-
Justification and Purpose
The following are commonly held views why the Presidential Land Review
Committee was commissioned:
-
On the basis of the controversial Buka Report the President
purportedly commissioned the work of this Committee to further probe into
the findings of the Buka Report before he could take decisive corrective
measures.
-
Furthermore, the fact that Buka Report had been leaked to the
foreign press made it essential in the President's view to answer to the
international community with a more comprehensive and forward-looking
response emanating from this Committee.
-
The fact that the country had plunged into shortages of food
especially the staple diet and that this was being linked to the Land Reform
Programme also made it necessary for the President to commission a study
that could show that there were other causes for the agricultural down-turn.
-
With the country virtually bankrupt while the major costs of
getting the Land Reform Programme to be operational are still outstanding,
the President saw the work of the Committee as a strategy of re-engaging the
international donor community by firstly engaging the multilateral
organisations to pave the way.
-
Composition of the Committee
-
Except for the Chairman and one or two other members, the Committee
was populated with professional individual with the requisite knowledge and
experience in agriculture and are generally regarded as non-partisan in a
political sense.
-
The Chairman was a strong ruling party official with close links to
the President and needless to mention, privy to the latter's thinking and
way of doing things having been the Secretary to the President's Office and
Cabinet.
-
Out of the nine members three were former Permanent Secretaries of
the Ministry of Agriculture and one a longest servicing General Manager of
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (ARDA) all of whose mandate had
a strong link to land and agriculture.
-
The average age of the Committee members was over 50 years and
nearly all are set in their ways and do not depend on the outcome of the
current Land Reform Programme.
-
Of the nine members three were women with only one of them having
an agricultural background and the same member is a staunch ruling party
activist and former Member of Parliament.
-
Terms of Reference of the Committee
The Terms of Reference were toned down to a point that it became voluntary
for the Committee to embark on the pertinent and controversial matters and
seemingly had to usurp powers from elsewhere to do so. There are major
omissions on the objectives and pertinent issues inter alia:
-
The link between the current hunger plaguing the country and the
haphazard implementation of the Land Reform Programme.
-
Partisan nature of allocation of land to applicants and abuse of
the system by high-ranking Government officials.
-
Use of compulsory acquisition of certain farms owned by enemies of
the state as a punitive measure.
-
Compensation for the expropriated land - compliance with the set
rules.
-
Loopholes in the system deliberately created for future abuse.
Some of the pertinent issues stated under the terms of reference were
seemingly designed to limit the Committee from doing an exhaustive job,
e.g.:
-
Provision of agricultural inputs and support services for the
optimal utilization of land tends to lead the study towards thinking that
such inputs must be provided from a charitable source rather than obtained
by the farmer as part and parcel of investment on the land. It also shields
against the Committee investigating just how much inputs have actually been
distributed covertly and corruptly under the guise of supporting the
start-up settlers using taxpayers' money.
-
The situation regarding infrastructure.....and any additional
support required in this regard, tends to shadow agricultural production
related infrastructure (irrigation water, marketing facilities) with the
social infrastructure such as educational and health facilities. The latter
should have been a prerequisite to allowing for any settlements.
-
Measures necessary to ensure targeted production for each
province......, implies that producers will be forced to produce certain
commodities irrespective of the market demand and that may create a further
need for controversial state subsidies that the state will certainly fail to
sustain.
-
The role of agribusiness (including indigenous companies) in the
agrarian reform programme. This could have been intended to use the
Committee as a vehicle for creation of business opportunities for black
entrepreneurs in such areas as supply and distribution of agricultural
inputs and marketing and processing of agricultural commodities. While that
in itself could pass as a noble idea there has been a tendency by those
closely connected to government schemes to corruptly act as brokers of
inputs and commodities thereby negatively influencing the costs to
production and viability of the commodities. If the Committee were to
endorse the need for, particularly indigenous companies to be given such
business opportunities the overriding requirement for their participation
should be to lower costs of production and improve competitiveness of the
products.
-
The merits of the demarcation undertaken on on-going agricultural
concerns vis-Р°-vis productivity and viability considerations is a thinly
veiled way of justifying invasion of farms that have not been served with
Section 8, or those farms that have been delisted after some settlers had
already moved in.
-
The nature of governance in the resettled areas is supposed to
incorporate matters of lawlessness and corruption.
-
Literature Review
This section on the report goes into a narration of colonial and
post-colonial history in a tone that has been used by proponents of revenge
style of land reform that uses that period in the country's history to
justify lawlessness. In the post-Independence era there is little mentioned
of the efforts, achievements and failures of the current government leaving
the reader with no doubt as to the purpose of the Background to Land Reform
section - a preface to revenge at any cost.
It glaringly distorts the efforts and content of the Land Reform Programme
Phase II as presented at the 1998 Donor Conference in Harare and its
resolutions that included the orderly approach to Land Redistribution that
had the backing of the international community. It lists the shortcomings of
Britain as one of the prospective donors, but fails to enlist the root cause
of failure of the Inception Phase as the Government's cold feet in
establishing the institutional framework for this preliminary step as
agreed. Proposals for the Inception Phase were submitted and even approved
by the Technical Support Unit (TSU), but Government could not guarantee a
conducive platform for implementation of the approved projects. The
politicians within the ruling party started to decampaign the whole
programme in preference for farm invasions.
This section on the report is conveniently integrated with Context, Policy
and Thrust of the Fast Track Land and Agrarian Reform Programme July 2000 -
August 2002. The Committee's report agrees that the rejection of the Draft
Constitution in a referendum held in February 2000 'strengthened the
Government's resolve to embark on an accelerated land reform programme'. The
report goes further to refer to the main Opposition Party as controlled by
the British Government thereby shedding off all sense of disguise as to the
mission of the Committee.
-
Methodology
The method followed by the Committee suits the hidden mission and objectives
of the exercise and its main features are as follows:
-
Commission of a nationwide data collection exercise - To give the
impression that all previous data and knowledge is obsolete and that all
recommendations will come from this new up-to-date information.
-
Courtesy calls to high-ranking Government Officials such as the
Vice-President, Reserve Bank Acting Governor and other stakeholders likely
to be mesmerised by the subject of land and then generalise that there were
more Zimbabweans satisfied by the reform programme. This can then be passed
for a democratic approach and anyone with a different view can be dismissed
to be in the minority.
-
The Committee also commissioned its Technical Unit to undertake
specialised studies that would contribute towards the recommendations. The
contributors were hand picked and the terms they were given were biased
towards assumptions that if all was well what would be their recommendations
for a way forward and for them to project what the yield of the programme
would be then - All hypothetical.
-
Consolidated Findings and Recommendations
-
A selection of Views on the Programme Implementation is completely
biased towards proponents of the chaotic approach to the Land Reform
Programme.
-
Resettlement Models and Take Up Rates is quite quantitative but
lacks on discussion of the causes of such variability within and amongst
provinces.
-
A 100 percent take up rate (Matabeleland South) just sounds
exaggerated.
-
Unofficially Settled Farms needed more discussion as this likely to
be a major exhibit of irregularity. Definition of unofficially settled was
needed.
-
Production Patterns: 2002-2003 Summer Season does not provide
objective (quantitative) data that supports the Committee's assertion that
2002-2003 was a good production year. The first bullet point under this
section strikes the reader as a lame appeal by the Committee to take it from
them that some new farmers did realise significant yields. The operating
words here are some and significant. What the Committee seems to fail to
appreciate is the fact that what is important is the sum total contribution
of these farmers who got significantly good yields to the overall
production. Tables 7 to 10 are irrelevant as they only show years 1999 to
2001 and mainly reductions in production for that matter.
-
Former Farm Workers - The report is not quantitative on this
subject that has been perpetually a bone of contention on a humanitarian
level. The Land Reform policies continue to be insensitive to farm workers
mainly regarding them as non-citizens and allies of white commercial farmers
as cited on the fact that the former workers tend not to want to work for
black farmers. Organisations dedicated to the welfare of farm workers such
as Farm Community Development Trust and Gawpuz (Farm Labour Union) should
have been interviewed and submitted their recommendations. (??)
-
Issues in Programme Implementation - This section is apologetic for
the planning failures of the programme and apportions blame anywhere else
but on Government. Smart sanctions that came after all mistakes had already
been made is blamed for some of the failures, particularly of Fast Track
(2000) while it is common knowledge that the Government had already reneged
on the agreed Land Reform Programme (1998). The issue of CFU members
contesting compulsory acquisition is not valid as this was done within the
provisions of the law and the failure was on part of Government in that it
did not have the institutional capacity to process all the cases that were
filed. By undertaking the programme in haste, it figuratively bit what it
could not chew and swallow and consequently choked. The capacity of the
administrative courts were known and the Government was repeatedly warned by
its own officers that the time periods allocated to each of the stages were
not enough, but did not wisely utilise that advice choosing instead to
continuously temper with the laws. The fact the Programme was implemented in
a period of poor performance is not valid if one applies the cause and
effect test. The failure of the national economy was caused mainly by
irrational and inconsistent land reform approaches of the Government that
were led by desire to manipulate the genuine uneven distribution of land in
the country to its advantage in respect of elections at a time that the
ruling party's popularity was plummeting. All other macro-economic
fundamentals referred to in that argument were caused by the Government's
disregard for good governance issues. The issue of linkages (backward and
forward) of agriculture with the rest of the economy is nothing new and is
trivial. Comments under paragraphs 6 to 12 simply accept that the Programme
as pertains to Fast Track was absolutely ill conceived in spite of the
abundance of good advice and will both internally and otherwise. Paragraphs
13 to 18 (save for 16) outline accusations of corruption while at the same
time stepping gingerly in fear of exposing too much and therefore chooses to
employ diversionary tactics of there having been a shortage of time to fully
investigate the allegations. Paragraphs 20 to 24 attempts to add sentimental
value to rural areas as being the home for urban dwellers and its value in
liberating the country. The latter is a fixation of the ruling party in the
wake of lost popularity in urban areas. This is used particularly with
knowledge that prospective donors have an affinity for rural areas
(particularly Communal), but the sad reality is that with all the assistance
pumped into them the rural areas remain admittedly the poorest. Paragraphs
25 to 27 toy around with the policy of one-person-one-farm and bring various
related issues that serve to confuse the simple issue of land rights. What
the Committee should have focused on are the basic land rights of all
Zimbabweans and access to the land through various legal processes. The
reason why there is a scramble for land may not be the fact that all
concerned want to use the land for one purpose or another than the fact that
they may simply believe that they are entitled to it. This argument leads on
to the confusion caused by Government itself when it issued certificates of
no present interest to willing sellers of land and turned around and listed
the same farms for compulsory acquisition. Interestingly, the buyers of land
were in some instances the ones obtaining certificates of no present
interest in corrupt circumstances. Generally, this whole confusion has
engulfed the rural land market and slowed down investment into land-based
commercial enterprises.
-
Clarification and Reaffirmation of Government Policy on Land Reform
and Resettlement
- Land Identification remains even more confused than
before the Committee sought clarity on it. Maximum Farm Size also remains
noncommittal and is therefore open to abuse. There would be equally a need
for the minimum sizes to aid in subdivision. One Person One Farm Policy is
complicated by the fact that there is no straight forward land rights policy
that cuts across the whole spectrum of society including high ranking party
and government officials, ex-combatants, recently retired combatants of the
Congo (DRC) war, etc. Lease Agreements or tenure arrangements should have
been agreed at the point of conception of the various models of settlement.
What if the settled household does not want the particular arrangement
eventually offered? Will it be, 'Tough luck, go back to where you came
from?'. Farm Workers issue is not being addressed comprehensively by
Government and will resurface in a more serious version such as when people
who were entitled to certain rights will be suing for damages.
Country-to-Country Agreements
- The fact that such farms have been affected
by the Programme in the first place is inexcusable bearing in mind that the
concerns were brought to Government's attention from the start. The former
German Ambassador as well as the High Commissioner of South Africa are on
record for having appealed time and again to the Government on this issue,
but while they were assured that the policy was not to touch such farms,
reality on the ground was different.
Policy on Continuous Gazetting of Farms
- The Committee's Report states that the policy of wholesale gazetting of is
being discontinued as a way of avoiding the facts on the ground that it is
still going on. The only difference is that at one point since the PLIC had
been disbanded it was now the Department of Lands that had the sole
discretion of what farms to gazette. This was the period during which
influential individuals were given the list of which farms had not yet been
gazetted and even accompanied by the junior Land Officers on a farm shopping
spree to select which farms they wanted and then the farms would be put on
Section 5 and subsequently on Section 8 simultaneously with a directive from
the Minister of Local Government (or any other powerful individual in the
ruling party) to allocate the respective farms to the individuals that would
have hand picked them. The continued existence of gazetting of farms is
further negatively affecting confidence in investing in the agricultural
sector and for the Committee to be evasive on this matter clearly indicates
that their mission was not a honourable one.
Buka Audit Report
- The Committee seems to be answering with some authority that this Report will
not be published instead of indicating its significant findings and how they
have resolved them and then including it in full as an annexure. The
Committee loses credibility by allowing itself to be used as a conduit for
dubious activities by the Executive.
Governance Issues in Resettled Areas
- The Committee points out the obvious, but in an apologetic language.
Lawlessness in the resettled areas is precisely fuelled by the fact that is
no clear authority responsible for the chaos going on there. Rural District
Councils, Traditional Leaders, Provincial Politicians, Local War Lords and
PLICs all set the rules that seem to supersede powers of the Police.
Ownership of Infrastructure and Equipment
- The Committee simply relates
intentions not reality on the ground. Most infrastructure is used by the
persons given letters of caretakership by the Ministry of Agriculture when
the farms were acquired. This was one way of assuring that favourite persons
were allocated the prime sections of any given farm. Access to
infrastructure by the other inhabitants is riddled with conflict and
contributes significantly to despondency particularly on Model A2 Schemes.
Most of the infrastructure such as water pumping equipment and fences were
looted during the period of farm invasions.
Fate of LA3 Forms
- The Committee seems to be talking authoritatively on this matter as if it will
be a permanent body that will actually ensure that what it states will
happen. What seems to be missing in such statements is the urgency with
which such matters should have been handled in order to restore production
in the affected farms.
Resettlement in the Contested Zones
- Again, no answer is offered by the Committee except that the matter is being looked at
by a collection of authorities that should have done the same in the first
place and probably did and failed to agree. There is no reason why they will
reach an agreement now.
Fresh Farm Invasions and Defiant Settlers in Gonarezhou National Park
- The case of Gonarezhou National Park is clear
testimony to what happens when Government condones lawlessness albeit for a
conveniently short time and expects the criminal to repent and return to the
previous status. The invasions were fuelled by ruling party politicians who
simply wanted to prove an already proven point that peasants need land. Now
the whole process of rectifying the problem will cost the taxpayer even more
as the invaders have been given rights by a law that was clandestinely
promulgated to protect invaders.
Dual and Multiple Allocations
- This is a problem related to deliberate manipulation for institutional or individual
gain. It is inconceivable that the Ministry of Agriculture can fail to
master such a database while it is known to operate much more complex ones.
Peri-Urban/Green Zone Resettlement Schemes
- This is just a wish and a
frontier for future corruption. Again, the Committee is being used to admit
or sneak in new schemes whose motives are not fully documented.
Delisting of Dairy Farms in Mashonaland East
- This paragraph seems to be out of place.
However if one looks at critical commodities dairy is just one of them. Why
not delist tobacco farms, horticulture etc?
Withdrawal of Offer Letters from Mashonaland East
- This is purely a petty administrative issue that did not
need this Committee to resolve. If Mashonaland East Province machinery fails
to deal with such simple matters of arithmetic then one must question
whether they are competent to man such offices.
Winter Wheat Programme
- The Committee rightly points out some problems were encountered in the wheat
scheme but quickly jumps to indicate that all will be well soon. Some of the
problems that affected the wheat programme this year are the continued
disruption of farm operations by invaders as well as compulsory acquisition
notices. In addition, there was diversion of inputs intended for the
programme to other farmers in corrupt deals involving the scheme operators
within Grain Marketing Board (GMB). That the deregulation of the oil
industry will improve availability of petroleum fuel (diesel) is as good a
guess as anyone's.
Targeted Production and Input Supply
- The Committee states what will be required and hopes that, based on last year's experience
resources will be mobilised to cater for the requirements. What is
disturbing though is the fact that this late into the season seed has not
been secured.
Measures Being Taken to Mitigate Maize Seed Shortage
- The Committee has done its best in cataloguing the requirements but the
strategies proffered are far-fetched and unachievable. This is a national
disaster! The main advice they could have come up with is whether to import
seed now or the grain later. The former may sound noble, but it is more
risky as there will be no assurance that just because you distribute seed to
farmers they will successfully produce the maize under the current
conditions of uncertainty. The latter costs more in foreign currency.
-
Recommendations on Critical Issues of Policy and Reform Post-Fast Track
-
Planning for the Transformation of Zimbabwe's Agriculture - This
section is confusing in that it seems to suggest a fresh start to everything
yet the so called transformation is already well underway. Is this an
admission that there was no planning before? There have been many brilliant
strategy documents tabled before but they are not worth the paper they are
written on if there is no genuine commitment to their content from the
powers that be.
-
Reform of Key Institutions of Government Involved in Agriculture
and Water Resource Development and Management - While there are some
reasonable recommendations from the Committee on restructuring of
parastatals, these recommendations are detached from the subject matter of
this study, i.e., the land reform activity thus far. Moreover, a better job
on reform of key institutions can only be derived from a much more
comprehensive review of particular institutions. To some extent reform of
key institutions without adequate planning and consensus has caused
breakdown of essential services that were provided by the respective
institutions. Agritex to AREX transformation is a case in point. Agritex was
consistently being reformed and redirected until it lost relevance and was
then replaced by AREX an equally if not worse entity in terms of direction
and focus. Cold Storage Commission (CSC) also reformed itself to oblivion
and so did Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC)/Agribank not to mention
Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA) to Agricultural Industry Fund (AIF).
-
The Gender Dimension of Agrarian Change and Reform - While the
recommendations are noble there is an omission on the institutional
framework that would implement and verify compliance, as the latter has been
the overriding problem on past pronouncements of quarters for various gender
groups. The committee tends to equate the term gender to women, which by
definition is wrong.
-
Medium and Long Term - This section is a collection of reasonable
recommendations that if properly framed can be achievable and valuable for
the rural communities.
-
Farm Sizes and Review of Resettlement Models - The Committee
rightly recommends that the plot sizes be varied in accordance to the
physical features ambient in each of the local circumstances, but there is
need for enforcement of some pertinent features of the models such as
ownership or access arrangements.
-
Cost Recovery Issues - The Committee concurs with the initial
concept in respect of cost recovery and goes on to detail to some extent the
items that should attract payment by the new settler and the possible
payment arrangements. It falls short, however on the method of cost
determination with particular reference to current value, replacement value
or market value of the items to be paid for as well as the interest element
on the proposed 5-year facility bearing in mind in all cases the
hyperinflationary circumstances under which such transaction would have to
be made.
-
Legal Issues that Arise from the Fast Track - The issues raised
under this paragraph do not pertain to Fast Track only, but to the
generality of the Land Reform Programme.
-
Information and Communication Needs for Agrarian Reform in Zimbabwe
- This section simply recommends further methods, tactics and gimmicks for
indoctrination of citizens into accepting that land is of paramount
importance in the current crisis.
-
Production and Marketing
This chapter discusses future plans and has little relevance to the
existing. It is more of a wish list intended for soliciting for support.
-
Water Development and Irrigation
This chapter also dwells on general issues not directly relevant to the
current status of the Land Reform Programme. Government already endorsed
most of the recommendations, but their implementation is what remains
illusive.
-
Plantations, Forests, Safaris and Conservancies
This chapter reinforces the fact that invaders of conservancies must be
evicted immediately if Zimbabwe would like to promote its tourism industry
with some level of success.
-
Role of Private Sector
Private sector, as the Committee correctly points out is quite responsive to
straightforward programmes that are predictable. Unless Government can show
some level of consistency in its own programmes private sector will be
reluctant to fully participate. On the other hand, Government must guard
against private sector based corruption that is infiltrating agricultural
sector through loopholes seemingly deliberately created within Land Reform
related support schemes.
-
Skills Training and Extension Services
The Committee rightly recognises the need for farmer training. If the Land
done much earlier in the programme whilst land identification and
negotiations for its acquisition were in process. This would have ensured
that skilled farmers were allocated the land and would produce additional
value and wealth for the country, not destroying the existing only to go
back later to the drawing board.
-
The Agrarian Reform and Protection of the Environment
Contrary to what the Committee sees as the cause for destructive activities
in the resettled areas, the main cause is lawlessness due to the subdued law
enforcement. The settlers are literally mining the resources they find on
the farms because there is no effective law enforcement mechanisms empowered
on farms that are settled. Clear tenure arrangements could also alleviate
the destructive activities currently gripping the resettled farms.
-
Funding Mechanisms
If the Government was serious about supporting the Land Reform Programme
they should have implemented it at a pace commensurate to their fiscal
capacity and geared up its institutions such as AFC/Agribank to fund the
process. It is too late now to create a bank that will fund the chaotic
programme. In fact Agribank executives have good reason to be reluctant to
plunge into the chaos. There is no amount of money that can cover the
bottomless pit that characterises the current status of the Land Reform
Programme. What Government must do is to correct the fundamentals such as
inflation, exchange rate, governance, etc. By genuinely starting to address
these matters, the Government will attract some goodwill from sensible
partners that will elevate it to economic recovery. The time for academic
discussion has long expired.
-
Shortcomings of the Report
-
The Report failed to account for the disparity between the 11
million of ha of land acquired and the 6.4 million ha which were allocated.
-
The Report failed to give the total number of farm workers who
affected by the fast track land resettlement programme.
-
The Report refers to a "contradiction" between the Land Acquisition
Act and the Constitution. What actually is the case here is that there was
a violation of the Constitution rather than that it is a mere contradiction.
-
The objective as per the Report of the Land Reform was the
decongestion of Communal Areas, however the Report fails to say how such
decongestion will be achieved since most of the land has been allocated
without any meaningful decongestion.
-
The Committee failed to consult the Portfolio Committee on Land and
Agriculture, neither did it consult Organisations representing farm workers.
-
The Report failed to address those criminal activities that were
perpetrated during the Land Reform Programme.
-
The Report was sanitised to give credibility to the chaotic Land
Reform Programme as witnessed by the failure to give a list of those
allocated multiple farms.
RENSON GASELA - MP
NOKWAZI MOYO
OCTOBER 2003
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