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REPORT

on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
(2003/2106 (INI))

Committee on Development and Cooperation

Rapporteur: Jean-Pierre Bébéar

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PROCEDURAL PAGE

At the sitting of 3 July 2003 the President of Parliament announced that the Committee on Development and Cooperation had been authorised to draw up an own-initiative report, pursuant to Rule 163 of the Rules of Procedure, on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

The Committee on Development and Cooperation had appointed Jean-Pierre Bébéar rapporteur at its meeting of 20 February 2003.

It considered the draft report at its meetings of 10 September 2003 and 1 October 2003.

At the latter meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 15 votes to 0, with 6 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Margrietus J. van den Berg (vice-chairman, acting chairman), Marieke Sanders-ten Holte (vice-chairman), Anders Wijkman (vice-chairman), Jean-Pierre Bébéar (rapporteur), Fernando Fernández Martín, Nirj Deva, John Alexander Corrie, John Bowis, Glenys Kinnock, Carmen Cerdeira Morterero (for Maria Carrilho), Miguel Angel Martínez Martínez, Jürgen Zimmerling, Karsten Knolle, Francisca Sauquillo Pérez del Arco, Elena Valenciano Martínez-Orozco (for Marie-Arlette Carlotti), Maj Britt Theorin, Ulla Margrethe Sandbæk, Inger Schörling (for Paul A.A.J.G. Lannoye), Didier Rod, Michel-Ange Scarbonchi (for Luisa Morgantini), Feleknas Uca (for Yasmine Boudjenah) and Hans Modrow.

The report was tabled on 8 October 2003.

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (2003/2106(INI))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the NEPAD initiative adopted in October 2001 in Abuja (Nigeria) and subsequently recognised by the African Union as forming part of its socio-economic development programme,
- having regard to the Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted on 11 July 2000 in Lomé (Togo),
- having regard to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, and in particular to Article 11 thereof concerning peace-building policies and conflict resolution,
- having regard to the Barcelona process,
- having regard to the statements of the Conference of Heads of State and Government and the decisions and declarations of the second ordinary session of the Conference of the African Union in Maputo (Mozambique), 10-12 July 2003,
- having regard to the work of the Parliamentary Forum for NEPAD held at Cotonou (Benin) on 8 and 9 October 2002 and the conclusions of the meeting of African parliaments held in Cape Town (South Africa) on 30 June and 1 July 2003,
- having regard to the Court of Auditors' special report 8/2003 concerning the execution of infrastructure work financed by the EDF¹,
- having regard to the action plan adopted by the G8 group of industrialised countries in Kananaskis on 27 June 2002 and the conclusions of the G8 Presidency adopted in Evian on 3 June 2003,
- having regard to the Commission communication to the Council on EU-Africa dialogue (COM(2003) 316),
- having regard to the resolution of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted in Brazzaville (Congo) on 3 April 2003²,
- having regard to Rule 163 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (A5-0329/2003),

¹ http://www.eca.eu.int/EN/RS/2003/rs08_03en.pdf

² OJ C 231, 26.9.2003.

- A. whereas the establishment of the African Union as an institutional and political framework at continental level is of overriding importance to the gradual integration of the States which go to make it up, and given the importance of the NEPAD programme launched by the African Union as a political initiative that has forcibly and appropriately drawn the international community's attention to the issue of under-development in Africa,
- B. whereas the African Union is a pan-African organisation, composed of a Commission, a Council of Ministers and a Parliament, and whereas NEPAD is not intended to replace it,
- C. having regard to the various previous initiatives taken by Africa with a view to taking up the continent's development challenges, in particular the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment (1989) and the Abuja Treaty (1991),
- D. whereas the states of Africa wish to construct African unity not only on a geographical basis but also on shared values, such as respect for human rights and democratic principles,
- E. recommending that cultural diversity, which is the best means of fostering mutual understanding and preventing (armed) conflict, be maintained and encouraged as part of this process,
- F. whereas, despite the recognition given to the central role of the peoples of Africa in achieving the aims of NEPAD, national parliaments, civil society and socio-professional organisations were not consulted about the formulation and definition of this initiative,
- G. whereas EU support for pan-African initiatives must be placed within a coherent framework,
- H. having regard to the experience of the European Union, which may be a source of inspiration for the African Union, while taking due account of the very different realities on these two continents,
- I. having regard to the innovative nature of NEPAD, which stresses the importance not only of traditional aid but also of other non-financial factors in achieving development, such as a favourable legal framework for the development of businesses, good governance and public-private partnerships,
- J. whereas, in order to achieve the aims set by NEPAD, funding of the order of \$64 billion per year will need to be made available,
- K. whereas in order to attain the objectives of NEPAD it is necessary for Africa's leaders jointly to assume a certain number of responsibilities, pursuant to the NEPAD action programme adopted in Abuja in October 2001, especially the following:

- consolidation of the prevention, management and conflict resolution mechanisms at regional and pan-African levels and encouragement of the use of those mechanisms for purposes of restoring and maintaining peace under the authority of the African Union;
 - encouragement and observance of democracy and human rights in their own countries and regions, establishing clear rules on responsibility, transparency, sound management and participatory democracy at both local and national levels,
- L. whereas women should be effectively included at all levels in discussion forums and decision-making bodies; noting with satisfaction the very positive signal sent out by the effective implementation of parity between men and women in the composition of the African Union Commission;
- M. whereas the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an important instrument for attaining the above objectives, and whereas the fundamental values relating to human rights and good governance have been incorporated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa,
- N. having regard to the importance of regional and local authorities as an essential step towards the success of sustainable development and good governance,
- O. believing that peace and stability are preconditions for development in all circumstances, and deploring the persistence of existing conflicts and the emergence of new conflicts in several countries and regions of Africa,
- P. whereas it is above all economic, political and social conditions which form the basis to lasting peace and security and at the same time reduce the risk of conflicts developing and escalating,
- Q. having regard to the decision, the first of its kind, to send a military force, the African Mission for Burundi (MIAB), to that country under the auspices of the African Union, and aware of the considerable commitment of human and financial resources by South Africa to that force, as well as the commitment proposed by Mozambique and Ethiopia,
- R. whereas the MIAB is a valuable test case for future operations of the same type,
- S. whereas the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and in particular Article 11 thereof, provides a basis for the EU to give its support to African initiatives in the field of crisis management and peace-building, under the political authority of the African Union, and whereas steps should be taken to extend the framework of this support to the continent as a whole,
- T. having regard to the request made by the Summit of the African Union, meeting in Maputo (Mozambique), calling on the EU to set up a Peace Support Operation Facility to fund peace support and peacekeeping operations conducted under the authority of the AU,

- U. whereas the EU has earmarked EUR 50 m from the European Development Fund to support the peace process in Liberia,
- V. having regard to the increasing poverty of the African countries and the persistent scale of problems in the fields of education and health (notably the devastating effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the African production force and on the social fabric of the countries affected),
- W. having regard to the recent adoption by the African Union of the Convention on combating corruption and the commitments made in the context of NEPAD to combat this enormous problem, which is widespread in a number of African countries, constituting a major obstacle to development,
- X. having regard to the debt burden of the African countries and the need to go beyond existing measures such as the reinforced HIPC (heavily indebted poorest countries) initiative, until it is effectively eliminated,
- Y. noting that the 'Plan of Action for Africa' announced by the G8 in 2002 has not yet been given a clear commitment timetable and that it is mainly centred on the aim of opening up markets,
- Z. whereas 60% of direct foreign investments in sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated on three countries only (Angola, Nigeria and South Africa),
- AA. whereas poor countries, mainly extremely indebted African countries, continue to reimburse a large proportion of their GDP and whereas the African countries' debt burden is stifling development,
- BB. having regard to the need for the African continent to undertake successful regional integration with a view to developing the economies of scale called for by globalisation and helping to increase these countries' capacity to produce and export manufactured and diversified products,
- CC. having regard to the need to involve private investors more closely in development in Africa and to the excessively low level of cooperation between the public and private sectors,
1. Warmly welcomes the establishment of the African Union and expresses great interest in its NEPAD programme, launched by five African Heads of State and based in particular on:
- the principle of taking control of development,
 - peace and security through conflict prevention and resolution,
 - the paramountcy of human rights, democracy and good governance,
 - the need to accelerate regional integration;
2. Considers that these priorities should constitute the major innovative features of development aid for Africa;

3. Notes the criticisms made by many actors of African civil society and encourages the member states of the African Union, and in particular the founder countries of NEPAD, to allow the active and democratic participation of all sectors of civil society, including NGOs, trade unions and employers' organisations, and churches at pan-African level and in each country; considers that the establishment of the AU Economic and Social Council will constitute a major element in this active and democratic participation;
4. Recalls that NEPAD is a socio-economic programme of the African Union for Africa's development, and not an independent institution;
5. Encourages African states to conduct a public debate and submit an independent forward study on the impact of NEPAD on social rights, food security, access to raw materials and environmental protection;
6. Welcomes the commitment made in Maputo by the European Union, represented by Commission President Romano Prodi, to strengthening its cooperation with Africa;
7. Calls on the Council, the Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP to develop a structured global political dialogue, on a union-to-union basis, between the European Union and the African Union;
8. Encourages African states, African regional organisations and the European Commission to ensure that NEPAD's priorities are reflected in Community aid programmes and, consequently, to seek greater consistency between the NEPAD objectives and regional programmes (in the context of agreements with ACP countries, MEDA countries and South Africa);
9. Stresses the need to adjust existing mechanisms for cooperation between the EU and African countries - in the context of the forthcoming revision of cooperation agreements with MEDA countries, ACP countries and South Africa - in order to take due account of the pan-African dimension;
10. Congratulates the Commission on its support for the institutional development of the African Union and support for peace initiatives;
11. Commends the African Union on having made provision within its institutional framework for a Pan-African Parliament; urges the parliaments of the African States to ratify the Protocol relating to the Pan-African Parliament at the earliest opportunity; undertakes to lend its sister institution, the Pan-African Parliament, all the assistance required for it to be established and, subsequently, to operate effectively;
12. Considers that African countries should devote resources to establishing a strategy of sustainable, equitable and viable development opening the way to genuine enjoyment of the right to food, health, education, housing and other necessities for African peoples;
13. Attaches the highest importance to the implementation, on the basis of democratic parliamentary control, of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), since this will help to realise NEPAD's basic principles and objectives, both political and economic,

- by instituting a framework for carrying out monitoring and promoting the most suitable policies and standards, such as responsible governance, democracy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law, alongside best practice; urges the parliaments of the African countries to ensure that this mechanism operates in a democratic fashion;
14. Considers that the role of the democratic state in the process of development based on social equity, respect for human rights and political pluralism, a fair redistribution of resources and democratic scrutiny of decision-making should be rehabilitated;
 15. Urges all the countries of Africa to join the APRM and to ensure that its workings are based on the principles of independence and technical competence;
 16. Calls in this connection for acknowledgement of successful participation in APRM also to take the form of increased EU financial development-policy cooperation with the countries concerned;
 17. Calls, furthermore, on the countries concerned to respond to the findings of the evaluation mechanisms which are to be put in place as soon as possible;
 18. Believes that the credibility of NEPAD will depend on the decisions - some of them involving difficult cases - taken by the AU regarding countries that fail to respect the APRM criteria in the medium term;
 19. Welcomes the African Union's efforts to strengthen its institutions in order to guarantee respect for human rights, democracy and good governance;
 20. Congratulates the African Union on the gradual development of a principle of 'non-indifference' and its willingness to intervene in individual member states in the event of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity;
 21. Calls on the AU member states, and in particular the SADC members, to take an initiative in support of the political and constitutional transition process in Zimbabwe, under which elections should be held within the next 24 months; encourages the African parliaments to concentrate their efforts on ratifying, as soon as possible, the protocol on the Pan-African Parliament;
 22. Reiterates its firm belief that the role of providing the impetus for and exercising parliamentary control over NEPAD naturally falls to the Pan-African Parliament, and that duplication of effort and expenditure and institutional proliferation and overlapping should be avoided;
 23. Encourages the African countries to take due account of input from regional and local authorities, town-twinning schemes, and cooperation between regional and local authorities in implementing the objectives of the African Union and NEPAD, and invites the African regional and local authorities to call in this context on the know-how and expertise of local and regional authorities in the Northern hemisphere;

24. Encourages the initiators of NEPAD to open up to all sectors of civil society, including NGOs, trade unions and employers' organisations, and Churches;
25. Notes the commitment of the G8 and the founder countries of NEPAD to giving priority to the fight against terrorism, but also stresses that this must be carried on in accordance with the rule of law, human and civil rights, and essential policies;
26. Considers it essential to support Africa's capacity to settle its own disputes and establish peace under the political authority of the African Union;
27. Considers that the African Union's confliction prevention policy should also combat structural causes, such as economic disparities, social injustice, absence of democratic participation in decision-making, environmental degradation, human rights violations, and access to and control of natural resources;
28. Expresses its support for the AU's Peace and Security Council, as a political authority and coordination body for the efforts achieved by the external partners and encourages the AU member states to ratify the protocol relating to this Council;
29. Congratulates the AU on its commitment to achieving peace in Burundi through the MIAB;
30. Calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to support, with all the appropriate instruments, policies for the building of peace and the prevention and resolution of conflicts, under the auspices of the AU;
31. Welcomes the earmarking by the EU of the sum of EUR 50 m, via the EDF, in support of the peace process in Liberia;
32. Calls for the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports to be made binding on the EU Member States,
33. Believes that a legally binding UN framework, providing for sanctions for companies which contribute to conflicts, should be drawn up;
34. Congratulates the Commission on the efforts it has made to reduce the debt burden in the context of the reinforced HIPC initiative, and calls on it and the Member States to take further measures in this direction;
35. Welcomes the measures announced at the G8 Summit in Evian for financing a World Fund to combat AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria;
36. Calls on the African countries to encourage and facilitate participation by the private sector, in the spirit of the Dakar meeting of April 2002, particularly by means of public-private partnerships and joint ventures between European and African firms;
37. Considers that cooperation between African and European public sectors could make a positive contribution to satisfying the fundamental needs of African populations, especially in the services sector;

38. Supports the project for an International Funding Facility to attract private finance to developing countries;
39. Stresses that the appeal to the private sector should not lead donors, including the EU Member States, to shirk their responsibilities; recalls its requests for a reform of and an increase in public development aid;
40. Stresses the need for proper coordination between the various development projects, and warns against the temptation to give priority to large-scale projects at the expense of more modest operations at local level;
41. Calls on all the African countries to ratify speedily the AU Convention against corruption and apply it with due rigour, and to participate in developing regional initiatives against money laundering in liaison with the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF);
42. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission, the African Union and the NEPAD secretariat, the ACP Council and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a political initiative undertaken by five African heads of state: Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal). These five countries make up the NEPAD Steering Committee.

NEPAD forms part of an ambitious project known as the 'African Renaissance'. It is a political initiative of great importance, for two main reasons: the personalities of the heads of state who came together to launch it, and its originality as compared with previous initiatives. Its deliberate promotion of democracy may be considered a genuine cultural revolution.

NEPAD is based on the idea that Africa should take hold of its own destiny, and its ground-breaking nature lies in its aim of creating an inter-African dynamic based on role models. Those countries which make firm commitments to respect for human rights, conflict prevention and resolution, democracy and good governance, action against corruption and regional integration will create the best possible conditions to attract the participation of private investors in economic and social development. Private-sector involvement is an essential complement to public aid, in view of the enormous challenges facing Africa¹

NEPAD's African instigators have identified ten priority themes: good public governance; good governance of the private sector; infrastructure; education; health; information and communication technology; agriculture; the environment; energy; and product diversification and market access in the developed countries.²

NEPAD has received very favourable responses from industrialised countries, particularly from the EU and the G8 (in Kananaskis and then in Evian), although the aid that has followed has not always fulfilled the instigating countries' expectations. It also received a favourable reception from European employers' associations, which hope for more public-private partnerships in Africa.

The UN has also given NEPAD its endorsement, and has, indeed, validated its principles to a very high degree: in September 2002, it decided that its own policies for Africa will henceforth be based on the NEPAD goals.

In parallel to the NEPAD initiative, the African Union (AU) has now replaced the OAU. The AU too is also based on the principles of good governance, safeguarding human rights, and democracy. NEPAD was adopted as an operational programme of the AU at the Durban Summit. At the Maputo Summit the Heads of State decided to incorporate the NEPAD secretariat into the AU structures within three years. During the transition period, the NEPAD

¹ The NEPAD Manifesto is a document consisting of 205 items adopted in Abuja in October 2001, and is available on the Internet at <http://www.nepad.org>.

² Algeria directs the human development section, including health and education, South Africa directs good political governance (conflict management, security and democracy), while Egypt is responsible for market access, product diversification and agriculture. Nigeria is in charge of good economic governance, and Senegal of infrastructures, energy, the environment and ICTs, which have been the subject of workshops with the private sector.

secretariat will become 'an office of the AU', which will make it possible to strengthen organisational links and working relations between the NEPAD secretariat and AU bodies, in particular the AU Commission.

1. NEPAD's two main elements: conflict prevention and resolution, and good governance

1.1 Conflict prevention and resolution

Peace and stability are preconditions of development. Without stabilising the political, economic and social environment, investment is not possible. While this is certainly true of public investment, it is even more so of private investment, as UNICE (the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe) has pointed out. After a conflict, public investors can resume investment fairly rapidly, but it takes longer for private investors, because confidence must first be rebuilt. In this respect the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire risks having negative consequences for the economy in the sub-region for many years.

One of NEPAD's objectives is precisely to bypass the need for public aid and to mobilise the private sector, as was declared in Dakar in April 2002.

The African Union has created a Council for Peace and Security (CPS), which is responsible for with mediation missions in regional conflicts involving war crimes and crimes against humanity. During the Addis Ababa Summit in February 2003, the African heads of state discussed the situation in Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi, and decided to send a peacekeeping force.

According to Mr Said Djinnit, the AU's interim commissioner for peace, security and political affairs, there is now a recognised principle of 'non-indifference', under which it is even possible to send troops to restore peace.

On 4 April 2003 in Addis Ababa, Commissioner Nielson signed a financial agreement on behalf of the Commission with the sub-Saharan ACP countries.¹ The agreement provides for a financial package of EUR 12 m under the Eighth EDF. The sum is shared out between two areas:

- EUR 10 m for strengthening peace, in particular the negotiation of peace agreements, post-conflict initiatives, election observations, work with civil society, institutional support for peace and security, and the setting up of a panel of 'wise men and women';
- EUR 2 m for the transition from the OAU to the AU.

Towards a support mechanism for peacemaking and peacekeeping operations

Your rapporteur visited Bujumbura and was able to acquaint himself with the remarkable work carried out by the AU Mission to Burundi (MIAB), in spite of its limited resources,

¹ The Pacific region and the Caribbean region had had to give their agreement beforehand.

which are mostly supplied by South Africa. Burundi - the AU's first independent military experience - is seen as a test case, and the mission's success is very much dependent on resources. It is therefore clear that external funding is essential if the MIAB is to fulfil its tasks of disarming and separating the combatants.

In this context, Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement is broadly enough worded to permit financial aid to be given to measures for peace-building and the prevention and resolution of conflicts undertaken under the auspices of the AU. A consensus needs to be reached with in the OECD's Aid and Development Council (ADC) with a view to including peacekeeping operations in the list of types of assistance eligible for public development aid.

The EU recently allocated EUR 50 m from the EDF to support for the peace process in Liberia.

1.2 Good governance and the fight against corruption

Not only stability, but also good governance, democracy and respect for the rule of law are conditions for human and economic development. Without good governance, there can be no increase in private-sector involvement. Investors have repeatedly stressed the need for good governance. With NEPAD, Africans themselves have adopted this principle and are making firm commitments for the future.

Mr Abedlkader Messahel, the Algerian Minister for Maghreb and African Affairs, drew up on 11 June 2003, for the Committee on Development and Cooperation, a table which showed how matters really stand. He estimates that a considerable proportion of aid ends up 'disappearing', thanks to corruption in the beneficiary countries, and all too little actually reaches the intended recipients.

The Commission estimates that funds illegally acquired and deposited in, mostly, foreign banks amount to more than half of Africa's external debt.¹ The instances of corruption in certain African countries are, alas, legion.

It should be remembered that corruption is not simply morally wrong, it is also an established fact that corruption significantly inflates the price of goods and services, leads to choices that are badly adapted to actual needs, deters serious investors, and demoralises the population.

The ratification of the international conventions and their implementation in practice must be made a reality.

2. African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

The principle of good governance is accompanied by a peer review system. In keeping with the logic of taking responsibility for themselves, the instigators of NEPAD have provided for a system of peer review, both politically and economically.

¹ COM(2003) 316.

The key objective of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is to bring African leaders' attitudes into line with the NEPAD principles, and to create a spirit of healthy competition in this sense. NEPAD's African instigators aim not to combat or to punish, but to win over hearts and minds.

At its last meeting in Abuja on 9 March 2003, the Implementation Committee of Heads of State and Government declared that the African Peer Review Mechanism, 'designed, owned and managed by Africans, must be credible, transparent and all-encompassing, so as to demonstrate that African leaders are fully aware of their responsibilities and obligations to their peoples, and are genuinely prepared to engage and relate to the rest of the world on the basis of integrity and mutual respect'. The AU Summit held in Maputo in July 2003 decided to set up a group of experts with the brief of determining whether the member states (or those which agree to be evaluated) are properly implementing the NEPAD goals. To date, 16 member states have asked to undergo this APRM assessment.

Thanks to its ground-breaking characteristics, the APRM has aroused considerable interest in the donor countries. Many, however, would have preferred the assessment to be mandatory, rather than optional and applying only to 'volunteers'. It will also take time to implement. These delays have been interpreted as showing a lack of will in dealing with difficult cases - in particular Zimbabwe, where the humanitarian disaster affecting the country is in large part the result of bad governance, flagrant breaches of human rights and the breakdown of the rule of law.

It is essential that the African countries, and especially South Africa, which is in charge of the 'good governance' section of NEPAD, adopt sterner positions on Zimbabwe, since without a firm stand the credibility of NEPAD as a whole is at risk. Equally, it is vital that NEPAD and the AU should not end up reproducing the shortcomings of the OAU as regards human rights and the promotion of democracy.

In addition, the EU should encourage the AU to take an initiative with a view to fostering a political and constitutional transition process in Zimbabwe, under which elections would be held within the next 24 months.

3. Implications of NEPAD for investors and beneficiaries

3.1 For investors

NEPAD represents an appeal to investors, of whom greater commitment to development policies is expected. Yet the UN target of allocating 0.7 % of GDP to development is far from being reached. We should nonetheless welcome the fact that all the EU Member States have committed themselves to allocating at least 0.33% of GDP to public development aid by 2006. In view of the higher scores already achieved by certain Member States, one may expect a Union average in the region of 0.4%.

The industrialised countries, and above all the EU and its Member States, have responded to this request with substantial aid. The G8, in Kananaskis, pledged USD 6 000 m over five years. The donor community has been especially mobilised by the fight against the AIDS/HIV

epidemic: the EU's contribution accounts for 54% of the World Fund against AIDS. At Evian, important commitments were made by the industrialised bloc.

In addition to the EUR 12 m allocated to conflict prevention and the transition to the AU (see above), the EU is involved in the Task Force to draw up a NEPAD short-term plan of action on infrastructures. Infrastructures and transport are priorities for the national strategic programmes to be financed as part of the ninth EDF.

Apart from financial aid, trade and the opening-up of industrialised countries' markets are also crucial for the development of the African countries.

NEPAD is also likely to have consequences for the EU and for ACP-EU relations in the medium term. The aid provided under the partnership agreements has been criticised in the past on the grounds of cumbersome and sluggish procedures. The stated and desirable aim of deconcentration must be applied in full, with care taken over geographical proximity. NEPAD can be a useful stimulus to reinforce the Cotonou Agreement and to help it correspond better to Africa's needs, while retaining its originality (including the peer principle and political dialogue).

3.2 For the beneficiaries

The main implications of NEPAD for the beneficiary countries are: good governance in all its aspects (cf. above), respect for human rights and the development of democracy. There are also practical implications.

In order to provide aid effectively, it is worth clarifying what the role of the different players should be, e.g. the secretariat of NEPAD, which is not a perennial structure and which has a political role, and the African Development Bank, which has a technical role.

In addition, NEPAD must not be reduced to a catalogue of short-term projects and programmes, but must be part of a strategic development vision. Hence the need for close coordination with other current projects. The temptation to hog the limelight might lead large-scale projects to take precedence over more modest schemes carried out at local level. Experience has shown that unwieldy or ill-adapted projects - where there has been an absence of long-term planning, the social and environmental impact has been poorly evaluated, or there have been maintenance problems - can prove counter-productive.

4. Integration into the African Union

The African Union, which has replaced the OAU, is based on the same principles as NEPAD (good governance, the promotion of human rights, and democracy), and has a strong economic dimension based on partnership.

It originally consisted of two distinct initiatives. Since the Durban Summit of 9 to 11 July 2002, however, NEPAD has been adopted as an operational programme of the AU. Each reinforces the other: NEPAD lends credibility and efficiency to the AU in the short term, while the AU provides NEPAD with an institutional framework and political legitimacy. In the words of Mr Saïd Djinnit, the AU's interim commissioner for peace, security and political

affairs: 'NEPAD is the soul, the AU is the body'. This convergence is reinforced by the fact that South Africa, one of the main instigators of NEPAD, also holds the presidency of the AU in its first year.

That said, there is the danger of confusion between NEPAD as a political initiative and the AU as a pan-African organisation. Indeed, there is a risk of institutional proliferation. The ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly has called for all duplication of resources between NEPAD and the AU to be avoided¹. Although NEPAD is a political initiative, it has had to create certain working structures and mechanisms. In a welcome development, it was decided at the Maputo Summit that, over a three-year period, the NEPAD secretariat (now in Johannesburg) will be incorporated into the AU Commission in Addis Ababa.

On the subject of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), ratification of the relevant protocol has speeded up in recent weeks. The protocol has now been ratified by 21 countries (it requires 30 ratifications to enter into force). In parallel, the African Parliamentarians' Forum for NEPAD took place in Cotonou in October 2002². The holding of the Forum in anticipation of the PAP has proved useful, but perennialisation must be avoided by setting up administrative structures and by giving priority to ratification of the PAP as soon as possible - i.e. by 31 December 2003, as called for at the Maputo Summit.

5. Conclusion

NEPAD has come in for some criticism: some criticise it for being a structure imposed from above, scarcely involving civil society³ and failing to take account of the needs of the poorest (water, food, housing, energy and transport).

Your rapporteur believes it is essential to encourage participation from all agents in civil society, including human rights groups. A further useful step could be to set up regional economic and social councils. Women's role in African society also stands in need of fuller recognition and greater integration into development projects.

Your rapporteur acknowledges that these criticisms are not without foundation but believes that NEPAD must be given a chance. The Marshall Plan, which made the reconstruction of Europe possible after the Second World War, was also a governmental initiative, and it in the end benefited the whole population. NEPAD aspires to a renaissance of an entire continent, and this could become reality if each party fulfils the obligations to which it has subscribed without delay.

¹ Resolution on NEPAD adopted in Brazzaville (Congo) on 3 April 2003; not yet published in the OJ.

² The Commission financed the African Parliamentarians' Forum for NEPAD to the sum of EUR 350 000, out of a total of around EUR 1 m.

³ President Mbeki, in his speech to the AU Summit in Maputo on 10 July 2003, recognised the need for NGOs, professional associations and civil society to be involved in the process of African integration.

ANNEX: CHRONOLOGY

- 1963: Creation of the Organisation of African Unity
- 11 July 2000: OAU Summit in Lomé (Togo) – protocol establishing the Pan-African Parliament adopted. 21 countries sign the protocol and three ratify it.
- July 2001: Meeting of African heads of state in Lusaka, creating NEPAD, an amalgam of programmes aimed at lifting Africa out of poverty: President Mbeki's *African Revival*, President Obasanjo's *Millennium Action Plan* and President Wade's *Omega Plan*. The five initiating countries are: Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa.
- June 2002: The G8 Summit in Kananaskis (Canada) brings together for the first time the instigating African heads of state of NEPAD and adopts the 'Plan of Action for Africa'.
- 9-11 July 2002: AU Summit in Durban (South Africa): NEPAD becomes an operational programme of the AU.
- 7-9 October 2002: African Parliamentarians' Forum for NEPAD in Cotonou (Benin).
- June 2003: G8 Summit in Evian (France).
- July 2003: AU Summit in Maputo (Mozambique).