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### Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

## Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration

### Report of the Secretary-General

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\* A/59/150.

## I. Introduction

1. The United Nations Millennium Declaration,<sup>1</sup> adopted by the world's leaders at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations in 2000, captured the aspirations of the international community for the new century. It spoke of a world united by common values and striving with renewed determination to achieve peace and decent standards of living for every man, woman and child.

2. I said in my report last year (A/58/323) that our sense of common purpose had been shaken by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and their aftermath. In particular, the war in Iraq profoundly divided the international community and brought to light fundamental differences among members of the United Nations on how to ensure our collective security in the face of increased threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These preoccupations greatly overshadowed other issues — from HIV/AIDS to extreme poverty and environmental degradation — despite the impact that such issues have on the lives of hundreds of millions of people every day.

3. In the last 12 months, we have made some progress in resolving our differences. It is essential that we continue on this path, for only a united international community can act effectively to confront the numerous obstacles which stand in the way of realizing the vision of the Millennium Declaration. A number of developments since my last report illustrate the magnitude of the tasks before us.

4. The situation in Iraq remains a major challenge for both the Iraqi people and the international community as a whole. The end of occupation and the formal restoration of Iraqi sovereignty on 28 June 2004 marked a new phase in Iraq's transitional process. The Interim Iraqi Government now has an opportunity to reach out to all Iraqis in an effort to bring the country together in a spirit of national unity and reconciliation in order to lay down the foundations for the new Iraq. But there are many competing visions among Iraqis, and the persisting climate of violence and insecurity threatens to undermine the establishment of democratic institutions through elections and the adoption of a new constitution.

5. One of the most distressing features of the last 12 months is the very large number of civilians who have fallen victim to terrorist acts not only within Iraq itself but also in many other countries. Major attacks targeting civilians in Istanbul, Madrid, Riyadh and Haifa and Moscow are grim reminders of the scope and severity of the challenge we face.

6. Also, in the last year, we have seen the spectre of gross and systematic violations of international humanitarian law rear its ugly head once again in the Darfur region of the Sudan. Massive human rights violations, including forced displacement, extrajudicial killings and gender-based sexual violence, combined with malnutrition and preventable disease due to a lack of access to food, water and basic sanitation, have led to the death of tens of thousands of people and the displacement of well over a million others, not only internally but also in neighbouring countries. We must not wait for confirmation of our worst fears to put the full force of the international community behind an immediate and definitive end to the atrocities. If we fail to act here, we lose not only lives but also all credibility. The situation in Darfur strikes at the very heart of the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations and the Millennium Declaration.

7. The record of the last 12 months for the world's poorest is hardly more encouraging. To cite only one measure, the number of new HIV/AIDS infections was higher in the last calendar year than ever before, raising serious concerns about the development prospects for whole regions of the world in which hundreds of millions of people reside. The growth rate of new HIV infection, which has long been a threat to the development prospects of Africa, has reached alarming levels in parts of Asia and Eastern Europe over the past year. Regional and global economic growth and social development could be hampered if this disturbing trend is not effectively countered. Indeed, in some parts of the world, the achievement of all the other Millennium Development Goals hinges on much more vigorous action to keep the epidemic in check and provide treatment for those already infected.

8. The impediments to achieving the goals of the Millennium Declaration come in many forms but they are not insuperable. In sections II to IV below, I review the results achieved in the implementation of the Declaration in certain areas: peacekeeping and curbing transnational crime (sect. II); the Millennium Development Goals (sect. III); and the protection of the vulnerable (sect. IV). This and previous reports make it clear that progress is possible and that the steps that need to be taken are well defined.

9. We have the knowledge and the technological instruments that are necessary to achieve real progress in combating poverty and to share more equitably the benefits of globalization. The conclusions of the World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization issued in February 2004 offered fresh ideas to consider.<sup>2</sup> They complement the strategies elaborated by the major United Nations conferences of the last decade on the full range of developmental and social issues before us.

10. Similarly, there are many avenues open to us for strengthening collective security and dealing more effectively with the variety of threats that confront us. The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which I appointed in November 2003, will report its findings and recommendations to me in December 2004. I am confident that its report will help us find a consensus on the way forward if there is a will to act.

11. Knowledge, capacity and the political will to act and provide sufficient resources are three necessary components of a successful drive to implement the Millennium Declaration. I would also mention another, equally necessary element: respect for the rule of law.

12. More than ever before, the global community needs an effective framework of norms to govern the behaviour of States, which continue to be the principal actors in international relations. The norms of international law that have been developed to date are a precious legacy from the past and a bedrock of international cooperation in the present. The most fundamental among them, such as the Charter of the United Nations, were solemnly agreed to after tragedies which should not be allowed to happen again.

13. This is why the international community must be conscious of the need to respect and uphold the international rule of law — in all spheres — ranging from maintaining international peace and security to managing international trade and protecting human rights.

14. New challenges to security often bring pressures to bear on established legal norms. In such times, the effort to uphold the rule of law is more necessary than ever. Counter-terrorism must be pursued in a manner that strengthens, not weakens, this effort. Any sacrifice of human rights in the struggle against terrorism demeans us all and also diminishes the prospects for successfully combating the scourge of terrorism. The laws of war must be observed. States have a duty to respect and ensure respect for humanitarian law in the new and complex circumstances of contemporary armed conflict. The creation of new laws, where necessary, must be undertaken in accordance with the norms governing the process of law-making.

15. One year from now, the nations of the world will reconvene to review their progress in achieving the goals set out in 2000. The results before them will undoubtedly be mixed. There will have been some notable advances and cause for hope in some areas but also stagnation or even regression in some others. The 2005 high-level event must be more than a simple stock-taking exercise. The occasion must be used to inject new energy into the pursuit of this great Millennium enterprise. I sincerely hope that this opportunity will not be lost to strengthen the United Nations itself, because the Organization is an instrument which must evolve and adjust to the needs of the time.

16. Our success in achieving the vision of the Millennium Declaration is not measured entirely by the quantifiable progress toward each of the Declaration's goals achieved in any given year. It is also measured by how we respond to crises and challenges when they arise. If we allow these setbacks to define our efforts, we will surely fail the people of the world. If, on the other hand, we use such occasions to mobilize our spirit and our resources, we will be more than equal to the challenge.

## **II. Peace and security**

17. The heads of State and Government pledged at the Millennium Summit to "spare no effort to free our peoples from the scourge of war, whether within or between States, which has claimed more than five million lives in the past decade".<sup>3</sup> To carry out that pledge, they resolved to give the United Nations the resources and tools it needs to maintain peace and security more effectively. United Nations peace operations are an important instrument in international efforts in this direction. They help to stabilize States emerging from armed conflict and to create the conditions for sustainable peace and development.

18. Since my last report, United Nations peace operations have achieved significant successes. In the face of substantial obstacles and despite setbacks, the missions in Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Georgia and Kosovo made progress in facilitating complex and fragile peace processes. The missions in Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste have been downsizing according to plan. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Nations mission was expanded and its mandate strengthened, and despite challenges to the authority of the Transitional Government, the peace process remained on track and tentative progress was made towards stability. In the second half of 2003, new missions were launched in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

19. This increase in activity proved to be a prelude to a surge in demand for United Nations peacekeeping in 2004. At the start of the year, the United Nations was managing 13 peacekeeping operations and 15 special political missions. In the six months that followed, the Organization was called upon to expand its peacekeeping operation in Côte d'Ivoire and to deploy new missions simultaneously in Haiti and Burundi. At the request of the Security Council or in anticipation of upcoming operational demands, it has also been planning for substantial new or expanded operations in Iraq and the Sudan.

20. This jump in the demand for United Nations peace operations is a welcome signal of new opportunities for the international community to help bring conflicts to a peaceful solution. However, those opportunities can only be truly seized if the necessary commitments of political, financial and human resources are made and if each peace process is seen through to completion. Success depends not only on the implementation of the mandates of peace operations but also on steady, longer-term assistance to ensure that gains made during an operation are sustained. This requires working with local representative institutions to promote good governance, consolidate the rule of law, reform state security structures and support sustainable economic development. As the recent example of peacekeepers returning to Haiti reminds us, the United Nations must stay the course if the fragile peace that accompanies the outset of a peace operation is to be consolidated and made irreversible.

21. Planning estimates for new or potential operations indicate that the heightened demand will stretch, to the limit and beyond, the capacity of the United Nations to respond. The magnitude of the task can be readily seen by a simple comparison. In early 2004, United Nations peacekeeping operations included some 45,000 troops, 4,500 civilian police, 2,000 military observers and about 8,500 international and local civilian staff. Yet the five above-mentioned new or potential missions were projected to add to peacekeeping operations some 27,000 troops, 2,500 civilian police, 1,300 military observers and 6,000 international and local civilian staff, at an additional cost of up to \$2 billion to the peacekeeping budget for 2004-2005.

22. The implementation of the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, better known as the Brahimi Panel, resulted in the restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and a 50-per-cent increase in its headquarters staffing capacity. In addition, strategic deployment stocks in the United Nations Logistics Base (Brindisi) were introduced, enabling the rapid deployment of the equipment needed for the start-up of one complex mission. Financial measures were also introduced to enable advance planning and recruitment to meet the 30/90-day deployment targets established as a result of the Brahimi Panel review. As a result, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is providing stronger support to field missions, as reflected in feedback from those missions.

23. However, the surge in requirements described above goes beyond the needs envisaged when the reforms were set in motion and therefore goes beyond the capacities that have been built. The Department has taken temporary measures to address the challenges posed by the sharp increase in peacekeeping. However, a number of critical gaps remain and further reforms are required. I will be presenting recommendations to the General Assembly on the new steps that need to be taken. While the necessary large-scale troop contributions may be within reach, the same cannot be said for vitally important specialized military capabilities, such as rapid-

response capacities, tactical air support, field medical facilities and movement control. The need for francophone police has also grown beyond the ready supply. And in terms of materiel, the strategic reserve stocks of the Organization will be depleted long before all the new missions are deployed. They must be rapidly replenished and every effort must be made to fill the remaining gaps.

24. Meeting the new challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping also calls for careful political management and the coordination of a number of different mandate elements since each of the new or planned operations is complex and multidimensional. The operational departments and the funds, programmes and agencies of the United Nations must be able to contribute with maximum efficiency and their support must be well coordinated. With those objectives in mind, the Department, the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) are jointly reviewing and improving the capacity of the United Nations to conduct integrated operations. One thing that is clear is that the successful implementation of complex mandates requires civilian personnel of the highest calibre, who will need to be drawn from across the United Nations system, as well as from other multilateral organizations and Member States where certain technical expertise is more readily available.

25. As the peacekeeping burden has increased, the strategic partnerships of the United Nations with the African Union, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other multilateral organizations have become more important — and I am pleased to report that solid progress has been made in strengthening those partnerships. Following the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was reported last year, effective operational handover between the United Nations and the European Union also occurred in Ituri, Democratic Republic of the Congo; in addition, the European Union/United Nations Joint Declaration on Crisis Management of 24 September 2003 underpins several years of sustained and growing engagement and cooperation. United Nations and African Union relations have been strengthened through headquarters-to-headquarters institution-building activities, as well as through the recent successful peacekeeping handover in Burundi. NATO and United Nations personnel continue to work alongside one another in complex peace efforts in Kosovo and Afghanistan. A solid basis therefore exists for making those partnerships even more active and operational.

26. The increased demand for United Nations peace operations that has arisen this year represents a challenge not seen since the rapid increases in the scale and complexity of such operations in the 1990s. Many lessons were learned from both the successes and failures of that era — lessons that we must draw on to meet the needs of today. The reforms and improvements in the system made over the last four years are a testament to the commitment of the international community to work effectively through the United Nations to meet the challenges in this area of international peace and security. But the process of strengthening United Nations peacekeeping is an ongoing one. The scale of current demands means that even greater commitment is required from all the partners in the system — Member States, United Nations entities and regional organizations. Both developing and developed countries must strengthen support for peacekeeping, reaffirming to local parties that the presence of the United Nations signifies the concerted will and determination of the entire international community. The costs of United Nations peace operations are minuscule compared to the costs of conflict — not only in

terms of funds but also in terms of human misery and suffering — and the world looks to the world body for effective interventions in this field.

### **Curbing transnational crime**

27. The Millennium Declaration emphasizes the right to live in dignity, free from violence, fear and oppression. Yet, across the globe, the remarkable growth of transnational forms of criminal activity in the years since the end of the cold war are having a significant impact on peace and development, on prospects for economic growth, and on human rights, democracy and good governance. The nature of the criminal organizations involved in such illegal activities, with the associated problems of corruption and linkages to terrorism, is evolving rapidly, and they constitute one of the key security challenges facing the global community.

28. Organized criminal groups today resemble complex networks of business conglomerates that are able to blend illegality with legitimate business. Gone, for the most part, are the hierarchical structures — the families, the cartels, the cupolas. Such groups have fragmented, to be replaced by an explosion of complex networks of criminal organizations. Their tentacles have extended into many countries, and Governments have different capacities and/or levels of political commitment to combat the problem. The available evidence shows that crime groups are becoming more pervasive and dynamic in organization and have broadened the scope of their operations, geographically and by sector: they are not simply transnational and specialized but transcontinental and diversified. Importantly too, the sophistication of the banking sector, combined with the global reach of the Internet, have dramatically reduced the importance of physical boundaries. Those trends will continue in conjunction with globalization.

29. Just like legitimate business, organized crime today pursues multiple activities. While drug trafficking remains a key specialization, criminal organizations also engage in trafficking of whatever is available for profit — from nuclear waste and firearms to protected species, cultural artefacts and, most tragically, human beings. Cyber-links enable sophisticated fraud scams by facilitating rapid economic and financial transactions that are not constrained by time and distance. Despite this diversification of activities and the facilitating role played by new technologies, one feature of organized criminal activity has remained the same — its propensity for violence. Transnational crime groups engage in extensive violence to bend victims' resolve: not only are threats and intimidation targeted at public officials and common citizens to gain acquiescence, but hundreds and thousands of women are trafficked for sexual exploitation, hundreds of thousands of children are brutalized and millions of people of all ages are forced to labour for little or no pay. On all continents, human resources are sold and bought by criminal organizations for quick return. The victims are highly vulnerable to injury and disease, including HIV/AIDS.

30. Ongoing conflicts, as well as civil and political strife, are closely linked to the growth of criminal networks. Conflicts and instability in the Andean region, in West, Central and Southern Africa, in Central Asia and in Southeastern Europe have all been intimately associated with the growth of powerful criminal organizations. War generates instability, in which organized crime thrives, and it provides an opportunity for illicit enrichment through the creation of profitable new markets for smuggled goods, ranging from natural resources to weapons. In its most extreme

form, organized crime can actually cause humanitarian crises, and conflicts can be rendered more difficult to settle because of greed and the illegal exploitation of assets in war-torn lands. In most post-conflict situations, the growth of organized crime constitutes a challenge to the development of reformed institutions, such as the police, customs and the judiciary. From Afghanistan to Iraq, from the Caucasus to the Balkans and in both West and East Africa, the evolution of criminal organizations is an obstacle to achieving stable, more prosperous societies.

31. Criminal organizations are not purely creatures of the underworld. Their “business”, bloody as it may be, overlaps with legitimate commerce. The vehicles, such as containers, that are used for illicit trafficking are the same as those used for legitimate business; illicit drugs and other contraband are often transported not by unregistered ships or unmarked aeroplanes arriving at isolated airports but commercial shipping, postal systems and couriers — the transport and communication network lying at the very heart of global trade. The profits from illegal activities are almost always invested in the legal economy. In this way, organized crime distorts markets. Legal practices are undermined by unrelated risks, and investments and business decisions are distorted. Criminal organizations often operate through “front companies”, blurring the distinction between licit and illicit business. Such companies especially harm new business by undercutting prices. They can do so by making their profits from illegal activities, effectively eliminating honest competitors.

32. In developing economies, the illegal activities of organized criminal groups impact most negatively upon the poor, who have few savings or resources to absorb the costs. The shadow economy fed by illicit profits means that there is a smaller revenue base for education, health care, pensions and other necessities. But criminal organizations also have a profound effect on communities by fostering local criminal economies that subvert the established systems of local governance. In many urban areas, many people live in constant fear for their lives as a result of drug-related violence, with communities being regulated not through consensus but by threats and intimidation. Organized crime has a heavy impact on the control and management of urban settlements, where, taking advantage of weak local government structures and governance mechanisms, it adversely affects public investments, resource management and the daily lives of city dwellers.

33. Then there is the less tangible aspect of the problem: the penetration of national Governments, economic sectors, even people’s hearts and minds. Almost everywhere they exist, organized crime and high-level corruption are linked, one depending on the other in the conduct of business and in the search for a cover for illicit activities. Corruption often reaches into Governments and parliaments, undermining the State and its institutions. Not only do crime groups engage in bribery to ensure the movement of contraband (whether drugs, weapons or any other illegal commodity) across borders; but they also engage in extensive political corruption. As a result, criminal groups gain political influence and render the administration of law less equal and fair. With the risk of effective government responses weakened, the reward of corruption becomes even more attractive. Fighting corruption is therefore integral to fighting organized crime.

34. As recognized by the Security Council in its resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, the links between criminal activities and terrorism must also be taken into account. Similarly, in its resolution 1456 (2003) of 20 January 2003, the



Council emphasized the need to prevent terrorists from making use of transnational organized crime, illicit drugs and drug trafficking, money-laundering and illicit arms trafficking. In its most extreme form, the activities of some criminal and terrorist groups are indistinguishable. Terrorist groups may smuggle drugs or people for profit, while criminal groups may terrorize for political ends. In some cases, the conduct of illegal economic activity by terrorist groups subverts their ideological aims as members' key activities centre on the acquisition of illegal resources and ideology is subordinated to profit. More commonly, however, criminal groups render services to terrorists by providing false documentation or weaponry for payment. Whatever the nature of the links in any particular case, given that both organized crime and terror adopt the same methods — cell-like structures, secret communications, the movement of financial resources, codes of silence and the use of violence to control and intimidate — similar responses are required. Building law-enforcement capacity to counter organized crime and corrupt practices, therefore, also reinforces the ability to counter terrorism effectively.

35. The increasingly global nature of organized crime requires a global response, relying first and foremost on more effective international cooperation. The trafficking operations of criminal groups, by definition, cross borders — indeed, they use the constraints posed by borders on law enforcement agencies as a comparative advantage. Accordingly, the fight against those phenomena must be a cross-national, regional and global enterprise. The key instrument to counter such anti-social behaviours is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,<sup>4</sup> which came into force in September 2003 and has now been ratified by 82 States. The Conference of Parties to the Convention met for the first time in July 2004 in Vienna, agreeing on a work plan for its implementation. Its three supplementary instruments are also significant, targeting the specific manifestations of organized crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,<sup>5</sup> the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air,<sup>6</sup> and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition<sup>7</sup> (which has yet to enter into force). The Convention puts in place processes and structures to initiate and sustain cooperation. I urge countries which have not done so to ratify this important instrument and its three Protocols, and by so doing to support the process for their effective implementation. The success of the Convention, as well as other related efforts at police and criminal justice reform, will depend on the provision of technical assistance to those most affected, and will also require a commitment from all States to effective implementation based on a commitment to the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

36. Similarly, the adoption and opening for signature at Mérida, Mexico, in December 2003, of the United Nations Convention against Corruption<sup>8</sup> is a significant achievement. The support that it has received, measured by the number of countries that have signed, indicates both an acute awareness of the severity of the problem and a remarkable commitment to tackling it. I call on States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify this important instrument. A key focus of the Convention is prevention — providing the institutional and regulatory framework to reduce the likelihood of corrupt practices in the first instance. Ensuring that this preventive framework is in place in societies severely affected by corruption must be an immediate priority. Without it, random prosecutions or media investigations cannot on their own prevent corrupt practices. The first step, as recognized by the

Convention, must be built on systems, structures and procedures that are aimed at prevention. This requires inputs and actions from many agencies and across multiple sectors.

37. These universal legal instruments provide a legal framework, a stimulus for action and a systematic way of organizing such action to contain and counter key challenges to global security. By definition, programmes that aim to eradicate social evils are multisectoral: given the breadth and depth of the challenges, there is work for a multitude of agencies and organizations both inside and outside the United Nations system, building on their comparative advantage and institutional expertise. With that in mind and with the aim of building a more comprehensive response to organized crime and corruption across the United Nations system, in April 2004 the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination endorsed a series of immediate and medium-term measures designed to ensure more effective action against organized crime in a variety of sectors where United Nations agencies are active. Our aim is to work together more closely to enhance our impact, ensuring a more effective response to the evolving threat posed by transnational crime and its links to corruption and terrorism (for more details, see E/2004/67).

38. We ignore the threat posed by transnational organized crime at our peril. In an interdependent world, the damage to one's neighbour will also eventually be damage to oneself. Transnational crime and its impact respect no borders, bypass no community and leave the life of no single citizen untouched. I urge all Governments, as well as the institutions of civil society more broadly, to support the efforts of the United Nations in responding effectively to this challenge.

### **III. Development**

#### **Making the Millennium Development Goals happen**

39. In four short years, the eight Millennium Development Goals derived from the Millennium Declaration have transformed the face of global development cooperation. The broad global consensus around a set of clear, measurable and time-bound development goals has generated unprecedented, coordinated action, not only within the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, but also within the wider donor community and, most importantly, within developing countries themselves.

40. The commitment of Governments, individually and collectively, to the Millennium Development Goals, and their integration into national and international development strategies, policies and actions is expected to produce improved development results. For most goals, however, data on achievements are not available beyond 2002. In addition, most projections of the possible outcomes in 2015 start from the base year of 1990 and are thus weighted heavily by the results achieved before the Millennium Development Goals were even adopted and corresponding policies introduced, which suggests that relying on such historical data to anticipate future outcomes, including the situation in 2015, may provide an unduly pessimistic view.

41. That caveat aside, the data available so far suggest that the developing countries fall into three broad groups in terms of their progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. The first is a group of countries, comprising most

of Asia and Northern Africa, that is largely on track to meet the target of halving extreme poverty by 2015 and to achieve many of the social targets of the Goals. The second group of countries, mainly in West Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, has been making good progress towards some individual goals, such as achieving universal primary education, but has been less successful in reducing poverty. The third group, largely comprising countries in sub-Saharan Africa but also least developed countries in other regions, are far from making adequate progress on most of the goals.

42. As the United Nations prepares for the five-year review of the Millennium Declaration, a major breakthrough is needed if the 2015 targets are to be met. Developing countries must fulfil their commitments, as set out in the Millennium Declaration and the Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development,<sup>9</sup> to reallocate and mobilize more domestic resources, reform institutions to suit national priorities, and adopt effective, nationally owned economic and social policies that can provide a spur to economic growth. It is particularly important to follow up the broader commitments to democracy, human rights and sound, accountable governance.

43. While these actions are all necessary to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, they are far from sufficient. Developed countries must also fulfil their responsibilities by increasing and improving development assistance, concluding a new development-oriented trade round, embracing wider and deeper debt relief and fostering technology transfer. Indeed, if the vision behind the Millennium Declaration is to be realized, the Goals must be seen as a global deal that is built on mutual commitments and mutual accountability.

### **Reshaping development strategies**

#### *Developing countries*

44. Within developing countries, there is a growing momentum around the Millennium Development Goals. At the regional level, intergovernmental groups, such as the African Union, have endorsed the goals, and five regional Millennium Development Goals reports, most recently for the Arab States and Central Europe, have been prepared. In addition, the preparation of Millennium Development Goals country reports has accelerated, with 82 prepared to date and 73 countries having completed at least one report. The improvement in the procedural, qualitative and quantitative aspects of the reports has been as important as the increase in the overall number. Although at first the reports tended to be prepared by small groups of drafters, more recently the process has come to include both Governments, which are engaging in national debates and tailoring targets to national priorities and circumstances, and national statistical offices, which have become more involved in the collection and analysis of specific indicators. The result is a stronger sense of national ownership and purpose. In most cases, the global Millennium Development Goals and indicators have been adjusted to countries' individual development conditions, and in some instances countries have gone so far as to adopt targets that are more ambitious than the Goals.

45. This work is having a real impact at the country level, where many Governments are starting to develop national strategies that trigger real policy changes focused on the Millennium Development Goals. In the United Republic of

Tanzania, the Government has used a United Nations-supported Millennium Development Goals monitoring system to sharpen its poverty reduction strategy to emphasize rural development and food security, leading directly to a doubling of this year's national budget for agriculture. In Albania, the Government is producing Millennium Development Goals reports that establish a baseline within each region to serve as the foundation for future development strategies. Thailand and Viet Nam have set Millennium Development Goals-plus targets that go beyond the global targets. Cambodia, Mozambique and Yemen have adapted the Goals to meet national priorities and conditions. Brazil has incorporated most Millennium Development Goals targets into its planning framework, and has set specific targets for regions and social groups. Egypt has made progress in implementing the Goals in local areas. The Solomon Islands and Afghanistan, which are both recovering from conflict, are framing their national development strategies around the Goals.

#### *Donor countries*

46. For their part, donor countries have increasingly recognized the value and necessity of reporting on goal 8 of the Millennium Development Goals (Develop a global partnership for development) as a way of verifying their own credibility in supporting the Goals and underscoring the importance of reciprocity between donor and recipient countries. Denmark was the first to publish its report, in 2003, followed by the Netherlands in May 2004 and Sweden in June 2004. Other donors, including Belgium, Canada, Finland, Norway and the United Kingdom, have indicated that they intend to publish their reports shortly. In another encouraging initiative, the European Union (EU) has decided to prepare a consolidated report related to goals 7 (covering environmental sustainability) and 8 (covering development assistance, dismantling trade barriers and debt relief) for the international Millennium Development Goals "stock-taking" event in 2005. Moves to undertake the reporting process collectively through the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), whereby member countries could share experiences and lessons learned and adopt a common reporting format and a greater focus on the Goals, would be welcome. Although all official development assistance (ODA) addresses poverty reduction either directly or indirectly, approximately 43 per cent, or just under \$24 billion, of the more than \$55 billion total annual ODA flows in 2001/02 also addressed the Goals specifically. For example, of that total more than \$1 billion was allotted to primary education, more than \$1.2 billion to HIV/AIDS, about \$2.1 billion to environmental sustainability programmes and nearly \$5.1 billion to debt relief.

#### *United Nations system*

47. The Millennium Development Goals have also reshaped the way the United Nations addresses development issues by improving coherence and coordination at the country level. UNDG, in particular, has reoriented its work around the Goals, developing new guidelines for the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks. The Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat contributes to national statistical capacity-building and the collection of sound, reliable and comparable data, which are indispensable for the formulation and implementation of policies to achieve the Goals. More broadly, the Goals have helped to galvanize the follow-up to the outcomes of major United Nations conferences and summits; including the Beijing Declaration and Platform for

Action,<sup>10</sup> the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,<sup>11</sup> the Brussels Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001-2010,<sup>12</sup> the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS,<sup>13</sup> and the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States.<sup>14</sup>

48. Similarly, many United Nations entities are using the Millennium Development Goals framework for monitoring their own activities, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Education for All programme; World Health Organization (WHO)/United Nations Children's Fund monitoring of child and maternal health; and the measurement of results for food security, hunger, nutrition and eradication of rural poverty by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Agencies and programmes are also using the Goals as a point of reference for overall reporting and analytical work, as can be seen, for example, in the World Health Organization annual *World Health Report* and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report*.

49. Similarly, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are using the Millennium Development Goals as a framework for their work, and in coordination with UNDG have adopted a shared approach to country-level assessments of the actions required to achieve the Goals within the context of poverty reduction strategy papers and national development strategies. Much of that work is centred on the Millennium Project, which draws together networks of hundreds of policy makers, practitioners and experts in 10 task forces to map out new strategies to meet the Goals. The Project is providing research and analysis to identify the institutional reforms, investments and other interventions needed to "scale up" efforts to meet the Goals. Among its core tasks is to work with a selected number of United Nations country teams, the World Bank and other partners in helping Governments to align the poverty reduction strategy papers (or equivalent policy vehicles) with a long-term, needs-based strategy for achieving the Goals in the context of the 10-year planning horizons required for the 2015 deadline. The Project's final report will be presented to the Secretary-General in early 2005.

50. Complementing that effort in research and policy analysis, the Millennium Campaign is mobilizing political support for the Millennium Declaration by working with parliamentary networks, local authorities, media, faith-based organizations, youth organizations, civil society and other movements extending well beyond the United Nations system. During 2003 and early 2004, a number of subregional and national consultations with civil society and other partners in developing countries were convened in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Arab countries aimed at putting together broad-based coalitions to promote the Millennium Development Goals. There is also growing support for the Goals in developed countries, especially in Europe, with a broad, civil society-led coalition being set up to focus on the forthcoming five-year review of the Millennium Declaration under the broad banner "Make poverty history". In all cases, the campaigns are managed and driven by national and regional actors, and the Millennium Campaign is playing a facilitating, convening and information-sharing role.

## **Moving towards the Millennium Development Goals**

51. Despite greater endorsement of the Millennium Development Goals and some encouraging regional and subregional trends, as a whole the world is not optimizing its performance. Some regions and countries are making little progress towards any of the Goals. Many sub-Saharan African countries will need special support to accelerate progress sufficiently to catch up. Indeed, many of those countries are caught in a poverty trap, in which a limited availability of domestic resources, accentuated by high population growth, restricts the public and private investment and public expenditure on both social services and development administration needed to escape from the trap.

### *Goal 1*

#### *Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger*

52. With regard to goal 1, progress remains uneven and in many countries there has been a deterioration. Although much of Eastern, South-Eastern and Southern Asia and North Africa are broadly on track, there has been little or no progress in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Western Asia poverty has increased. As of 2001, almost half the population of sub-Saharan Africa was struggling to survive on \$1 per day or less, the same proportion as in 1990. The poverty gap ratio for that region is almost three times that in Southern Asia, the next most impoverished region.

53. The proportion of the population in developing countries who suffer from hunger fell in Eastern and South-Eastern Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. It also fell in Southern Asia, but the rate of improvement was insufficient to ensure that the target will be met. In Africa, food production has barely kept up with population growth since 1980, owing to the depletion of soil nutrients, the declining availability of arable land per person and high population growth. In Western Asia, the rate of hunger increased.

### *Goal 2*

#### *Achieve universal primary education*

54. Under goal 2, all developing country regions experienced an increase in their primary net enrolment ratios from 1990/91 to 2001/02, but sub-Saharan Africa, Southern Asia and Oceania are still short of meeting the goal. Moreover, 121 million children are still out of school, 65 million of them girls and a disproportionate number of them in Africa, Southern Asia and the least developed countries. Success is possible — net primary school enrolment rates increased substantially from 1990 to 2000 in Benin, Eritrea, the Gambia, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal and Togo — but a substantial additional effort is required.

### *Goal 3*

#### *Promote gender equality and empower women*

55. With regard to goal 3, the target of achieving parity between girls and boys in primary and secondary education by 2005 is being met or nearly so in most regions except sub-Saharan Africa and Southern and Western Asia (which could catch up by 2010). Girls' enrolments have increased faster than boys' in all regions, and the ratio of girls to boys in primary school rose impressively from 1990 to 2000 in such countries as Bangladesh, Gambia, Mauritania, Nepal and the Sudan. Nevertheless,

fewer than 80 girls per 100 boys are enrolled at the secondary level in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia overall.

56. Progress as measured by other indicators under goal 3 is lagging behind. Wage-employment rates of women have changed little in any region since 1990, and are far below those for men in all regions except Latin America and the Caribbean, where 43 per cent of wage workers are now women, and Eastern Asia, where the proportion is 40 per cent. Women continue to be vastly underrepresented in national parliaments in most regions. Only in the Nordic countries do women hold 40 per cent of the seats; in 14 countries they hold 30 per cent or more of the seats; in Northern Africa, Southern and Western Asia and Oceania, they hold less than 10 per cent.

#### *Goal 4*

##### *Reduce child mortality*

57. Progress on goal 4 is on track or nearly so in Northern Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and South-Eastern Asia but has been weaker in Southern Asia and negligible in Western Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to have the highest level of under-five mortality, estimated at 174 under-five deaths per 1,000 live births, nearly twice the rate of the next highest region, Southern Asia, and more than 20 times the rate in developed regions.

#### *Goal 5*

##### *Improve maternal health*

58. Under goal 5, the uncertainty of maternal mortality estimates does not allow any definite assessment of trends. Recent estimates continue to indicate appallingly high rates of maternal deaths in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia: of an estimated 529,000 maternal deaths worldwide in 2000, 445,000 occurred in those two regions. The maternal mortality rate was highest in sub-Saharan Africa, at 920 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, followed by South Asia, with 520 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. Recent data on the proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel, a critical factor in reducing maternal deaths, indicate significant improvements in northern Africa and Eastern and South-Eastern Asia; the lowest rates are found in South-Central Asia — only 35 attendants per 100 deliveries.

#### *Goal 6*

##### *Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases*

59. Goal 6, stopping the spread of HIV/AIDS and other major diseases, especially malaria and tuberculosis, has received greater political and financial support from donors but annual funding remains significantly short of the estimated \$12 billion needed in 2005 and the \$20 billion needed for 2006. A total of \$4.7 billion was spent in 2003, up from \$1.7 billion in 2002. Nevertheless, implementation and national commitment remain inadequate and the world is still far short of realizing any major success. As the 2004 global report on AIDS demonstrates, there is no region where HIV is not a potential serious threat to the population, and almost no country where the spread of HIV/AIDS has been definitely stopped.

60. Trends in AIDS prevalence and deaths, available for the first time in 2004, indicate that the number of persons living with HIV/AIDS increased from 35 million in 2001 to 38 million in 2003, while an estimated 4.8 million people became newly infected in 2003, more than in any previous year. The pandemic continues unabated in the majority of countries of sub-Saharan Africa, is reaching epidemic proportions in eastern Europe and is starting to spread rapidly in the general population in Southern Asia. Successful interventions and prevention programmes continue to fall far short, and the sheer scale of the problem is having a devastating “knock-on” impact on broader health, poverty, education and hunger indicators and on the very capacity to govern.

61. The epidemic remains most severe in Africa, particularly Southern Africa, where 24-39 per cent of pregnant women aged 15-24 in capital cities were infected with the virus in 2002/03. Of the estimated 2.9 million AIDS-related deaths in 2003, 2.2 million occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, where progress has been slow. Where the necessary prevention, testing and control programmes have been adopted, such as in Uganda, progress has been made, with the prevalence of infection declining as measured in two antenatal clinics in Kampala.

62. On another key front, there is no evidence that malaria is diminishing. Once again, sub-Saharan Africa is the region most affected. Tuberculosis infection rates are also on the increase in that region, and they have only been reduced by a small margin in most other regions.

63. Outbreaks of new and re-emerging diseases are also threatening global health, with severe potential repercussions for all the Millennium Development Goals. To respond to such threats, WHO and United Nations partners are working with Governments, particularly in least developed countries, to improve the preparedness of national health systems through capacity-building, exchange of information and other measures, including building up laboratory and epidemiology capacity. At a global level, new initiatives, such as the Global Outbreak Alert and the Response Network, are bringing together more than 120 partners to provide timely and high-quality technical support. It has become clear that the WHO International Health Regulations, which serve as a global regulatory framework for addressing global health security and epidemic alert and response, need to be strengthened and adapted to the realities of the health challenges of the twenty-first century.

64. The picture regarding goal 7 is mixed. Although the data on drinking water and sanitation remain incomplete, all regions have seen some progress. Urban access to improved drinking water is nearly universal, except in sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania, where it has declined. Significant improvements have been made in rural access in all regions, but only a few countries have achieved improvement at a sufficient rate to meet the target. While there has been significant progress towards meeting the sanitation goal, 2.6 billion people worldwide did not have access to improved sanitation in 2000. Reflecting those challenges, in its resolution 58/218 the General Assembly declared 2005-2015 to be the International Decade for Action, “Water for Life”, and the Secretary-General has established the Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation to help mobilize action and funds for water and sanitation, and encourage new partnerships.



*Goal 7**Ensure environmental sustainability*

65. Even regions that have made significant progress towards achieving many other goals, such as parts of Asia, tend to have a poorer record on environmental issues. Protected areas have increased in all regions, but there has been a loss of forest cover in some parts of the world, notably those with tropical forests. Energy use and per capita carbon dioxide emissions have increased in developing countries but fell in the economies in transition with the decline in industrial production in the 1990s. The use of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons has been almost eliminated globally.

66. Progress in the implementation of the global conventions has been mixed. The Kyoto Protocol<sup>15</sup> to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change<sup>16</sup> has been ratified by 120 countries, but it requires ratification by either the Russian Federation or the United States in order to come into force. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa,<sup>17</sup> was adopted in 1994 and entered into force in 1996, but a lack of financial resources has limited its implementation. More encouragingly, there has been progress towards the full implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity,<sup>18</sup> with the adoption of measurable indicators and specific goals to reduce the current rate of biodiversity loss by 2010, and the entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety<sup>19</sup> in September 2003. On the question of deforestation and forest degradation, nine international processes involving 150 countries that encompass 85 per cent of the world's forests have made progress in developing criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management. The Second World Conference on Disaster Reduction, to be held in Kobe, Japan, in January 2005, should help to intensify cooperation to reduce the number and effects of natural and man-made disasters, particularly through the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.

**Building a strong global partnership***Goal 8**Develop a global partnership for development*

67. Essential to achieving the Millennium Development Goals is goal 8, the pledge by developed countries to follow through on previously stated commitments to support the good-faith efforts by developing countries to achieve the first seven goals by dismantling trade barriers, widening debt relief and expanding development assistance. There has been some progress, particularly with regard to aid flows, but the scale of support continues to fall well short of what is needed.

68. In the area of trade, the collapse of negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting held in Cancún, Mexico, on the Doha round of trade talks, which had for the first time explicitly placed the needs and interests of poor countries at the centre of the trade agenda, stalled progress for 10 months and was a serious setback in efforts to create a level playing field in which developing countries are able to take advantage of their comparative advantages, particularly in such areas as agriculture and textiles. With the agreement on 31 July by the 147 member Governments of WTO on a new framework, the prospects for the Doha round have significantly improved. In particular, for the first time, WTO

member Governments agreed to abolish all forms of agricultural export subsidies by a specific date and to reduce trade-distorting domestic support for agriculture. According to World Bank estimates, a rollback of developed-country trade barriers and subsidies in agriculture would improve global welfare by about \$120 billion. The task now is to turn the new framework into a final agreement that delivers this great promise to the developing world.

69. Recent market access initiatives, such as the “Everything but Arms” initiative of the European Union and the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of the United States, also represent some progress. In particular, apparel exports to the United States from certain countries in Africa have increased dramatically, but the overall impact is not yet significant across the board.

70. The long-term downward trend and volatility in non-fuel commodity prices continue to pose a major challenge to exporting countries. The international community should renew its efforts to alleviate these problems by improving existing mechanisms and considering new approaches.

71. With regard to debt relief, of the 37 least developed countries that have been classified as eligible for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief programme, as of April 2004, 13 had reached “completion point” and 14 had reached “decision point.” Partly as a result, the debt-to-gross national income (GNI) ratio for those countries fell from 109 per cent in 1997 to 86 per cent in 2002. While the debt-to-export ratio shrank across all regions of the developing world over the same period, it remains above the 150 per cent threshold condition for a country’s heavily indebted poor country (HIPC) designation in Latin America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. Even for several countries that reached the completion point, debt sustainability is not guaranteed. Given evidence that countries have been using debt-relief savings to invest in Millennium Development Goals-focused areas, such as health and education, relief should be accelerated. In addition, there is a strong case for expanding HIPC eligibility to some larger and middle-income countries that are facing an acute debt crisis.

72. With regard to development assistance, the trend is positive with regards to both quality and quantity, but much more needs to be done. At one level, there has been encouraging progress in streamlining procedures and harmonizing practices across donors and institutions. The Rome Declaration on Harmonization adopted by the High-level Forum on Harmonization in February 2003 was timely in that it coincided with the shift to country ownership of development programmes. However, in following up on this new approach, donors need to adopt and execute a collective road map indicating how, by September 2005, they intend to improve coordination and reduce the transactions costs imposed on recipient countries.

73. With regard to total flows, OECD/DAC member countries increased ODA to developing countries by 3.9 per cent (\$2.3 billion) in real terms from 2002 to 2003. That level is down from the 7.0 per cent real increase in ODA from 2001 to 2002, but in absolute terms DAC countries’ ODA in 2003 reached \$68.5 billion, a figure slightly distorted by the depreciation of the dollar but nevertheless the highest level ever in both nominal and real terms. It represents 0.25 per cent of donor countries’ total gross national income, an increase from 0.23 per cent in 2002 and 0.22 per cent in 2001.

74. Much of that progress was country-specific, with the \$2.3 billion increase in ODA reflecting the start of reconstruction aid flows into Iraq (\$2 billion) and the continuing growth in general bilateral grants (\$2 billion), all of which were offset by decreased contributions to multilateral concessional funds (-\$1.2 billion) and net lending (-\$0.5 billion). The United States is the largest aid donor in absolute terms, though only Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have met the United Nations ODA target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI). Five other countries have committed themselves to meet the 0.7 per cent target: Ireland by 2007, Belgium by 2010, France and Spain by 2012 and the United Kingdom by 2013.

75. The combination of all commitments made by donors since the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey would, if fulfilled, raise ODA by about \$20 billion by 2006 compared to 2001 levels. That is encouraging but needs to be put in perspective. On the one hand, much of the increase simply represents “catch-up” after a long period of decline: per capita aid flows to most least developed countries and to Africa as a whole remain between one fifth and one third lower, respectively, than they were in the early 1990s. As the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development led by former President Zedillo of Mexico concluded in its report to the Monterrey Conference (see A/55/1000, annex), even assuming that developing countries adopted sound policies and maximized their use of domestic resources, a minimum additional \$50 billion a year in aid would probably be needed in order to meet the Millennium Development Goals. While innovative ideas, such as the United Kingdom’s proposed international finance facility, point to some potential solutions, for developing countries the key is not how but when. Whatever other steps they take, without assistance on a sufficient scale the goals will simply not be met.

76. With only 11 years to go until the 2015 deadline, 2005 will be a critical year, particularly for Africa. Overcoming human poverty will require a quantum leap in scale and ambition: more nationally owned strategies and policies, stronger institutions, wider participatory processes, focused investments in economic and social infrastructure, and more resources, domestic and external. Realistically, if the goals set are to be reached, these developments need to happen very soon.

77. The Millennium Development Goals are still technically feasible in even the poorest countries, but the window of opportunity is rapidly narrowing and the political will remains largely absent. The five-year review of the Millennium Declaration provides potentially the last realistic opportunity to take the necessary steps to accelerate the enormous momentum of the last few years to meet the Goals. We must seize this opportunity.

## **IV. Protecting the vulnerable**

### **The Millennium Development Goals, disasters, risk reduction and complex crises: making the humanitarian linkages**

78. In the Millennium Declaration, world leaders declared their commitment to ensuring “that children and all civilian populations that suffer disproportionately the consequences of natural disasters, genocide, armed conflicts and other humanitarian emergencies are given every assistance and protection so that they can resume normal life as soon as possible”.<sup>20</sup> The pledges made in the Declaration regarding

protecting the vulnerable remain as important as ever for achieving the vision of a more peaceful, prosperous and just world that was articulated by the Millennium Summit four years ago.

#### **Addressing vulnerabilities in emergencies**

79. Interventions geared towards mitigating the adverse effects of disasters and crises are a vital part of efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. After all, it is the poor, the vulnerable and the oppressed who are most affected by environmental degradation, natural hazards or the eruption of violent conflict. They are also the most likely to suffer the consequences in the form of death and displacement and the systematic loss of development gains.

80. The terrible consequences of disasters resulting from environmental hazards continue to fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the world's poor. In 2003 alone, 600 million people were adversely affected by 700 natural occurrences, which caused economic losses exceeding US\$ 65 billion. Approximately 75,000 people perished in those disasters — 30,000 of them were killed in seconds by the earthquakes in Algeria in May 2003 and in Bam, Iran, in December 2003.

81. A number of emerging trends suggest that the frequency of and vulnerability to such hazards will only get worse. The Earth's climate is very likely to change over the decades to come — the result of increases in the concentration of atmospheric greenhouse gases caused by human activity and short-sighted government policies. In addition, there are the dangers of rising sea levels, as well as increased variability in rainfall and temperature levels, resulting in floods, droughts, hurricanes and tornadoes. The likely socio-economic outcomes are not favourable and include changes in agricultural production patterns that in turn will have negative implications for livelihoods and migration trends. The ensuing competition for control of natural resources may exacerbate tensions between groups.

82. Growing vulnerability to natural hazards will also have significant implications for humanitarian and development actors. Poor countries will be least able to reduce the impact of droughts, flooding or disease; the resulting dependence on life-saving responses may divert time, energy and resources from activities that address long-term goals.

83. The events of the past 12 months serve as evidence that attention to risk-reduction and prevention strategies can curb vulnerability to natural hazards. Widespread flooding across South Asia in July 2004, although severe and deadly for many, had a less destructive impact than comparable flooding a few decades ago. The difference was the result of the increased attention that has been paid in recent years to ensuring local preparedness and building response capacities. Similarly, the focus by humanitarian and development partners and donors on addressing — and funding — the structural obstacles to food security in the Horn of Africa has averted a major famine from the drought cycle that began in 2002.

84. Such examples have raised awareness of the important place that risk reduction must hold in efforts to achieve sustainable development, giving rise to many United Nations and government initiatives to integrate disaster reduction into development planning and action. For example, an initiative of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, supported by the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, UNDP and the World Bank, resulted in the African Regional

Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction, which was endorsed by African heads of State in Addis Ababa in July 2004. The importance of developing practices to increase resilience to sudden and chronic shocks will also come into sharper focus during the second World Conference on Disaster Reduction, to be held in Kobe, Japan, in January 2005.

85. At the same time, vulnerability from conflict continues to be widespread. Violent incursions in the Darfur region of Sudan have displaced at least a million people within Sudan and neighbouring Chad. Violence in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo threatens the fragile gains made in the peace process. United Nations missions in Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia have helped to stabilize those countries, but continued insecurity and the cumulative effects of years of unrest have deprived the population of basic services in many areas. Humanitarian emergencies in northern Uganda and the Central African Republic and long-simmering conflicts in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and in Colombia put at risk the livelihoods of their civilian populations and undermine critical stabilization efforts.

86. In addition to the loss of lives and livelihoods that occur in war zones, prolonged violence significantly alters political, social and economic relations, with immediate as well as more long-term implications. While some undoubtedly benefit from warfare and have a vested interest in its continuation, it is generally the weakest members of societies — civilians, women, children, the elderly, disabled, displaced and refugees — who suffer the most and depend on the support of humanitarian and other actors to survive. For example, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, lawlessness, the breakdown of government services and the flight of professional expertise to sustain those services have led to the almost total collapse of health and education systems in the areas affected by conflict.

87. The bulk of United Nations, Red Cross and NGO relief efforts is, in principle, dedicated to those who are most vulnerable. It is no less important, however, to help affected communities as a whole to overcome the shocks and stresses that deplete their coping mechanisms. In this way, their ability to push for changes can be restored and they may emerge from the crisis and onto the path of development.

88. Strengthening support and protection for the internally displaced and ensuring a more focused planning and funding of post-crisis transition are some of the ways in which the international community and United Nations Member States can help to stabilize societies and create the environment in which sustainable development can take place. The past year saw some progress in this regard. For example, the United Nations and the Government of Liberia were able to develop a transition strategy and implementation mechanism to help put that country squarely on a development path. And after 10 years of conflict in Sierra Leone, a national recovery strategy resulted in a transitional appeal to fund the reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees, build national law enforcement institutions and address economic disparity through job creation.

89. Those initiatives, however, are simply first steps, and there is still much to be done. The international community must harmonize its transition planning and fundraising tools, bring more coherence to needs assessments and build local institutions so that national actors can be involved in their own transition from the beginning. Member States should work to strengthen national laws and national policies to

address the needs and protect the rights of the internally displaced, taking into account the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.<sup>21</sup>

90. The ability to overcome vulnerability in the long term is directly linked with access to humanitarian assistance and protection. As outlined in recent reports to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, among the violations of human rights and humanitarian law that are depressingly familiar are efforts to block or impede access that put millions beyond the reach of humanitarian actors. It is estimated that more than 10 million people in some 20 countries affected by complex emergencies are denied access to the support of humanitarian agencies.

91. Both physical and political factors can impede access. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Angola, the constraints of war, underdevelopment and the weak capacity of government institutions have led to the collapse of physical infrastructure, putting millions of people beyond the reach of humanitarian organizations. In the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the construction of a separation barrier has become the greatest physical obstacle to humanitarian access and has severely affected the livelihoods and access to essential services of the Palestinian population.

92. In some countries, political, procedural and administrative obstacles continue to be used as a means of restricting humanitarian access. A case in point is the Sudan, where cumbersome travel and customs authorization procedures limited early attempts to gain access to the displaced in Darfur.

93. Humanitarian access and aid delivery are also severely impeded by a lack of security. There have been many instances where an affected population has been faced with a bleak choice: either to forgo food assistance that has been pending for months or risk murderous attacks by fighters as they seek that assistance. Deliberate attacks on civilians, the recruitment and use of child soldiers and the indiscriminate use of landmines have also affected the security and well-being of populations in zones of conflict.

94. Obtaining and maintaining access to vulnerable populations is critical to humanitarian assistance and protection and will ultimately create an enabling environment for development. Denying access robs civilians of the right to human dignity espoused in the Millennium Declaration. I therefore call on all States concerned to cooperate fully with United Nations and other humanitarian agencies and organizations to ensure the safe and unhindered access of humanitarian personnel, supplies and equipment so that assistance is provided whenever and wherever it is required.

95. HIV/AIDS remains a critical factor in increasing vulnerability to both environmental disasters and complex emergencies. Although sub-Saharan Africa has only 10 per cent of the world's population, it is struggling to cope with about 70 per cent of all HIV-infected people. While the disease is a massive crisis in its own right that requires extraordinary emergency responses, HIV/AIDS is not a short-term phenomenon but has long-term implications that will exacerbate the vulnerability of affected communities for generations. The disease continues to take the lives of the most productive members of society in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Decades of development have been lost and efforts to reduce poverty and improve living standards have been severely undermined. Women now account for nearly 60 per cent of those who are HIV-positive. Coupled with the sexual exploitation and

abuse of women and children that routinely occur in conflicts, the AIDS pandemic is yet another reminder of the importance of concerted preventive measures to reduce threats to the safety, health and well-being of vulnerable populations.

96. International and national HIV/AIDS interventions should be better integrated into humanitarian planning and programming, including in vulnerability assessments. They should cut across humanitarian and development lines and focus on reducing threats to the safety, health and well-being of vulnerable populations over the long term.

### **Funding**

97. The disproportionality of funding for humanitarian emergencies and transition activities continues to impede long-term development. Although the global humanitarian assistance requirements of US\$ 3 billion in 2004 are similar to previous years, the pattern of funding humanitarian activities remains uneven, leaving some countries substantially underfinanced. While some high-profile emergencies are well-funded, long-simmering but “forgotten” emergencies, such as those in the Central African Republic and Côte d’Ivoire, have received less than one fifth of their total requirements. Often it is in those countries where the needs are the greatest and most urgent.

98. To address that problem, donors launched the “Good humanitarian donorship” initiative in 2003. The initiative emphasizes greater donor performance and accountability through commitment to a number of key principles and practices that are designed to ensure that humanitarian assistance is based on clearly defined needs. Although progress has been made in improving the assessment and prioritization of needs, increased levels of timely, predictable and flexible funding are required to ensure that financial assistance is equitably applied where and when it is needed. The initiative is ongoing and will be taken up at a meeting of donors in Ottawa in October 2004 that will review progress made by participating donor countries, discuss needs-based funding and consider next steps.

## **V. Conclusion**

99. The United Nations requires a range of key inputs in order to succeed, including vision and political support, adequate financing and staff of the highest calibre. The last year has made it abundantly clear that there are two other prerequisites for the United Nations to fulfil its mission: it requires adequate security to do its job and it requires institutional agility to adapt to changing circumstances in the world.

100. The tragic bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Iraq on 19 August 2003, as well as attacks on United Nations staff in other countries since then, suggest that United Nations personnel are endangered not only by their presence in insecure environments throughout the world but also by the fact that the United Nations itself is increasingly a target.

101. While there will always be risk in working in some of the areas where the United Nations is mandated to carry out its mission, it is necessary to devise new ways of securing our operations. The Organization has begun to introduce a number of measures to improve security and protection arrangements for its staff. In

response to the new threats faced by United Nations agencies, additional risk-mitigation measures have been put in place in the more high-risk areas. These include setting out clearer guidelines on the way in which United Nations staff engage and interact with local populations; greater reliance on national staff for ongoing projects, with support and guidance from outside the country in question; and maximizing the use of common services. The aim is to ensure that the flow of resources to the population in need can continue, without putting at risk the lives of the high-profile and therefore most often targeted international staff.

102. The deliberate targeting and killing of United Nations political, humanitarian and development personnel denies vulnerable groups their right to assistance and developing countries a more prosperous future. It limits the ability of the Organization to carry out its mandate and to meet the challenge of the Millennium Declaration. Additional steps are being proposed to strengthen and unify the security management system of the United Nations system. Those steps will need to be supported in very concrete ways by Member States. If they are not, the very mission of the United Nations will be placed in jeopardy.

103. The present report has outlined many of the challenges we face today in implementing the vision laid out in the Millennium Declaration. Challenges, however, are never static. They evolve, and as such we must be prepared to address not only the problems we see today and the trends we observe but also those that we anticipate for tomorrow.

104. Although the goals of the Millennium Declaration have been fixed by the world's heads of State and Government, the institutional arrangements required to achieve them must be agile. As the primary actors and stakeholders in the international system, the Member States of the United Nations will have to be flexible in their own approaches. On the one hand, developing countries will need to continue the very positive trend towards integrating the Millennium Development Goals into their own planning processes and adopting strategies best suited to improve the prospects of successful reform, where required. On the other hand, donor Governments will need to incorporate the vision of the Millennium Declaration into their own bilateral programmes. This may necessitate a candid review of their own strategies and institutions in order to ensure that they are best suited to the new environment.

105. The United Nations, as an institution, must also prove that it can and will be agile. As I have reported previously, we have made major headway on reform and revitalization in recent years. Adaptation, however, is a constant process. New realities call for new solutions, in terms of both mechanisms and processes. This coming year will be crucial in this regard.

106. In December 2004, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which I constituted to provide a new assessment of the challenges ahead and to recommend the changes which will be required if those challenges are to be met effectively through collective action, will issue its report. That report should provide an important foundation for serious discussion of changes that may well be needed.

107. Simultaneously, we need to prepare for the crucial high-level event that will be convened a year from now. Much has changed since the Millennium Declaration was issued four years ago. More will have already changed by the time the world's leaders meet again to review progress and shape the road ahead.



108. As the Organization prepares to mark its sixth decade in 2005, there could be no more fitting recognition of its many accomplishments and its ongoing promise than to advance in practice the vision of the Millennium Declaration. If all the United Nations Member States engage in serious contemplation and renew their commitment to the Declaration in concrete ways in the course of the coming year, the foundation will be laid for the peoples of the world not just to mark the target date of the Declaration in 2015 but also to celebrate real accomplishments at the conclusion of the seventh decade of the United Nations.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> General Assembly resolution 55/2.
- <sup>2</sup> *A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All* (Geneva, International Labour Office, 2004).
- <sup>3</sup> General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 8.
- <sup>4</sup> General Assembly resolution 55/25, annex I.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, annex II.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, annex III.
- <sup>7</sup> General Assembly resolution 55/255, annex.
- <sup>8</sup> General Assembly resolution 58/4, annex.
- <sup>9</sup> *Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.A.7), chap. I, resolution 1, annex.
- <sup>10</sup> *Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, 4-15 September 1995* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 96.IV.13), chap. I, resolution 1, annexes I and II.
- <sup>11</sup> *Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August-4 September 2002* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.03.II.A.1), chap. I, resolution 2, annex.
- <sup>12</sup> A/CONF.191/11.
- <sup>13</sup> General Assembly resolution S-26/2, annex.
- <sup>14</sup> *Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, Bridgetown, Barbados, 26 April-6 May 1994*, chap. I, resolution 1, annex II.
- <sup>15</sup> FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, decision 1/CP.3, annex.
- <sup>16</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 1771, No. 30822.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 1954, No. 33480.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. 1760, No. 30619.
- <sup>19</sup> See UNEP/CBD/ExCOP/1/3 and Corr.1, part two, annex.
- <sup>20</sup> General Assembly resolution 55/2, para. 26.
- <sup>21</sup> E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, annex.

## Statistical annex

### Millennium Development Goals, targets and indicators, 2004\*

#### Goal 1

#### Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

##### Target 1

Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day

##### Indicator 1

Population below \$1 purchasing power parity (PPP) per day<sup>a</sup>

	Percentage of population living below a \$1 per day		
	1990	1999	2001
Northern Africa	2.6	2.0	1.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	46.9	42.7	46.4
Latin America and the Caribbean	10.9	10.6	10.0
Eastern Asia	33.0	17.8	16.6
Southern Asia	39.7	30.5	30.4
South-Eastern Asia	18.4	10.8	10.2
Western Asia	1.6	4.2	3.7
Commonwealth of Independent States	0.5	10.3	5.0
Transition countries of Southeastern Europe	0.4	1.7	2.1

<sup>a</sup> High-income economies, as defined by the World Bank, are excluded.

##### Indicator 2

Poverty gap ratio<sup>a</sup>

	Mean shortfall from poverty line <sup>b</sup> (percentage)		
	1990	1999	2001
Northern Africa	0.5	0.3	0.3
Sub-Saharan Africa	19.5	18.6	20.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	3.5	4.1	3.5
Eastern Asia	8.9	4.2	3.9
Southern Asia	10.3	7.1	7.1
South-Eastern Asia	3.8	2.0	1.7

\* As set out in the United Nations Millennium Declaration (General Assembly resolution 55/2) and the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Road map towards the implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration" (A/56/326); for a complete description and technical details concerning the indicators, see *Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals: Definitions, Rationale, Concepts and Sources* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E. 03.XVII.18).

	<i>Mean shortfall from poverty line<sup>b</sup> (percentage)</i>		
	<i>1990</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2001</i>
Western Asia	0.4	1.0	0.9
Commonwealth of Independent States	0.2	2.9	1.0
Transition countries of Southeastern Europe	0.3	0.6	0.6

<sup>a</sup> The poverty gap ratio measures the magnitude of poverty. Expressed as a percentage of the poverty line, it is obtained by multiplying the proportion of people who live below the poverty line by the difference between the poverty line and the average income of the population living under the poverty line. If, for example, 30 per cent of the population live below the \$1 a day line and on average the consumption or income of these people is 20 per cent below the poverty line (i.e., US\$ 0.80), then the poverty gap ratio is 6 per cent.

<sup>b</sup> High-income economies, as defined by the World Bank, are excluded.

### *Indicator 3*

#### *Share of poorest quintile in national consumption*

No new global or regional data are available.

### **Target 2**

#### **Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger**

### *Indicator 4*

#### *Prevalence of underweight children under five years of age*

(a) Total

	<i>Children under five years of age who are underweight (percentage)</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	10	9
Sub-Saharan Africa	32	31
Latin America and the Caribbean	11	8
Eastern Asia	19	10
Southern Asia	53	47
South-Eastern Asia	38	29
Western Asia	11	10
Oceania	..	..

## (b) By sex

	<i>Children under-five years of age who are underweight, by sex (percentage in 2002)</i>		
	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Boys/Girls</i>
Northern Africa	9	9	1.00
Sub-Saharan Africa	30	29	1.03
Latin America and the Caribbean	8	7	1.14
Eastern Asia	10	11	0.91
Southern Asia	43	46	0.93
South-Eastern Asia	30	29	1.03
Western Asia	17	16	1.06
Oceania	..	..	..
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	7	8	0.88
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	3	3	1.00

*Indicator 5**Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption*

	<i>Percentage of undernourished in total population</i>	
	<i>1990-1992</i>	<i>1999-2001</i>
Northern Africa	5	4
Sub-Saharan Africa	35	33
Latin America and the Caribbean	13	10
Eastern Asia	16	11
Southern Asia	25	22
South-Eastern Asia	17	13
Western Asia	7	10
Oceania	25	27
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	18 <sup>a</sup>	27
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	4 <sup>a</sup>	4
Other transition countries in Europe <sup>b</sup>	4 <sup>a</sup>	4

<sup>a</sup> Data refer to the period 1993-1995.

<sup>b</sup> Including Millennium Development Goals transition countries of Southeastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and other European countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia).

## Goal 2

### Achieve universal primary education

#### Target 3

Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling

#### Indicator 6

Net enrolment ratio in primary education

	Primary-level enrollees per 100 children of enrolment age		
	1990/91	1998/99	2001/02
Northern Africa	81.7	88.1	91.9
Sub-Saharan Africa	53.9	57.1	62.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	86.4	94.4	95.7
Eastern Asia	97.7	100.4	92.1
Southern Asia	72.7	79.4	79.7
South-Eastern Asia	92.4	90.1	90.8
Western Asia	81.0	80.2	82.9
Oceania	74.2	77.0	79.4
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	84.7	87.4	94.4
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	91.1	82.6	86.5

#### Indicator 7

Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 5

##### (a) Total

No global or regional data are available.

##### (b) Primary completion rate

	Percentage of students enrolled in the final grade of primary school <sup>a</sup>					
	1998/99			2001/02		
	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls
Northern Africa	83.9	87.3	80.3	85.6	88.2	82.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	49.4	54.4	44.3	52.9	57.0	48.6
Latin America and the Caribbean	89.0	86.6	91.5	98.1	97.2	99.0
Eastern Asia	107.1	106.7	107.6	102.2	102.1	102.2
Southern Asia	66.3	73.2	58.9	73.1	79.2	66.6
South-Eastern Asia	88.4	89.3	87.5	92.7	92.8	92.6

	<i>Percentage of students enrolled in the final grade of primary school<sup>a</sup></i>					
	<i>1998/99</i>			<i>2001/02</i>		
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Boys</i>	<i>Girls</i>
Western Asia	77.2	82.9	71.1	76.1	80.9	71.1
Oceania	64.0	65.0	62.9	63.3	64.6	61.8
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	96.1	96.5	95.6	97.6	98.1	96.9
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	79.4	81.4	77.3	78.8	78.8	78.7

<sup>a</sup> The primary completion rate is calculated through the gross intake rate at the last grade of primary: "Total number of new entrants in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of the theoretical entrance age to the last grade"; see UNESCO Institute for Statistics, *Global Education Digest 2004: Comparing Education Statistics Across the World*.

*Indicator 8*  
*Literacy rate of 15-24-year-olds*

	<i>Literacy rate, 1990 and 2000-2004 (percentage)</i>					
	<i>1990</i>			<i>2000/04<sup>a</sup></i>		
	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Northern Africa	66.3	76.3	55.8	78.5	84.1	72.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	67.4	74.9	59.8	76.6	81	72.3
Latin America and the Caribbean	92.7	92.7	92.7	94.7	94.2	95.2
Eastern Asia	95.5	97.6	93.3	98.9	99.2	98.6
Southern Asia	61.5	71.1	51.0	72.3	81.5	62.5
South-Eastern Asia	94.3	95.5	93.1	95.4	96	94.9
Western Asia	80.1	88.2	71.5	85.6	90.7	80.3
Oceania	73.5	78.5	68.0	81.3	84.4	78.1
Commonwealth of Independent States	99.2	99.2	99.2	99.4	99.4	99.3

<sup>a</sup> Data refer to the latest literacy estimates and projections released in March 2004 by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics for the reference period 2000-2004.

### Goal 3

#### Promote gender equality and empower women

#### Target 4

**Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015**

#### Indicator 9

*Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education*

#### (a) Primary level

	<i>Ratio of girls' gross enrolment ratios to boys' gross enrolment ratios</i>		
	<i>1990/91</i>	<i>1998/99</i>	<i>2001/02</i>
Northern Africa	0.82	0.90	0.93
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.83	0.84	0.86
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.98	0.98	0.98
Eastern Asia	0.93	1.01	0.99
Southern Asia	0.76	0.83	0.84
South-Eastern Asia	0.96	0.96	0.97
Western Asia	0.83	0.87	0.89
Oceania	0.90	0.95	0.93
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	0.99	0.98	0.98
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	1.00	0.99	1.00
Developed regions	0.99	1.00	1.00

#### (b) Secondary level

	<i>Ratio of girls' gross enrolment ratios to boys' gross enrolment ratios</i>	
	<i>1998/99</i>	<i>2001/02</i>
Northern Africa	0.94	0.96
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.81	0.79
Latin America and the Caribbean	1.09	1.07
Eastern Asia	..	..
Southern Asia	0.74	0.77
South-Eastern Asia	0.97	0.98
Western Asia	0.76	0.79
Oceania	0.89	0.93
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	0.98	0.97
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	..	1.01
Developed regions	1.01	1.02

## (c) Tertiary level

No regional or global figures are available.

*Indicator 10**Ratio of literate women to men, 15-24-year-olds*

	<i>Ratio of female-to-male youth literacy rates</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000/04<sup>a</sup></i>
Northern Africa	0.73	0.86
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.80	0.89
Latin America/Caribbean	1.00	1.01
Eastern Asia	0.96	0.99
Southern Asia	0.72	0.77
South-Eastern Asia	0.97	0.99
Western Asia	0.81	0.89
Oceania	0.87	0.93
Commonwealth of Independent States	1.00	1.00
Developed regions	1.00	1.00

<sup>a</sup> Data refer to the latest literacy estimates and projections released in March 2004 by the UNESCO Institute for Statistics for the reference period 2000-2004.

*Indicator 11**Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector*

	<i>Share of women in total non-agricultural employment (percentage)</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
North Africa	18.9	20.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	..	..
Latin America	38.4	42.9
Eastern Asia	38.2	39.8
Southern Asia	13.3	18.2
South-Eastern Asia	37.2	38.5
Western Asia	17.8	19.2
Oceania	27.8	28.9
Commonwealth of Independent States, transition and other countries in Europe <sup>a</sup>	49.0	48.9
Developed regions	43.1	46.1

<sup>a</sup> Including Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.



*Indicator 12*  
*Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments*

	<i>Percentage of parliamentary seats occupied by women (single or lower house only)<sup>a</sup></i>		
	<i>1990</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>2004</i>
Northern Africa	2.6	1.8	6.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.2	9.0	13.4
Caribbean	22.1	16.6	23.9
Latin America	8.6	10.9	16.1
Eastern Asia	20.2	19.3	18.8
Southern Asia	5.7	5.9	8.5
South-Eastern Asia	10.4	10.8	15.3
Western Asia	4.6	3.0	4.9
Oceania	1.2	1.6	2.4
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	34.4	7.0	9.0
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	..	5.4	8.1
Transition countries of Southeastern Europe	27.8	7.5	14.5
Developed regions	13.2	16.5	20.6
Nordic countries <sup>b</sup>	33.9	36.4	39.7

<sup>a</sup> Data refer to January of each year.

<sup>b</sup> Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

**Goal 4**  
**Reduce child mortality**

**Target 5**  
**Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate**

*Indicator 13*  
*Under-five mortality rate*

	<i>Deaths per 1,000 live births</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	87	41
Sub-Saharan Africa	186	174
Latin America and the Caribbean	54	34
Eastern Asia	48	38
Southern Asia	126	93
South-Eastern Asia	78	48
Western Asia	68	61
Oceania	86	78
Commonwealth of Independent States	41	44
Developed regions	11	8

*Indicator 14*  
*Infant mortality rate*

	<i>Deaths per 1,000 live births</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	66	34
Sub-Saharan Africa	109	104
Latin America and the Caribbean	43	28
Eastern Asia	37	30
Southern Asia	87	67
South-Eastern Asia	54	36
Western Asia	53	49
Oceania	63	59
Commonwealth of Independent States	34	35
Developed regions	10	6

*Indicator 15*  
*Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles*

	<i>Percentage of children aged 12-23 months who received at least one dose of measles vaccine</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2003<sup>a</sup></i>
Northern Africa	85	93
Sub-Saharan Africa	57	61
Latin America and the Caribbean	77	93
Eastern Asia	98	85
Southern Asia	58	69
South-Eastern Asia	72	79
Western Asia	80	84
Oceania	70	57
Commonwealth of Independent States	..	97
Developed regions	82	92

<sup>a</sup> Not fully comparable with comparison year because some of the country figures for 1990 need to be readjusted; new series for 1990 forthcoming.

## Goal 5 Improve maternal health

### Target 6 Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio

#### Indicator 16 Maternal mortality ratio<sup>a</sup>

(No new global or regional data are available; data presented are taken from the previous report (A/58/323).)

	<i>Maternal deaths per 100,000 live births</i>	
	<i>2000</i>	
Northern Africa		130
Sub-Saharan Africa		920
Latin America and the Caribbean		190
Eastern Asia		55
South-Central Asia		520
South-Eastern Asia		210
Western Asia		190
Oceania		240
Developed regions		20

<sup>a</sup> Regions according to Millennium Development Goals regional composition adopted for 2003 reporting; see [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi\\_worldmillennium1.asp](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_worldmillennium1.asp).

#### Indicator 17 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel<sup>a</sup>

(No new global or regional data are available; data presented are taken from the previous report (A/58/323).)

	<i>Percentage of deliveries</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>
Northern Africa	39	64
Sub-Saharan Africa	40	43
Latin America and the Caribbean	76	85
Eastern Asia	53	72
South-Central Asia	27	35
South-Eastern Asia	36	59
Western Asia	59	64

<sup>a</sup> Regions according to Millennium Development Goals regional composition adopted for 2003 reporting; see [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi\\_worldmillennium1.asp](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_worldmillennium1.asp).

## Goal 6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

### Target 7 Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS

#### Indicator 18 HIV/AIDS prevalence, both sexes

	Percentage of the population aged 15-49 living with HIV/AIDS					
	2001			2003		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Northern Africa	<0.1	..	..	<0.1	..	..
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.3	6.3	8.3	7.2	6.2	8.3
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.6	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.5
Eastern Asia	<0.1	0.1	<0.1	0.1	0.2	<0.1
Southern Asia	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.8	0.5
South-Eastern Asia	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.7	0.3
Western Asia	<0.1	..	..	<0.1	..	..
Oceania	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.3
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	<0.1	<0.1	<0.1	0.1	0.1	<0.1
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	0.8	1.0	0.5	1.1	1.5	0.8
Developed regions	0.4	0.6	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.3

#### Indicator 19 Condom use as a percentage of the contraceptive prevalence rate

No global or regional data are available.

#### (a) Condom use at last high-risk sex

	Percentage of the population aged 15-24 who used a condom at last high-risk sex <sup>a</sup> (1998-2002)			
	Women 15-24		Men 15-24	
	Number of countries covered by the surveys	Percentage who used a condom at last high-risk sex <sup>a</sup>	Number of countries covered by the surveys	Percentage who used a condom at last high-risk sex <sup>a</sup>
Sub-Saharan Africa	20	23	19	41
Latin America and the Caribbean	4	24	1	30
Southern Asia (India)	1	51	1	59
Commonwealth of Independent States	2	27	2	61

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of young women and men aged 15-24 reporting the use of a condom during sexual intercourse with a non-regular sexual partner in the last 12 months, among those who had such a partner in the last 12 months.

## (b) Percentage of population aged 15-24 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS

	<i>Percentage of population with comprehensive knowledge<sup>a</sup> (1998-2002)</i>			
	<i>Women 15-24</i>		<i>Men 15-24</i>	
	<i>Number of countries covered by the surveys</i>	<i>Percentage who have comprehensive knowledge<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Number of countries covered by the surveys</i>	<i>Percentage who have comprehensive knowledge<sup>a</sup></i>
Sub-Saharan Africa	28	20	10	30
Latin America and the Caribbean	6	28	1	24
Eastern Asia (Mongolia)	1	32	0	..
South-Eastern Asia	3	13	0	..
Commonwealth of Independent States	4	5	1	8
Developed regions (Albania)	1	0	0	..

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of young women and men aged 15-24 who correctly identify the two major ways of preventing the sexual transmission of HIV (using condoms and limiting sex to one faithful, uninfected partner), who reject two common local misconceptions and who know that a healthy-looking person can transmit the AIDS virus.

*Indicator 20**Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans aged 10-14*

	<i>Orphans to non-orphans school attendance ratio<sup>a</sup> (1998/01)</i>	
	<i>Number of countries covered by the surveys</i>	<i>Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of non-orphans<sup>a</sup></i>
Sub-Saharan Africa	35	0.83
Latin America and the Caribbean	6	0.83
South-Eastern Asia (Cambodia)	1	0.71

<sup>a</sup> Ratio of the current school attendance rate of children aged 10-14 both of whose biological parents have died to the current school attendance rate of children aged 10-14 both of whose parents are still alive and who currently live with at least one biological parent.

**Target 8**  
**Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases**

*Indicator 21*

*Prevalence of and deaths associated with malaria<sup>a</sup>*

(No new global or regional data are available; data presented are taken from the previous report (A/58/323).)

	<i>Number of deaths per 100,000 children aged 0-4 years (2000)</i>
Northern Africa	47
Sub-Saharan Africa	791
Latin America and the Caribbean	1
Eastern Asia	0
South-Central Asia	6
South-Eastern Asia	2
Western Asia	26
Oceania	2
Developed regions	0

<sup>a</sup> Regions according to Millennium Development Goals regional composition adopted for 2003 reporting; see [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi\\_worldmillennium1.asp](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_worldmillennium1.asp).

Data on malaria prevalence are not available.

*Indicator 22*

*Population in malaria-risk areas using effective malaria prevention and treatment measures*

(No new global or regional data are available; data presented are taken from the previous report (A/58/323).)

(a) Prevention: children under 5 who sleep under insecticide-treated bed nets

	<i>1999/2003 (percentage)</i>
Africa (31 countries)	2.1

(b) Treatment: children under 5 with fever who are appropriately treated

	<i>1998/2003 (percentage)</i>
Africa (30 countries)	38.3

*Indicator 23*  
*Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis*

(a) Prevalence

	<i>Number of cases per 100,000 population (excluding HIV-infected)</i>		
	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	55	54	52
Sub-Saharan Africa	463	480	492
Latin America and the Caribbean	99	95	91
Eastern Asia	268	266	265
Southern Asia	413	375	343
South-Eastern Asia	505	489	432
Western Asia	85	83	84
Oceania	455	443	388
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	133	138	135
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	156	162	170

(b) Deaths

	<i>Number of deaths per 100,000 population (excluding HIV-infected)</i>		
	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	4	4	4
Sub-Saharan Africa	52	54	55
Latin America and the Caribbean	10	9	9
Eastern Asia	21	21	20
Southern Asia	42	39	36
South-Eastern Asia	48	46	43
Western Asia	9	9	9
Oceania	41	40	39
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	14	15	15
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	17	18	19
Developed regions	2	2	2

*Indicator 24**Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under directly observed treatment short course (DOTS)*

## (a) New cases detected under DOTS

	<i>Percentage of estimated cases notified to WHO</i>		
	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	82	79	81
Sub-Saharan Africa	36	38	43
Latin America and the Caribbean	43	42	45
Eastern Asia	28	29	28
Southern Asia	14	23	30
South-Eastern Asia	39	44	50
Western Asia	26	26	25
Oceania	13	13	20
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	37	34	47
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	4	5	5
Developed regions	22	27	39

## (b) DOTS cases successfully treated

	<i>Percentage of DOTS cases successfully treated</i>	
	<i>2000 cohort</i>	<i>2001 cohort</i>
Northern Africa	88	85
Sub-Saharan Africa	72	71
Latin America and the Caribbean	81	83
Eastern Asia	94	96
Southern Asia	83	85
South-Eastern Asia	86	86
Western Asia	81	83
Oceania	76	76
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	78	77
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	68	67
Developed regions	78	73



## Goal 7 Ensure environmental sustainability

### Target 9 Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources

*Indicator 25  
Proportion of land area covered by forest*

	<i>Percentage of land area</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>
Northern Africa	1.0	1.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	29.3	27.1
Caribbean	24.4	25.0
Latin America	50.4	48.0
Eastern Asia	15.4	17.0
Southern Asia	13.5	13.3
South-Eastern Asia	53.9	48.6
Western Asia	3.1	3.1
Oceania	68.0	65.7
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	5.1	5.8
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	48.9	49.2
Developed regions	25.7	25.9
World	30.3	29.6

*Indicator 26  
Area protected to maintain biological diversity<sup>a</sup>*

	<i>Ratio of protected area to total territorial areas (terrestrial and sea)</i>			
	<i>1990</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2004</i>
Northern Africa	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	9.4	9.8	10.0	10.1
Latin America and the Caribbean	12.6	15.3	16.8	17.3
Eastern Asia	7.8	8.9	10.8	11.8
South-Central Asia	4.5	5.1	5.3	5.5
South-Eastern Asia	5.3	6.5	7.6	7.8
Western Asia	4.1	17.8	17.9	18.0
Oceania	3.5	6.1	7.0	7.1
Developed regions	8.7	9.7	11.4	11.7

<sup>a</sup> Regions according to Millennium Development Goals regional composition adopted for 2003 reporting; see [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi\\_worldmillennium1.asp](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_worldmillennium1.asp).

*Indicator 27*  
*Energy use per \$1 gross domestic product (GDP) (purchasing power parity (PPP))*

	<i>Consumption of kg oil equivalent per \$1,000 GDP (PPP)</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2001</i>
Latin America and the Caribbean	187	177
Northern Africa	202	196
Sub-Saharan Africa	400	406
Eastern Asia	294	216
Southern Asia	326	256
South-Eastern Asia	223	237
Western Asia	268	327
Oceania	..	..
Commonwealth of Independent States	613	644
Transition countries in Europe <sup>a</sup>	527	484
High-income countries <sup>b</sup>	233	214

<sup>a</sup> Including transition countries in Europe classified by the World Bank as low or middle-income economies.

<sup>b</sup> As defined by the World Bank.

*Indicator 28*  
*Carbon dioxide emissions and consumption of ozone-depleting chlorofluorocarbons*  
*(CFCs)*

(a) Carbon dioxide emission: total and per capita

	<i>Millions of metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub></i>			<i>Per capita emissions</i> <i>(metric tons)</i>		
	<i>1990</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2000</i>
Fossil fuel sources <sup>a</sup>						
World <sup>b</sup>	22 460	23 468	24 238	4.25	4.14	4.00
Developed regions <sup>c</sup>	14 521	13 097	13 402	12.06	11.21	11.27
Developing regions	6 749	9 163	9 597	1.68	2.07	2.01
	<i>1990<sup>d</sup></i>		<i>2001<sup>d</sup></i>	<i>1990<sup>d</sup></i>		<i>2001<sup>d</sup></i>
All activity sources <sup>e</sup>						
Annex I countries <sup>f</sup>	14 526		14 050	13.0		12.1

<sup>a</sup> Total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from fossil fuels (expressed in millions of metric tons of CO<sub>2</sub>) includes CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from solid fuel consumption, liquid fuel consumption, gas fuel consumption; cement production; and gas flaring (United States Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center).

<sup>b</sup> The sum of fossil-fuel CO<sub>2</sub> emissions for regions (developed and developing) does not equal the global total because global estimates are based on energy production data while national and regional estimates are based on "net apparent energy consumption" estimates, using production and trade (imports, exports, stock changes) data. The difference between the global estimates and the sum of regional estimates is about 5 per cent.

<sup>c</sup> Including CIS countries in Europe.

<sup>d</sup> In order to assess trends for annex I countries as a group, the aggregate figures for 2001 include data referring to a previous year for countries where 2001 data were not available. Data refer to 1999 for Liechtenstein and the Russian Federation and to 1996 for Slovenia. For 1990, the aggregate figure includes data referring to 1991 for Hungary.

<sup>e</sup> Excluding emissions/sinks from land-use change and forestry.

<sup>f</sup> Based on the annual national emission inventories of annex I countries (Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America) that report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; non-annex I countries do not have annual reporting obligations.

(b) Ozone-depleting CFCs

	<i>CFC consumption in ODP<sup>a</sup> ton</i>			
	<i>1986</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1996</i>	<i>2002</i>
World	1 081	732	175	91
Industrialized regions	938	618	24	1
Developing regions	143	114	151	90

<sup>a</sup> Ozone-depleting potential.

*Indicator 29*  
*Proportion of population using solid fuels*

No new global or regional data are available.

**Target 10**  
**Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation**

*Indicator 30*  
*Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved water source, urban and rural*

	Percentage of population					
	1990			2002		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Northern Africa	88	95	82	90	96	84
Sub-Saharan Africa	49	82	36	58	82	45
Latin America and the Caribbean	83	93	58	89	95	69
Eastern Asia	72	99	60	78	93	68
Southern Asia	71	90	64	84	94	80
South-Eastern Asia	73	91	65	79	91	70
Western Asia	83	94	65	88	95	74
Oceania	51	92	39	52	91	40
Commonwealth of Independent States	92	97	83	93	99	82
Developed regions	100	100	99	98	100	94

*Indicator 31*  
*Proportion of population with access to improved sanitation, urban and rural*

	Percentage of population					
	1990			2002		
	Total	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural
Northern Africa	65	84	47	73	89	57
Sub-Saharan Africa	32	54	24	36	55	26
Latin America and the Caribbean	69	82	35	75	84	44
Eastern Asia	24	64	7	45	69	30
Southern Asia	20	54	7	37	66	24
South-Eastern Asia	48	67	39	61	79	49
Western Asia	79	96	52	79	95	49
Oceania	58	83	50	55	84	46
Commonwealth of Independent States	84	93	68	83	92	65
Developed regions	100	100	99	98	100	92

**Target 11**  
**By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers**

*Indicator 32*  
*Proportion of households with access to secure tenure*

	<i>Slum population (millions)</i>		<i>Percentage of urban population living in slums</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2001</i>
Northern Africa	21.7	21.4	28.2	37.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	101.0	166.2	71.9	72.3
Latin America and the Caribbean	110.8	127.6	31.9	35.4
Eastern Asia	150.8	193.8	36.4	41.1
Eastern Asia excluding China	12.8	15.6	25.4	25.3
Southern Asia	198.7	253.1	59	63.7
South-Eastern Asia	49.0	56.8	28	36.8
Western Asia	28.6	40.7	35.3	34.4
Oceania	0.4	0.5	24.1	24.5
Commonwealth of Independent States (Asia)	9.7	9.8	29.4	30.3
Commonwealth of Independent States (Europe)	9.2	8.9	6	6
Developed regions	41.8	45.2	6	6
Landlocked developing countries	46.5	47.3	56.5	48.4
Small island developing states	5.7	7.3	24.4	24.0
Least developed countries	81.9	140.1	78.2	76.3

**Goal 8**  
**Develop a global partnership for development**

**Target 12**  
**Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system (includes a commitment to good governance, development and poverty reduction — both nationally and internationally)**

**Target 13**  
**Address the special needs of the least developed countries (includes tariff- and quota-free access for least developed countries exports; enhanced programme of debt relief for heavily indebted poor countries and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction)**

**Target 14**  
**Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States (through the Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the twenty-second special session of the General Assembly)**

**Target 15**  
**Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term**

**Official development assistance (ODA)**

*Indicator 33*

*Net ODA to all developing and least developed countries*

(a) Annual total assistance (US\$ billions)

	1990	2001	2002	2003
All developing countries	54.3	52.4	58.3	68.5
Least developed countries	15.2	12.0	15.1	..

(b) Share of OECD/DAC donors gross national income (percentage)

	1990	2001	2002	2003
All developing countries	0.33	0.22	0.23	0.25
Least developed countries	0.09	0.05	0.06	..

*Indicator 34*

*Proportion of bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of OECD/DAC donors allocated to basic social services (basic education, primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)*

	<i>Percentage of bilateral, sector-allocable aid</i>			
	1995-1996	1997-1998	1999-2000	2001-2002
All OECD/DAC countries	8	11	13.5	17

*Indicator 35*

*Proportion of bilateral official development assistance of OECD/DAC donors that is untied*

	<i>Percentage of aid that is untied</i>	
	1990	2002
All OECD/DAC countries <sup>a</sup>	67.6	84.8

<sup>a</sup> Based on only about 40 per cent of total ODA commitments from OECD/DAC countries, as it excludes technical cooperation and administrative costs, as well as all ODA from Austria, Luxembourg, New Zealand and the United States that do not report the tying status of their ODA.

*Indicator 36**ODA received in landlocked developing countries as a proportion of their gross national incomes*

	<i>ODA as a percentage of GNIs of recipients</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Landlocked developing countries	5.9	7.5

*Indicator 37**ODA received in small island developing States as a proportion of their gross national incomes*

	<i>ODA as a percentage of GNIs of recipients</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Small island developing States	2.6	1.0

**Market access***Indicator 38**Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and excluding arms) from developing countries and least developed countries, admitted free of duty*

	<i>Percentage of total developed country imports admitted free of duty</i>			
	<i>1996</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
(a) Excluding arms				
Developing countries	46	62	61	57
Least developed countries	68	77	77	81
(b) Excluding arms and oil				
Developing countries	47	61	59	56
Least developed countries	77	70	70	75

*Indicator 39*

*Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agricultural products and textiles and clothing from developing countries*

	<i>Percentage</i>			
	<i>1996</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>
(a) Agriculture				
Developing countries	10.5	10.1	10.0	9.9
Least developed countries	4.3	4.1	3.3	3.3
(b) Textile				
Developing countries	8.1	7.2	7.4	6.7
Least developed countries	4.2	3.8	3.7	3.6
(c) Clothing				
Developing countries	12.2	11.5	12.2	11.5
Least developed countries	8.5	8.1	8.0	8.3

*Indicator 40*

*Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as a percentage of their gross domestic product*

(No new global or regional data are available; data presented are taken from the previous report (A/58/323).)

	<i>Agricultural support estimate in OECD countries</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
As percentage of OECD countries GDP	1.9	1.2
In billions of US\$	351	318

*Indicator 41*

*Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacity*

	<i>Percentage of total ODA of recipients</i>
	<i>2001-2002 average</i>
Americas	4.0
Europe	9.8
Africa	4.4
Asia	3.0
Oceania	3.8
Global programmes	6.6



## Debt sustainability

### Indicator 42

Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC decision points and number that have reached their HIPC completion points

	Number of countries	
	2000	2004 <sup>a</sup>
Reached completion point	1	14
Reached decision point but not completion point	21	13
Yet to be considered for decision point	16	11
<b>Total eligible countries</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>

<sup>a</sup> As of July 2004.

### Indicator 43

Debt relief committed under HIPC Initiative

(US\$ billions (cumulative))

	2000	2004 <sup>a</sup>
To countries that reached decision or completion point	34	52

<sup>a</sup> As of 11 March 2004.

### Indicator 44

Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services

	Ratio of debt service to export of goods and services	
	1990	2002
All low and middle-income countries <sup>a</sup>	19	18
Heavily indebted poor countries	20	9

<sup>a</sup> As defined by the World Bank.

**Target 16**  
**In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies**  
**for decent and productive work for youth**

*Indicator 45*

*Unemployment rate of young people aged 15-24 years*

(a) Unemployment rate of 15-24-year-olds

	1993			2003		
	Total	Women	Men	Total	Women	Men
Northern Africa	30.7	39.7	27.1	29.4	39.1	25.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	21.9	19.5	23.7	21.1	18.6	23.0
Latin America and the Caribbean	12.4	15.5	10.7	16.6	20.8	14.0
Eastern Asia	4.8	4.1	5.5	7.0	5.8	8.1
Southern Asia	13.3	14.6	12.7	14.6	17.1	13.5
South-Eastern Asia	8.8	9.3	8.4	16.5	17.7	15.6
Western Asia	19.0	19.6	18.7	20.8	22.5	20.1
Oceania	7.5	7.8	7.3	8.7	9.2	8.4
Commonwealth of Independent States	9.4	9.0	9.7	14.6	14.7	14.5
Developed regions	16.7	16.5	16.8	14.6	14.2	15.0

(b) Ratio of youth unemployment rate to adult unemployment rate, 1993-2003

	1993	2000	2003
Northern Africa	3.2	2.9	3.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.6	3.5	3.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	2.8	2.7	3.1
Eastern Asia	3.1	3.0	2.9
Southern Asia	5.6	5.8	5.8
South-Eastern Asia	3.9	5.0	4.8
Western Asia	3.4	3.3	3.0
Oceania	3.1	3.3	3.3
Commonwealth of Independent States	3.1	2.4	2.5
Developed regions	2.4	2.4	2.3

## (c) Share of youth unemployment in total unemployment, 1993-2003

	1993	2000	2003
Northern Africa	51.5	48.8	46.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	62.0	62.3	62.8
Latin America and the Caribbean	49.7	44.8	48.6
Eastern Asia	52.6	41.6	41.0
Southern Asia	64.3	64.0	62.1
South-Eastern Asia	58.2	55.4	58.2
Western Asia	55.9	52.3	48.3
Oceania	59.2	56.5	55.6
Commonwealth of Independent States	38.1	28.0	29.6
Developed regions	30.1	27.6	26.2

**Target 17**

**In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries**

*Indicator 46*

*Population with access to affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis*

No new global or regional data are available.

**Target 18**

**In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications**

*Indicator 47*

*Telephone lines and cellular subscribers*

	<i>Number of telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population</i>	
	1990	2002
Northern Africa	2.9	17.0
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.0	5.3
Latin America and the Caribbean	6.4	36.2
Eastern Asia	2.4	37.8
Southern Asia	0.7	5.3
South-Eastern Asia	1.4	16.3
Western Asia	10.0	42.3
Oceania	3.4	9.4
Commonwealth of Independent States	12.5	28.8
Transition countries of Southeastern Europe	13.8	48.2
Developed regions	45.4	120.8

*Indicator 48*  
*Personal computers and Internet users*

(a) Personal computers

	<i>Number of personal computers per 100 population</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	0.1	1.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.3	1.2
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.6	6.8
Eastern Asia	0.3	5.2
Southern Asia	0.0	1.0
South-Eastern Asia	0.3	2.7
Western Asia	1.2	5.6
Oceania	0.0	6.1
Commonwealth of Independent States	0.3	6.7
Transition countries of Southeastern Europe	0.2	5.9
Developed regions	11.1	44.1

(b) Internet users

	<i>Number of Internet users per 100 population</i>	
	<i>1990</i>	<i>2002</i>
Northern Africa	0.0	2.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.0	1.0
Latin America and the Caribbean	0.0	8.2
Eastern Asia	0.0	7.0
Southern Asia	0.0	1.5
South-Eastern Asia	0.0	4.6
Western Asia	0.0	6.3
Oceania	0.0	3.6
Commonwealth of Independent States	0.0	3.1
Transition countries of Southeastern Europe	0.0	7.5
Developed regions	0.3	42.9

\* \* \*

**Sources**

United Nations Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the Millennium Development Goals Indicators and the United Nations Millennium Indicators Database (<http://millenniumindicators.un.org>); the reports and composition of the Expert Group may be accessed at the Millennium Indicators Database Internet site under "Key documents and sources" ([http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi\\_links.asp](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_links.asp)).

**Notes**

Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not reported separately.

Except where indicated, regional groupings are based on United Nations geographical regions, with some modifications necessary to create, to the extent possible, homogenous groups of countries for analysis and presentation. The regional composition adopted for 2004 reporting of Millennium Development Goals indicators is available at [http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi\\_worldmillennium.asp](http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mi/mi_worldmillennium.asp).

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) comprises Belarus, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in Europe; and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in Asia.

Many of the indicators are presented for the developing regions only. Where shown, in most cases for comparative purposes, "developed regions" comprises Europe (except CIS countries), Canada, the United States, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Developed countries always include transition countries in Europe unless the latter are presented separately in the tables as "transition countries of Southeastern Europe".

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