (starter packs) of seed and fertiliser to smallholders in Malawi, and the consequent boost to domestic maize production – of the order of 350 000 tons (Levy 2003 reporting estimated impact in 2002-03) – has been criticised by donors and government in Mozambique. In the absence of such support, they argue, the lower-cost maize grown by farmers in northern Mozambique would have a larger market. Not only does this measure prevent trade, but uncertainties over the distribution and the consequent harvest in Malawi deter investment in maize production and trading in northern Mozambique.
219. While this may be the case, Malawi is well within the provisions of SDT permitted under the AoA. Moreover, it can be argued that the starter packs are less a subsidy, more a way to overcome chronic failures in the supply of inputs and credit to farmers.
220. The issue does signal the case for harmonising domestic support measures across the region, or at least beginning negotiations towards this end. It also reveals inconsistencies in donor programmes: DFID funds inputs in Malawi, but would reportedly not contemplate such a measure in Mozambique. Do the different country contexts justify the difference?

Segmented markets? Informal trade in foods and informal traders

221. Trading in basic foods in the region is stratified. For example, in the case of Malawi, Whiteside (2003) identifies the following different modes of trade:
- Official imports by the National Food Reserve Agency, donors, and NGOs in response to estimates of need, political considerations, availability of finance. Often delayed response;
 - Commercial imports motivated by price differences and profits, usually legal and recorded. Often between medium to large companies, governed by contracts; and
 - Informal and unrecorded flows, often in small lots, motivated by profit and need.

It is likely that similar divisions apply in other parts of the region.

222. Markets are segmented to the extent that supply chains from producer to consumers can be quite distinct — above all when contrasting grain that is grown, traded, milled and consumed, all in small lots, within circuits composed of villages and district-level markets; to that which is grown on a larger scale, traded nationally and internationally, processed by large-scale millers in major cities, and consumed mainly by urban dwellers. As noted (paragraphs 180, 181), the obstacles faced by different scales of traders can be distinct.
223. It is a moot point, however, to what extent markets are separated and not integrated. Large-scale millers will source maize from traders who have bought locally and in small lots; rural households who do not grow all their own food sometimes get access to maize distributed by the larger agencies — indeed, in remote areas in the hungry season, supplies from parastatals or donors may be the only source of basic grains. The often wide price gaps that are seen in grain markets through space and time can usually be accounted for by the high costs of transport and of storage (including interest on inventories), respectively.
224. Why is it that there is such a variety of scale of operation? It might be thought that larger traders would have sufficient economies of scale to dominate the market and drive smaller competitors out of business. Examining this question, Fafchamps et al. (2003) — in a study of three countries that include Malawi in this region — see that small traders can survive, partly since they may have special knowledge of highly localised circumstances, and partly since the lack of technology and institutional innovations prevent larger operators from realising their potential. For example, increased use of telephones would reduce transport costs. Invoicing and cheques might reduce some of the need for working capital.
225. In some parts of the region, it is likely that informal and unrecorded trade in basic foodstuffs exceeds the formally recorded trade.²⁷ The most salient case is that of Malawi.
- Imani (2001) points to the results of a study on informal cross-border trade, which show that, in 1995/96, the country exported US \$13.7 million worth of goods to Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. Imports from these countries during that period amounted to US \$30.4 million. By contrast, formal trade with those countries totalled US \$9.5 million for exports and US \$18.9 million for imports. Thus, informal cross-border trade with those countries totalled US \$44.1 million as against US \$28.4 million for formal trade. (Madola et al. 2002, 14–15)
226. Since 1996, and setting aside the years of major harvest failures, recorded maize imports into Malawi have been in the range 50 000-80 000 tons a year. Whiteside's (2003) estimates of the unrecorded flows of maize into the country range from 70 000 tons when harvests are good to 200 000-250 000 tons in years of poor harvest. Another indication of the importance of informal trade in foodstuffs is the sheer extent to which small- and medium-scale traders handle the maize trade: for the COMESA area it is estimated that they handle 60% of the trade (RATES 2003).

Current initiatives for trade facilitation and trade liberalisation

227. All countries in southern Africa are engaged in processes of trade liberalisation – some in bilateral agreements with countries in the region and further a field, including the EU and USA. The most notable regional preferential trading agreements are COMESA, SACU and SADC. Multilateral arrangements beyond the region are mainly in the form of obligations as members of the WTO. Almost all countries are involved in several of these arrangements.

²⁷ Some informal trade occurs to escape high duties. Arndt & Tarp (2003) show the benefits of removing tariff peaks that encourage contraband into Mozambique, and the imposition of a 7% flat rate duty with no exemptions — revenues would probably increase.

Looking at the regional configurations, COMESA has already set up a preferential free trading area for nine of its members including Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with plans to become a customs' union by 2005. SACU has been a customs' union since 1969, and SADC adopted a Trade Protocol in 2000 that establishes a preferential trading area with duty-free trading by 2008, with the exception of certain sensitive products, which face a deadline of 2012.

228. At first sight, the commitment to freer trading is impressive, as are the accompanying technical efforts to harmonise standards, trade documentation, and border crossing procedures. The reality, however, seems to be otherwise. Adherence to the spirit of the agreements is less than perfect: in food trading. The governments of Malawi and Zambia (and Tanzania) routinely invoke special clauses to impose restrictions on both exports and imports, while Zimbabwe has re-nationalised grain trading both internally and externally. Even within SACU Lesotho and Swaziland have found reason to stop trade in foodstuffs. The non-tariff barriers to free trade, some of them discussed above, show little sign of being abandoned: instead they may even be proliferating.
229. Both COMESA and SADC have technical assistance to their secretariats to help them facilitate trade. In the case of SADC, for example, Germany, the USA and DFID have programmes specifically designed to support trade initiatives. Annex 2 sets out the main trade facilitation programmes with relevance to food security issues.

3.3.6 Conclusion and discussion

230. To begin, an important caveat. Trade can help make food physically available: it does not necessarily do anything more to improve access to food. Above all it does not guarantee that the price of food will be affordable to the poor.
231. This last point needs expanding. In years of favourable weather, in much of the region grains can be grown domestically for costs of under US\$100 a ton (not including milling costs) to consumers. When, however, there is a poor harvest, the cost of grain at the margin becomes the import parity price. This can easily be between US\$150 and US\$250 a ton a more; depending mainly on the ruling price and availability of stocks in the Gauteng market, and on the distance from that Province.
232. Even this is an 'at best' outcome: if the transport routes are clogged or trade is otherwise blocked, then physical shortages will send prices much higher. If the macro-economy of a country is feeble, then the additional imports of grain may cause the exchange rate to depreciate, thus inflating the cost of imported food still higher in local currency. Put simply, the fluctuations in food production in the region mean that in some years food prices are likely to rise by 50%, 100% or more. Trade will not solve that problem.
233. The release of stored domestic grains may appear to avert such price rises, but only if the cost of storage is disguised — by some form of subsidy. The cost of storage added to that of grain, will probably exceed, although not necessarily by a large margin, that of imports. Hence a self-financing store could not afford to release grains at prices below import parity. Trade is thus probably a more efficient way to cope with the problem of fluctuating production from year to year.
234. Given the erratic nature of food trade, a major challenge is simply finding the funds to import when needed. There are several ways of doing this²⁸: amongst the more prudent is to set aside a financial reserve, ready to be drawn on when the harvest is bad; the other — as yet novel and unproven — way is to take out weather-based insurance that would pay out when the weather is poor. There are, as yet, no formal comparisons of the economic costs of these alternatives; but a back-of-the-envelope comparison suggests the financial reserve would be clearly and considerably cheaper.

²⁸ Amongst the other options is that of simply appealing for international help. But for how long are countries of Southern Africa expecting to do this?

235. The use of options and futures markets will not markedly help solve the problems: they tackle just one of the risks, that of price — and even then, they provide no guarantee of an affordable price at the time needed. At the margin, they serve a useful function. But they are no panacea for the fundamental problems of fluctuating domestic production.

236. Trade in foodstuffs in the region faces three sets of obstacles:

- One is the high cost of transporting bulky foodstuffs across a large area without cheap river transport. This is currently exacerbated by the parlous state of the railways, a means of transport that, for bulk loads over long distances, costs potentially about half that of road haulage.
- A second issue is the longstanding distrust of governments of trading in foods, and their inclination to introduce bans and other controls on grain movements across borders.
- A third set of problems is made up of the diverse difficulties that some traders have in getting the job done. These include: getting accurate information on trading possibilities; completing customs paperwork; meeting standards that sometimes differ from country to country, are unpublished, and possibly excessive; and, depending on financial systems that cannot provide enough working capital nor cope with international transfers.

237 What can be done about these?

- The first requires sizeable capital investments, and no doubt important changes to the operations of transport. Further consideration of this issue is beyond the terms of reference of this report, but that should not detract from its importance.
- The second requires governments to abandon their instincts and trust the markets. They might be helped if the potential of freer trade were fully appreciated; but perhaps more important, by an understanding of the limits to what trade can do. To repeat the point made, trade can help make food available: it cannot make more expensive, imported food cheap. Just because prices go up when imports increase, does not mean that trade has caused prices to rise. It is easy to overstate the case for trade, and thereby make it an Aunt Sally for critics.
- If there's an issue of access to food and its affordability, then governments, and their donor partners, need to do something in addition to allowing free trade. That may be some form of safety net, such as food vouchers. It may even be a blanket subsidy on food prices in years of poor harvests. But controlling trade is unlikely to help matters.
- The third is a job for trade facilitation. As will be argued in section 4.3, there is plenty of activity in that field already. But there is probably one segment of the market that gets little help from current efforts, and that is small-scale traders. They are most deprived of information and working capital, and are prey to arbitrary obstacles created by policy and the way that officials at borders implement it. The large traders, in comparison, can probably fend for themselves in this regard — provided progress can be made on the first two sets of obstacles.

3.4 Policy for food security

3.4.1 Food security policy in Southern Africa

Table 3.6 sets out some of the main elements of food security policy in the region.

Table 3.6 Food security policies in southern Africa

	Food self-sufficiency	Agricultural production	Public storage	Trade stance	Social safety nets
Botswana	No	Commercial and smallholder focus	52kt of maize, wheat, rice	No restrictions	Pension scheme, supplementary school feeding and mother / infant support
Lesotho	No	Smallholder focus	None	No restrictions.	Pensions, FFW/public works, Supplementary feeding
Malawi	Yes	Smallholder focus	100kt of maize	Permits needed to export grains Significant informal cross-border trade	Supplementary school feeding and mother / infant support. FFW/public works [Targeted farm inputs]
Mozambique	Yes, but deficits expected in south	Smallholder focus	None	No restrictions. Significant informal cross-border trade.	Limited, but some social funds, FFW
South Africa	No	Commercial and smallholder focus	None	No restrictions	Pensions, school feeding, mother / infant support
Swaziland	No	Smallholder focus	None	Restricted maize trade. Government monopoly	Welfare programmes, including orphans and vulnerable children
Zambia	Yes	Smallholder focus, some commercial	200kt of grains	Permits needed to export, import grains Floor prices for smallholders	Welfare programme for chronically food insecure Some public works
Zimbabwe	Yes	Smallholder focus Fast-track resettlement	500kt maize, 200kt wheat	Government monopoly on trading in grains	Some FFW/public works, Supplementary feeding, Farm inputs distribution [Large-scale food relief operations]

FFW = Food-for work

Sources: Charman & Hodge 2003, Mano et al. 2003

Strategies for food security in the region might be summarised as follows:

238. **Food availability:** given the high costs for most countries of importing staple foods to the main centres of consumption (SACU countries and the coastal cities of Mozambique being the exceptions), most countries are determined to produce as much staple food domestically as they reasonably can. Some countries, such as Botswana and Lesotho, accept the limits of their natural resources and the consequent need for imports. Within Mozambique there is also recognition that the south of the country faces similar limits and will need to import food.
239. Strategies for achieving domestic production goals vary by scale of production, technologies used, crops, and state intervention. Most countries depend very heavily on smallholders for grain production, while others such as Zambia (and South Africa) have significant production from large-scale cereals farms. In technology almost all of the region depends largely on rain-fed crops, but there are variations in the degree of use of hybrid versus open-pollinated varieties, and the amount

of chemical fertiliser applied. In crops, maize is a preferred grain throughout the region although in the drier areas millets and sorghum are grown, and in the cooler areas wheat may be grown in winter. A more significant difference, though, is the degree to which cassava and other tubers are grown either as a regular staple, or as a back-up crop to be consumed when grain harvests are poor. Since liberalisation of domestic food marketing in the 1990s that took place throughout the region, state support to production and marketing has been limited. But in Zimbabwe controls on marketing have been re-imposed, while in Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia public agencies continue to intervene in cereals markets. In response to concerns over smallholder access to farm inputs, there have been large-scale distribution of these in Malawi, and some less large programmes in Zambia and in Zimbabwe (although in this case carried out by NGOs as part of relief and rehabilitation efforts).

240. Some important differences in food policy arise in dealing with periodic harvest failures arising from bad weather. Most landlocked countries, with the exceptions of Lesotho and Swaziland, hold physical reserves. Other countries — the two mentioned, plus Mozambique — rely largely on imports and hold minimal stocks. International trade is another line of cleavage. Although much has been done to liberalise trade in grains both domestically and internationally Zimbabwe has re-nationalised trading, while Malawi and Zambia from time to time control trade in foodstuffs through permits and outright prohibitions.
241. **Access to food:** active policies for food access are seen most clearly when poor harvests lead to crises of restricted supply and soaring prices, at the same time that farming communities have lost harvests and incomes. In such cases programmes of public works, food distribution to the needy and vulnerable, and supplementary feeding for children are typically instituted — usually with donor and NGO assistance. In ‘normal’ times, however, food access questions tend to be subsumed within wider questions of economic growth and poverty reduction. In some countries, and in part, they may be addressed through policies designed to try and stabilise the price of basic foodstuffs — although most countries cannot afford extensive intervention in food markets.
242. The problems that the chronically poor face in obtaining food are less well addressed. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has thrown the fate of those plunged into poverty by their inability to work, and by the costs of their care, into stark relief. By raising the profile of one section of the chronically poor, it has opened debate on appropriate, effective and economical forms of social protection.
243. **Food utilisation:** in most cases, issues of utilisation such as care practices, environment, sanitation and health are addressed mainly by specialists in education, nutrition and public health located in ministries of education and health. Programmes in these fields are not closely co-ordinated with the rest of food security policy, where ministries of agriculture and planning tend to hold sway. Statistics on malnutrition, for example, are compiled and published by health agencies and do not always enter into the analyses carried out by specialists working on food availability and access issues. Although many working in these fields are well aware of the divide between food security and nutrition, it remains the case that food security is seen largely as a matter of food availability with some considerations of access, while nutrition is treated as a separate matter.²⁹
244. The interactions between disease, sanitation, care practices and food are thus not well understood,³⁰ making it difficult to set priorities amongst competing programmes to tackle the underlying causes of malnutrition.

²⁹ Even in Malawi where there a Food and Nutrition Security Strategy is being developed, there is still a separate nutrition plan being developed in parallel.

³⁰ After the major drought of 1991/1992, almost all relief was focused on making food available and accessible. The health implications of the crisis were marginalised.

245. In broad terms, food security discussions in the region are dominated by considerations of food availability. This is not just a matter of emphasising one dimension of policy, but it is closely associated with particular temporal, geographical and social foci.
246. Temporally, in most years food availability is not a great concern: a normal harvest will, for most countries of the region, produce enough food for national requirements and at reasonable cost.³¹ Hence concerns of food availability concentrate on the years of poor harvests.
247. Geographically, the country level is the unit of analysis. The national food balance sheet becomes central, perhaps complemented by data on prices in the main wholesale market. Less discussion takes place on issues that arise at the household level, for example those of access to food, and within households where utilisation concerns emerge.
248. Socially the combined focus on bad years and national concerns, means that chronic conditions of poverty and malnutrition get less attention than those of transitory poverty. Considerations of social differentiation, so cruelly illustrated by nutrition statistics, are blurred when the majority are affected by a national crisis.

3.4.2 Policy-making for food security

249. For want of a more widely accepted model, the elements of policy-making may be seen as follows:³²
- Evidence: knowledge and understanding – based on available data, analysis and discussion;
 - Links: communication and influence – channels of dissemination, information networks, advocacy, location of analysts and so on; and
 - Political context – decision-making processes, powers within the political system.

To these may be added:

- Implementing capacity of public agencies – resources, staff, experience, structure, procedures, etc.
250. The programme under consideration cannot address all these issues. Implementation capacity, for example, can only be addressed for particular activities – for example, in strengthening an early warning unit. Actions in the political domain have to be limited by considerations of national sovereignty. Even where there may be some scope for influence, it is not clear how feasible action may be. For the most part, then, this leaves scope for work on improving the base of evidence and making the links from this to policy-makers more effective.

What issues require more information or analysis to guide and inform policy thinking?

251. The balance between the need for more evidence, on the one hand, and making more effective use of existing knowledge, on the other hand, is not always clear. Several interviewees stated that the priority was not more evidence. Instead, they argued for making better use of existing understanding. But that said, there are still several important issues on which not enough is known with the detail necessary to make policy with confidence. Four priority areas for more evidence can be picked out:

³¹ The typical delivered cost of unmilled maize to central cities in the region is less than US\$100 a ton. A family of five might be met as much as 85% of dietary needs for energy from one ton of maize. Even allowing for a 100% mark-up to meet milling and distribution costs, the family could gain most its basic diet for just US\$200 a year, or just US\$0.55 a day. Even a household living on the US\$1 a day poverty line could access food at this price. [Assume: 50% of household budget spent on food, and 50% of that spent on the staple = US\$5*0.5*0.5 = US\$1.25.]

³² Based loosely on the framework proposed by the Research & Policy in Development (RAPID) Group, Overseas Development Institute, London.

- **Trade and markets for basic foods:** ensuring that supplies of basic foods are available year round countrywide, and at prices that are both modest and reasonably stable,³³ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for food security. This is understandably a prime concern for policy-makers. To what extent can private agents in liberal food markets, with open trade, meet these conditions? Are there failures in markets that require public action, and if so, how can this be achieved effectively and economically? Since liberalisation of markets, governments have struggled to understand their role: lacking such knowledge, they have repeatedly made ad hoc, heuristic interventions that more often than not have simply not worked. The advocates of unfettered private enterprise in fully liberalised markets also have some difficult questions to answer. These include the extent to which competing traders can function in markets, about competition policy and cartels, the equity of social outcomes from market functioning, and not least, what happens to domestic prices when harvests fail.
- **Vulnerability to food insecurity and the management of social risks:** in some countries, there is a divorce between thinking about, and planning for, economic growth and poverty reduction (the province of the Poverty Reduction Strategies) and about the risks arising from recurrent hazards, including drought. Strategies for the former tend to be formulated without regard to inevitable future shocks, while responses to those shocks may be devised with little regard to subsequent recovery and development efforts. Part of the reason for the divide is that concepts, including vulnerability, risk mitigation and disaster preparedness, and their implications are not well enough understood. There is a need to bring together ideas and practices to bridge this breach. Differences between households, both geographical and social, will be central to such thinking.
- **Health and food insecurity:** as mentioned in the previous section, a divide exists between:
 - (a) Those working on issues of food availability and access, usually agriculturalists, economists and other social scientists; and
 - (b) Those concerned with care practices, sanitation, disease challenges and overall nutritional outcomes, usually specialists from the fields of public health, environmental sanitation, education, medicine and nutrition.

Partly as a consequence there is little firm evidence on the ways in which food intake, care, health and sanitation interact to produce nutritional outcomes. Scarce resources therefore have to be allocated between competing activities in these fields based on judgments so imprecise at times as to be guesswork.

- **Influencing policy for food insecurity:** several informants noted that even when they had enough evidence to make confident judgments, using this to influence decision-making at high levels was based on largely empirical means. Although there may be more important ways to improve policy-making, as set out in the next section, there is scope for some study of effective ways to ensure that the evidence gets fuller consideration in policy-making.

How can the evidence have more influence on policy-making?

252. On some food security issues there is reasonable agreement on the broad outlines of policy. So much so that several interviewees stated that there was little need to spend more time gathering data, analysing it or discussing the implications. Instead, they argued the priority was to make better use of existing understanding, and above all to find ways to use this to best effect in policy-making.
253. In some cases, there was frustration at the disparity between the technical consensus and policy decisions. A case in point is trade in food. Few professionals would argue for limitations on moving staple foods within the region. Most see increased trade as likely to improve food security. Yet

³³ 'Modest' prices might be defined as being at the import parity price or below; 'reasonably stable' means that prices should not vary by more than the costs of storage between the immediate post-harvest and pre-harvest seasons – and this should not exceed 25-30%.

despite this, several governments (see section 3.3 above) repeatedly place obstacles in the way of free trade in basic foods. Why is this so? Part of the answer may lie in not transmitting clear messages based on convincing evidence to senior decision makers effectively.³⁴

254. Progress might be made to improve dissemination and influence in the following ways:
- Better understanding of the ways in which food policy is made, and how the influence of evidence may be brought to bear on the process. Study here might be less a matter of formal research, more a matter of examining cases of success and failure, deriving lessons and disseminating them; and, probably more importantly, and
 - Building capacity amongst those with influence on policy to understand concepts and concerns, and to inform them on experiences and best practice. This would include voters, elected politicians, the media, public servants, and NGO and donor staff.
255. A complement to these would be to encourage a wider range of stakeholders to contribute to policy-making, including the voices of the poor and food insecure. This promises to improve the quality of debate by ensuring that the concerns and needs of all those with a stake in food security are considered. It will also be more democratic and increase the likelihood that implementing agencies in government, donor institutions and NGOs will be held to account.

3.4.2 Conclusions

256. Policy for food security in the region is dominated by debates over making food available at affordable prices. This is understandable: achieving this goal is a prior condition to people having access to food, and using it well. But it does mean that policy-making is focused on occasional crises, national food balances, and on food production and trade. Issues of chronic poverty, and the corresponding geographical and social differences seen amongst households and individuals, and the interactions of food with health, sanitation, and care, get second attention if any.
257. The evidence base for policy-making is incomplete, certainly in detail. Key issues that need more understanding are, and no order of importance: how food markets can and do function; vulnerability, risks and their implications; the influences of health, sanitation and care on nutrition; and, effective ways to influence policy-making.
258. Existing knowledge might be better used if concepts and concerns were better understood, together with best practices from experience. This would be reinforced if there were more participation in policy-making by diverse stakeholders.

³⁴ Another part of the answer is the wretched business of public perceptions. A government faced by some emerging public concern, such as rising food prices, that does not act in the belief that market forces will bring prices down, risks incurring the wrath of the public. The accusation that the government knew of the problem, but did nothing, is powerful. This applies even when action may be unwise. A government that intervenes clumsily, in contrast, can always blame the poor outcome on some extraneous factor. In food markets, traders can always be lambasted as unscrupulous and unpatriotic opportunists. Who will defend them from such allegations?

ANNEX 1: PEOPLE & ORGANISATIONS INTERVIEWED

NAME	DESIGNATION	INSTITUTION ³⁵
Regional: SA based		
Gauteng		
Michael Drinkwater		CARE, Regional
Rene Verduijn	RVAC Support	Consultant: VACs
Steve Goudswaard		C-SAFE
Johan Kirsten	Professor	Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Pretoria
Graham Farmer		FAO
Phumzile Mdladla		FEWSNET
Steve Shone	General manager	Grain South Africa
Richard Hess	Chairman	Imani Development Group
Bruce Mawere	Trader	Louis Dreyfus Africa (Pty) Ltd, Sandton
Maarten Venter	Procurement & Marketing Manager	Louis Dreyfus Africa (Pty) Ltd, Sandton
Tobias Takavarasha	Agricultural Advisor (FAO)	NEPAD, Midrand
Richard Mkandawire	Agriculture Advisor	NEPAD, Midrand
Jane Cocking		Oxfam
Chris Sturgess	Manager	Safex, Agricultural Division, JSE, Johannesburg
Greg Ramm	Regional Office Co-ordinator	Save the Children UK
Anne Witteveen		Save the Children UK
Chris van Rensberg	General manager	South African National Seed Organisation SANSOR
Stephen Hanival	Executive Director	Trade & Industrial Policy Strategies
Patrick Smith		USAID
Pedro Figueiredo	Logistics Officer, Southern Africa	World Food Programme
Catharina Powell		World Food Programme
Philip Hovmand		World Food Programme
Deborah Saidy		World Food Programme
Joyce Luba		World Food Programme
Country Visits		
Botswana		
Maria-Lisa Santonocito		European Commission, Gaborone
Margaret Nyirenda	Supervisor	Food, Agriculture & Natural Resources Directorate, SADC, Gaborone
Stefan de Keyser	Technical Advisor for Crop Development	Food, Agriculture & Natural Resources Directorate, SADC, Gaborone
Bentry Chaura	VAC Chair	SADC
Gary Sawdon	VAC Support	SC-UK
Stefan Andersson	Programme Officer	Swedish Embassy, Gaborone
Sennyne Obuseng,	Deputy Resident Representative	UNDP, Gaborone
Bioneelo Letshabo		UNDP, Gaborone
Constance Formson		UNDP, Gaborone
Eliot Vhurumuku	VAC Member	WFP/FAO
Lesotho		
James Atema	PRSP	DFID
Diane Webster	Head of Office	DFID
Tlelima Phakisi		DFID
Dr Castro Camarada	Representative	FAO

³⁵ Institution names in alphabetical order.

NAME	DESIGNATION	INSTITUTION ³⁵
Alex Carr	Representative	FAO
Mr Pepetsi Manyamalle	Nutritionist	FNCO
Ms. Pseletso Makhema	Assistant Economic Planner	FNCO
Simon K Phafane	Executive Director Deputy President	KDA LCCI
Mr. Thuso Thokwa		LCCI
Seabata Motsamai	Director	LCN
Peter Muhangi	Livelihoods Advisor	LVAC
Mapalesa Mothokho	Chair	LVAC
Lineo Mathule	Lesotho Agricultural College	LVAC
Mrs Lesenya	Senior Economic Planner, Planning and Budgeting Division	MAFS
Lucy Phakisi	Senior Economic Planner, Department of Planning and Policy Analysis	MAFS
Mrs L. Hlasoa	Chair, PRSP Secretariat	MoFDP
Mahlape T Qoane	Deputy Principal Secretary	MTICM
Makali P Nathane	Senior Industrial Development Officer	MTICM
Dr Agostino Munyiri	Project Officer – Child Survival	UNICEF
Malawi		
Ed Musopole		Action Aid
Mathews Madola	Research Fellow	Agricultural Policy Research Unit, Bunda College of Agriculture, University of Malawi
Nick Osborn	Country Director	CARE Malawi
Dr Harry Potter OBE	Livelihoods Advisor	DFID Malawi
Paul Ginies	Food Security Expert	European Union
Sam Chimwaza	Country Representative	FEWS NET
Andrea Pozza	Technical Advisor	Food Crisis Joint Taskforce
Allan Chintedza	Food Security & Nutrition Policy Co-ordinator	Food Security & Nutrition Policy Working Group
Pickford S	Agro-economist	Food Security & Nutrition Policy Working Group, Lilongwe
Beatrix N	Nutritionist	Food Security & Nutrition Policy Working Group, Lilongwe
Collins Magalasi	Co-ordinator	Malawi Economic Justice Network
Patricia Nyirenda	Food Security Unit, also member of VAC	Ministry of Agriculture & Co-operatives, Planning Division
Isaac Chirwa	Statistician	Ministry of Agriculture & Co-operatives, Planning Division
Christine Chamina	Commerce	Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Lilongwe
J Bunda	Planning Unity	Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Lilongwe
Fanny Bibi Kundaya	Deputy Director of Industry	Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Lilongwe
Patricia Zimpita	NVAC Zambia Chair, Deputy Director (monitoring & evaluation)	Ministry of Economic Planning and Development
Teresa Banda		Ministry of Health
Jason Agar		National Action Group, Blantyre
Patrick Makina	General Manager	National Food Reserve Agency, Lilongwe
TN Saukila		National Food Reserve Agency, Lilongwe
Catherine Lefebvre	Food Security Advisor	Oxfam, Malawi
Charles Rethman	Food Security Advisor	SC-UK
Peter Hailey	Nutrition Project Officer	UNICEF, Lilongwe
Kenneth Wiyo	Agriculture	USAID, Lilongwe

NAME	DESIGNATION	INSTITUTION ³⁵
Austen Tembo	Natural Resource Management	USAID, Lilongwe
Richard Kimball	Private Sector Development	USAID, Lilongwe
Gerard van Dijk	Representative	World Food Programme, Lilongwe
John Mandere		WVI
Mozambique		
SETSAN Group		
Marcella Libombo	SETSAN Chair	
Leonor Domingos	VAC Chair	
Gabriel Dava	Director	CIDA, Maputo
Julia Compton	Livelihoods Advisor	DFID, Maputo
Emidio Oliveira		DFID, Maputo
Alison Beattie		DFID, Maputo
Alicia Herbert		DFID, Maputo
Paul Wafer		DFID, Maputo
Melanie Speight		DFID, Maputo
Esther Bouma	Food Security Analyst	FAO
Peter Vantor	Country Representative, Mozambique and Swaziland	FAO
Michele McNabb		FEWS NET
Bridget Walker	Economic Advisor	Irish Aid, Maputo
Representatives		Ministries of Health, Education and Women
Kathy Duffield		Oxfam Australia
Karen Jackson	Development Programme Officer	SC UK
Owen Calvert		WFP
Anthea Spinks		World Vision, Maputo
Carlos Santapiedra		World Vision, Maputo
Swaziland		
Choice Ginindza	Statistician	Agriculture Division, Central Statistical Office, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development
Emmanuel Ndlangamandla	Co-ordinator	CANGO
Maqhawe David Gama	Principal Statistician, Agriculture Division	CSO, MEPD
George Ndlangamandla	Swazi VAC Chair	Dept. of Agricultural Extension, MOAC
	Deputy Prime Minister	DPMO
Dr Ben Sibandze	Chair, National Disaster Task Force	DPMO
Aloys Lorkeers	Resident Advisor	European Union
Lungile Mndzebele	VAC Co-ordinator	EWU, MOAC
Khanyisile Mabuza	Assistant Representative	FAO
Ephraim M. Hlophe	Principal Secretary	MEPD
Thembumenzi Dube	VAC Core Team member	Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Lonkhululeko Sibandze	Senior Economist, Poverty Reduction Unit	Ministry of Economic Planning and Development
N.M. Nkambule	Permanent Secretary	MOAC
Patrick K. Lukhele	Director of Agriculture	MOAC
	Senior Agricultural Economist	MOAC
Dube Thembumenzie	Agricultural Economist	MOAC
Obed N Hlongwane	Chief Executive Officer	NAMBOARD
Peter M Ginindza	Chief Financial Officer	NAMBOARD
Deborah L Cutting	Project Co-Ordinator: Baby	NAMBOARD

NAME	DESIGNATION	INSTITUTION ³⁵
	Vegetables	
Henry Mndawe		NAMBOARD
Derek von Wissell	National Director	National Emergency Response Council on HIV/AIDS (NERCHA)
Busi M Dlamini	Accountant	National Maize Corporation (Pty) Ltd
Alex Rees	Livelihoods Advisor	Save the Children, UK
Jordan Hamilton	Recovery Programme Officer	UN Office of the Resident Co-ordinator
Nombusu Thanda	UNDP Poverty Unit	UNDP
Jabulane Dlamini	Head of Governance Programme and Economist	UNDP
Sibongile Maseko	Head of HIV/AIDS and Poverty Mainstreaming Programme	UNDP
Cedric Dladla	Programme Assistant	UNDP
Lare Sisay	Resident Co-ordinator	UNDP
Sharon Neeves	Project Officer	UNFPA
Gabriel Galgalo	Consultant	UNICEF
Christian Anumand	Information Specialist	WFP
Zambia		
George Allison	Managing Director	Afgri Corporation Limited, Lusaka
Brenda Cupper		CARE
Charles Chanthunya	Director of Trade, Customs & Monetary Affairs	COMESA
Shamseldin Salim	Agricultural Economist	COMESA
Waitpaso Mkandawire	Senior Investment Promotion Officer	COMESA
Mrs Asfaw	Technical co-operation	COMESA
Isaac S	Technical co-operation	COMESA
Mark Pearson	Regional Integration Advisor	COMESA
Carolyn Chibinga	Project Co-ordinator, Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS)	Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of community Development and Social Services
John Hansell	Private Sector Advisor	DFID Zambia
Grace Chibowa	Senior Programme Officer, Education and Social Development	DFID Zambia
Chembo Mbula	Head, Information Management System and NVAC Chair	DMMU
Patrick Kangwa	Principal Research Officer	DMMU
Tesfai Ghermazien	Emergency Co-ordinator for Zambia	FAO
Chansa Mushinge	Country Representative, Zambia	FEWS NET
Alfred Mwila	Deputy Country Representative	FEWS NET
Jan Nijhoff	In-country Project Co-ordinator	Food Security Research Project, Michigan State University, Lusaka
Claire Barkworth	Ex Relief & Recovery Advisor	Formerly DFID Zambia
Jan Neirhoff		FRSP
Vesper Chisumpa	Quantitative Analyst	Policy Project (USAID)
Kaseba Roberts Kabwe	Office Manager	Policy Project (USAID)
Shem Simuyemba	Trade Policy Specialist	Regional Agricultural Trade Expansion Support Program (RATES), Lusaka
Dr Stella Goings	Country Representative	UNICEF
Dr Birthe Locatelli-Rossi	Head: Health Section	UNICEF

NAME	DESIGNATION	INSTITUTION ³⁵
Rory		UNICEF
Jorge Fanlo-Martin	Deputy Country Director	World Food Programme
Jacob Mwale	Trade & Policy Analyst, Agribusiness	Zambia Trade & Investment Enhancement Project (ZAMTIE, Lusaka)
Zimbabwe		
Erika Keogh	Independent consultant	
Stephen Gwynne-Vaughan	Assistant Country Director	CARE Zimbabwe
Reneth Mano		Department of Agricultural Economics & Extension, University of Zimbabwe
John Hansell	Rural Livelihoods Advisor	DFID Zambia
Tom Barrett	Rural livelihoods advisor	DFID Zimbabwe
Joanne Manda	Deputy Programme Manager	DFID Zimbabwe
Luke Mukubvu	Governance Advisor	DFID Zimbabwe
Patrick Phipps	Regional Food Aid/Food Security Co-ordinator	European Commission
Lindiwe Sibanda	Chair	FANRPAN, Harare
Kathy Rutivi	Programme Co-ordinator	FANRPAN, Harare
Roderick Charters	Emergency co-ordinator for Zimbabwe	FAO, Harare
Michael Jenrich	Agricultural Advisor, Emergency Unit	FAO, Harare
Blessing Butaumocho		FEWS NET
Jonathan Kafesu	Director	FOSENET
Leonard Turugari	Deputy Director, Policy and Special Programmes, Social Services Department	Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare
Antoine Gerard	Head of Unit, OCHA Senior Humanitarian Advisor	Office of the Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Relief and Recovery Unit
Vincent Lelei	Humanitarian Affairs Co-ordinator	Office of the Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Relief and Recovery Unit
Chris McIvor	Country Programme Director	Save the Children
Alwin Nijholt		UNDP
Paul Weisenfeld,	Mission Director	USAID, Harare
Candace Buzzard	General Development Officer	USAID, Harare
Kevin Farrell	Country Representative	WFP
Joyce Chanetza	Chair	Zim VAC
Advisory Meeting		
Michael Drinkwater	CARE, Regional	
Tom Kelly	DFIDSA	
Phumzile Mdladla	FEWSNET	
Scott Drimie	HSRC	
Gavin Maasdorp	Imani	
Tobias Takavarasha	NEPAD	
John Howell	ODI, DFID RHVP Programme Design Consultant	
Richard Humphries	SARPN	
Hilton Zunckel	Tralac	
Claudia Hudspeth	UNICEF	
Coleen Vogel	Wits University	

ANNEX 2: REGIONAL TRADE & POLICY INITIATIVES

There are several trade agreements that have been entered into by the most of countries in the Southern African region. These include the customs union, regional; bilateral and international trade agreements. Currently the trade initiatives that exist within the region are Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement; Southern Africa Development Community Trade Protocol (SADC TP); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Free Trade Agreement (COMESA FTA) as well as the bilateral trade agreements between some of the countries within the region. Trade initiatives that exist at the international level include the World Trade Organisation (WTO); United States’ Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); and the Partnership Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and the European Union (ACP-EU) of Cotonou. Objectives of the above trade policy initiatives are summarized as follows:

Trade Agreements	Objectives
SACU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides for a common external tariff and a common excise tariff to this common customs area. Promote ease trade flows in the area. Provides an extended market for members’ goods including agricultural products
SADC TP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Harmonisation and rationalisation to enable the pooling of resources to achieve collective self-reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people of the region. Establish an FTA in 2008.
COMESA FTA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Removal of the structural and institutional weaknesses in the member States by pooling their resources together in order to sustain their development efforts either individually or collectively. Promote free trade between member states.
WTO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Eliminate all quantitative restrictions, establish, bound, tariff-based protection and reduce existing border protection. Substantial improvements in market access. Reduction of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies. Substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.
AGOA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Offers tangible incentives for African countries to continue their efforts to open their economies and build free markets Provides reforming African countries with the most liberal access to the US market available to any country or region with which the United States does not have a Free Trade Agreement. Extends Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) to a large number of tariff lines
ACP-EU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides non-reciprocal trade preferences available to ACP countries. Poverty reduction in ACP countries

Country \ Agreement	SACU	SADC	COMESA	WTO	AGOA	ACP-EU
Lesotho	✓	✓	X	✓	✓	✓
Malawi	X	✓	X	✓	✓	✓
Mozambique	X	✓	X	✓	✓	✓
Swaziland	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zambia	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Zimbabwe	X	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Donor matrix for COMESA

Project/Study	Donor	Funding	Countries
Rules of Origin	EU	N/A	COMESA
WTO Rules and Regulations	USAID	US\$221 000	COMESA
African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI)	IDA/EU	EUR740 000	4 member states
Regional Harmonisation of Customs & Statistics (RHCSSP)	EU	EUR 12.6 million	COMESA
COMESA PPIU	ADF	US\$ 3.2 million	COMESA
Irrigation Development Study	ADF	US\$ 0.19 million	COMESA
NTBs	EU/UNCTAD	N/A	COMESA
FTA Expansion	EU/USAID	N/A	COMESA
Regional Integration Phase II	EU	EUR 2.0 million	COMESA
Standardisation, Quality, Metrology and Testing Programme (SQMT)	EU	EUR 8.5 million	COMESA
Harmonisation of agricultural policy in COMESA	PGTF/UNDP	US\$ 60 000	COMESA
Policy networking & communications systems	USAID	US\$ 210 000	COMESA
Regional Integration Research Network II	IDRC/EU	US\$ 260 000	COMESA

Donor matrix for SADC

Directorate	Sector	Project	Donor	Project Amount	Start & End Date	Project Status
FANR	Crop	Institutional support to the Directorate in crop development	Belgium	€ 1 596 967	03/01/2002 – 31/12/2004	Implementation phase: Ongoing
	Livestock	Promotion of Regional Integration in the SADC Livestock Sector: - PRINT	European Commission	€ 7 900 000	26/01/2004 – 31/12/2009	Ongoing
		Food and Mouth Disease	European Commission	€ 12 500 000	N/A	Formulation Phase: Pipeline
		Animal Disease Control	European Commission	€ 10 000 000	17/03/1994 – 31/12/2002	Closed
	Food Security	8 ACP RAU - Regional Food Security Training Workshop	European Commission	€ 4 153 000	13/08/1999 – 31/12/2010	Ongoing
		9 ACP SAD - Regional Food Security Training Workshop	European Commission	€ 830 000	13/08/1999 – 31/12/2010	Ongoing
		Promotion of small scale seed production	Germany	€ 1 789 521	9/1999 – 3/2002	Finalised
		Support to the sorghum and millet improvement program	Germany	€ 2 061 528	10/1993 – 3/2002	Finalised
		Promotion of legume cultivation	Germany	€ 2 362 168	7/1995 – 6/2003	Finalised
		Regional Food Security Programme (Regional Hunger and Vulnerability)	UK	€ 7 482 790	Ends 2007	Design stage
		Regional Land Facility	UK	€ 7 482 790	N/A	In discussion between DFID/UNDP/SADC
		Expanded Market for Commercial Agriculture	USA	€ 6 764 000	13/06/2000 – 30/09/2004	Ongoing
	Agricultural Research and Training	Agriculture and Research Training Programme: ICART	European Commission	€ 15 000 000	14/11/2003 – 31/12/2010	Ongoing
		Fund for Innovative and Regional Collaborative Projects (FIRCOP)	France	€ 1 600 000	2002 – 2006	Ongoing
		Support to agricultural sector stakeholders of Southern Africa	France	€ 1 600 000	2003 - 2007	Ongoing
		Support to SACCAR	Germany	€ 6 264 222	1/1995 – 12/2002	Finalised
		Support to the training programme CONVERDS	Germany	€ 2 045 167	9/1993 – 3/2002	Finalised

Directorate	Sector	Project	Donor	Project Amount	Start & End Date	Project Status
SHDSP	HRD	HIV/AIDS in the HRD sector	Belgium	€ 4 250 000	2004 - 2007	Identification phase: Pipeline
	Health	Multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS (capacity building component funded under EDF)	European Commission	€ 3 114 000	20/11/2000 – 30/06/2006	Ongoing
		Multi-sectoral response to HIV/AIDS (grant component funded under SA budget line)	European Commission	€ 4 500 000	23/01/2001 – 22/01/2006	Ongoing
		Regional HIV/AIDS awareness and education programme	European Commission	€ 10 000 000	N/A	Ongoing
		Southern Africa regional SADC HIV/AIDS Programme	UK	€ 11 448 668	Ends 31/12/2006	Ongoing
		Soul City Regional HIV/AIDS Programme	UK	€ 5 986 232	Ends 31/12/2007	Ongoing
		Regional DFIDSA HIV/AIDS	UK	€ 9 428 315	Ends 31/12/2006	Ongoing
Parliamentary Forum		Seminar on role of Parliament in the Cotonou Agreement	Belgium	€ 100 000	11/2003	Under negotiation: Pipeline
TIFI	Trade	SADC Regional Integration and Trade Facilitation	European Commission	€ 9 000 000	N/A	Identification/ formulation phase: Pipeline
		SADC EPA Negotiation Support Facility	European Commission	€ 5 000 000	N/A	Identification/ formulation phase: Pipeline
		Customs Modernisation	European Commission	€ 20 000 000	N/A	Identification/ formulation phase: Pipeline
		UNCTAD Trade and Services	European Commission	€ 1 090 000	N/A	Appraisal phase: Pipeline
		Support to the Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade	Germany	€ 771 942	12/2000 – 9/2002	Finalised
		Advisory services for private business	Germany	€ 3 322 374	12/1998 – 12/2002	Phase completed
		Advisory services for private business	Germany	€ 3 579 000	1/2003 – 12/2006	New phase: ongoing
		Support to the Implementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade at national level	Germany	€ 1 500 000	N/A	Planned: Pipeline
		Regional Trade Facilitation Programme	UK	€ 16 462 137	Ends 2007	Ongoing

Directorate	Sector	Project	Donor	Project Amount	Start & End Date	Project Status
		Africa Trade and Poverty Programme	UK	€ 1 945 525	Ends 2007	Ongoing
		Making Commodity and Service Markets Work for the Poor (ComMark)	UK	€ 22 448 369	Ends March 2008	Ongoing
		Regional Market Integration	USA	N/A	18/9/1998 – 30/9/2004	Ongoing
	Other	EU/SADC Regional Statistical Training Programme	European Commission	€ 4 800 000	03/01/2001 – 31/12/2005	Implementation phase: Ongoing
Infrastructure and Services	Transport	Rehabilitation of Maputo/Chicualacuala (Limpopo) Railway	European Commission	€ 10 000 000	1992 – no expiry date	Ongoing
		Rehabilitation of Beira-Inchope Road	European Commission	€ 20 000 000	1995 – no expiry date	Ongoing
		Rehabilitation of Monze-Zimba Road	European Commission	€ 13 000 000	18/02/1999 – 31/12/2003	Closed
		Rehabilitation of Mpulungu Harbour	European Commission	€ 1 500 000	07/03/2000 – 31/12/2004	Ongoing – to be closed
		Mtwara Corridor	European Commission	€ 20 000 000	N/A	Identification/formulation phase: Pipeline
		Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park	European Commission	€ 4 900 000	N/A	Identification/formulation phase: Pipeline
		Walvis Bay Corridor	European Commission	€ 10 500 000	N/A	Formulation phase: Pipeline
		Lubango to Santo Clara Road (Angola)	European Commission	€ 30 000 000	N/A	Identification/formulation phase: Pipeline
		Rehabilitation of Milonge-Macuba Road, Mozambique	European Commission	€ 30 000 000	N/A	Formulation phase: Pipeline
		Regional Market Integration: SADC Transport Efficiency Project	USA	N/A	18/9/1998 – 30/9/2004	Ongoing
Secretariat	General	EU/SADC Regional Integration and Capacity Building Programme	European Commission	€ 15 615 000	04/07/2001 – 30/06/2007	Ongoing
		Support to the SADC Secretariat (incl. Trade component and Private Sector component)	Germany	€ 4 535 000	10/2002 – 5/2005	Ongoing

Directorate	Sector	Project	Donor	Project Amount	Start & End Date	Project Status
Regional Other	HIV/AIDS	Action to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS and other STD's in the road transport sector of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique (grants contract GTZ)	European Commission	€ 999 507	01/03/2000 – 31/12/2005	Ongoing
		PSG Regional HIV/AIDS Programme	Norway	€ 17 006 587	2002 - 2006	In progress
		SANASO – Southern African Network of Aids Services	Sweden	€ 108 696	01 – 12 2003	Ended
		SANASO – Southern African Network of AIDS Services Organisations	Sweden	€ 130 435	01/2003 – 12/2004	Indicative: Pipeline
		NIR/SMF development of HIV/AIDS workplace Policies at Swedish related companies	Sweden	€ 108 696	2003 – 2004	Indicative: Pipeline
		SAfAIDS – Southern Africa Aids Information Dissemination Service	Sweden	€ 652 174	08/2001 – 05/2004	Ongoing
		SAfAIDS: Aids in Africa – A Continent in crisis	Sweden	€ 239 130	2003 – 2004	Ongoing
		Regional Psychosocial Support Initiative for Children Affected by Aids (REPSSI)	Sweden	€ 2 939 130	05/2002 – 05/2007	Ongoing
		UNDP Capacity Building Programme for Mainstreaming HIV/AIDS in Development	Sweden	€ 217 391	2002 – 2003	N/A
		UNICEF-OVC Programme on Aids orphans Children's rights	Sweden	€ 3 260 870	2002 – 2004	Ongoing
		FEMINA	Sweden	€ 1 346 152	2002 – 2005	Ongoing
		International HIV/AIDS Alliance (IHAA)	Sweden	€ 652 174	2002 – 2004	Ongoing
		UN Habitat: Building Capacity for Municipal Government and other Stakeholders to deal with the Impact of HIV/AIDS	Sweden	€ 691 304	2004 – 2005	Indicative
		UNAIDS Scenario	Sweden	€ 543 478	2003 – 2004	Ongoing

Directorate	Sector	Project	Donor	Project Amount	Start & End Date	Project Status
		ILO: HIV/AIDS in the Transport Sector	Sweden	N/A	N/A	Indicative
		ILO: HIV/AIDS in the Informal Sector	Sweden	N/A	N/A	Indicative
		Partnership on HIV/AIDS and Mobile Populations in Southern Africa (IOM-PHAMSA)	Sweden	€ 1 630 435	10/2003 – 10/2006	Ongoing
	Other	Macroeconomic reform and sustainable development in southern Africa (grants contract (WWF))	European Commission	€ 427 597	01/08/1997 – 30/06/2004	To be closed
		Conservation and development opportunities from the sustainable use of biological diversity in the communal lands of Southern Africa (grants contract Africa Resources Trust – UK)	European Commission	€ 936 333	15/12/2000 – 30/06/2005	Ongoing
		Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Program (SSATP)	Sweden	€ 1 576 087	2003 - 2005	Ongoing
		Strengthening the Voice of Poor People for Pro-Poor Change in Southern Africa (SVOPPSA)	UK	€ 14 965 579	Ends 2008	Early implementation: Ongoing

ANNEX 3: INFORMATION SYSTEMS RELEVANT TO VULNERABILITY SYSTEMS

Information Providers	Name of System	Comments
Lesotho:		
Lesotho Meteorological Services	Meteorological Information system - CLICOM	Products: Monthly weather bulletin; Ten day agro-meteorological bulletin; monthly agro-meteorological bulletin.
Bureau of Statistics Agricultural Statistics Section	Agricultural Statistics System of Lesotho	Products: Crop Forecasts Surveys, Agriculture Production Surveys, Agriculture Censuses
Bureau of Statistics: Demography, Labour & Social Statistics Division	Lesotho Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (EMICS)	
Dept of Crops, MoAFS	Crop Situation Report/Crop Monitoring System	
NEWU, DMA	National Early Warning System (NEWS) Agro-meteo. data; Agro-statistical data	
Food & Nutrition Coordinating Office (FNCO)	National Nutrition Surveillance System (NNSS)	
National AIDS Prevention & Control Programme, Ministry of Health & Social Welfare	HIV Sentinel Surveillance System	
FAO / WFP	Crop Estimates Study	
CARE South Africa-Lesotho & Sechaba Consultants		
MoAFS / CARE SA-Lesotho	Livelihoods Recovery through Agricultural Production (LRAP)	
Malawi:		
National Statistical Office, in collaboration with MoAIFS and FAO	Crop production estimates (survey)	The system is used to monitor food availability based on production. Information is formally released to FEWS-NET and VAC in a spread sheet who conduct the GIS mapping
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Food Security (collaboration with Government, FEWS-NET, FAO, UN, NGOs, SADC)	Market Information System: Price information (of retail and farm gate prices of some selected food and cash crops). Dissemination is through the radio and newspapers	Purpose: To improve the availability quality market information for use by various users for food security monitoring and market development planning
Ministry of Health	Health Management Information Systems (HMIS), especially the Disease Surveillance (the incidence of selected diseases) and Health Information (on morbidity and mortality patterns, and burden of disease) components	Data on health services, health status, drugs and supplies, finance and administration, human resources and management activities, for monitoring the performance of health services in order to improve quality and coverage.
FEWS NET	Early Warning Information System	To provide up to date and reliable information on food security situation.
National Aids Commission (collaborates with USAID, CIDA, NORAD, CDC, DFID, Malawi government, NGOs, FBOs, and CBOs.)	HIV/AIDS Prevalence/Incidence	Monitoring the prevalence and Incidence of HIV/AIDS

Information Providers	Name of System	Comments
Mozambique:		
Nutrition Unit, Ministry of Health (collaboration with UNICEF)	Nutrition Surveillance System	Monitoring nutrition status (growth monitoring; low birth weight)
Early Warning Department, Ministry of Agriculture (collaborating with FAO, INAME, INIA, SADC-REWU, MIC)	Crops monitoring & harvest forecast	Monthly Monitor of crops productions and harvest forecast; Quarterly estimative of planted area and harvest forecast; Annual measure of areas and agriculture yields
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER) Statistic Department (collaborating with Central level: Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC) and Fews-Net. Provincial level in Nampula: NGOs such as CLUSA, CARE and OLIPA)	Agricultural Market Information System (SIMA)	Collect and disseminate information on prices and market information, to support the decision making of stakeholders in all steps of agricultural production
National Institute of Meteorology (INAM) (collaborates with MADER, Civil Aviation, Gov of Portugal, Spanish and Finland and some NGOs)	Agroclimatological Data	Daily Agroclimatological data; Dekadal Agroclimatological data; Monthly Agroclimatological data; Annual Agroclimatological data
World Food Programme	Post Distribution Monitoring	Output Monitoring System to monitor the <u>perception</u> that both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have of a WFP operation. Information is collected after services have been delivered to assess the extent of <u>access to, use of, and satisfaction</u> with the outputs of the operation. This will give an indication of whether or not the operation is leading towards the achievement of its objectives.
World Food Programme	Community and Household Surveillance	Outcomes monitoring system that: Monitors the <u>outcomes</u> of WFP interventions, through the <u>measurement of trends in key variables</u> ; improves understanding of <u>relationship between food security and other factors</u> (in particular HIV/AIDS and demographic factors); and detects <u>early signs of a food crisis</u> .
National Statistics Institute (collaborating with UNICEF, USAID, DANIDA, NÓRDICOS, MISAU)	Household Budget Survey – IAF Well being indicators – QUIBB DHS	IAF – Evaluation of the household budgets, including expenditure and income. QUIBB – Basic well-being indicators for the Mozambican population. DHS - Mother and child health and demographic data, HIV knowledge, family planning etc.
MIC – Ministry of Industry and Trade of Mozambique, National Directorate of Trade (MIC-DNC) (collaborating with Ministry	INFOCOM (Sistema de Informação Comercial e do Mercado – Agricultural Market and Trade Information System)	Collection, processing, storage and transmission of market and trade information related to food and commodity prices and market conditions to the Government, public and private

Information Providers	Name of System	Comments
of Agriculture – SIMA/MADER, National Government Institutions (INA, INCAJU and IAM), private sector, Projects, NGOs, etc.)		organisations and the commodity trade sector.
Zambia:		
Central Statistical Office (collaboration with the World Bank and government institutions)	Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys	Highlight and monitor poverty/vulnerability of households periodically in Zambia. Specifically, the surveys also provide information required for targeting vulnerable households. Many independent studies in the area of poverty, food security, health and nutrition have been commissioned using data from the surveys. CSO conducts the Indicator Monitoring Surveys (IMS) once in every 2 years and the Integrated Surveys (IS) once in every 5 years. The former is designed to produce reliable district estimates while the later produces estimates at province level.
the LCMB branch of CSO (collaboration with Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU), Central Board of Health (CBOH), Ministry of Health (MOH) and National Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC))	Food, Health, Agriculture and Nutrition Information System (FHANIS)	The overall objective of the FHANIS is to provide quick, timely and regular indicators on food security, health and nutrition so as to facilitate policy making, planning and decision making with regard to targeting of interventions by government and its cooperating partners. The FHANIS surveys are planned to be undertaken every quarter of the year. At the moment, all the FHANIS rounds for this year are budgeted for by the government in the 2004 Budget.
Central Statistical Office (collaboration with key stakeholders such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO) and the Food security Research Project (FSRP))	Post Harvest Survey (PHS)	The main purpose of the PHS is to provide annual agricultural data that is useful for generating performance indicators required for programming government, donor and NGO interventions. The data is also used to determine the current post harvest stocks of major crops in Zambia and also the current stock of livestock. Specifically, this information is vital in ascertaining the food reserve requirements in the Country. Further, the information is also required for estimating the contribution of the agricultural sector to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its growth.
Central Statistical Office (Collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives)	Crop Forecasting Survey (CFS)	Provide reliable estimates on food crops grown at household and community levels. The main aim of this survey is to collect pre-harvest data that can be used to predict the expected food deficit at national and household levels. These estimates form the basis for early warning and remedial measures to be instituted during times of disasters. The estimates are also used to construct the National Food Balance Sheet.

Information Providers	Name of System	Comments
National Early Warning Unit (NEWU) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO/)	National Early Warning System (NEWS)	<p>The following are some of the primary data that MACO/NEWU collects for its own use:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Area under food crops ii. Production of food crops iii. Yield rates of various food crops iv. Sales of food crops v. Number of Livestock and their conditions vi. Information on Poultry vii. Fish farming <p>The secondary data includes the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Information on weather conditions such as rainfall ii. Food crop conditions iii. Area harvested under food crops iv. Production levels of various crops in all the 72 districts v. Price changes of major food crops vi. Outlook of marketing seasons vii. Distribution, sales and usage of fertilizer by farming households
Meteorological Department	System on weather conditions	<p>The department has provided valuable information on weather forecasts ideal for the agriculture and tourism sector planning. The main purpose of the system is to provide agricultural agents data that can be used to efficiently plan for various season specific agricultural activities. Agro-climatic information such as daily rainfall, temperature (hourly), evaporation (Daily) humidity, wind and pressure are vital in setting up both agricultural inputs and output markets in the country.</p>
Ministry of Health and Central Board of Health (MOH/CBOH)	Health information systems	<p>Collect information on nutritional and health issues facing the Zambian population on a quarterly basis. The following information related to under-five child nutrition is collected from health centres: Under weight prevalence, malnutrition case fatality, and incidence of malnutrition. In addition to the above information the MOH/CBOH systems also collect the following information from health centres; Number of Antenatal visits; Number of supervised deliveries; New family planning visits; Fully immunized children; Health care drug kit opened per 1000 population; Health care client contacts; Incidence of various illnesses including malaria, measles respiratory infections; Patients with prolonged illnesses, etc.</p>
National Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC)	Food and nutrition studies	<p>NFNC collects data twice a year using a national wide sample covering the following indicators: Coverage of vitamin</p>

Information Providers	Name of System	Comments
		A for children under 5 years; Knowledge of child health week; Use of fortified sugar among households; Coverage of under-five attending under five clinic; and Usage of iodated salt among households
FEWS NET	Early Warning Information System	To provide up to date and reliable information on food security situation.
Agricultural Consultative Forum, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Michigan State University's department of Agricultural Economics (USAID funded)	Food Security Research Project (FSRP)	The project is not into data collection per se but has been supporting CSO when conducting the Post harvest surveys. In addition, the FSRP has been financing agriculture supplementary surveys that have been carried out jointly between CSO and MACO. The main purpose of the project is to help government formulate informed policy interventions in the area of food security in the country.
World Food Programme	Information System	Collects from about 39 districts where it has some food relief distribution interventions / programmes. The in Zambia is among organisation involved in in the country.

Source: Adapted from National Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) Consultation Process Reports

ANNEX 4: PRSP STATUS BY COUNTRY

SADC Country	PRSP Status	Poverty Monitoring Unit	Inclusion of “vulnerability” in PRSP
Angola	Currently preparing an Interim PRSP	Not established	N/A
Botswana	Does not qualify for PRSP bec. upper middle income country. A National Poverty Reduction Strategy has been formulated but not implemented	Not established	N/A
DRC	Interim PRSP completed in Mar-02. PRSP under preparation	Not established	N/A
Lesotho	Interim PRSP completed in Dec-00. Full PRSP currently awaiting Cabinet approval	Plans to establish a PMU in the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning. Not yet operational. The Cabinet will provide oversight leadership for the poverty monitoring system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food security: second most important priority area after employment creation. • FS strategies incl: expanding formal and informal employment opportunities to improve purchasing power and FS; measures to improve agricultural productivity; legislation to address inequalities in land ownership • Special emphasis on improving nutritional status of vulnerable groups (esp. OVCs) and ensuring these have access to social welfare services. • Activities: refining nutrition policy; improving disaster preparedness; school/supplementary feeding, promoting good nutrition practices; nutritional food packages and micronutrient supplements. • One cornerstone of LPRS: deliver poverty-targeted programmes to empower the poor and vulnerable • Proposed strategies incl.: modest pension; assist NGOs working with orphans, PLWAs, disabled and child-headed HH. • No apparent inclusion of VAC information.

<p>Malawi</p>	<p>Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy completed in Apr-02</p>	<p>National Economic Council is responsible for coordination and analysis. Four levels to rest of system: 1. Cabinet Committee on the Economy (provides political guidance and oversight); 2. MPRS Monitoring Committee comprising Principal Secretaries; 3. Technical Working Committee (with range of members); and 4. Government institutions responsible for monitoring.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MoF: inputs and outputs • MEP&D/NSO: outcome and impact. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty diagnostics: FS seen as a serious threat to better life and a core poverty concern. • MPRS framework for poverty reduction: activities and policies grouped around 4 strategic pillars <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sustainable pro-poor growth 2. Human capital development. 3. Improving the quality of life of the most vulnerable. 4. Good governance. • Some core poor, who may not be in a position to take advantage of any economic opportunities from interventions under Pillars 1-2. They will therefore require deliberate redistribution programmes under safety nets. • Pillar 3 aims to ensure that the needs of the vulnerable people are met and assist the transient poor to be self-supporting after the programme by providing social safety nets. • These are seen to consist of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) productivity enhancing interventions for the transient poor (poorest 30% of the population who are capable of moving out of poverty)(targeted distribution of inputs for capital-constrained poor; public works programmes for the land-constrained poor) and (b) Substantial welfare transfers to the chronically poor (poorest 5-10 percent). targeted nutrition interventions for malnourished children and vulnerable pregnant and lactating mothers, and direct welfare transfers for the poor who cannot be supported by any of the other three programmes. These include groups like the chronically ill, the elderly and orphans. Persons with disabilities
<p>Mauritius</p>	<p>Does not qualify for PRSP bec. upper middle income country. National Action Plan for Poverty Alleviation (APPA 2001) is currently being implemented</p>	<p>Not established</p>	<p>N/A</p>

<p>Mozambique</p>	<p>Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) completed in Apr-01</p>	<p>Poverty and PARPA Observatory is committee for management and oversight of the PARPA M&E system. Consultative body with range of participants.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty diagnostics: Apart from acute material poverty, poor Mozambiquans suffer from high degree of vulnerability to natural disasters and economic shocks. • PARPA emphasises the reduction of absolute poverty defined in terms of material needs and lack of capacity and opportunities. The strategy also covers other basic dimensions of poverty, namely vulnerability and empowerment. • Main key areas of action are agriculture, health, education, rural development, basic infrastructure, good governance, and macro-economic and financial management. • Other complementary areas of action: selected social programmes (targeted social welfare programmes), housing; income generation programmes and policies (business development, fisheries, mining, industry, tourism); programmes to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters; and policies that support sustainable growth (transport and communications, technology, environmental management). • PARPA prioritises structural policies that stimulate equitable growth, which it turn will ensure that additional resources are available for social safety net programmes for the most needy and vulnerable groups.
<p>Namibia</p>	<p>Does not qualify for PRSP bec. lower middle income country. Poverty Reduction Strategy (1997), National Poverty Reduction Action Programme (NPRAP 2000) and National Development Plan (NDP2, 2001-06).</p>	<p>Co-ordinated by the National Planning Commission Secretariat (NPCS) and involved an inter-ministerial team, the World Bank, the UNDP, NEPRU and the Social Science Division of the University of Namibia.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>Seychelles</p>	<p>Does not qualify for PRSP bec. upper middle income country.</p>	<p>Not established</p>	<p>N/A</p>

<p>South Africa</p>	<p>Does not qualify for PRSP bec. lower middle income country. Introduced many PRSP-type reforms– moved from broad strategies on poverty reduction as enunciated in the RDP towards sector specific programmes governed by The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR 1996) macroeconomic strategy.</p>	<p>No official poverty monitoring unit has been established, although there has been discussion over the last few years of establishing one in the National Treasury.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>Swaziland</p>	<p>Does not qualify for PRSP bec. lower middle income country. Currently finalising Poverty Reduction Strategy and Action Plan (PRSAP) (due end Sept-04)</p>	<p>In the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, a Poverty Reduction Unit established in early 2004. The Poverty Task Force, the co-ordinator of the PRSAP, is also based in the Ministry.</p>	<p>N/A</p>
<p>Tanzania</p>	<p>Completed in Oct-00</p>	<p>Cabinet oversees Poverty Monitoring Master Plan. Poverty Monitoring Steering Committee leads - broad membership. Linked is the Technical Committee for the Poverty Reduction Strategy, supported by a Poverty Monitoring Secretariat, hosted by VPO (not an empowered secretariat). Body of the system is made up of four Technical Working Groups (TWGs) which will do the substantial work on poverty monitoring and all involve a range of stakeholders</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty diagnostics: Vulnerability to unpredictable events is a major concern of the poor. HIV/AIDS resulted in growing numbers of AIDS victims and orphans, disabled, elderly, and refugees. There is, therefore, a growing need for safety-nets. • Apparent breakdown of traditional systems that used to take care of vulnerable groups and the escalating number of dependents have increased the need for safety-net programmes. • Stakeholder consultations prioritised, <i>inter alia</i>, effective safety-nets to assist vulnerable groups. • Focus of poverty reduction strategy: efforts to (i) reduce income poverty; (ii) improve human capabilities, survival and social well-being; and (iii) contain extreme vulnerability among the poor.

Zambia	Completed in Mar-02	<p>Planning and Economic Management Department in the Ministry of Finance and National Planning is the focal point for coordination and M&E.</p> <p>Planning and monitoring of the PRSP/TNDP is spearheaded through the Sector Advisory Groups (SAGs) and the Provincial Development Coordinating Committee (PDCC) and the District Development Coordinating Committees (DDCCs) subcommittees.</p> <p>Also highlights the role of the Poverty Monitoring and Analysis Unit at the Zambia Social Investment Fund (ZAMSIF)</p> <p>Macro level monitoring will be carried out by the ZAMSIF and CSO. Sectors will monitor sector specific interventions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty diagnostics: The worsening poverty trend in Zambia is seen partly as a product of inadequate or inappropriate targeting of the poor and vulnerable people. Analysis therefore incorporates aspects of vulnerability and coping strategies • The Zambian PRSP has as its major objectives to promote growth and diversification in production and exports, to improve delivery of social services and to incorporate crosscutting policies for HIV/AIDS, gender and the environment. • Greater attention should have been given to social safety net programmes: The Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS), which targets specific vulnerable segments of the population, receives only occasional references.
Zimbabwe	Some discussion has taken place on the possibility of preparing a PRSP but the current political situation has forestalled this for being developed	Not established	N/A

ANNEX 5: SOCIAL PROTECTION MEASURES

Project Information				Types of Safety Nets Intervention																	
				Cash Transfers					In-Kind Transfers								Others				
				Social Assistance/Transfers: Income Support	Child / Family Allowance	Non-Contributory Pensions	Disability Benefits	Unemployment Benefits	Food-Related			Education/ Training			Health		Housing	Public Works	Micro-Credit / Income Generation	Others (specify)	
Food Subsidy	Food Aid Assistance / Programs	Feeding	Fee waivers/ Scholarships to cover school costs						Conditional Costs	Transfers to Schools	School Materials	Training for Unemployed	Fee Waivers / Vouchers	Free Basic Health Care	Fee Waivers for Heating						
Institutions	Date Approved	Closing Date																			
Lesotho																					
Old age pension	MEPD, MoHSW	Nov-04				***															
Livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture Programme (LRAP)	DFID, CARE, MAFS	Oct-02	Sep-05																		
Food-for-work																			***		
Supplementary feeding	UNICEF									***											
Free Primary Education	MoE, UNICEF	Jan-00	ongoing							***	***			***							
Free basic health	UNICEF															***					
Food aid	WFP, FAO, DMA								***												
Malawi																					
Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF)	WB	Dec-98	ongoing																***	C	
Free Primary Education											***										
Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurial Training (TEVET)														***							
Essential Healthcare Package																***					
Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP)	MOA																			***	
Public Works Programmes																			***		
Targeted Nutrition Programmes											***										
Direct Transfers Programme (Dedza Safety Nets Project)						***															

Project Information (continued)				Cash Transfers					In-Kind Transfers										Others				
				Social Assistance/Transfers; Income Support	Child / Family Allowance	Non-Contributory Pensions	Disability Benefits	Unemployment Benefits	Food-Related			Education/ Training				Health			Public Works	Micro-Credit / Income Generation	Others (specify)		
Food Subsidy	Food Aid Assistance / Programs	Feeding	Fee waivers/ Scholarships to cover school costs						Conditional Costs	Transfers to Schools	School Materials	Training for Unemployed	Fee Waivers / Vouchers	Free Basic Health Care	Fee Waivers for Heating	Housing							
Institutions	Date Approved	Closing Date																					
Mozambique																							
Social Fund for Medicines and Infant Food Supplements																	***	***					
Caixa Escolar (school fund)																***							
School Feeding Programme										***													
Food Subsidies Programme	National Institute for Social Action (INAS), Ministry of Social Action	late 80s						***															
Food-for-work	INAS, Ministry of Social Action																				***		
Social Security System	INAS, Ministry of Social Action			***	***																		
Integrated National Social Welfare, Employment and Youth Programme	Ministry of Social Action ?																					***	
Microcredit facilities	National Institute for Social Welfare																					***	
Swaziland																							
Public Assistance Programme	MOHSW			***																			
Free Primary Education	MOE											***			***								
School Feeding Campaign	WFP, SC, DPMO										***												
Indlunkhulu Project	NERCHA, MOAC									***													H,C
Social Protection of Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children Project	MEPD, MOF, MOE, MOHSW, MOAC, DPMO										***	***					***						ECD, C

ANNEX 6: MAIZE TRADE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

<i>Imports - Qty (Mt)</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
SADC	1,197,466	978,999	627,485	1,891,755	3,808,413	1,528,479	674,666	770,779	1,076,687	847,340	840,148
Angola	142,735	99,394	119,103	75,500	110,965	79,557	40,455	65,239	67,323	61,880	107,000
Botswana	23,000	15,000	17,535	38,908	47,363	47,869	35,000	39,420	51,523	45,070	62,398
Congo, Dem Republic of	147,435	353,592	123,000	101,000	96,000	84,000	75,000	100,000	80,000	42,707	80,000
Lesotho	35,000	30,000	40,000	28,500	40,000	27,000	50,000	28,000	97,000	50,000	50,000
Malawi	11,160	56,063	1,153	0	0	0	0	44,903	119,500	149,000	116,500
Mauritius	11,785	12,964	12,043	17,150	12,694	11,046	15,929	25,667	21,180	32,580	22,694
Mozambique	92,000	102,000	91,000	71,000	215,000	402,699	110,697	183,000	380,700	297,000	250,000
Namibia	20,000	20,000	22,000	22,000	23,000	36,974	29,169	59,425	46,506	39,693	32,000
Seychelles	80	55	63	87	65	70	56	2,120	3,347	4,853	5,368
South Africa	4,685	3,268	1,283	1,276,746	2,673,665	420,531	209,414	92,266	33,108	2,377	3,438
Swaziland	0	11,000	10,000	24,000	36,000	12,000	9,200	12,700	27,500	32,100	8,484
Tanzania, United Rep of	249,541	158,817	121,516	120,939	138,000	276,732	34,731	31,000	9,000	80	2,208
Zambia	315,000	116,721	68,787	115,925	143,719	130,000	65,000	87,000	140,000	90,000	100,000
Zimbabwe	145,045	125	2	0	271,942	1	15	39	0	0	58
SACU + Mal, Moz, Zam, Zimb	645,890	354,177	251,760	1,577,079	3,450,689	1,077,074	508,495	546,753	895,837	705,240	622,878

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
SADC	1,021,566	7,191,905	3,086,727	1,534,224	1,877,057	1,684,495	986,071	1,836,359	1,196,018	891,077	1,083,748
Angola	92,897	87,000	98,500	183,000	165,000	231,000	97,500	111,000	85,000	113,900	170,000
Botswana	43,707	54,463	35,823	47,045	54,946	52,824	50,520	45,762	26,300	54,439	62,997
Congo, Dem Republic of	30,000	38,000	26,700	100,000	21,500	22,001	9,300	8,000	1,500	12,500	10,500
Lesotho	51,905	178,500	170,100	198,100	99,900	196,486	78,914	119,929	107,748	107,748	107,748
Malawi	150,000	347,344	490,000	389,000	235,000	83,000	54,140	324,583	28,163	7,879	51,000
Mauritius	35,787	35,617	42,585	36,574	60,293	50,277	48,142	55,473	64,068	61,239	69,766
Mozambique	350,000	750,000	376,000	273,600	205,000	115,000	121,000	110,000	150,000	125,000	300,000
Namibia	46,940	151,512	128,705	42,863	145,178	201,378	127,965	72,700	92,127	53,878	85,145
Seychelles	5,687	539	6,072	6,112	2,769	1,027	7,713	2,918	2,200	917	2,000
South Africa	150,393	3,594,870	830,242	29,760	750,177	506,760	252,704	128,682	376,681	251,012	109,285
Swaziland	20,259	22,000	25,000	20,300	6,300	7,300	10,834	19,955	29,236	36,420	72,124
Tanzania, United Rep of	1,651	44,000	49,000	193,000	43,917	50,575	12,989	269,615	35,585	49,453	31,045
Zambia	42,000	680,000	316,000	13,461	84,811	40,000	70,000	415,000	14,410	5,481	10,334
Zimbabwe	340	1,208,060	492,000	1,409	2,266	126,867	44,350	152,742	183,000	11,211	1,804
SACU + Mal, Moz, Zam, Zim	855,544	6,986,749	2,863,870	1,015,538	1,583,578	1,329,615	810,427	1,389,353	1,007,665	653,068	800,437

Maize Exports

<i>Exports - Qty (Mt)</i>	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
SADC	3,386,351	4,642,487	4,254,561	1,925,817	169,855	633,368	2,338,126	2,985,309	756,157	3,165,721	2,815,746
Angola	500	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Botswana	0	100	270	105	79	27	60	17	1,033	14	787
Congo, Dem Republic of	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lesotho	0	0	2,700	10,000	40	10	0	0	0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	49	120,541	127,345	64,602	85,080	490	0	200	1,088
Mauritius	1	0	17	0	0	3	6,763	4,167	4,641	650	22
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa	3,317,301	4,400,000	3,900,000	1,300,000	40,000	379,504	1,770,271	2,480,350	337,185	2,932,876	2,000,515
Swaziland	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,700	9,900	2,000	200	150
Tanzania, United Rep of	251	0	0	0	0	0	0	90,000	18,711	30,347	57,039
Zambia	2	0	3	0	0	548	35,000	163	485	500	14,119
Zimbabwe	68,296	242,387	351,522	495,171	2,391	188,674	436,252	400,222	392,102	200,934	742,026
SACU + Mal, Moz, Zam, Zimb	3,385,599	4,642,387	4,254,274	1,925,712	169,776	633,338	2,331,303	2,891,125	731,772	3,134,710	2,757,898

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
SADC	869,850	554,150	451,018	5,043,732	1,800,718	2,185,153	2,116,231	1,364,650	558,447	768,197	663,614
Angola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Botswana	549	266	2,341	1,163	506	1,383	55	604	604	567	1,968
Congo, Dem Republic of	0	0	0	0	30	33	36	39	41	95	95
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Malawi	0	0	4,125	1,259	3,126	450	685	52	90	11,000	200
Mauritius	36	533	0	105	150	0	0	1	2	2	1
Namibia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	461	104
South Africa	374,731	523,750	216,000	3,760,177	1,508,450	1,948,230	1,695,585	897,068	420,921	616,848	620,267
Swaziland	0	0	0	0	0	0	709	639	415	1,424	791
Tanzania, United Rep of	7,000	4,141	9,637	0	0	0	16,185	20	1,588	16,871	26,386
Zambia	300	115	3,088	1,100	638	140	32	100	8,277	14,189	11,726
Zimbabwe	487,234	25,345	215,827	1,279,928	287,818	234,917	402,944	466,127	126,509	106,740	2,076
SACU + Mal, Moz, Zam, Zim	862,265	549,210	439,040	5,042,464	1,800,032	2,183,737	2,099,955	1,363,986	556,212	750,201	635,060

ANNEX 7: REFERENCES & BIBLIOGRAPHY

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