



# **PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : ANGOLA**

Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP  
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council

(as of 9 August, 2002)

Also available at <http://www.idpproject.org>

Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.

The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP  
Project or NRC

Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project  
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59  
1209 Geneva - Switzerland  
Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00  
Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01  
E-mail : [jdpsurvey@nrc.ch](mailto:jdpsurvey@nrc.ch)

## CONTENTS

<b>CONTENTS</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>PROFILE SUMMARY</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT</b>	<b>11</b>
30 YEARS OF WAR SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1963-1994)	11
SIGNATURE OF THE 1994 LUSAKA PEACE PROTOCOL FAILS TO END VIOLENCE (1994-1997)	11
ALL-OUT WAR RESUMES IN ANGOLA BY END 1998	12
UN MONITORING MECHANISM ON ANGOLA SANCTIONS ESTABLISHED TO PREVENT VIOLATIONS BY UNITA (2000-2001)	13
ARMS TO UNITA ALLEGEDLY PROVIDED BY BULGARIA, UKRAINE AND ROMANIA VIA TOGO AND BURKINO FASO (JANUARY 2001)	15
UNITA FORCES MOVE FROM GUERRILLA TO TERRORIST WARFARE IN 2000/2001	15
UNITA ATTACK OF CIVILIAN TRAIN IS STRONGLY CONDEMNED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (AUGUST-OCTOBER 2001)	17
CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT SINCE INDEPENDENCE (1975-2000)	17
ANGOLA PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS ANNOUNCES HE WILL NOT RUN IN NEXT ELECTIONS (AUGUST 2001)	19
SAVIMBI'S DEATH ADDS NEW IMPETUS TO PEACE PROCESS – LEADING EVENTUALLY TO CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE WARRING PARTIES (APRIL 2002)	19
UN SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS MANDATE OF SANCTIONS MONITORING MECHANISM – BUT SUBSEQUENTLY SUSPENDS TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON UNITA (APRIL-MAY 2002)	21
DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION OF UNITA TROOPS BEGINS ACROSS ANGOLA – BUT THE PROCESS IS LESS THAN SMOOTH (MAY 2002)	22
<b>MAIN CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT</b>	<b>23</b>
GUERRILLA AMBUSHES AND SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS HAVE FORCED MILLIONS FROM THEIR HOMES (1999-2001)	23
FLOODS IN EARLY 2001 HAVE LED TO DISPLACEMENT OF THOUSANDS OF FAMILIES (APRIL 2001)	25
GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT PLANS LEAD TO FORCIBLE EVICTIONS FROM LUANDA INNER-CITY DISTRICT (JULY 2001)	25
TERRORIST WARFARE BY UNITA AND "CLEANSING" OPERATIONS BY FAA FORCES CAUSE FEAR AND DISPLACEMENT (JUNE-OCTOBER 2001)	26
CIVILIANS FLEEING INTENSIFYING FIGHTING HEAD FOR GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED TOWNS (OCTOBER 2001)	27
POVERTY IN THE MIDST OF PLENTY: THE CASE OF IDPs IN DIAMOND-RICH SAURIMO (NOVEMBER 2001)	27

BOTH UNITA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA ARE INTENTIONALLY AND FORCIBLY  
DISPLACING POPULATIONS, SAYS MSF (MARCH 2002) 28

## **POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES** 31

### **POPULATION PROFILE** 31

WAVES OF DISPLACEMENT IN ANGOLA HAVE RESULTED IN CATEGORIZATION OF "OLD" AND  
"NEW" IDPs (2001) 31

### **GENERAL COMMENTS ON COUNTING** 32

ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF DISPLACED DIFFICULT TO REACH DUE TO MAGNITUDE  
OF PROBLEM AND CONTINUED INSECURITY (2001) 32

SAVE THE CHILDREN FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT REVEALS PROBLEMS WITH COUNTING IDPs  
(JULY 2001) 32

DISPARITY IN GLOBAL ESTIMATES IS IN PART A RESULT OF DIFFERENT METHODS OF COUNTING BY  
GOVERNMENT AND UN PARTNERS (APRIL 2000) 33

### **GLOBAL FIGURES** 33

MORE THAN 150,000 NEWLY REGISTERED IDPs BETWEEN JANUARY AND APRIL 2002 33

UN CITES UNPRECEDENTED FIGURE OF 4.1 MILLION IDPs IN 2002 CAP (NOVEMBER 2001) 34

### **GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION** 35

EVERY ONE OF ANGOLA'S 18 PROVINCES HAS AN IDP POPULATION (FEBRUARY 2002) 35

HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN BIÉ PROVINCE WORSENS AS INFLUX OF IDPs CONTINUES (JANUARY  
2002) 36

HIGH NUMBERS OF IDPs ARE ON THE MOVE IN MOXICO PROVINCE (JANUARY 2002) 37

### **DISAGREGGATED FIGURES** 38

MANY OF NEWLY DISPLACED IN BIE PROVINCE ARE SINGLE MOTHERS (JULY 2001) 38

MAJORITY OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED IN ANGOLA SAID TO BE WOMEN AND CHILDREN (1998-  
2001) 39

## **PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT** 40

### **GENERAL** 40

MANY IDPs HAVE BEEN DISPLACED NUMEROUS TIMES AS A RESULT OF BOTH MILITARY  
STRATEGIES AND WILFUL NEGLECT (2001) 40

INITIALLY, PEOPLE FLEE IN LARGE GROUPS; LATER, THEY BREAK OFF INTO NUCLEAR FAMILIES  
(2001) 41

IDPs IN LARGER PERI-URBAN ENVIRONMENTS DO NOT NECESSARILY RETAIN TIES WITH HOST  
COMMUNITIES (2001) 42

TRADITIONAL MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED HAS BEEN FROM RURAL AREAS TO PROVINCIAL URBAN  
CENTRES (1999-2001) 43

## **PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT** 44

### **PHYSICAL SECURITY** 44

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH CLAIMS THAT PROTECTION NEEDS OF ANGOLAN IDPs ARE NOT BEING  
MET (JULY 2002) 44

GREATER EMPHASIS GIVEN TO PROTECTION IN 2001 THAN IN THE PAST (APRIL-MAY 2001) 45

PHYSICAL SECURITY OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS THREATENED BY UNITA,  
GOVERNMENT FORCES, AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2000-2001) 45

UN SENIOR NETWORK MISSION NOTES THAT PROTECTION NEEDS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED GO LARGELY UNADDRESSED (MARCH 2001)	46
<b>FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT</b>	<b>47</b>
ALARMING SITUATION OF LANDMINES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY THREATENS SAFETY OF DISPLACED PERSONS SEEKING TO MOVE ABOUT AND TO RESETTLE (2000-2002)	47
SOME DISPLACED PERSONS INVOLUNTARILY RESETTLED IN UNSAFE AREAS (2000-2001)	48
UNITA REPORTEDLY REQUIRES A PERMIT FOR TRAVEL IN ALL AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL (2000)	49
<b>VULNERABLE POPULATIONS</b>	<b>49</b>
WOMEN AND CHILDREN AT RISK OF RAPE, SEXUAL ASSAULT, FORCED PROSTITUTION AND MILITARY RECRUITMENT (1999-2001)	49
ABDUCTIONS OF CHILDREN OCCUR WITH REGULARITY IN CONFLICT IN ANGOLA (OCTOBER 2001)	50
<b><u>SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)</u></b>	<b>52</b>
<b>GENERAL</b>	<b>52</b>
BASIC NEEDS OF THE MAJORITY OF IDP COMMUNITIES AND RESIDENT POPULATIONS ARE NOT BEING MET (FEBRUARY 2002)	52
POPULATIONS ON THE MOVE IN INTERIOR REGIONS ARE IN "APPALLING" CONDITION (NOVEMBER 2001)	52
WARRING PARTIES ARE GUILTY OF NEAR-TOTAL NEGLECT OF POPULATIONS IN NEED, CHARGES MSF (JULY 2001)	52
STATISTICS ON THE STATUS OF CHILDREN (2001-2002)	53
<b>FOOD AND NUTRITION</b>	<b>54</b>
MSF WARNS OF A SEVERELY MALNOURISHED 'DYING POPULATION' IN NEWLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS OF ANGOLA (APRIL 2002)	54
LOCATIONS WITH HIGH CONCENTRATIONS OF NEWLY ARRIVED IDPs SHOW ALARMING LEVELS OF MALNUTRITION (APRIL 2002)	55
DISPLACEMENT REMAINS ONE OF THE PRIMARY CAUSES OF FOOD INSECURITY (NOVEMBER 2001)	56
RECURRENT PELLAGRA EPIDEMIC IN KUITO (2001)	57
<b>HEALTH</b>	<b>57</b>
HIGH MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY RATES PARTICULARLY IN AREAS WITH INFLUXES OF IDPs (APRIL 2002)	58
WHO FINDS CRITICAL HEALTH AND NUTRITION SITUATION IN MALANGE PROVINCE (APRIL 2002)	59
NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEM UNABLE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS AND OTHER AT-RISK POPULATIONS (2001)	59
DISPLACED ARE PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES (2000-2001)	60
CHILDREN ARE ESPECIALLY VULNERABLE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS FROM EXPOSURE TO CONFLICT (FEBRUARY 2001)	61
<b>WATER AND SANITATION</b>	<b>61</b>
VAST MAJORITY OF DISPLACED COMMUNITIES USE CONTAMINATED WATER SOURCES (NOVEMBER 2001)	62
<b>SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS</b>	<b>62</b>
MORE THAN 84,000 NEWLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS ARE IN URGENT NEED OF SHELTER AND ESSENTIAL SURVIVAL ITEMS (MARCH 2002)	62
THOUSANDS OF IDPs REMAIN IN SUB-STANDARD TRANSIT CENTRES (DECEMBER 2001)	62

LIFE IN TENTS OR WAREHOUSES EMBARRASSING FOR PEOPLE ACCUSTOMED TO HAVING THEIR OWN HOMES (2001)	63
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS LIVE IN CROWDED CAMPS, IN DERELICT BUILDINGS, AND IN AND UNDERNEATH TRAIN CARRIAGES (1998-2000)	63
<b><u>ACCESS TO EDUCATION</u></b>	<b>65</b>
<b>GENERAL</b>	<b>65</b>
ACCESS TO EDUCATION IS MOST DIFFICULT FOR DISPLACED WOMEN AND CHILDREN (2001/ 2002)	65
NATIONAL EDUCATION CRISIS HIGHLIGHTED BY SEVERE PROBLEMS IN LUANDA (JUNE 2001)	65
IDP PARENTS ARE OFTEN UNABLE TO PAY BRIBES OR OTHERWISE PAY FOR SCHOOLING (2001)	66
<b><u>ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION</u></b>	<b>67</b>
<b>SELF-RELIANCE</b>	<b>67</b>
DISPLACED RARELY BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT DUE TO LIMITED ACCESS TO LAND AND INSUFFICIENT SEED (JULY 2002)	67
MAJORITY OF IDPs ARE ABSORBED BY OVERSTRETCHED HOST COMMUNITIES (2001-2002)	67
DISPLACEMENT HAS FORCED COMMUNITIES TO FIND INNOVATIVE COPING STRATEGIES (2001)	68
STUDY IN HUAMBO SHOWS THAT IDPs WORK IN MANY DIFFERENT WAYS TO GAIN LIVELIHOOD AND PROTECT THEMSELVES (2001)	68
SOLIDARITY AMONGST IDPs CAN BE LACKING IN PERI-URBAN ENVIRONMENTS (MAY 2001)	69
MANY IDPs RELY ON KINSHIP AND OTHER INFORMAL NETWORKS TO MAKE ENDS MEET (2000-2001)	70
IDPs OBLIGED TO RE-ADAPT SKILLS TO NEW INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES (2001)	71
<b><u>DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP</u></b>	<b>73</b>
<b>DOCUMENTATION</b>	<b>73</b>
LACK OF LEGAL DOCUMENTATION LEADS TO PROBLEMS FOR DISPLACED CHILDREN (2001-2002)	73
DISPLACED PERSONS WHO HAVE LOST PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS ARE OFTEN SUBJECT TO HARASSMENT (2000-2001)	73
<b><u>ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE</u></b>	<b>74</b>
<b>FAMILY UNITY</b>	<b>74</b>
UP TO 100,000 CHILDREN ARE SEPARATED FROM THEIR BIRTH FAMILIES – AND THE NUMBER IS INCREASING (MARCH 2002)	74
CONSCRIPTION MEANS WOMEN OFTEN FLEE THEIR HOMES WITH CHILDREN BUT NO MEN (NOVEMBER 2001)	74
DISPLACEMENT HAS CHANGED TRADITIONAL FAMILY ROLES (2001)	75
DISPLACEMENT CAN HAVE SEVERE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNAL IDENTITY (2001)	75
<b><u>PROPERTY ISSUES</u></b>	<b>77</b>

<b>GENERAL</b>	<b>77</b>
INSUFFICIENT LAND DISTRIBUTION FOR DISPLACED FAMILIES (2001-2002)	77
VALUABLE LAND REMAINS IN HANDS OF POWERFUL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY INTEREST GROUPS (DECEMBER 2000)	77
<b><u>PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT</u></b>	<b>79</b>
<b>GENERAL</b>	<b>79</b>
SUB-STANDARD TRANSIT CENTRES ARE OVERCROWDED WITH IDPs WAITING TO BE RESETTLED (2002)	79
NEW IMPETUS FOR IDPs TO RETURN HOME, BUT SERIOUS OBSTACLES REMAIN (2002)	80
ALMOST ½ MILLION IDPs RESETTLED IN TEMPORARY AREAS BETWEEN 1998 AND END OF 2001	82
UN SUPPORTED ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IN THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMMES IN 2000	82
<b><u>HUMANITARIAN ACCESS</u></b>	<b>84</b>
<b>GENERAL</b>	<b>84</b>
WHILE HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IMPROVES FOLLOWING THE APRIL 2002 CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS CONTINUE (APRIL 2002)	84
HUMANITARIAN AID IS SEVERELY HAMPERED BY INSECURITY AND POOR INFRASTRUCTURE (2002)	85
DISPLACED IN BIÉ, CUT OFF FROM INTERNATIONAL AID, ARE DYING OF HUNGER, ACCORDING TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES (DECEMBER 2001)	86
PLANE ACCIDENT IN KUITO HIGHLIGHTS CONSTRAINTS TO DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN AID (NOVEMBER 2001)	86
ISSUE OF "HUMANITARIAN CORRIDORS" IN ANGOLA REVISITED BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL (OCTOBER 2001)	87
HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TARGETED IN MAY AND JUNE 2001	88
INSECURITY TRIGGERED INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE TO CREATE HUMANITARIAN CORRIDORS IN 1999	89
SHOOTING DOWN OF UN PLANES UNDERLINES THE LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN ANGOLA IN LATE 1998 AND EARLY 1999	90
<b><u>NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES</u></b>	<b>91</b>
<b>GOVERNMENT RESPONSE</b>	<b>91</b>
GOVERNMENT CONVENES PROVINCIAL PLANNING WORKSHOP IN ORDER TO FACILITATE PROPER RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT (JUNE 2002)	91
PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS CONSIDERS THE SITUATION OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE COUNTRY AS "SERIOUS" (NOVEMBER 2001)	92
GoA DECREES NORMS ON THE RESETTLEMENT ON INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS (JANUARY 2001)	92
PRIOR TO PUBLICATION OF NORMS, GoA WORKED IN COLLABORATION WITH OCHA TO DEVELOP MINIMUM OPERATIONAL STANDARDS FOR RESETTLEMENT AND RETURN (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 2000)	94
SOME COMMITMENT TO HUMANITARIAN SECTORS SHOWN BY GoA WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF PNEAH (2000-2001)	94

ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN HEAVILY CRITICISED FOR NOT TAKING GREATER ACTION TO SUPPORT IDPs AND OTHER VULNERABLE POPULATIONS (JANUARY - MARCH 2001)	96
<b>REGIONAL RESPONSE</b>	<b>98</b>
CENTRAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES MEET TO COORDINATE POLICIES AND EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF REFUGEES AND IDPs (NOVEMBER 2001)	98
<b>INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RESPONSE</b>	<b>99</b>
UN SECRETARY-GENERAL CALLS FOR AN EXPANDED UN MANDATE IN ANGOLA (JULY 2002)	99
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL CALLS UPON US GOVERNMENT TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT IDPs IN ANGOLA (MARCH 2002)	101
WIDESPREAD AGREEMENT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COULD PLAY A MORE PROACTIVE ROLE IN ANGOLA (DECEMBER 2001)	102
INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST UNITA REMAIN IN FORCE (DECEMBER 2000-OCTOBER 2001)	102
ANGOLAN PEACE PROCESS TROIKA RE-ACTIVATES ACTIVITIES WITH THE OPENING OF THE UN OFFICE IN ANGOLA (SEPTEMBER 2000)	104
<b>INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE</b>	<b>104</b>
UN USG FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS DESCRIBES SITUATION IN ANGOLA AS 'DIRE' FOLLOWING VISIT (JULY 2002)	105
FOUR NGOs GIVE RARE ORAL BRIEFING TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ANGOLA (MARCH 2002)	105
UN SENIOR INTER-AGENCY NETWORK ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT CONDUCTS MISSION TO ANGOLA IN MARCH 2001	106
UN REPRESENTATIVE ON INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS VISITED ANGOLA IN NOVEMBER 2000	106
<b>INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION</b>	<b>111</b>
PROBLEMS NOTED BY UN REPRESENTATIVE ON INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS WITH REGARD TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING COORDINATION MECHANISMS (JANUARY 2001)	111
NEW INFORMATION FORMAT INTRODUCED TO IMPROVE WORK OF HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION GROUP (HCG) (FEBRUARY 2001)	111
US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN MAKES CRITICISM OF UN COORDINATION IN ANGOLA FOLLOWING HIS VISIT TO THE COUNTRY IN JULY 2000	112
DIFFERENT COORDINATION STRUCTURES ESTABLISHED OVER THE YEARS TO ASSIST INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATIONS (1998-2000)	113
<b>INTERNATIONAL DONOR RESPONSE (2001-2002)</b>	<b>114</b>
UN LAUNCHES 'BRIDGING REQUEST' FOR US\$ 142 MILLION TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS IN ANGOLA (JUNE 2002)	114
US GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT TO PROGRAMMES BENEFITTING IDPs IN ANGOLA (JUNE 2002)	115
IDPs ARE MAIN BENEFICIARIES OF EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S EURO 125 MILLION ACTION PLAN FOR ANGOLA (MAY 2002)	115
IDP CHILDREN, AMONG OTHERS, TO BENEFIT FROM OPEC BOOST TO THE EDUCATION SECTOR (MAY 2002)	116
UN REQUESTS US\$ 232,768,666 IN 2002 CAP - BUT RESPONSE IS SLOW (NOVEMBER 2001)	117
<b>SELECTED ACTIVITIES OF UN AGENCIES (2002)</b>	<b>117</b>
INTER-AGENCY TEAMS CARRY OUT ASSESSMENTS IN NEWLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS (APRIL 2002)	117
UN'S HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY BASED ON PRAGMATISM, CONSTRAINED BY LOGISTICS AND FUNDING (MAY 2002)	118
WFP FACES DWINDLING STOCKS AS FOOD NEEDS SOAR IN NEWLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS (MAY 2002)	119
WIDE-RANGING UNICEF PROGRAMME BENEFITS DISPLACED CHILDREN IN NEWLY ACCESSIBLE AREAS, AMONG OTHERS (2002)	120

WHO AND PARTNERS PROVIDE HEALTH ASSISTANCE TO 40,000 IDPs IN BENGO PROVINCE (2002)	122
WITH UNHCR'S IDP PROGRAMME IN ANGOLA UNDER THREAT, ASSESSMENT TEAM RECOMMENDS CONTINUATION UNTIL AT LEAST THE END OF 2003 (MAY 2002)	123
<b>SELECTED ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL NGOs AND THE RED CROSS (2001-2002)</b>	<b>125</b>
ICRC ASSISTS AND PROTECTS VICTIMS OF ANGOLAN CONFLICT, INCLUDING IDPs (2002)	125
RED CROSS FEDERATION (IFRC) ASSESSES NEEDS IN ANGOLA (JULY 2002)	126
MSF MAINTAINS 44 FEEDING CENTRES IN 11 OF ANGOLA'S 18 PROVINCES (JULY 2002)	127
ACTION BY CHURCHES TOGETHER MEMBERS UPSCALE HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMMES FOR IDPs AND OTHER VULNERABLE POPULATIONS IN ANGOLA (JULY 2002)	127
CRS RESPONDS TO INCREASED NEEDS OF IDPs FOLLOWING THE APRIL 2002 CEASEFIRE (MAY 2002)	129
ACTION AGAINST HUNGER RUNNING FIVE NEW PROGRAMMES TO ASSIST IDPs (FEBRUARY 2002)	130
MINES ADVISORY GROUP RUNNING AWARENESS PROJECT IN LUENA (DECEMBER 2001)	131
<b>REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT</b>	<b>132</b>
KNOWN REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES (AS OF AUGUST 2002)	132
<b>ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS</b>	<b>135</b>
<b><u>LIST OF SOURCES USED</u></b>	<b>137</b>



## **PROFILE SUMMARY**

### **Background and causes of displacement**

Angola bears the ignominy of having one of the largest internally displaced populations in the world, with some of the worst human development indicators, whilst at the same time producing vast mineral wealth that ends up on faraway foreign markets and consistently eludes ordinary Angolans.

In April 2002, the Angolan government put the total number of persons displaced throughout the 26 year civil war at more than 4 million – one third of the country's 12 million inhabitants. Of this number, more than 1.4 million IDPs were confirmed to receive assistance from humanitarian organizations. Needs assessments carried out in newly accessible areas as of April 2002, confirmed that 800,000 vulnerable people required life-saving and emergency assistance (UN OCHA, 24 June 2002).

This dire humanitarian situation is the direct result of protracted conflict between the government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), who were bitter enemies even before the country's independence from Portugal in 1975. Some of the worst fighting broke out in 1992, following the electoral victory of the government ruling party, MPLA, and its subsequent rejection by UNITA. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, and up to two million displaced. The 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol failed to end the violence, and all-out war resumed by the end of 1998.

Both sides to the conflict have used civilian populations as pawns in their military strategies. By mid-2001, UNITA appeared to have moved away from guerilla tactics in favour of terrorist warfare, becoming increasingly involved in kidnappings and the deliberate targeting of civilians. One stark example was the UNITA attack, on 10 August 2001, on a civilian train in Cuanza Norte province resulting in the death of over 400 people. Witnesses reported that the train was derailed by an anti-tank mine, and that passengers attempting to escape the accident were killed by UNITA soldiers lying in wait (Action for Southern Africa 5 September 2001, 5 October 2001).

UNITA has in recent years forcibly displaced civilian populations in order to get human and material support, while government forces have in turn moved civilians in order to isolate UNITA. According to MSF in its March 2002 briefing to the UN Security Council, 'The widespread and systematic forced displacement occurring in Angola and the failure to assure proper conditions for IDPs is responsible for devastating the health and nutritional status of large civilian populations' (MSF, 5 March 2002).

The death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi at the hands of government troops in February 2002 gave new impetus to the peace process, resulting in a ceasefire agreement between the two sides in April. This was to pave the way for the demobilization of 50,000 UNITA troops, who would be absorbed into the Angolan army and police. President dos Santos, who had earlier declared he would be stepping down in the next elections, promised that free elections would be held – but without giving a date.

As reported by the BBC in April, some observers were optimistic that this peace agreement would hold where others had failed, due to the fact that it was achieved entirely by Angolans themselves without any foreign mediation. Indeed, the precise role of the UN in supporting the peace plan remained to be worked out (UN News Service, 1 April 2002). In July 2002, the UN Secretary-General offered detailed proposals for an expanded UN mandate in Angola (UN Security Council, 26 July 2002).

However, it soon became clear that "the people most affected by the war have yet to see a significant 'peace dividend'" (UN OCHA, 17 July 2002) and that the world's worst humanitarian crisis was unfolding.

### **Conditions of displacement**

The traditional movement of displaced populations has been from rural areas to state-controlled provincial capitals. Once there however, the absence of sustained and effective government services has meant that resident populations - already impoverished by the effects of the war - have been forced to shoulder the burden caused by the massive levels of displacement. 'The overwhelming majority of displaced persons continue to be absorbed into host communities, placing additional strains on the coping capacities of already-poor families and intensifying competition for meagre resources, including land, employment and income-generating opportunities,' says the UN in the 2002 CAP.

During flight, communities and families have often been separated from each other. Movements of displaced people in Bié Province – one of the worst-hit areas in terms of internal displacement - have revealed that many women are left to flee on their own with their children since their husbands are fighting for government or UNITA forces (WFP 12 July 2001). The UN reports that more than 100,000 children are estimated to be separated from their birth families throughout the country. Many IDPs have been displaced numerous times as a result of both military strategies and wilful neglect.

Though IDPs have found some protection in provincial capitals, both OCHA and the UN Commission on Human Rights reported in the first half of 2001 that persons in all areas were vulnerable to attack, rape, kidnapping and forced conscription by UNITA and government forces. Women and children have naturally been the most vulnerable populations. Women have been subject to sexual harassment and forced into marriage and prostitution; children – of which UNICEF reports one million are internally displaced - have been forcibly recruited and victim of kidnappings and sexual assault. While the overall security situation improved following the cessation of hostilities in April 2002, there were continuing reports of IDPs in Angola facing security threats and human rights abuses (HRW, 3 July 2002).

The ceasefire also gave access to humanitarian organizations to areas which had been cut off for years. The scale of the unfolding humanitarian crisis soon became apparent. In April 2002, MSF warned of a severely malnourished "dying population" in newly accessible areas of the country. Mortality and malnutrition levels were well above emergency thresholds in areas accessed (MSF, 24 April 2002). Assessments carried out by inter-agency teams also revealed the widespread need for urgent basic health care assistance, in areas where the main causes of death included water-borne disease, malaria, diarrhoea and measles (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002).

According to OCHA in April 2002, some 600,000 IDPs were living in temporary resettlement sites, with approximately 437,000 remaining in camps and sub-standard transit centres. Continuing influxes of IDPs and limited resources hampered the closure of the centres as planned, worsening conditions yet further (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002). According to a report by Refugees International, IDPs sent to these centres have a 20-30 percent chance of dying there (RI, 18 June 2002). In June 2002, humanitarian organizations estimated that up to 500,000 people could resettle or return before the end of the year (UN OCHA, 24 June 2002), although serious obstacles remained, not least the abundance of landmines and a lack of shelter in areas of origin (RI, 2 July 2002).

### **Humanitarian response and constraints**

At the national level, the Angolan government was one of the first state authorities to adopt and use the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement – first to form the basis of Minimum Operational Standards (MINOPS) for Resettlement and Return of IDPs, developed in cooperation with UN agencies in the summer of 2000, and culminating in the adoption of these standards in a government Decree (1/01) of 5 January 2001 as the Norms on the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons. The government has also cooperated with the UN in developing provincial protection plans based on the Guiding Principles. However, actual compliance with the Norms has been tenuous, according to OCHA (which monitors implementation at provincial level), but this increased to nearly 70 percent by the end of 2001.

In general, the Angolan government has fallen far short of expectations in its level of assistance to displaced populations. In a rare oral briefing of the UN Security Council in March 2002, several NGOs – including MSF and Human Rights Watch – reiterated their criticisms of the government (as well as

UNITA) for failing to fulfil its responsibilities to populations under its control (MSF, 5 March 2002; HRW, 5 March 2002; Oxfam, 6 March 2002).

The humanitarian operation in Angola is very large; in 2001 it comprised ten UN agencies, 100 international NGOs and more than 340 national NGOs, as well as numerous government ministries and departments. It is also one of the most expensive humanitarian operations in the world due to exorbitantly high transport costs, mostly by air. Delivery of humanitarian aid to war-affected populations has been hampered in recent years by widespread insecurity – including the deliberate targeting of aid organizations such as World Vision and WFP in 2001, as well as by delapidated airstrips and dangerous roads. As a result, 60% of humanitarian relief had to be transported by air (UN OCHA 22 May 2001). However, by the time the Angolan government and UNITA signed the ceasefire agreement in April 2002, WFP reported that due to stronger army escorts and increasing prospects for peace, about 60 percent of humanitarian aid was being delivered by road and 40 percent by air - quite a dramatic change in a short space of time. While the circulation of goods and people did greatly increase throughout the country after April 2002, there were however continuing logistical constraints, including the poor condition of roads and airstrips, broken bridges and landmines (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002).

Lack of resources has been one of the main factors constraining humanitarian operations in Angola, even more so since the opening up of the country after April 2002. Humanitarian organizations, many of them already working to capacity at the beginning of 2002, struggled to address the overwhelming needs of IDPs in newly accessible areas and were forced to identify the highest priorities until at least the end of the year.

The UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals (CAPs) for Angola have been consistently under-funded. For example, only 30 percent of the amount requested in the 2002 CAP was funded by June 2002. The UN subsequently launched a "bridging request" for US\$142 million for humanitarian operations in Angola (UN OCHA, 18 June 2002).

As reported by OCHA, the UN has linked the poor donor response in the Angolan context to the expectation by some donors that the government of Angola would allocate additional resources from oil revenues to social sectors (UN OCHA, 22 May 2001). To date, adequate government funding in this regard has never been forthcoming. Africa Confidential, in its 24 June 2002 edition, stated, "Though Angola needs technical assistance, the oil-rich country has no serious financing need."

*Updated August 2002*

# CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

## Background to the conflict

---

### 30 years of war since independence (1963-1994)

- Independence war (1963-1974)
- Post-independence war (1974-1992)
- Post-multiparty election war (October 1992-November 1994)
- Post-multiparty election war is most devastating to Angolan people

"Angola has known little peace in the past 30 years. It has experienced three wars, the independence war (1963-1974), the post-independence war (1974-1992) and the post –multiparty election war (October 1992-November 1994) when UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) rebels rejected electoral defeat and returned to conflict.

[...]

The post-multiparty election war (October 1992-November 1994) was the most devastating: the UN estimates that more than 300,000 died, 3 per cent of the population. At its peak in 1993, as many as 1000 people were dying daily from conflict, starvation, and disease – more than in any other conflict in the world at that time. By September 1994, the UN Secretary General reported that there were 3,7 million Angolans, mostly displaced and conflict-affected, in need of emergency supplies, including essential medicines, vaccines and food aid. [...] Th[is] war was notable for widespread systematic violations of human rights by both the government and the UNITA rebels. In particular, indiscriminate shelling of starving, besieged cities by UNITA resulted in massive destruction of property and the loss of untold numbers of civilian lives. Indiscriminate bombing by the government also took a high civilian toll. The US deputy assistant secretary for African affairs noted at that time that: 'This type of warfare bears mainly, cruelly and disproportionately on the populace, which is caught between the warring parties'." (Vines 1998, pp. 89-90)

*For a detailed review of the conflict in Angola see chapter III "Background" of the Human Rights Watch report "Angola Unravels - the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process" (September 1999)*  
[\[External link\]](#)

### Signature of the 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol fails to end violence (1994-1997)

- Persistent reports of banditry, obstruction of free movement, continuation of fighting, human rights violations, and acquisition of arms
- Government and UNITA continue to acquire new arms
- Despite monitoring by the United Nations Peacekeepers (UNAVEM III), demobilization process of UNITA troops remains incomplete
- Civil war in Zaire is significant factor in power struggles

"Following the signing on 20 November 1994 of the Lusaka ceasefire protocol between the Angolan government, led by the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the UNITA rebels, Angola has been on a tortuous path to reestablish peace and security. Although a new Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) was inaugurated on 11 April 1997, sporadic fighting continues,

including the laying of landmines by both sides. Widespread human rights abuses by the government and UNITA continue, including conscription of child soldiers and the intimidation and detention of journalists. Movement around the country is difficult. By September 1997, as confidence in the peace process deteriorated, old checkpoints had been reactivated and new ones set up on both government and UNITA areas. Acts of banditry have also escalated. The government in 1997 continued to acquire new arms in contravention of the Lusaka Protocol, the 1991 Bicesse accords and UN Security Council resolutions.

The civil war in neighbouring Zaire was a significant factor in the power struggle in Angola during 1997. UNITA had been supporting President Sese Seko Mubutu of Zaire in return for supply lines for arms and a marketing route for diamonds. In February and March the MPLA sent two battalions of Katangese Angolans (originally from Shaba province in Zaire) to help Laurent Kabila, the leader of the rebel forces in Zaire. In June 1997, Kinshasa fell to the rebel forces and Zaire became the Democratic Republic of Congo. The immediate impact on Angola was that UNITA became more vulnerable as the Kinshasa government shifted its alliance to Luanda. In May and June, Angolan government forces invaded 10 per cent of UNITA-held diamond areas in Lunda Norte in order to reduce UNITA's power base in the northeast and to expand the diamond-producing areas held by the government." (Vines 1998, p. 90)

"In 1995, a nearly 7,000-strong UN military force, known as UNAVEM III, entered Angola to monitor implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, including the disarmament and demobilization of UNITA troops. During 1996, thousands of UNITA troops assembled at UN sites throughout the country. However, many were only part-time soldiers or civilians whom UNITA forced to pose as soldiers, according to observers. Only about half of the UNITA 'troops' who arrived at assembly areas carried weapons, and tens of thousands subsequently deserted. Many observers contended that UNITA still possessed significant military capacity 'including an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 troops' in Angola's northeastern Lunda Provinces and in neighboring Zaire (later renamed Democratic Republic of Congo). . .

[...]

[International observer mission] MONUA also confirmed the existence of armed UNITA soldiers, verified forced recruitment of new UNITA troops and 'remobilization' of demobilized UNITA troops, and reported other irregularities in the demobilization process." (USCR 1998, p. 50)

*For a detailed review of the Lusaka process and its failure, see chapter IV "The Lusaka Peace Process" and chapter V "Undermining the Lusaka Peace Process" of the Human Rights Watch report "Angola Unravels - the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process" (September 1999) [\[External link\]](#)*

### **All-out war resumes in Angola by end 1998**

- Demobilization of UNITA troops as well as civilians sympathetic to the government is unsuccessful
- Fighting intensifies in the north and east of the country
- 200,000 persons newly displaced as result of fighting at end of 1998/early 1999
- UN decides to pull out MONUA observer mission in February 1999

"During 1998 the Angolan peace process unravelled. The União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, had failed to comply with the Lusaka Protocol (1994) requirements to allow the state to extend its authority over UNITA-controlled territory and to stand down and disarm its estimated 20,000 to 30,000 troops. The government had failed to fulfill its task of disarming civilians who had been given arms during previous periods of conflict and militia groups, banned under the peace agreement, increased in numbers. From March 1998 the security situation began to deteriorate. Fighting between government and UNITA troops increased, particularly in the north and east and in the central highlands, and armed attacks on villages and ambushes occurred in many other parts of the country. In December, government aircraft attacked UNITA's strongholds of

Andulo and Bailundo in the central highlands and UNITA attacked the cities of Kuito, Huambo and Malange. As a result of the fighting in December 1998 and January 1999 hundreds of people were killed and over 200,000 displaced." (AI February 1999)

***By 1999, security situation is so unstable that UN pulls out all peacekeeping forces:***

"In a report to the Security Council on 24 February [1999], the Secretary-General stated that the humanitarian situation had 'attained the devastating proportions which could be compared to the humanitarian catastrophe in Angola during the fighting in 1993 and 1994'. He added that 'in the prevailing situation, the humanitarian principles of unrestricted access to affected populations, independent assessment and monitoring, and safety and security of humanitarian personnel, are not being met. In order to achieve these objectives, a clear and unequivocal commitment is necessary by all concerned to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law'.

On 26 February, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1229 (1999), which took note that the mandate of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Angola expired on that day. At the same time, the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation for the liquidation of MONUA and decided that MONUA's human rights activities should continue through the liquidation period." (OCHA 4 March 1999)

***For a detailed review of the actions of the United Nations in Angola, see Chapter X "The United Nations" of the Human Rights Watch report "Angola Unravels – the Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (September 1999) [External link].***

***Please find at UN website the full text of the 24 February 1999 report of the UN Secretary General [External link] and the UN Security Council Resolution 1229 (1999) [External link].***

### **UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established to prevent violations by UNITA (2000-2001)**

- International sanctions imposed against UNITA since 1997
- UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established in April 2000
- Members of Mechanism visited Angola in November 2000 and again in February 2001
- Mechanism recommended a permanent capability to ensure on-going sanctions monitoring

"The Monitoring Mechanism was established by the Security Council on 18 April [2000] to collect information on violations of the sanctions against UNITA and recommend ways to improve their implementation. Its members were Ambassador Juan Larrain of Chile (Chairman), Ambassador Lena Sundh of Sweden, Ms. Christine Gordon of the United Kingdom, Mr. James Manzou of Zimbabwe and Mr. Ismaila Seck of Senegal." (DPI 28 December 2000)

"The Mechanism was formed in July 2000, with the mandate to follow up leads initiated by the Panel of Experts, collect new information and investigate leads, and develop a mechanism to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of sanctions on UNITA.

It got off to a slow start due to wrangling over its role, but in the final months of its investigations it made considerable headway in uncovering links between UNITA and the international trade in diamonds and arms." (Action for Southern Africa 5 January 2001)

"Members of the sanctions-monitoring mechanism established under Security Council resolution 1295 (2000) visited Angola in November 2000 and again in February 2001. They met with several senior Government and State corporation officials, including some former UNITA generals, as well as members of the diplomatic community. As confirmed by the Government of Angola (S/2001/123), the sanctions seem to have contributed to efforts aimed at eroding the military capability of UNITA. However, there are worrying indications that some unidentified planes have been violating Angola's air space in the Cuando Cubango province to deliver supplies to UNITA, and that representatives of UNITA continue to raise funds through the illicit sale of diamonds." (UNSC 11 April 2001, para. 12)

"The Security Council this afternoon [19 April 2001] extended the mandate of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions until 19 October and requested it to provide a supplementary report by that date [it submitted its first report in December 2000].

[...]

As it unanimously adopted orally revised resolution 1348 (2001) today, the Council also requested the Secretary-General, acting in consultation with the Security-Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning Angola, to appoint up to five experts to serve on the Monitoring Mechanism and to make the necessary arrangements to support its work." (UNSC April 2001)

***The Mechanism recommended the establishment of a permanent monitoring body in its supplementary report of October 2001:***

260. The experience of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA has shown that there is a need for establishing a permanent capability of the Security Council to ensure ongoing monitoring of targeted sanctions regimes and illicit trafficking in high-value commodities in armed conflicts.

261. Such a new unified facility under the authority of the Security Council would maintain the political momentum gained in recent years on the question of sanctions enforcement and in the fight against the illicit trafficking fuelling armed conflicts. It would be cost-effective, and would avoid duplication of tasks and overlapping of investigations and ensure the preservation of a comprehensive database as well as its systematic and continuing processing. It would also permit the establishment of permanent and fruitful working relations with technical and regional organizations such as Interpol, ICAO, SADC, ECOWAS, OAU, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the World Customs Organization, all of which are essential partners in an effective implementation of sanctions.

262. In the case of Angola, a monitoring capacity has been in place since July 2000. Any gap in the monitoring process would afford a respite to sanctions violators and would be detrimental to the effectiveness of sanctions. The monitoring of illicit trafficking in high-value commodities involved in armed conflicts of which the Security Council is seized is intrinsically related to the question of sanctions monitoring. The lack of enforcement of sanctions and embargoes and the perpetuation of illicit trafficking have the same negative impact on the perpetuation of conflicts. Experience and data accumulated by the various panels of experts appointed in the past two years have shown that sanctions violations and illicit trafficking involve the same patterns of illegal activities and similar criminal networks.

263. A permanent monitoring capability will also strengthen the enforcement of sanctions, because it will act as a deterrent to potential violations. In this regard, the Mechanism has been able to appreciate the importance of this function and its positive effect. This also sets the ground for obtaining the cooperation of States in complying with the sanctions." (UNSC October 2001)

***For more detailed information on UNITA sanctions enforcement, see the first report of the UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angolan Sanctions issued in December 2000 [\[External link\]](#) as well as UN Security Council draft resolution 1348 extending the Mechanism's mandate to October 2001 [\[External link\]](#). Refer also to the Mechanism's Supplementary Report of October 2001 for details on UNITA structures and trafficking mechanisms [\[External link\]](#).***

## **Arms to UNITA allegedly provided by Bulgaria, Ukraine and Romania via Togo and Burkino Faso (January 2001)**

- UN Monitoring Mechanism exposes arms sales to UNITA via Togo and Burkino Faso
- End-user certificates forged in many cases

*The following information comes out of the UN Sanctions Monitoring Mechanism report of December 2000:*

"The [UN] Monitoring Mechanism found that Bulgaria and the Ukraine had been major suppliers of weapons to UNITA, but appears to accept that some weapons were sold in good faith on the basis of the end-users certificates to Togo and Burkino Faso.

However, the Mechanism's report does not tackle the issue of why these countries were prepared to sell Togo and Burkina Faso such large quantities of weapons, which on the face of it do not meet their current military needs – for example, Bulgaria shipped 6,300 RPG-7 anti-tank rockets to Togo.

The mechanism points out that Bulgaria, Ukraine and Romania have wide-ranging legislation governing various aspects of the export of arms.

However, Bulgaria exported \$14 million worth of weapons between 1996 and 1998 on the basis of forged end-user certificates, with Togo as the stated destination. Forensic examinations carried out on these certificates on behalf of the Mechanism found that they were forgeries, but the Mechanism concludes that the forgeries were based on a legitimate end-user certificate issued by Togo to one of UNITA's senior arms procurers, Marcelo Moises Dachala 'Ambassador Karrica'.

Romania provided the Mechanism with evidence that it had exported \$776,000 worth of weapons to Togo and Burkino Faso between 1996 and 1999. Burkina Faso denies ever issuing the end-user certificates, but the forensic examinations found that 'the end-user certificates featuring Burkina Faso as the country of origin were authentic'." (Action for Southern Africa, 5 January 2001)

## **UNITA forces move from guerrilla to terrorist warfare in 2000/2001**

- UNITA returns to guerrilla tactics after losing ground to government troops early in 2000
- Guerrilla warfare results in greater overall insecurity for Angolan people
- By 2001, UNITA is targeting civilians in terrorist attacks and mass kidnappings

*2000:*

"One of the most important factors affecting the humanitarian operation in 2000 was a change in military tactics, with a shift early in the year to guerrilla warfare. In 1999, shelling occurred frequently in major provincial capitals including Huambo, Malanje and Kuito. During 2000, the most common form of attack was rapid infiltration, usually involving looting, followed by immediate withdrawal. Insecurity in the countryside increased, particularly in prospective resettlement sites. In a disturbing trend, several previously secure locations, where recovery activities were either underway or scheduled, were attacked." (UN November 2000, 2000 in Review, para. 2)

"[T]he report states that 'before the Government offensive in September 1999, it was possible to talk about UNITA-controlled areas, this is less relevant today, in a situation where UNITA is operating as an



insurgent force. To speak about Government-controlled areas and areas not under Government control does not seem to give a good description of today's situation, because areas under Government control still exist where UNITA is able to operate." (Action for Southern Africa 5 January 2001)

"During the first quarter of 2000, the government appeared to be in the ascendance on the battlefield and UNITA appeared disoriented, its actions limited to sporadic guerrilla attacks. As the year progressed, this changed, with UNITA adapting back to guerrilla attacks and high-profile hit-and-run ambushes on main roads...

The level of UNITA violence against civilians increased significantly as UNITA's tactics changed during the year. In January, as the FAA approached Chinguar town, UNITA embarked upon a killing spree, aimed at ensuring that residents would not be captured by government forces. Some 140 soldiers and civilians were reportedly killed. UNITA was also reportedly responsible for extrajudicial executions in localities such as Camaxilo in Lunda Norte, Katchiungo in Huambo, and Quimbele in Uige.

Deliberate mutilations have not been commonplace in the Angolan conflict, but the number of incidents increased during the year, with UNITA forces reportedly cutting off ears and hands. The purpose appears to have been to send a warning to others not to betray UNITA, or to attempt to flee to areas controlled by government forces. It was a response to the rebels' greater isolation and battlefield losses." (HRW December 2000, Human Rights Developments)

#### **2001:**

"The number of kidnappings and murders by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement increased sharply in May [2001], drawing widespread condemnation both inside Angola and internationally. The recent attacks have indicated that the remnant of UNITA is shifting away from classic guerrilla tactics towards unashamedly terrorist warfare.

The most publicised atrocity took place on 5 May, when two hundred UNITA soliders attacked the city of Caxito, 60km north of Luanda. It is not clear how many civilians were murdered during the attack. Some reports put the number at 79, whilst the African Church Information Service puts the number at around 200. [...]

Straight after the attack on Caixito, one group of fifty soliders attacked an orphans' home run by the Danish agency Development Aid from People to People (ADPP). The rebels sacked the orphanage, and took 60 children hostage, along with a teacher. Two teachers are reported to have been killed. Also murdered during the attack was an Angolan doctor from the Italian NGO, the Committee for the Co-ordination of Volunteering Organisations.

[...]

The attacks on civilians have continued to grow, leading senior Angolan military figures to point to a change in UNITA's strategy.

The operational commander of Bie province, Brigadier Eugenio Figueiredo, told Radio Ecclesia on 23 April that the strategy was to seize weapons and food using small mobile units to attack poorly defended villages: "This is not like the old guerrillas – rather, these are ones who are trying to find means of survival and material goods to sustain themselves. The old guerrillas were more compact because they had the assistance of the people who worked on the farms. They do not have such assistance, and therefore they have to steal to survive" said Figueiredo

[...]

While terror has always been a central feature of Jonas Savimbi's approach – both for internal control and external objectives – latest events highlight that the remnants of UNITA's military units are now acting in a purely terrorist manner. This is for a combination of practical military and logistical reasons (a lack of food and diminishing local civilian support) and a desperate attempt to, paradoxically, strengthen the widely held opinion that they must be dealt with at the negotiating table.

The change in strategy is away from Jonas Savimbi's belief in the doctrine of Maoist guerrilla warfare, which puts the central emphasis on the belief that 'the revolutionary war is a war of the masses; it can be waged only by mobilising the masses and relying on them.' (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001)

"8. UNITA has increased its terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. It has attacked schools, buses and trains. It has shot at people fleeing to escape from the flames of a burning explosion. It has shot at World Food Programme planes carrying not weapons but desperately needed food and humanitarian supplies. Sadly, such instances are far too numerous to cite here." (UNSC October 2001)

### **UNITA attack of civilian train is strongly condemned by international community (August-October 2001)**

- Civilian train derailed by anti-tank mine in Cuanza Norte province
- Over 400 persons killed, some of who were murdered by UNITA forces when jumping from the train
- U.N. has condemned the "terrorist" attack in the strongest terms

"There has been widespread condemnation of an attack by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA rebels on a civilian train on 10 August, which left over 250 [later confirmed at 422] people dead and another 160 [later confirmed at 229] injured.

The train was an ordinary scheduled service from Luanda to Dondo, consisting of four passenger carriages, two freight trucks and two oil tanks. It was derailed when it hit an anti-tank mine near Zenza do Itombe, Cuanza Norte province. Witnesses state that UNITA rebels were lying in wait, and many people were murdered as they jumped from the train." (Action for Southern Africa 5 September 2001, Revulsion over train massacre)

"The number of people murdered by UNITA during the attack on a train on 10 August is now reported to be 422 confirmed deaths, with 229 people still missing and unaccounted for.

The train had been travelling from Luanda to Dondo when it was attacked near Zenza do Itombe, Cuanza Norte province. UNITA has admitted that it attacked the train, but denies that many civilians were killed.

However, in the current climate UNITA's terrorist attacks have rebounded on themselves. A statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 20 September (S/PRST/2001/24) warned that 'the Security Council condemns in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks by UNITA forces on the civilian population of Angola. It stresses that such attacks are unacceptable and cannot be justified by any political goals. The Council reminds their perpetrators that such acts are in violation of international law and may have further implications'." (Action for Southern Africa 5 October 2001, Train massacre toll rises)

*For details of the U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement on Angola, please refer to original document [\[External link\]](#).*

### **Chronology of the conflict since independence (1975-2000)**

- UNITA, MPLA and FNLA already at odds at time of independence in 1975
- Country is wracked by fighting until 1994 when ceasefire accord signed
- UNITA fails to respect ceasefire; international sanctions imposed in 1997
- Continued fighting fueled by UNITA diamond revenues since 1998

"Key events of the conflict that has left at least 500,000 people dead are as follows:

### **1975**

*Nov 11:* Angola wins independence from Portugal but is already wracked by conflict between the pro-Soviet People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), both backed by the United States and Zaire.

Apartheid South Africa had in October sent troops to back UNITA against the MPLA, which had major support from Cuba.

### **1979**

*Sept 20:* Jose Eduardo dos Santos succeeds the late president Agostinho Neto.

### **1984**

*Feb 16:* Angola and South Africa sign a deal calling for a South African withdrawal to be completed in 1988.

### **1988**

*Aug 8:* South Africa, Cuba and Angola agree on ceasefires in Angola and in Namibia as part of a regional peace pact.

*Dec 22:* The largely US-brokered New York treaty among the same three parties opens the way to Namibian independence and agreement between Cubans and Angolans on the withdrawal of Cuba's 50,000 troops in Angola.

### **1989**

*July:* Fighting resumes, despite a June 22 ceasefire between the government and UNITA.

### **1991**

*March 26-30:* New laws introduce multi-party politics and guarantee civil liberties.

*May 30:* The UN Verification Mission (UNAVEM), in Angola since late 1988, is extended to monitor the ceasefire and organise general elections.

*May 31:* The government of Dos Santos and the rebels of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi sign peace accords to end the civil war.

### **1992**

*Sept 29-30:* General and presidential elections take place under UN supervision and are carried by the MPLA.

Dos Santos fails to carry the presidential poll in the first round. Savimbi refuses to admit defeat at the polls and renewed war breaks out.

### **1993**

*March 6:* UNITA takes control of Angola's second city Huambo, after battling since January in a campaign that left 12,000 dead.

*May 19:* The United States, which backed UNITA between 1975 and 1991, recognises Dos Santos' regime.

*Oct 6:* UNITA recognises the 1991 peace deal and the elections' outcome.

*Nov 15:* Direct negotiations between government and UNITA begin.

### **1994**

*March 31:* UNITA agrees to a second round of presidential elections as fighting continues.

*Nov 20:* Government and UNITA representatives in Lusaka sign another ceasefire agreement.

### **1995**

*Feb 8:* UN Security Council agrees to send a 7,000-strong peacekeeping force to Angola.

*May 6:* First summit between Dos Santos and Savimbi in Gabon.

*May 18:* Savimbi declares that he accepts the September 1992 election results and in June he announces "the end of the war in Angola."

#### **1996**

*Nov 13:* Parliament abolishes the post of vice-president after Savimbi refuses to take it up.

#### **1997**

*April 11:* Formation of a national unity and reconciliation government.

*Oct 30:* The UN imposes sanctions against UNITA for failing to respect the ceasefire.

#### **1998**

*March 11:* UNITA is officially recognized as a political party.

*Sept 2:* Influential UNITA members split from Savimbi, prompting the government to end its dialogue with UNITA and to recognize only the splinter group.

*Late 1998:* All-out warfare resumes.

#### **1999**

*Jan 29:* Dos Santos extends his presidential powers.

*Feb 26:* United Nations ends its observer mission in Angola due to resumed fighting.

#### **2000**

*March 10:* A UN report accuses some African leaders of fueling the war through diamond and arms trading in violation of sanctions.

*Aug 18:* Intense fighting breaks out in eastern Angola.

*Oct 2:* MPLA calls off elections due in 2001 because of ongoing fighting, angering opposition parties." (AFP 9 November 2000)

### **Angola President dos Santos announces he will not run in next elections (August 2001)**

"Angolan President José dos Santos announced on Thursday [24 August 2001] that he would not stand as a candidate in the next presidential election. Addressing the central committee of the ruling MPLA party in Luanda, Dos Santos said the party should prepare to find a candidate for the next electoral contest, which he said could take place in 2002 or 2003. 'It is clear that the name of that candidate will not be José Eduardo dos Santos,' he said." (IRIN-SA 24 August 2001)

"In a step that could offer Jonas Savimbi an honourable exit from political life, the President of Angola, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has announced that he will not stand in the next presidential elections.

[...]

The government is keen to go ahead with elections in 2002, but there is growing debate over whether the conditions will exist for voters to freely express their will." (Action for Southern Africa 5 September 2001, President to step down)

### **Savimbi's death adds new impetus to peace process – leading eventually to ceasefire agreement between the warring parties (April 2002)**

- Jonas Savimbi, veteran leader of the UNITA rebel movement, is killed by Angolan government troops (FAA), in the eastern Moxico province, on 22 February 2002
- Hopes are raised for an end to the fighting - although some fear that UNITA might split into many factions and that fighting would continue

- President dos Santos calls for a ceasefire on 13 March 2002
- Peace talks between Angolan government and UNITA commanders take place in Moxico province in March, but ongoing fighting forces more civilians to flee their homes
- Aid agencies reiterate warnings that their resources are already overstretched and that they do not have the capacity to deal with further large influxes of IDPs
- Ceasefire agreement is signed by Angolan government and UNITA in April 2002

"The death of veteran Angolan rebel leader Jonas Savimbi has added new impetus to the search for a settlement to the country's long-running civil war, analysts told IRIN over the weekend.

Savimbi was killed on Friday by Angolan government troops (FAA) after a fierce gun battle near Lucusse, about 700 km east of Luanda, the capital. His 'column', hunted by the FAA, was reportedly headed for the Zambian border. State television on Saturday showed the body of the 67-year-old guerrilla chieftain, who had led the UNITA rebel movement since 1966, sprawled on a makeshift table. The authorities said his corpse would be publically displayed in Luanda.

'I'm so optimistic. The nightmare has ended and the future has just begun,' Dinho Chingunji, spokesman for the anti-Savimbi UNITA-Renovada faction in the United States told IRIN.

There are, however, question marks over whether UNITA commanders in the bush will continue fighting, or if Savimbi's death could clear the obstacles to a peace agreement." (IRIN, 24 February 2002)

"While the international community has called for a rapid cessation of hostilities in Angola, on the ground the conflict between government forces and UNITA rebels has continued.

On Wednesday US President George Bush, after a meeting with his Angolan counterpart Jose Eduardo dos Santos in Washington, said 'we agreed that all parties have an obligation to seize this moment to end the war', and that 'Angolans deserve no less than peace'.

The European Union (EU) presidency, Spain, said in a statement this week that in light of the recent death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, 'it is the strong conviction of the EU, that the end of the Angolan conflict can only be achieved through an effective engagement of all in peace and national reconciliation, on the basis of the Lusaka protocol'. While the EU 'welcomes the positive signals from the government of Angola to date and looks forward to the early publication of the announced detailed programme leading to a definitive end of all the hostilities in Angola', some humanitarian officials on the ground believe Angola's suffering could continue for some time yet.

One aid worker told IRIN it is expected that the government, sensing it may finally have the upper hand militarily, will intensify their efforts to wipe-out UNITA. 'I expect this will lead to more IDPs (internally displaced persons) and an unpredictable response from UNITA. The worst case scenario is that we will have a Somali situation with (UNITA splitting into) many factions.'

Supporting the sentiments of the EU, the official said: "The best move for government now is to try and pull UNITA together, though I'm not sure they'll do that. The military solution is what the military wants, the heads of FAA (Angolan Army) are saying they want a military solution, lets hope wisdom prevails.'

On Monday, dos Santos called for a ceasefire, shortly thereafter a UNITA attack killed several people and dashed hopes for an immediate peace." (IRIN 28 February 2002)

"Peace talks between the Angolan government and rebel UNITA commanders continued on Friday in the eastern province of Moxico as on-going skirmishes force people to flee their homes.

A diplomatic source told IRIN that the UNITA commanders were being kept under close watch in the city of Luena. 'They [UNITA delegation] can walk in and out of their houses but they are being closely monitored and they won't be able to just leave,' the source said.

Information on the content of the talks has thus far been slow to trickle out. 'Not even high-ranking government officials know anything about it at all, there's no information coming out about the peace talks,' said the source.

UNITA member of parliament Jaka Jamba said: 'All we can say now is that the talks are aimed at [reaching agreement] on a cessation of hostilities. UNITA has reinforced its delegation [led by General Abreu Kamorteiro] with its secretary for information, Marcial Adriano Dachala. The government delegation is headed by FAA's [Angolan Army] deputy chief of staff, General Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda.'

The World Food Programme (WFP) has meanwhile warned that the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into cities would further stretch aid agencies already limited resources." (IRIN, 22 March 2002)

"Welcoming the recent signing of a ceasefire agreement between the Government of Angola and the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the United Nations envoy to the country has reiterated the UN's support in helping to establish peace in the war-torn nation.

The ceasefire accord 'concludes a first phase of a process, which we all want to be irreversible and which we all want to bring peace to Angola,' Mussagy Jeichande, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's Representative to the country, said in a statement to the signing ceremony on Saturday in Luena.

'Peace is a process, which requires an open and sincere dialogue,' Mr. Jeichande said. 'It is the only way to achieve the true reconciliation of the Angolan family.'

Mr. Jeichande also reiterated the UN's readiness to 'help that peace, democracy, progress and social welfare become realities available for the Angolan nationals.'

Meanwhile, Mr. Annan's Special Adviser for Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, is set to arrive tomorrow in Angola on a fact-finding mission to examine the current peace process and clarify the UN's role in it, a UN spokesman said Monday in New York.

Mr. Gambari will also seek to encourage the parties to take full advantage of the recent positive developments in Angola to move the peace process forward under the Lusaka Protocol." (UN News Service, 1 April 2002)

### **UN Security Council extends mandate of sanctions monitoring mechanism – but subsequently suspends travel restrictions on UNITA (April-May 2002)**

- Sanctions monitoring mechanism extended in April 2002 for 6 months
- In May 2002, UN Security Council suspends travel restrictions on UNITA in order to advance the peace process and national reconciliation

#### **"Resolution 1404 (2002) Adopted Unanimously:**

Welcoming the 4 April ceasefire agreement in Angola and determining that the situation in Angola continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region, the Security Council this afternoon extended until 19 October the mandate of the monitoring mechanism created in April 2000 to investigate violations of the sanctions placed on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

By unanimously adopting resolution 1404 (2002), the Council requested the monitoring mechanism to provide a detailed action plan for its future work to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) within 30 days, in particular on financial measures and the measures concerning the trade in diamonds and arms, against UNITA.

The Council further requested the Secretary-General to appoint four experts to serve on the monitoring mechanism, in consultation with the Committee.

Pursuant to resolution 864 of 15 September 1993, the Council placed sanctions on UNITA and created a committee to monitor sanctions violations concerning, among other things, the sale or supply of weapons, petroleum and petroleum products.

In May 1999, the Council established an independent panel of experts "to trace violations in arms trafficking, oil supplies and the diamond trade, as well as the movement of UNITA funds". In April 2000, after considering the final report of the panel, the Council adopted resolution 1295 (2000), by which it tightened existing sanctions, established a new monitoring mechanism, and put into place a process whereby the Council would consider appropriate action in relation to States suspected of violating the sanctions." (UN Security Council, 18 April 2002)

"The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 864 (1993) concerning the situation in Angola wishes to inform that the Security Council decided on 17 May 2002 by its resolution 1412 (2002) to suspend the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of resolution 1127 (1997) on UNITA senior officials and adult members of their immediate families, as designated by the 864 Committee\* for a period of 90 days commencing on 17 May 2002.

By suspending the above travel restrictions, the Security Council recognized, in particular, the need for the facilitation of travel by UNITA members for the peace process and national reconciliation to advance. Prior to the end of the suspension period, the Security Council will decide whether to extend the suspension of the measures referred to above, taking into account all available information on the continuing progress of the process of national reconciliation in Angola." (UN Security Council, 20 May 2002)

*For the 26 April 2002 report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA, [click here](#)*

### **Disarmament and demobilisation of UNITA troops begins across Angola – but the process is less than smooth (May 2002)**

- Angolan government sets up 33 quartering areas for UNITA troops in various parts of the country
- MOU between the army and UNITA provides for the demobilisation of up to 50,000 UNITA troops as well as provision for 250,000 family members
- In May 2002, conditions in the quartering areas are described as an 'emerging humanitarian crisis'

"UNITA troops have begun to gather in the 33 quartering areas set up by the Angolan government as part of the re-launched peace process. As of 25 April, over 9,000 soldiers had already reached the cantonment areas, with several thousand additional troops awaiting transportation from the bush.

The troops entering the camps are reported to be genuine soldiers and handing in real weapons. This is in stark contrast to the quartering process which took place in 1995 when - under the watch of the United Nations - UNITA sent boys and old men, carrying obsolete guns, as part of its charade of abiding by the Lusaka Protocol.

The quartering process is to take place within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which was signed by the head of the Angolan army, General Armando da Cruz Neto, and the Chief of Staff of UNITA's armed wing, General Geraldo Abreu Muengo 'Kamorteiro' on 4 April in Luanda. This was the document agreeing to the end of the fighting and the completion of the outstanding items of the Lusaka Protocol.

Under the MOU a Joint Military Commission has been set up to oversee the quartering and demilitarisation of UNITA's military forces. The first meeting was held on 10 April in Luanda, attended by General Geraldo Sachiengo 'Nunda' of the Angolan army and General Kamorteiro. The meeting was witnessed by the United Nations Secretary General's Special Advisor on Africa, Ibrahim Gambari and the ambassadors from the Troika of Observer nations (the United States, Russian Federation and Portugal).

The section of the agreement dealing with quartering provides for shelter for up to 50,000 UNITA troops, with UNITA's 12 generals and 47 brigadiers being housed in nearby towns. Each quartering area is to hold up to 1,600 men with security and easy access. Provision will also be made nearby for the families of UNITA soldiers, totalling up to 300,000 people.

The Angolan government is to provide, with the help of the United Nations, emergency assistance for family members as well as promoting their reintegration through rapid income generating projects in areas such as agriculture and rural trade.

Upon arrival at the camps the soldiers are required to hand over their weapons, which are subsequently to be destroyed.

The MOU sets out a timetable for the completion of all outstanding military matters. It expects UNITA's military forces to be quartered and demilitarised within 47 days of the signing of the MOU on 4 April." (ACTSA, 1 May 2002)

"The Angolan government is flagging as a success its demobilisation programme, but diplomatic sources told IRIN on Wednesday there are concerns over Luanda's ability to keep UNITA troops and their families fed in the quartering areas, and the risk that could pose to the peace process.

Angola's Joint Military Commission, set up under the 4 April ceasefire to oversee the demilitarisation of an estimated 55,000 UNITA soldiers, said this week that more than 30,000 former rebels had already been quartered. Some 42,000 family members out of an estimated 300,000 had also been received.

'These numbers are an indication of the serious work for the consolidation of peace,' the Portuguese news agency Lusa quoted Angolan army spokesman General Francisco Furtado as saying. The general said UNITA troops were being quartered in 31 out of 35 cantonment areas established by the government, and more were heading for the remaining four sites which had not yet received military personnel.

But a US Agency for International Development (USAID) report on Tuesday described conditions in some of the quartering areas as an 'emerging humanitarian crisis'. Diplomatic sources told IRIN there had been unconfirmed reports of UNITA soldiers arriving in poorly provisioned cantonment sites and returning to the bush with their weapons." (IRIN, 8 May 2002)

## **Main causes of displacement**

---

### **Guerrilla ambushes and small-scale attacks have forced millions from their homes (1999-2001)**

- Both UNITA and FAA counter-insurgency measures responsible for displacement
- Indiscriminate shelling and banditry by both sides have been main causes of displacement in 1999 and 2000



**1999:**

"In early January 1999, between 30 and 40 people were killed in Malange when UNITA forces shelled the city in broad daylight. Observers reported that this mortar shelling, by mobile units based less than 21 kilometres away, appeared to deliberately aim at the city's heavily populated market places in an attempt to force civilians to flee. The killing and wounding of unarmed civilians through indiscriminate shelling is a breach of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions." (AI February 1999, "Human rights abuses in the context of the fighting since beginning of December 1999")

"A spokesman for the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) told IRIN that growing instability in Angola was forcing people to flee their homes creating new influxes not only in the besieged government-held provincial capitals, but in the capital Luanda, itself. He said people had been fleeing mainly to the Central Highlands cities of Huambo and Kuito, Benguela further south, Malanje east of Luanda, Cuito Carnavale in the southeast, Luena in central Angola, and the northern city of Uige.

[...]

An analyst in Luanda said people were fleeing not only from regular skirmishes between government troops and UNITA rebels, but because they knew both sides were preparing for the dry season offensive." (IRIN 14 May 1999)

"UNITA attempted to prevent civilian populations from fleeing some areas under its control while successfully forcing hundreds of thousands in other areas to flee to government-held towns. UNITA's strategy of forced population displacement seemed designed to burden the government with humanitarian responsibilities and to detract from the government's military response." (USCR 2000 Annual, p. 65)

**2000:**

"28. ...[I]t is important to note, as did the inter-agency mission, that the responsibility for displacement falls on both the government Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) and UNITA. The Government and the FAA are reported to displace forcibly the civilian population as a counter-insurgency strategy or as a short-term security measure to protect civilians. Other reports indicate that indiscriminate shelling by the FAA and the circulation of false information have resulted in the displacement of civilians. Allegations of similar practices have been levied against UNITA. There are also reports that UNITA forcibly displaces civilians to Government-controlled areas in order to increase pressure on government resources.

[...]

82. Displacement results from civilians fleeing their villages as a result of, or in order to avoid, such practices as those above [human rights abuses, forced conscription and the like]. Often the displaced will spend several days hiding in the bush before attempting to move to safer locations such as major towns or provincial capitals. Displacement also results from civilians being deliberately forced from their homes and having to carry the very items which have been looted from them. It also results from families fleeing or sending their children to government controlled areas in an effort to protect them from forced recruitment by UNITA. The Representative was particularly alarmed by reports that children are being abducted and traded by UNITA to work as forced labour in salt mines in Malanje province. Local NGOs and church groups who may have access to salt mines are encouraged to collect additional and more detailed information which should be brought to the attention of the national authorities and the international community.

83. Displacement of the civilian population is also reported to result from the FAA 'mopping up' and counter-insurgency operations, which are expected to increase in intensity. Reports indicate that FAA troops employ many of the same tactics as UNITA, such as looting villages and forcing the inhabitants to carry the food and other possessions which have been looted from them. Accounts from internally displaced persons suggest that villagers who refuse to comply with such demands risk being beaten or killed. The Representative was informed on a number of occasions that part of the problem in this regard is that the FAA troops often receive neither their salaries nor sufficient supplies and are thus inclined to prey on the local population. A senior government official readily conceded to the Representative that this was a problem. In an effort to prevent such practices, the Government needs to ensure that its military personnel

receive regular salary payments and supplies of food and basic equipment." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 28, 82, 83)

### **Floods in early 2001 have led to displacement of thousands of families (April 2001)**

- UN estimated that nearly 10,000 persons were displaced by torrential rains in southern provinces of Benguela, Namibe and Cunene
- State media puts number of those displaced by floods at 20,000
- Government later noted that as many as 38,000 persons were displaced in Benguela province

"Floods caused by torrential rains in southern Angola have forced 9,500 people from their homes, a UN report released Friday [20 April 2001] said.

State media had put the number at about 20,000. The displaced people had to flee their villages in the southwestern province of Namibe, where the Bero and Giraul rivers burst their banks and flooded several neighborhoods of Namibe town and several outlying villages.

An assessment team sent by the United Nations and aid groups said regions in Cunene, Huila and Namibe provinces could face a food crisis because floods have destroyed huge swaths of farmland, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

[...]

The floods have compounded Angola's long-standing humanitarian disaster caused by the unrelenting 25-year civil war." (AFP 20 April 2001)

"Heavy rains and flooding during April caused extensive damage in Benguela, Namibe and Cunene provinces affecting over 70,000 people. In Benguela province, the authorities reported 9,300 houses destroyed and over 38,000 people displaced." (UNICEF 21 June 2001)

### **Government development plans lead to forcible evictions from Luanda inner-city district (July 2001)**

- Forced removals from Boavista began on 1 July 2001
- Several hundred members of community now living in tents 30 km outside Luanda
- Evidence that Boavista has been earmarked for redevelopment by a subsidiary of the state oil company, Sonangol

"Forced removals from Boavista began on Sunday 1 July, in an operation accompanied by hundreds of armed police, and have continued every weekend since then. Several hundred members of the 50,000 strong community are now living in tents at Viana, 30 km outside Luanda. The government intends to continue with the removals until Boavista has been completely evacuated.

Many of those who were forced to move have had to give up their jobs in central Luanda, since their return bus fare to the city would cost 20 kwanza (about US\$1) – almost an entire day's wages for some workers. The wealthier residents had invested tens of thousands of dollars in their homes, and received no compensation when they were destroyed.

The government has promised land and building materials for the construction of new houses, but many residents are sceptical about this. The tents have been set up supposedly as a temporary measure. In the absence of any other source of income, the residents of the camp have little choice but to work on the

building site where their new houses are supposedly to be constructed. They receive no payment for this, and are dependent on staple foods handed out by the authorities.

The authorities say the removals are being carried out because landslides have made the Boavista houses unsafe. Although some structures close to the cliff edge did indeed collapse during rains earlier this year, residents argue that most of the houses are safely built. There is evidence that the Boavista site, which enjoys a central location and spectacular sea views, has been earmarked for redevelopment by a subsidiary of the state oil company, Sonagol." (IRIN-SA 24 July 2001)

"For city authorities, the standoff over Boa Vista has degenerated into a mini-conflict in this war-ravaged nation, after police tried to forcibly evict residents last week and ended up killing two people how refused to budge.

The city has tried to lure residents away, noting the squalid living conditions in Boa Vista and the environment dangers they face from the chronic mudslides caused by unusually heavy rains during the last two years.

[...]

The tent city is 45 kilometers (25 miles) outside the city center, making it closer to the town of Catete, which has suffered several UNITA attacks already this year." (AFP 6 July 2001)

### **Terrorist warfare by UNITA and "cleansing" operations by FAA forces cause fear and displacement (June-October 2001)**

- Terrorist tactics and kidnappings by UNITA puts civilian populations on alert
- Government "cleansing" operations force still inhabitants from their homes

#### ***UNITA troops:***

"The number of kidnappings and murders by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA movement increased sharply in May [2001], drawing widespread condemnation both inside Angola and internationally. The recent attacks have indicated that the remnant of UNITA is shifting away from classic guerrilla tactics towards unashamedly terrorist warfare." (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001)

"Throughout September there have been sporadic attacks by UNITA around Angola. Whilst some of these attacks were acts of banditry aimed at stealing clothes and food, other are acts of terror to deny any normality to the Angolan population." (Action for Southern Africa 5 October 2001)

***For a list of reported attacks by UNITA in the last two months, see Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 1, Vol. VII [\[External link\]](#).***

#### ***FAA troops:***

"A human catastrophe is under way in the war-torn central highlands of Angola, amid claims that the government of Eduardo dos Santos is deliberately 'cleansing' large areas of its village population in order to starve Jonas Savimbi's Unita rebels out of existence.

In recent months, tens of thousands of villagers have been displaced in Unita's heartland Bie province by the Angolan army as part of a policy of denying Unita access to the food it levies from villages under its control.

[...]

The claim by aid workers in the field and by Western diplomats in Luanda that the government is encouraging the crisis is supported by dozens of displaced villagers. It also comes as large numbers of

starving villagers continue to be displaced daily by heavy fighting in Bie province and gathered into massive camps without sufficient food or shelter.

'Government troops are rounding up whole villages when they reach them and forcing the inhabitants to leave Unita areas so that they cannot feed the Unita soldiers. Then we are being expected to feed them.' Said a humanitarian official based in Kuito, Bie province's regional capital.

For its part Unita has responded to the accelerated government programme of *limpieza* – or 'cleansing' – by redoubling its attacks on villages and government positions, often to steal food and clothes, hampering the aid effort and sending thousands more villagers fleeing." (Mail and Guardian 20 August 2001)

### **Civilians fleeing intensifying fighting head for government-controlled towns (October 2001)**

- Major government offensives in Bie, Moxico and Cuando Cubango provinces cause civilians to flee
- Widespread insecurity causing population movements elsewhere in the country
- Increase in number of IDPs also indicated by rise in number of reported landmine accidents

"Civilians continue to seek safety in government-controlled towns across the country as they flee intensifying fighting between rebel UNITA forces and Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) troops, according to humanitarian officials.

An aid worker in Kuito, capital of the central Bie province, told IRIN on Wednesday there were large influxes of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in area where there had been attacks, but that there continued to be a 'steady movement (of IDPs) into Kuito and Camacupa', also in Bie.

Large numbers of Angolans have fled into Zambia, Namibia and Angolan towns in recent weeks to escape a major government offensive in the provinces of Bie, Moxico and Cuando Cubango. Humanitarian sources who spoke to IRIN attributed the large displacements to military activity in the region, but added that population movements elsewhere in the country indicated widespread insecurity.

World Food Programme (WFP) spokesperson in Angola, Cristina Muller, told IRIN: 'I think during this week there has been a high number of IDPs (internally displaced persons) arriving in places where WFP is present.' The number of people would be determined after everyone was registered, she said.

Muller added, however, that there was a stabilisation in the number of IDPs entering therapeutic feeding centres, especially in Bie, indicating an improvement in their nutritional status compared to about six months ago.

She said another indication that the number of IDPs was rising was an increase in the number of landmine accidents reported in the past week. The victims were usually IDPs who went in search of firewood on arrival at a new area or camp without knowing the area was mined, she said." (IRIN 31 October 2001)

### **Poverty in the midst of plenty: the case of IDPs in diamond-rich Saurimo (November 2001)**

- UNITA attacks near Saurimo, in Angola's northeast diamond zone, have forced thousands of civilians to flee to the provincial capital

- An estimated 88,000 Angolans live in six camps surrounding Saurimo
- Saurimo itself is considered safe since government garrisons are protecting one of the country's largest diamond mines nearby

"There is plenty of diamond wealth in the ground around mineral-rich Saurimo, but war-displaced Angolans living in temporary camps in the remote area don't see any of it.

'We are displaced people. We don't have enough food and we are getting thin,' said 52-year-old Alberto Tchipatulo, in the Sumulonda camp outside Saurimo city in Angola's northeast diamond zone.

The rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by the elusive Jonas Savimbi, has been fighting Luanda since independence from Portugal in 1975.

Recent UNITA attacks on Dala, 180 km (112 miles) south of Saurimo, to capture food and conscripts have forced residents to flee to the provincial capital. 'They killed a lot of people,' Tchipatulo said.

The camp has housed 7,000 people for 14 months, including Tchipatulo, his two wives and five children.

Saurimo is relatively safe and has never been attacked by UNITA despite lucrative diamond zones to its north. Some 88,000 Angolans now live in six camps surrounding Saurimo, just some of the three million people who have been forced to flee their homes to seek shelter from the war.

But while they are safe from the fighting, Saurimo citizens treat them with hostility, regarding them as lucky interlopers who get aid agency support while they have to scramble for food and medical care.

'They call the people in the camps the governor's pigs because they are accused of stealing food from local fields,' said one aid worker.

Lying on a bushy plain with hardly a tree in sight, the city is easier to protect than some others in Angola's more lush areas.

Government garrisons protecting Angola's largest diamond mine 35 km (21 miles) north, also discouraged rebel incursions, aid workers said. 'The Angolan army has good control around Saurimo,' said one.

The most recent vehicle ambushes occurred in September outside a safety perimeter that extends 20 km (12 miles) east and west of Saurimo and 17 km (10 miles) south and 50 km (31 miles) north." (Reuters 13 November 2001)

### **Both UNITA and the Government of Angola are intentionally and forcibly displacing populations, says MSF (March 2002)**

- Forced displacement of civilians by both sides to the conflict in Angola is widespread and systematic, with devastating effects on civilians' wellbeing
- UNITA has forcibly displaced civilian populations in order to get human and material support
- Government forces have moved civilians in order to isolate UNITA
- Civilian populations remain continuously displaced, often in acute distress but isolated from humanitarian aid

"The intentional and forced displacement of populations by UNITA and the Government of Angola, in furtherance of their military strategies, is taking place in many locations throughout the country.

UNITA has over the past years forced civilian populations to move with its troops in order to maintain a human and material support. This policy has been further expanded since the end of 1999, when UNITA increasingly lost control over territories and had to become more mobile, particularly in Moxico, Huambo and Bie provinces. Civilian populations remain continuously displaced under insecure conditions and with no access to healthcare or sufficient food. Gradually their health and nutritional situation deteriorates to the point where many, including adults, become severely malnourished. Patients arriving in our health centers have also reported alarming levels of mortality among the populations under UNITA control. Humanitarian organizations have absolutely no access to them.

In large parts of the country, Government forces have moved populations to isolate UNITA, cutting it off from the rural population which supplies it with food, labor, and potential recruits. In 2001, a large proportion of newly registered IDPs were displaced as a result of this increasingly widespread Government strategy, with dramatic consequences on the people's health and nutritional status.

Families are obliged to find shelter in displaced sites where overcrowding, an absence of medical care, and a lack of food has led to the outbreak of epidemics and other major health problems. Many of these IDPs are concentrated and kept in locations where international humanitarian organizations cannot be present.

In addition, Government authorities rarely provide any food assistance or health care following the displacement. Displaced populations no longer have access to their villages or fields to cultivate food. In most cases, these populations are only authorized to leave these locations once they have become seriously ill or severely malnourished, and then become dependant on international organizations.

A large proportion of the 50,000 people who arrived in Camacupa (Bie Province) last year were displaced as a direct result of the Government's strategy. Many patients recounted how villages and houses were burned by Government forces to compel them to leave. A survey conducted in Camacupa's IDP camps indicates that mortality rates have reached emergency levels. Under five and crude mortality rates were recorded at 4.8 deaths per 10,000 children per day and 2.9 deaths per 10,000 persons per day, respectively. The results of a nutrition survey conducted in the same camps indicate severe and global malnutrition rates of 1.6 and 13.3 percent, respectively. Malnutrition levels were found to be highest among IDPs who have arrived since mid December 2001.

In Huila Province, the level of displacement of populations in the north-eastern part of the province increased considerably during the second half of 2001 and continues today. According to IDP accounts, people are forced to leave their villages and are escorted on foot by Government armed forces to towns such as Caconda, Chipindo, Cuvango and Matala.

Since the second half of 2001, in Moxico and Cuando-Cubango provinces, large numbers of people have been brought by Government army helicopters and trucks to Luena and Menongue. Although some of these people are in search of security and assistance in the provincial capitals, many patients in MSF programs explained how they were forced to leave their villages. In Luena, the admissions in the therapeutic feeding centers have increased considerably during the last two months.

Forced displacement justified under international law by 'imperative military reasons' only applies to specific locations, a limited time and with the condition that assistance and security be provided to these populations by the authorities. The widespread and systematic forced displacement occurring in Angola and

the failure to assure proper conditions for IDPs is responsible for devastating the health and nutritional status of large civilian populations." (MSF 5 March 2002)

# POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

## Population profile

---

### Waves of displacement in Angola have resulted in categorization of "old" and "new" IDPs (2001)

- Angolan IDPs label themselves as *deslocados*, a term that implies they have been forced to leave their homes
- "Old" displaced are those who fled before 1998; "new" are those who fled from this year on
- Displaced persons indicate that, with a loss of home and land, they feel a loss of cultural identity

"In Angola, displaced persons label themselves as *deslocado* (singular). Directly translated into English, *deslocado* means 'dislocated' or 'out of place'. However, such a pure linguistic translation of the term does not necessarily capture the implicit understanding of forced relocation as is implicit in the Angolan context. In a society where movement and relocation of villages, tribes, families and individuals are normal, the term *deslocado* is used to describe an abnormal situation: a relocation that is forced, not voluntary or part of normal practice. It is therefore necessary to highlight the element of force that is implied in the term *deslocado*.

The *deslocado* identity is a social identity. Those whom we label as *deslocados* or displaced in this chapter have multiple facets of identity, such as 'woman', 'old', 'Ovimbundu' (ethnic group), 'Sambo' (tribe), 'peasant', 'head-of-family', 'Catholic', 'MPLA-supporter', etc. These facets assume different levels of importance at different times (Bordo 1990:136-145). '*Deslocado*' is only one facet of the identity of the people we interviewed.

In Angola, the displaced population is often divided into two categories: 'new' and 'old' *deslocados*. This is a classification that is commonly used by the displaced themselves, by NGOs and by government representatives. New *deslocados* are all those who have been displaced after July/August 1998, regardless of the cause of their displacement, although the war is the predominant cause. Among the new *deslocados*, some have fled from government-controlled areas, others from UNITA-controlled areas.

This division between new and old *deslocados* can be related to Susan Bordo's multiple 'axes' of identity, whereby the various axes are given varying degrees of importance by the *deslocados*, the established population, and others (1990, p. 139). Based upon the information culled from our interviews, the *deslocado* axis is more important to the new *deslocados* than to the old. This is not to suggest, however, that the old *deslocados* have stopped using that word to describe themselves. Rather, other identifying axes are more important in their daily lives.

Sørensen argues that for rural populations identity is embedded in their land and their agricultural practices (1998:82-83). Even though the displaced in Huambo province have not fled far from their homes, they often find it impossible to cultivate the land where they settle after flight. Displaced persons have described a loss of cultural identity after they leave their home villages. Our interpretation is that, with the loss of their land and normal life, an important facet of their identity is lost, too.

[...]

In all locations around Huambo that had welcomed displaced persons, both established groups and new *deslocados* struggled to survive. However, where the established groups had housing and land they could tend, the new *deslocados* often did not have access to fields. If they did, it was land that was far away and



of low fertility. The new *deslocados* pointed out that even if they could rent land from someone, they lacked other essentials, such as seeds, fertilisers and tools. Elderly *deslocados* and female-headed-households had great difficulty in constructing houses or repairing abandoned houses for shelter against rain and cold nights." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, pp. 23-25)

## **General comments on counting**

---

### **Accurate estimates of the number of displaced difficult to reach due to magnitude of problem and continued insecurity (2001)**

- Vast areas of country are inaccessible
- Sheer scope of displacement makes precise counting impossible

"Accurate assessments of new population displacement were impossible. Conflicting estimates about the total number of uprooted Angolans continued to reflect the difficulty of assessing both the needs and the size of the displaced population after three decades of war." (USCR 2001, p. 58)

"The number of internally displaced persons in Angola varies from month to month and year to year. As some displaced return home, new people become displaced. As a result, there is continual disagreement between the Angolan government, particularly the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINARS), and many international NGOs and agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), even over estimates of the number of displaced persons in the country." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, pp. 26-27)

### **Save the Children food security assessment reveals problems with counting IDPs (July 2001)**

- Assessment notes that different agencies use different methodologies when counting IDPs
- In case of Kuito, some methods do not take into account the exit of IDPs from camps
- Furthermore, different agencies use different names for the same IDP camps

"There are different ways of recording numbers of IDPs. The official method used by the Coordination Group (comprising MINARS, WFP, OCHA and CARE International) shows only new arrivals; it does not document when IDPs leave a camp. MSF collects figures from so-called home monitors within the camps on a weekly basis. The difference between the data collected using the two different methodologies is considerable. According to the first method, the number of IDPs in Kuito has increased by about 50% since the beginning of this year; according to the second method, the numbers have stayed more or less the same over the same time period. This clearly has considerable implications for how responses are planned.

Different agencies use different names for different camps. This causes confusion when trying to compare data.

With respect to WFP pipeline food, beneficiaries are categorised differently by WFP and their implementing partner. This makes tracking food distributions difficult." (SCF 13 August 2001, Executive summary)

### Disparity in global estimates is in part a result of different methods of counting by government and UN partners (April 2000)

- UN mission to Angola estimates total number of displaced persons at 2,299,314, of which 456,278 are said to have been displaced before 1998
- GoA estimates the total number of displaced persons at 3,697,322, of which 1,339,248 are said to be displaced before 1998
- GoA figures include dispersed populations that have been settled in and around Luanda for some time
- GoA figures include populations that moved at the very beginning of the conflict

*Following a UN inter-agency assessment mission to Angola in April 2000, UNHCR concluded the following regarding figures of displaced persons:*

	Government (1)	UCAH (2)
		Reported/Confirmed
Persons displaced from 1998 or newly displaced persons	2,358,074	1,843,036/1,024,664
IDPs from the period preceding 1998 or longer-term displaced persons	1,339,248	456,278/456,278
Totals	3,697,322	2,299,314/1,480,942

<sup>1</sup> according to UCAH / report as of January 00

<sup>2</sup> according to UCAH Data base updated on 12 March 00

"Newly-displaced persons:

The figures of the Government include about 500,000 IDPs who are living dispersed in the different neighbourhoods of Luanda.

The figures of the UN **do not** include the displaced population living dispersed in Luanda.

Longer-term displaced persons:

The figures of the Government take into consideration the population that has moved since the very beginning of the conflict.

The figures of the UN takes into consideration the IDPs of the post-electoral war that were about to resettle until the country went back again to war and are therefore susceptible to be found in a vulnerable situation."

(UNHCR April 2000, pp. 5-6)

## Global figures

---


### More than 150,000 newly registered IDPs between January and April 2002

- Government cites more than 4 million displaced, of which more than 1.4 million have been confirmed by humanitarian partners for assistance as of April 2002
- Provinces with the largest concentrations of IDPs include Bié, Huíla, Huambo and Malanje
- While some IDPs are returning to their areas of origin, many are moving towards areas where humanitarian operations are underway

"During April 2002, approximately 22,766 new internally displaced persons (IDPs) were registered in nine provinces, bringing the total number of persons displaced since the beginning of the year to 150,714. According to the Government, more than four million people are currently displaced in Angola. Of this number, more than 1.4 million IDPs have been confirmed by humanitarian partners for assistance. Provinces with the largest concentrations of IDPs include Bié, Huíla, Huambo and Malanje.

Following the cessation of hostilities and the beginning of the quartering process, the level of internal displacement has remained high. Although some IDPs are returning to their areas of origin, many persons continue to move towards areas where humanitarian operations are underway in search of assistance. Most new IDPs and persons en route to quartering areas are in serious condition and initial reports regarding food availability and health conditions in quartering and family areas are serious. During April, the most significant movements continued to occur in Bié, Moxico and Huambo Provinces, where humanitarian operations are overstretched and capacity to assist existing and new caseloads remain limited.  
[...]

**Population Displacements  
January - April  
2001 and 2002**



(UN OCHA, 30 April 2002)

#### **UN cites unprecedented figure of 4.1 million IDPs in 2002 CAP (November 2001)**

"During the period of intense fighting between 1992 and 1994, 1.3 to two million people fled their homes, primarily to provincial capitals and Luanda. In late 1997, humanitarian agencies estimated that approximately one million people were still displaced, despite the limited resettlement that had occurred following the Bicesse and Lusaka peace agreements. Since 1998, when hostilities between the parties again erupted, an additional 1.3 million persons have been forced from their homes, bringing the total number of displaced persons in Angola to an estimated 4.1 million."  
(UN November 2001, p. 10)

## Geographical distribution

---

### Every one of Angola's 18 provinces has an IDP population (February 2002)

- Areas with the highest concentration of IDPs include Bie, Huila, Huambo and Kuanza Sul provinces
- Many of the new arrivals have been forcibly displaced by the army
- Further influxes of IDPs are expected, although there is almost no space to accommodate more people
- Some of the worst living conditions in the country are in the 22 transit centres and warehouses in seven provinces that remain open

"The total number of IDPs in the country is currently 4.1 million. Two years ago, the number was two million. Of the 4.1 million IDPs, 1.36 have been confirmed to receive international assistance.

The areas with the highest concentration of IDPs include Bié with 173,000; Huila with 174,000; Huambo with 150,000; and Kuanza Sul with 118,000. Every single one of the country's 18 provinces has an IDP population.

In Kuito and Camacupa, more than 62,000 displaced persons have poured into the area during the last five months, most, forcibly displaced by the army. An additional 12,000 entered during the first two weeks of January alone. There is almost no space to accommodate these people and resources have run out. At least 22,000 more IDPs are close by and may shortly enter Kuito and Camacupa in a desperate effort to reach life-saving assistance.

In Luena, 6,000 IDPs are arriving per month, most, forcibly displaced by the army. There is almost no space to accommodate these people and resources are about to run out. Higher levels of new arrivals are expected in coming months.

Approximately 320,000 IDPs continue to live in camps and transit centres.

During the past 20 months, 35 transit centres have been closed and 25,000 IDPs resettled to safe areas with agricultural lands. It was expected that all centres would be closed by the end of 2001. Due to the huge level of displacement, more than 12 centres have been either established or reopened in recent months. Some of the worst living conditions in the country are in the 22 transit centres and warehouses in seven provinces that remain open. More than 17,500 IDPs are living in inhumane conditions in these centres." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

*UN OCHA's Special Report on the Humanitarian Situation in Angola (7 March 2002) contains maps showing, among others, critical areas in the country and areas accessible to international agencies (see list of sources).*

*See also the map section of this profile containing UN OCHA map of IDP presence by province (as of February 2002), [\[External link\]](#)*

## Humanitarian crisis in Bié province worsens as influx of IDPs continues (January 2002)

- Between July 2001 and January 2002, approximately 64,645 persons have been displaced in Bié province - bringing the total number of IDPs there to more than 181,000
- On-going military operations are the main cause of displacement
- According to the government of Angola, more than 305,000 IDPs requiring humanitarian assistance may be in inaccessible areas of the province
- Shelter is an urgent issue, with many unregistered IDPs living in inadequate and overcrowded accommodation
- Large numbers of the newly displaced people are in an alarming health and nutritional state

### *"The Problem: Displacement*

Since July 2001, approximately 64,645 persons have been displaced in Bié Province, bringing the total number of IDPs in the province to more than 181,000. The highest number of new arrivals occurred in October, when 16,000 persons arrived in Kuito and Camacupa. In November, 10,500 additional IDPs entered these areas. In December, 5,779 new IDPs arrived in Kuito, 7,229 in Camacupa and 4,479 in Cunhinga. During the first two weeks of January, 11,740 new IDPs were reported in the province, including 9,720 in Camacupa town. The main cause of displacement are on-going military operations in the northern areas of the province and along the borders with Huambo and Moxico Provinces.

Government sources estimate that more than 305,000 IDPs requiring humanitarian assistance may be present in inaccessible areas of the province. Approximately 83,000 are concentrated in the inaccessible areas of Muinha, Ringoma, Umpolo, Munhango, Kuanza, Gamba and Sachinemuna, where humanitarian conditions are reportedly serious. Authorities have indicated that as many as 22,000 IDPs may enter Camacupa and Kuito in coming weeks in search of humanitarian assistance.

	Total number of IDPs (as of 15 Jan)	New IDPs reported in December	New IDPs reported 1-15 January
KUITO	125,639	5,779	2,020
CAMACUPA	50,587	7,229	9,720
CUNHINGA	5,107	4,479	628

### *Registration*

An estimated 21,500 newly arrived IDPs have not yet been registered in the three locations where humanitarian operations are underway and are therefore not receiving humanitarian assistance. In Kuito, two reception centres have been transformed into transit centres due to overcrowding at existing camps and limited opportunities for resettlement on the basis of the Norms. More than 1,000 persons in these centres have not been registered. In addition, more than 1,200 families are housed in inadequate shelters in Kuito camps, including overcrowded houses, schools and food distribution points. In Camacupa, approximately 10,000 IDPs are living in the newly established Aifena camp. An additional 7,505 IDPs are living in warehouses and other locations. None of these persons has been registered. In Cunhinga, approximately 4,500 recently arrived IDPs are waiting to be registered.

### *Alarming Health and Nutritional Situation*

According to nutritional surveys conducted during December, the global malnutrition rate in Kuito IDP camps is 13 percent. In Camacupa, severe and moderate malnutrition rates among new arrivals are three

percent and 28 percent, respectively. Camacupa's supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres are operating at full capacity and severely malnourished beneficiaries are now being transferred to Kuito, a 75-kilometre journey. The onset of heavy seasonal rains has aggravated the precarious water and sanitation situation in Kuito and Camacupa IDP camps, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases and malnutrition. Measles and other preventable diseases are also of concern, particularly since many IDPs arriving from inaccessible areas have not received routine vaccinations.

#### *Constraints*

The security situation remains volatile in the province, limiting humanitarian access to only three of the province's nine municipalities. The Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) has reconfirmed its commitment to providing assistance to populations in areas where humanitarian partners do not have access. Unless assistance is urgently received in these areas, populations are likely to move towards Camacupa and Kuito in coming weeks, putting additional pressure on already overburdened emergency response mechanisms.

The extremely poor condition of the airstrip has impeded delivery of adequate humanitarian assistance for more than 22 months. WFP is currently able to deliver less than 60 percent of relief requirements into Kuito. The poor condition of the road between Kuito and Camacupa has also prevented assistance, particularly food and non-food items, from being transported to Camacupa. Due to persistent insecurity in most municipalities, international humanitarian partners are unable to provide assistance to vulnerable populations in inaccessible areas." (UN OCHA 24 January 2002)

### **High numbers of IDPs are on the move in Moxico province (January 2002)**

- Moxico province, the birthplace of UNITA, is seen by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) as the most important remaining UNITA stronghold
- The resulting military activity continues to force thousands of civilians from their homes, and aid agencies fear many more are on their way
- Government forces are reported to be moving 100-150 people daily by helicopter to the provincial capital Luena, which remains calm
- Some IDPs testify that they have been forced to move by the government, in what NGOs are describing as a "scorched earth policy"

"A government military offensive against UNITA rebels in the eastern Moxico province and other parts of the country continues to force thousands of Angolans from their homes into camps for the displaced and aid agencies fear that many more are on their way.

Cristina Muller, spokesperson for the World Food Programme (WFP) in Angola, told IRIN on Wednesday that 2,359 new internally displaced people (IDPs) were registered in Moxico's capital, Luena, last week. This brought the total number of IDPs registered in January to 4,869, she said.

'Intense military activity has been reported throughout the province, affecting the movement of people in the region. At the moment government forces are reportedly moving 100-150 people daily by helicopter into the provincial capital Luena, where the situation remains calm. The area along the border with Zambia is reported to be highly insecure, but humanitarian agencies have no access to the region,' she said.

'Our concern is with the humanitarian situation. What we have here are extremely high numbers of IDPs moving ... WFP has increased the amount of food delivered to Luena from 800 mt to 1,200 mt a month because the number of IDPs has been so high,' she added.

According to Muller, the majority of people being flown in by the Angolan army arrived in Luena in a state of 'moderate malnutrition' - not as bad as they would be if they walked to the capital. After being registered, evaluated and given a month's ration of food, the IDPs were moved to Muachimbo, a camp about 12 km from the capital, she said. (IRIN, 30 January 2002)

Moxico was the birthplace of UNITA, and since the victories by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) on the central plateau in 1999, the government has come to regard the eastern province as the most important remaining UNITA stronghold.

Since July, the FAA have been sending more soldiers to the area, saying the intention is to destroy the last rebel bases in the province, and to capture UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Aid workers say the resultant increase in military activity is the main reason why thousands of people are leaving their homes each month.

While people some come to the camps on foot, others arrive in military helicopters and trucks from more distant reaches of a province which extends 500 km to the Zambian border. Some of these areas are under the effective control of UNITA, whose soldiers rely on the villagers for sustenance - either in the form of willing donations of food, or wholesale looting of crops and supplies.

'Conditions were terrible - we had no food,' said another man who had been flown by helicopter and was now in the resettlement area at Muachimbo. 'We decided to put ourselves in the hands of the government.'

But other testimonies indicate that not everyone was so willing to hand themselves over to the authorities. In the Katepue camp near Luena, women who had been separated from their families have a different story to tell.

'The government forces captured me in the fields and brought me here. I came in a helicopter - I didn't want to leave my home,' she said.

Her family remained behind: 'At first they must have thought I was dead, but when they didn't find my body they must have realised I'd been captured,' she said.

Stories like this indicate that the airlift is taking place for more than simply humanitarian purposes. Since UNITA relies on peasant farmers for its livelihood, the evacuation of the rural population is helping to starve out the rebels.

Non-governmental organisation staff are almost unanimous that a scorched earth strategy is being implemented, though no one will talk openly about such a politically sensitive matter." (IRIN 10 December 2001)

## **Disaggregated figures**

---

### **Many of newly displaced in Bie province are single mothers (July 2001)**

- Majority of IDPs in Kuito and Camacupa are women and children who have walked long distances to reach aid

"Abandoned by husbands either fighting for government forces or for the armed opposition movement Unitsa and left to fend for themselves, more and more female-headed households are being driven off their land by the recent intensification in fighting.

Faced with starvation, the women have little choice but to gather their belongings and move their children toward the relative safety of provincial capitals like Kuito.

[...]

In Kuito alone, it is estimated that more than 1,000 exhausted mothers, together with their severely malnourished children, are receiving medical help from aid agencies.

[...]

The situation is even worse in Camacupa, a small town some 20 kilometres northeast of Kuito and recently caught in the crossfire of the civil war.

In the past two months, thousands of mothers and children have crossed a damaged bridge on the river Cuanza to take refuge in aid camps set up in and around the town...

Suffering from severe malnutrition and war trauma, the physical and emotional well-being of many of these people is affected irreparably. The majority of the IDPs receiving food aid at Camacupa, for the most part women and children, have walked over 70 kilometres from Cuemba, to the southeast, before crossing the Cuanza." (WFP 12 July 2001)

### **Majority of internally displaced in Angola said to be women and children (1998-2001)**

- UNICEF estimates that one million children are displaced
- Over 75 percent of the displaced population are women and children
- Female-headed households make up 30 percent of persons in camps

"A recent UN inter-agency mission estimated the number of IDPs in Angola to be 2.3, out of a population of 11 million. Among these IDPs, an estimated one million are children. They are the most disadvantaged, and the ones most adversely affected by the conflict. They have little access to the poorly-run social institutions that provide health and education, as well as food, and they are the ones most at risk of disease. They are vulnerable to a number of varying forms of abuse, such as beatings and sexual abuse, and are also under the threat of being enrolled to serve in varying functions as child soldiers." (UNICEF 2001, Country Background)

"[O]ver 75 percent of the displaced population are children and women." (UN 30 November 1999, p. 69)

"Resumption of war in December 1998 resulted in renewed displacements of some one million people as of May 1999; this number is likely to increase in the coming months. Women and children constituted the majority of those who fled, leaving behind assets and food stocks." (WFP 9 September 1999, p. 1)

"[A]mong IDPs living in camps, more than 30 percent are female-headed households." (UN February 1998, p. 99)



## PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

### General

---

#### **Many IDPs have been displaced numerous times as a result of both military strategies and wilful neglect (2001)**

- Government forces remove people from rural areas in order to deprive UNITA of human and material support
- UNITA in turn punishes civilians for "choosing" the government side - attacking them and laying mines near their fields
- Once in government-controlled towns, civilians do not receive the food and medical care they require, but are inaccessible by international agencies
- Many people are forced to move again because of malnutrition and disease

"The most obvious examples of areas of concern are the towns of Cuemba, in Bie province, and Mussende, Cuanza Sul province. Both are pockets of areas under government control, while the surrounding areas remain very unstable.

People abandon their homes and fields in compliance with government counter-Unita tactics of removing people from the rural areas. Populations also flee violent oppression and destruction (or theft) of harvests, primarily but not only by Unita. Unita forces effectively prevent people from returning to their fields to gather food, attacking them – punishing them for having “chosen” the government side – or laying mines on paths to fields. Once crowded into government-controlled cities and towns that are inaccessible to aid organizations, people rely on the civil and military authorities for essential food or medical assistance. However, these are not forthcoming.

Many of the people coming from Cuemba municipality are originally from Andulo and Bailundo regions and were forced to follow Unita when those areas came under government control by late 1999. Unfortunately, when the people later (forcibly) joined areas under government control, such as Cuemba, it did not put a final end to their long journey as they had again to flee malnutrition and diseases. Basically, they have been living for years on the move, and have been displaced multiple times as a result of both military strategies and wilful neglect of the parties.

Since early April/01, over five thousand ill and malnourished people have had to make a desperate and dangerous journey from Cuemba to the town of Camacupa (also Bie province) in search of humanitarian assistance. Many arrive there in a state where they need to be urgently referred to Kuito (Bie province) for medical treatment in MSF's programmes (for figures, see below). Further North, along the border between Malange and Cuanza Sul provinces, thousands more people are making a similar journey, fleeing from emergency conditions in Mussende to Cangandala, where many need admission to MSF's therapeutic feeding centre (TFC).

[...]

In addition to these statistics, newly arrived IDPs tell consistent stories: they flee Mussende and Cuemba because the living conditions are unbearable. Put simply, there is no (or insufficient) food or medicine, and many people are dying, especially children. Their journeys are difficult and perilous, as they walk for days with no protection (Cuemba to Camacupa - 80 km., Mussende to Cangandala, 100 km.). IDPs arriving in Camacupa routinely recount that others, too weak to make it, died along the long road. These IDPs also tell us that many more people remain behind in Mussende and Cuemba.

*In Mussende, lots of people are dying of sickness, vomiting, diarrhoea, and swelling . . . I was sick and had no family. I could not go to the lavras [fields] because UNITA had laid new mines to stop the people from returning to the fields to collect food. My niece had her leg blown off from a mine . . . while trying to collect food. – 41 year old IDP from Mussende.*

MSF is worried that these cases are not isolated, but the emerging tip of a humanitarian crisis in many Angolan localities which are beyond the tight security perimeters that limit the reach of international humanitarian aid, and sometimes the civilian government itself. Cuemba, Camacupa and Mussende are seemingly just a few dramatic examples of what MSF believes is a pattern repeated throughout the war-torn provinces of Angola. Field workers hear (but are unable to verify) reports from IDPs that similar suffering exists in other areas under government control yet beyond our access (e.g., Massango, in Malange province, and Luando, in Bie)."

(MSF 2 July 2001)

***And earlier (excerpt taken from Andrade study of IDPs conducted in 1996/1997):***

"The research showed that most displaced people have moved not once, but at least twice. These movements of population were at the end of the 1970s (in Benguela), during the 1980s (Malanje), and in 1992/93 (both provinces). Before the last move, many displaced people had returned to their 'original homes' during the period of relative stability that followed the Bicesse Accord (1991). Then, after armed conflict restarted, they were forced to flee for a second time (or, in some cases, a third time), in worse conditions than before. (Andrade 2001, p. 119)

### **Initially, people flee in large groups; later, they break off into nuclear families (2001)**

- People generally fled on foot and suffered from hunger during course of journey
- Initially, people formed large groups which provided solidarity and mutual support
- Later, they split off in order to travel faster and avoid attack

***Excerpt taken from Andrade study of IDPs in Malanje and Benguela conducted in 1996-1997:***

"Only a few people fled in vehicles. Most fled on foot, carrying very little. Journeys could take several days and there were often attacks.

Hunger was frequently mentioned, as a cause of death and as creating severe difficulties when fleeing through not having enough energy to continue. Alternative foods were used, and this in turn led to unknown illnesses, which even traditional medical knowledge was unable to combat. Such events were most dramatic during the siege of Malanje. Men and women of all ages said unanimously that women were more resistant to these hardships than men. Some women ended up helping men.

While children suffered from the cold and rain, it was women of all ages who stressed the problem of partial or complete nakedness. Nudity is seen to be an exhibition of the woman's 'core' to everybody's view, and is considered a violation. It was some time into the research before we understood that women use the term 'to abuse' to mean anything from removal of clothing to rape.

Taking away young women to be the wives of soldiers is seen as improper, mutilating, and morally wrong. Older people in particular grieved because the rituals were not respected, and there was no consideration or dignity.

At a certain point the displaced people, particularly those who fled under fire, had to make difficult choices about maintaining the composition of the groups. Initially, they tended to form large groups, which

provided solidarity and mutual support to deal with the difficulties. As the walk continued the circumstances changed – big groups were more vulnerable to attack because their pace was slower. Therefore many small groups (frequently just one nuclear family) split off and travelled faster; but the potential for solidarity and mutual support was diminished." (Andrade 2001, sect. 4)

*For a comprehensive analysis of the coping strategies employed by IDPs, refer to Filomena Andrade's analysis in Construction and Reconstruction in Angola available from Development Workshop - Angola.*

### **IDPs in larger peri-urban environments do not necessarily retain ties with host communities (2001)**

- IDPs in camps and smaller neighborhoods often retain ties with resident communities
- Other IDPs, particularly those in urban centres, split away in order to survive
- Community ties often break down during period of displacement, particularly in bigger towns and cities
- Level of trust and collective action is low as a result

"In certain camps for displaced people, and perhaps in certain neighbourhoods of displaced people in inland cities, people live in 'communities' i.e. they have organised the camps so that people from the same place live together, they have maintained their old leadership (or perhaps chosen a new one from among themselves), and tend to have moved together to this new location.

But it is very rare to find anything like this in the larger towns and cities (Luanda, Benguela, Lobito, Lubango and Huambo) where the bulk of displaced people are living. There seem to be various reasons for this.

While people may move as a group on the first stage of their flight, successive stages are made in smaller groups.

In towns, people tend to seek out people from their own community to lodge them during an initial period. But they then seek their own home, and the stresses of the period when people stay together in this initial period mean that they do not necessarily want to live afterwards with the people who helped them when they arrived.

While it may have been more common in the past for people to build a house in the town alongside someone from their own community, this is now much less true: urban neighbourhoods are full and it is difficult to find space near to a previous migrant or to build in a group. There is a market in land and housing, and land prices and rents are higher in the old neighbourhoods so poorer, new migrants have to build on the edge of the towns, away from people from their own community.

It is interesting to note that in the camp of Kasseque, near to Huambo, displaced people live grouped according to their place of origin. In the poor neighbourhoods of the town of Huambo itself this is not the case.

People told us that we would find neighbourhoods of people from the same origin, and we looked very hard for this phenomenon but we did not find it.

This has certain implications for life in the towns. People rarely know their neighbours, the level of trust and collective action is low, Churches are one of the few places where people can make friends, develop trust, participate in collective action (though the number of Churches can be a divisive influence as well). Few development initiatives have taken these factors into account." (Robson 30 January 2001)

Also refer to *Construction and Reconstruction in Angola* edited by Paul Robson. The book is available from *Development Workshop - Angola*.

### **Traditional movement of displaced has been from rural areas to provincial urban centres (1999-2001)**

- 50 to 60 percent of Angolan population concentrated in urban centres
- Civilians seek protection from attacks in government-secure zones
- Widespread looting and destruction of property makes life in rural areas difficult
- Lack of access to land makes it difficult for IDPs to gain livelihood

"In areas accessible to humanitarian agencies, IDPs have tended to collect in urban areas that are generally under government control, such as Malange, Kuito and Huambo. This is largely because many of the rural areas are heavily insecure and farming practices are frequently interrupted by security incidents...The urban areas offer some hope of security as well as access to the possibility of humanitarian assistance. However, the obvious lack of access to land in these urban locations limits their opportunities for food production resulting in affected populations becoming heavily reliant on food assistance." (ACC/SCN July 2001, p. 36)

"Large-scale displacement has resulted in rapid urbanisation throughout the country, estimated at 50 per cent (UNDP 1999:47). Cities and towns may be safer than rural areas, but livelihoods are harder to come by in urban zones. The massive migration into urban areas has not been followed by the necessary investments in infrastructure to provide basic sanitation, water, health care and schools." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, p. 19)

"The continuous shift of populations from rural to urban areas has changed the demography of the country from one predominantly rural-based to one in which around 60 percent of the population now live in urban centres. As a result, pressure has increased on the psychosocial and physical status of these urban dwellers. They all must vie in overpopulated conditions for the same meagre resources, much of them coming from the international assistance community, itself circumscribed by a limited capacity to meet growing needs.

[...]

The majority of IDPs are concentrated in the coastal belt and in major urban centres with more than half located in Luanda, Cuando Cubango, Benguela, Huambo and Malange provinces." (UN 30 November 1999, pp. 7, 28)

## PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

### Physical security

---

#### **Human Rights Watch claims that protection needs of Angolan IDPs are not being met (July 2002)**

- HRW reports that displaced in Angola continue to face serious security threats and human rights abuses
- Neither the Angolan government nor the UN is ensuring adequate protection for IDPs as resettlement plans go ahead, claims HRW
- HRW promotes idea of UNHCR as lead agency for protection of IDPs in Angola, while criticising OCHA's role in this domain

"During the first two months of 2002, about 98,000 displaced persons were newly registered by United Nations (U.N.) and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies in Angola. Since February, new arrivals have averaged some 30,000 people a month. These people are no longer fleeing the war, but are trying to escape starvation and find assistance where it is provided. At least half of these people require immediate medical care and food provision. Of the 1.4 million displaced people that were already receiving humanitarian assistance, more than 400,000 are living in more than one hundred camps and transit centers. Many of these facilities have very poor conditions. The displaced also continue to face serious security threats, including harassment by government forces, restrictions on free movement, and possible forced return to areas where they would be at risk of political persecution and human rights abuses.

The government and U.N. agencies are currently developing plans to resettle the internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their areas of origin. The operation, due to start in July, is expected to move 500,000 people by the end of this year. Human Rights Watch is deeply concerned, however, that human rights considerations are being marginalized within these plans, and that neither the government nor any U.N. agency is taking responsibility for implementing an effective protection system for the displaced as the resettlement plans go forward—including ensuring that nobody is forced to move against their will. Given the past protection problems faced by IDPs in Angola, among them those housed in government-approved camps, this is a serious omission.

[...]

Within the U.N., the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has been responsible since mid-2001 for coordinating U.N. initiatives in relation to the protection of the internally displaced. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), though it has only a limited mandate in relation to IDPs and a very small presence in Angola, has also played an important role in focusing attention on protection issues. However, following the failure of major donors to renew funding, UNHCR's program for IDPs in Angola is currently scheduled to close in 2002. OCHA is also reviewing its work with the internally displaced; Human Rights Watch has learned that there is even a possibility that it too may withdraw from protection work. Even as it is, the latest draft of the U.N. inter-agency 'protection strategy for IDPs and returnees' only provides for human rights issues to be taken up with the government authorities in the case of harassment of humanitarian personnel and looting of humanitarian assets. In case of forced resettlement or harassment of returnees and others, the strategy focuses on monitoring and sensitisation, the promotion of community-based protection initiatives, and the development of referral systems for victims rather than direct intervention with government authorities regarding the protection of IDPs. This is seriously inadequate and should be changed.

Human Rights Watch has been critical of OCHA's protection role with IDPs in Angola. The agency is overstretched with other responsibilities and lacks experience in protection work. [...] We also believe that as the international agency mandated to protect refugees, UNHCR has greater expertise and experience in providing protection to forcibly displaced people. As such, UNHCR would appear in principle to be the most appropriate agency to lead protection work among the internally displaced in Angola." (HRW, 3 July 2002)

### **Greater emphasis given to protection in 2001 than in the past (April-May 2001)**

- Greater emphasis on protection by international agencies
- Protection workshops being held in provinces to establish practical frameworks for protection at local level

"Humanitarian principles and human rights remain a major preoccupation. Evidence continues to mount that populations, including women and children, are suffering from extended periods of forced portage and other gross violations in rebel areas. An increasing number of these populations, the overwhelming majority of whom are in extreme distress, are seeking safety and assistance. Forced displacement, looting, physical assaults and forced recruitment are continuing and are concentrated in areas where armed combatants do not receive adequate logistics support." (OCHA 22 May 2001, Humanitarian context)

"The intensification of guerrilla and counter-insurgency warfare has led to a notable increase in protection violations including forced displacement, looting and physical assaults. As a result of this increase and to ensure a successful integrated approach, greater emphasis is being given to protection issues than originally indicated in the Appeal. Workshops led by joint teams of Government and UN trainers have been held in six provinces during the first three months and will be convened in all 18 provinces by the end of June. The aim of the workshops is to develop Provincial Protection Plans that establish practical frameworks for addressing protection issues at the provincial level. Partners are working closely together to develop other initiatives in information gathering, capacity-building and community mobilisation that will be implemented as a matter of priority during upcoming quarters." (OCHA 30 April 2001)

### **Physical security of internally displaced persons threatened by UNITA, government forces, and local authorities (2000-2001)**

- Theft of food and non-food items by both UNITA and government forces reportedly common
- Populations suffering from forced portage and other gross violations in UNITA-held areas
- Displaced report that UNITA murders villagers with machetes
- IDPS sometimes expected to hand over portion of assistance to local authorities
- Populations formerly under rebel-control are targeted most commonly

#### ***General:***

"Humanitarian principles and human rights remain a major preoccupation. Evidence continues to mount that populations, including women and children, are suffering from extended periods of forced portage and other gross violations in rebel areas. An increasing number of these populations, the overwhelming majority of whom are in extreme distress, are seeking safety and assistance. Forced displacement, looting, physical assaults and forced recruitment are continuing and are concentrated in areas where armed combatants do not receive adequate logistics support." (OCHA 22 May 2001, Humanitarian context)

"29. The [UN Inter-Agency] rapid assessment [of April 2000] found that the most widely observed protection problems concerned the delivery of humanitarian assistance and freedom of movement....Theft

of food and non-food items by combatants was common, particularly in areas where troops were not regularly paid. Other reports suggest that extortion and theft by government troops had on occasion involved or resulted in forced displacement. Harassment by armed troops appeared to be targeted towards populations from areas formerly under UNITA control, for example Andulo, Bailundo and Malanje. There were reports that displaced persons who had ventured past the security perimeters of towns to collect food or firewood had been beaten and robbed by armed UNITA groups or bandits, or had fallen victim to landmines. There were also reports of forced recruitment of displaced persons, including of children, by both sides." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 29)

"The UN pointed to dangers that stalked displaced families even after they reached supposed safe havens. 'Displaced populations have been prevented from entering the provincial capitals of Huambo, Malanje, and Kuito and, in several cases, have been involuntarily resettled in the outskirts of these cities,' the report stated. 'In certain areas, displaced persons are forced to pay bribes to local or traditional authorities in order to be included on distribution lists. Displaced persons are sometimes expected to hand over a portion of their assistance to local or traditional authorities...Theft by combatants is common, particularly in areas where troops are not regularly paid,' it added." (USCR August 2000)

"In certain areas, displaced persons are forced to pay bribes to local or traditional authorities in order to be included on distribution lists. Displaced persons are sometimes expected to hand-over a portion of their assistance to local or traditional authorities. The assessment confirms that misappropriation by combatants is common, particularly in areas where troops are not regularly paid. Populations formerly under rebel-control, for example in Andulo, Bailundo and Malanje, are targeted most frequently. (OCHA 15 April 2000, pp.14-15)

### **UN Senior Network mission notes that protection needs of internally displaced go largely unaddressed (March 2001)**

- More focused and active approach required to address protection needs of IDPs
- Responsibility for protection lies with GoA
- Still, mission noted progress of international humanitarian actors in appointing protection focal points at the provincial levels

"The Mission recognised that, notwithstanding the efforts of the ICRC and other actors, many protection needs of the displaced go largely unaddressed. Primary responsibility for protecting displaced civilians rests with the GoA, including through the respect of human rights and international humanitarian law. A step forward in this regard has been the promulgation of Norms on the Resettlement of displaced populations, based on the Guiding Principles, as well as the development of provincial protection plans, also based on the Guiding Principles. The GoA, in collaboration with the UN and other humanitarian agencies, is currently overseeing the elaboration of operating procedures for these Norms.

The Mission noted that, while both GoA and agencies have made some progress in implementing the recommendations stemming from the visit of the RSG on IDPs, a more focused and active approach to protection is required by the Government including with regard to the prevention of arbitrary displacement. The lack of capacity and commitment on the part of the GoA to ensure the protection of IDPs is also reflected in and compounded by the weakness of the justice system and the rule of law.

The Mission noted the attention given to and the progress made by the international humanitarian community in the development of a comprehensive protection strategy, based on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. As an exceptional and immediate measure, the HC/RC will designate a focal point in each province for protection monitoring and, as appropriate, intervention at the provincial level. An inter agency group will determine appropriate advocacy at the national level. As part of an

integrated strategy, the Human Rights Division of the UN Office in Angola (HRD/UNOA) envisages expanding its presence and activities in the areas of advocacy, capacity building and community empowerment at the provincial level and should be supported to do so." (OCHA 23 March 2001, Protection)

## **Freedom of Movement**

---

### **Alarming situation of landmines throughout the country threatens safety of displaced persons seeking to move about and to resettle (2000-2002)**

- Angola most mined country in the world
- Independent groups put the number of landmines between eight and 15 million, covering approximately 40 percent of the countryside
- Government of Angola says number is five to eight million
- Return, resettlement and agricultural production are obstructed by danger of landmines
- Absence of systematic approach to mine clearance in country is extremely worrying

"An international demining agency on Tuesday called on donors to coordinate their funding for mine action in Angola with their aid for other emergency activities.

The British-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) said that as word spread across the country's 18 provinces that the war had finally ended, people had spontaneously moved back to their homes and found new areas to resettle in.

'The situation at the moment is very fluid. We are concerned about reports that groups of IDPs (internally displaced persons) are already on the move throughout the country. Some of the areas chosen for resettlement are still littered with anti-personnel landmines,' MAG's Africa coordinator, David Greenhalgh told IRIN.

Although the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) is expected to organise repatriation of Angolans from across the sub-region early next year, already an estimated 9,000 refugees from camps in northern and western Zambia have crossed back into Angola since the 4 April ceasefire.

In Moxico province, probably the most heavily-mined area of Angola today, MAG works closely with the Lutheran World Federation (LWF).

'Moxico has been identified for mine action due to the fact it was also one of the last areas to suffer conflict earlier this year. Also it has a large number of IDPs and its border towns will be points of entry for many refugees from Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo,' Greenhalgh said.

He added that close to 80,000 people are expected to spontaneously repatriate to the province before the end of the year.

In the southern province of Cunene, MAG had already widened paths through minefields and erected minefield warning signs. Part of the demining process included targeting community liaison groups with detailed messages.

Said Greenhalgh: 'Mine awareness messages should be focused on how to travel through unfamiliar areas safely, rather than 'mines are dangerous, do not step on them'. People need correct information. One of our



biggest challenges is how to let people know which areas are safe and which are unsafe. At times people will occupy an area because of economic hardship."(IRIN, 30 July 2002)

"At least seven provinces, accounting for approximately 40 percent of the countryside, are heavily mined. In addition, active fields encircle the provincial capitals of Huambo, Bié, Luena, and Malanje and new mines continue to be laid, particularly along logistics corridors. Widespread mine infestation is a major obstacle limiting agricultural production and the free movement of people and goods. The presence of mines also impedes resettlement and return and puts thousands of Angolans at risk of grave injury or death. During the first eight months of the year, 385 mine incidents were reported in 15 provinces, up from the same period a year ago. A large percentage of landmine casualties continue to be women and children, who often fall victim while farming, searching for wood, or travelling by road." (UN November 2001)

"The [UN] Representative [on Internally Displaced Persons] was seriously concerned at the landmine situation throughout the country which, in addition to posing an obvious danger to displaced and resident populations, gives rise to problems regarding access to displaced populations by international agencies and NGOs, as well as access of the internally displaced to land for resettlement and agricultural activities.

[...]

108. As well as increasing the dangers to the displaced and the population at large and posing problems for the future development of agricultural production throughout the country, the continued use of landmines is compounded by the absence of a systematic approach to mine action which needs to be addressed urgently. Part of the problem to date has been dispute over the role of INAROOEE, which was established within MINARS to accommodate the preference of donors to fund civilian rather than military mine action..." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 105, 108)

"According to the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Land mines and Unexploded Ordnance (INAROOEE), there are an estimated six to seven million land mines scattered throughout the country. The provincial capitals of Huambo and Bié, as well as many locations in Benguela, Malanje, Moxico and Uige have the highest levels of landmine contamination. In a sixteen-month period between mid 1998 and January 2000, 1,117 Angolans fell victim to land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The majority of incidents affect civilians, many of whom are women and children, travelling by road, farming or search for wood. Mines laid during previous wars have caused an estimated three-quarters of recent accidents." (UN November 2000, p. 16)

"Incidents of mine accidents and other war-related wounds indicate that civilian populations outside of city centers continue to be affected by the ongoing conflict. In Kuito's hospital, MSF's surgical program conducted over 23 mine-related amputations in the first three months of 2000. This number reflects an increase in such injuries. In all of 1999, the total figure of amputations at the same hospital was 35; there were only 13 in 1998." (MSF 26 July 2000)

"Agencies estimate there are seven million landmines and at least ten times this number of unexploded ordnance (UXO), causing numerous injuries and preventing access to farming and grazing land." (OCHA 17 July 2000, sect. B)

### **Some displaced persons involuntarily resettled in unsafe areas (2000-2001)**

- Displaced persons have been moved near military camps or to other unsafe areas
- Resettlement schemes planned against will of displaced persons and implemented without proper planning
- GoA attempted to justify moves by the need to free up facilities where displaced had settled
- Displaced populations from the central highlands often treated as "subversives"

"31. The [UN Inter-Agency] assessment [of April 2000] found that displaced populations had been prevented from entering the provincial capitals of Huambo, Malanje and Kuito and, in several cases, were involuntarily resettled in the outskirts of these cities. In Cambondo, approximately 800 displaced persons were transferred in January [2000] to a site near a local military camp and in Luena, local authorities had established a resettlement site in an area with mines. Similar concerns were noted by the inter-agency mission of March [2000], which reported that in various instances the Government had forcibly relocated displaced populations, usually to areas outside the national or provincial capital security perimeter. In most cases, such movements were implemented without planning or coordination and imposed on both the displaced and the humanitarian community, resulting in human suffering. The Government justified these moves by the need to free up the facilities where the displaced had settled, i.e., factories or military camps. However, the relocation is regarded by many as part of the Government's attempt to consolidate its presence and control in newly liberated areas. The inter-agency mission was informed of cases of forced return where the Government had 'strongly encouraged' the displaced population to regain their areas of origin, without ensuring adequate safety and living conditions. In some cases, the areas of return were attacked and the displaced forced to flee once more." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 31)

"Authorities in certain provincial capitals fear infiltration by UNITA elements and try to concentrate the newly displaced in separate locations in order to segregate them from the general population. There is also a general perception in coastal areas and urban centers that the population from the rural hinterland are "anarchistic elements that need to be controlled"... Consequently, the displaced tend to be treated as second-class citizens.

In Huambo, provincial capital of the heartland of the conflict, IDPs arriving since a year are maintained in 'concentration centres' under unacceptable conditions. In Benguela, authorities are pursuing resettlement schemes against the resistance of the displaced and without adequate planning (no land entitlements, lack of water and health infrastructures, etc.). Such examples illustrate, again, that the protection needs of IDPs will increase as authorities make additional efforts to reaffirm governmental control in the new phase of the conflict." (OCHA January 2000)

"Some displaced populations have been resettled in the peripheries of provincial capitals such as Huambo, Malanje and Kuito and, in several cases, have been involuntarily resettled in the outskirts of these cities. In Cambondo, approximately 800 displaced persons were transferred in January to a site near a local military camp. In Luena, local authorities have established a resettlement site, Sangondo, in an unsafe area that has not been completely demined." (OCHA 15 April 2000, pp.14-15)

### **UNITA reportedly requires a permit for travel in all areas under its control (2000)**

"Freedom of movement continued to be denied in all areas controlled by UNITA. A permit for travel even to the next village was demanded by those in command. In the central highlands, UNITA was also responsible for forced displacement as it lost or captured territory, and its forces continued to loot and destroy private property." (HRW December 2000, Human Rights Developments)

## **Vulnerable populations**

---

### **Women and children at risk of rape, sexual assault, forced prostitution and military recruitment (1999-2001)**

- Young women raped, sexually assaulted, and forced into marriages or prostitution

- Some 300,000 children are estimated to have been forced into combat by rebel and government forces
- UNICEF estimates that some 300,000 children are without parents in Angola; one million children have no access to education or health care

"While the breakdown of government infrastructure and social structures have led to millions of children suffering, it is estimated that at least 300,000 children have been forced into combat in Angola by rebel and government armed forces. Those who have survived say they are used to flight, to work in military camps, transport heavy loads on their backs as soldiers, move location and also as sex slaves.

According to UNICEF's Lidia Borba, who works in child protection services, about 1 million Angolan children have lost one parent in the war and almost 300,000 have lost both parents. In addition, more than 1 million children across the country are believed to have no access at all to education and health facilities. 'In general,' she told IRIN, 'all children are direct or indirect victims of this war. Not a single family has not been affected.' (IRIN-SA 14 June 2001, The war generation)

"30. The assessment found that internally displaced women, particularly those living near military encampments were subject to sexual harassment and some had been forced into prostitution in order to procure basic necessities. There were also reports of women and girls abducted from camps for the displaced by UNITA. In addition, there are large numbers of unaccompanied and orphaned children among the displaced. The assessment notes that although many of these children have been integrated into kinship networks or community structures, many of their needs are not met. Unaccompanied children are vulnerable to forced recruitment and abuse. Furthermore, the poverty, disease, domestic violence and child abuse associated with displacement prompt many children to leave their homes voluntarily. In so doing, they become increasingly vulnerable to disease and abuse." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 30)

"Among these IDPs, an estimated one million are children. They are the most disadvantaged, and the ones most adversely affected by the conflict. They have little access to the poorly-run social institutions that provide health and education, as well as food, and they are the ones most at risk of disease. They are vulnerable to a number of varying forms of abuse, such as beatings and sexual abuse, and are also under the threat of being enrolled to serve in varying functions as child soldiers." (UNICEF 2001, Country Background)

### **Abductions of children occur with regularity in conflict in Angola (October 2001)**

- Most recent case involves some 16 children in Kwanza Norte province
- Over sixty children abducted in Caxito during raid on village in May 2001
- Children are abducted for recruitment in armed forces, sexual abuse and forms of forced labour

#### ***Kidnapping in May in Caxito, 60km north of Luanda:***

"Straight after the attack on Caxito, one group of fifty UNITA soldiers attacked an orphan's home run by the Danish agency Development Aid from People to People (ADPP). The rebels sacked the orphanage, and took 60 children hostage, along with a teacher. Two teachers are reported to have been killed...

[...]

The children were freed on 25 May, but there are conflicting versions of events. UNITA issued a statement claiming that it had released over 60 orphans to a Catholic priest, Father Antonio Joaquim Ribeiro in Ambaca (over 150km from Caxito). However, the Angolan army statement claims that the children were freed after its troops surrounded the UNITA fighters at Ambaca." (Action for Southern Africa 7 June 2001)

#### ***Abduction in October in Kwanza Norte:***

"UNICEF Angola and the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Angola were shocked and concerned by the recent declaration from the Catholic Bishop of Kwanza Norte on the abduction of 16 children and their relatives during a religious service in the village of Kiluange in the Municipality of Golungo Alto, Kwanza Norte.

[...]

UNICEF and the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator call for their immediate release and strongly condemn all violations of children's rights in Angola. This is not the first time that children have been abducted: similar abductions have occurred throughout Angola's prolonged conflict in various parts of the country. The majority of these children have not been heard from since.

The motivation for these abductions is not always clear, but children abducted in conflict countries are often used by armed groups to carry goods and ammunition and to cook and clean. In the worst case, children, particularly young girls, may be sexually abused and both girls and boys may be used in combat or as a defensive shield." (UNICEF 16 October 2001)

## **SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)**

### **General**

---

#### **Basic needs of the majority of IDP communities and resident populations are not being met (February 2002)**

"Agencies estimate that only 25 percent of the basic needs of vulnerable populations, including both resident and displaced communities, are currently being met.

Acute malnutrition exists in at least eight locations, including Caconda, Cruzeiro, Cuemba, Cusse, Lau, Luena, Mussende and Sambo Samboto, and is probably present in a further three to four.

According to the Executive Committee of the Inter-Ministerial Commission, the Angolan Armed Forces and OCHA, critical needs are suspected in 60 locations in 11 provinces. Of these, 53 cannot be reached by international agencies." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

#### **Populations on the move in interior regions are in "appalling" condition (November 2001)**

- Tens of thousands of newly displaced persons are thought to be on the brink of starvation
- Up to 500,000 people living in areas inaccessible to international agencies are estimated to be in need - with more than 200,000 believed to be in acute distress

"Possibly the most vulnerable populations in Angola are the increasingly large numbers of families who are on the move in interior regions. Tens of thousands of newly displaced persons are estimated to be foraging for food in the bush. Credible reports indicate that the condition of these populations is appalling and that many are probably on the brink of starvation. Widows, separated children and persons with physical disabilities are highly vulnerable throughout the country, but face serious dangers during displacement. Many are unable to reach safe havens and remain abandoned in insecure areas, at constant risk of attack and abduction. In addition to these groups, about which little is known, as many as 500,000 people living in areas inaccessible to international organisations are estimated to be in need. At least 20 locations, with a combined total of more than 200,000 people, are believed to have populations in acute distress. Information on the condition of these groups is provided by newly displaced, church networks and military personnel. Reliable reports in early October indicated that populations in four to five inaccessible locations were in catastrophic condition and that at least one quarter of children in these areas were at mortal risk." (UN November 2001)

#### **Warring parties are guilty of near-total neglect of populations in need, charges MSF (July 2001)**

- Forced displacement by both parties to the conflict drives civilians to restricted areas, where the authorities then fail to provide food or health care, resulting in very high levels of malnutrition and mortality

"The warring parties to the Angolan civil war are turning blind eyes to the obvious, serious, and often acute humanitarian needs of the Angolan people. Both the Government and the UNITA rebel movement are guilty of this negligence. The medical and nutritional emergencies that MSF encounters due to its projects in the field are not just a logic consequence of the ongoing war. To a large extent they are caused by the near-total neglect towards populations, the disrespect of international humanitarian law, and the military strategies of the parties to the conflict.

The underlying causes for the emergencies include:

The near absence of governmental response to emergencies in areas under its control, resulting in very high levels of malnutrition and mortality.

Forced displacement caused by military strategies applied by both parties, which drive large populations from their land and then pin them down in restricted areas, where the authorities then fail to provide food or health care.

The inaccessibility, due to insecurity and the incapacity to negotiate, with both parties, access for humanitarian assistance, of some areas of major concern for international humanitarian organizations." (MSF 2 July 2001)

### **Statistics on the status of children (2001-2002)**

- In 2001, UNICEF and local partner carry out first nationwide survey in five years
- Results reveal 'catastrophic' situation among Angolan women and children

"Throughout 2001, UNICEF has been supporting the Angolan National Institute of Statistics (INE) in conducting a Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), the first nation-wide survey conducted in Angola since 1996. Although carried out in accessible areas only, recently released survey results are striking and reveal a catastrophic situation among Angolan children and women. The under-five mortality rate is 250 per 1,000 live births, with wide geographical disparities from 192 to 315, meaning that every year over 155,000 children under five years of age die. This translates into 18 children dying every hour. The MICS also found that 45.2% of children suffer from stunting, illustrating the long-term negative effect of the conflict on the healthy growth of children. Immunization coverage remains very low with only 26.6% of 1-year-old children fully immunized against measles, polio, BCG, and DPT. The MICS also indicates that among children 0 to 14 years of age, there are some 750,000 orphans of either one or both parents that are being cared for in households. One of the most worrying findings of the MICS is the very low level of knowledge about HIV/AIDS, with only 8% of women having sufficient knowledge of HIV prevention and transmission." (UNICEF, 29 May 2002)

"Thirty percent of all children die before reaching the age of five. The under-five mortality rate is the second highest in the world, with one child dying every three minutes, corresponding to 20 per hour and 480 per day.

Forty percent of the children who do survive, die before 40.

Nineteen percent of children are born with a low birth-weight, 53 percent are stunted and 42 percent are severely underweight.

An estimated 100,000 children have been separated from their families as a result of war.

Credible evidence indicates that child soldiers are being forced to fight." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

## Food and Nutrition

---

### **MSF warns of a severely malnourished 'dying population' in newly accessible areas of Angola (April 2002)**

- MSF finds thousands of sick and starving people in some 30 'grey zones' which had for years been inaccessible to humanitarian organizations
- Mortality and malnutrition levels are well above emergency thresholds in areas accessed
- In Northern Huambo province, the global malnutrition rate is 18 percent, and is the main cause of death
- International aid is slow to arrive in newly accessible areas

"Over the last few weeks, teams from the international medical aid agency Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have come across thousands of starving and sick people, who have been stuck in those regions of Angola to which humanitarian access has been denied for many years. Thousand of civilians have been trapped in some 30 of these so-called 'grey zones', without any assistance from relief agencies or the UN.

These people have been caught up in a series of fierce wars, and many have been forced from their homes, often because their villages and homes have been destroyed. The mines, attacks and retaliations have prevented them from cultivating their crops, leaving the population destitute and extremely vulnerable.

The consequences are dramatic. Thanks to the cease-fire which has recently been agreed between government forces and UNITA, MSF teams have finally been able to access areas previously closed to us. One team assessed the situation in Bunjei, an area situated 116 km from Caala in the south of the country (Huila Province). They found extremely high mortality rates there.

Thierry Allfort-Duverger led the assessment team: 'We counted 14 deaths per day over a population of around 14,000 in Bunjei. We found more than 1,050 freshly dug graves. Bunjei is a ghost town where displaced and destitute people have been settling since last September.'

Malnutrition levels in Bunjei were found to be well above the emergency threshold. 30% of the children examined were severely malnourished and have had to be admitted to emergency therapeutic feeding centres. MSF has also opened a nutritional centre for children suffering from moderate malnutrition and has started distributing food and drinking water to 3,500 children below the age of 10. In addition, there are 900 severely malnourished children in the emergency feeding centre in Caala city.

A second MSF assessment showed an equally alarming situation in Chilembó, south of Huambo. A basic nutritional survey of 1,219 children showed that 42% of them are malnourished with 10% suffering from severe malnutrition. An emergency therapeutic feeding centre and a 'soup kitchen' are being set up for the 6,000 uprooted people in the area.

The levels of malnutrition in these two areas are extremely worrying and require an urgent general food distribution. MSF is continuing its assessments of the newly-accessible areas and is very concerned that the situation may be equally bad elsewhere. If this is the case, significant humanitarian assistance will be required. MSF itself has tripled the size of its teams in Angola to cope with the need and has set up an air bridge to bring in the necessary supplies." (MSF, 24 April 2002)

"A nutritional survey done by Epicentre among 15,000 people in Chiteta in Northern Huambo province of Angola between 10 and 14 June confirms a serious nutritional crisis. 700 severely malnourished children are being treated in MSF's Therapeutic Feeding Centre in Bailundo.

One in six children is malnourished, and malnutrition is the main cause of death in this region. The rate of global malnutrition is 18%, and the severe malnutrition rate of 5% among children-under-5. Yet there is still no guarantee that enough food is being distributed to this population.

This is just the latest indication of the scale of the emergency in Angola, where international relief has barely started to reach hundreds of thousands of people who were deprived of it during the civil war that ended in April.

The survey showed that the overall mortality rate for the first 6 months of this year (January 1 - June 12th 2002) was 2.3/per 10 000/ per day. This is four times the normal crude mortality rate, and twice the level that signifies an emergency.

Three-quarters of deaths were children under five years old. Overall mortality rates among children under 5 was of 5,7/10 000 per day: 2.5 times the emergency threshold, and five times the normal mortality rate for children under 5.

Last month MSF opened a therapeutic feeding centre in Bailundo, in northern Huambo province; this feeding centre is also assisting malnourished people gathered in Chiteta, who are taken to Bailundo by MSF mobile medical teams. More than 700 severely malnourished children are currently being treated by in Bailundo therapeutic feeding centre." (MSF, 27 June 2002)

[Click here](#) for MSF map showing malnutrition levels in various provinces of Angola (6 May 2002)

### **Locations with high concentrations of newly arrived IDPs show alarming levels of malnutrition (April 2002)**

- Assessments in seven provinces in April 2002 all show very high levels of malnutrition, particularly in locations with influxes of IDPs
- One rapid screening of under-fives in Chipindo, Huila province, revealed a severe malnutrition rate of 64 percent
- Therapeutic and supplementary feeding centres are overcrowded and under-resourced

"High levels of malnutrition were reported in a number of locations during April, particularly in areas where large numbers of malnourished IDPs continued to arrive. In hard-hit locations, including Camacupa, Caála, Luena and Negage, the capacity of feeding centres was severely strained. The Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs indicated that several locations, including Bunjei, Sanza Pombo, Chilembo and Chipindo, urgently require food assistance to malnourished populations.

In Bié Province, an assessment mission to Chitembo revealed global and severe malnutrition rates of 25.9 and 8.5 percent, respectively. More than 45 malnourished children were transported and admitted to the feeding centres in Kuito. In Cuemba, global and severe malnutrition rates of 22 and 6 percent, respectively, were found. A screening of new IDPs in Kuito indicated global malnutrition rates of 4.9 percent and 7.1 percent for adults and children, respectively. In Camacupa, the capacity of feeding centres was expanded from 400 to 650 persons to respond to the continual arrival of displaced persons in the municipality.

In Huambo Province, a nutritional survey of 900 children in Ekunha indicated a global and severe malnutrition rates of 8.9 and 1.4 percent, respectively. During the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs in Katchiungo, Tchicala Tcholohanga and Londuimbali, the results of mid - to upper-arm circumference (MUAC) screenings indicated a high proportion of severely malnourished children. A general food distribution in Tchilembo began as a result of the serious nutritional situation during recent months.



In Huíla Province, inter-agency teams confirmed that health and nutritional conditions among the 14,000 persons in Bunjei are critical. A rapid nutritional screening indicated global and severe malnutrition rates of 26 and nine percent, respectively. Registration for an emergency general food distribution was carried out in Bunjei to address the nutritional situation of more than 9,000 people. Severely malnourished children from Bunjei continue to be referred to feeding centres in Caála. A critical nutritional situation was also found during the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs in Chipindo. A rapid screening indicated a severe malnutrition rate of 64 percent among children under five. More than 80 percent of the population, including adults, elderly and pregnant women, is moderately malnourished.

In Kuando Kubango Province, 74 malnourished individuals were transported from the Soba Matias quartering area to the therapeutic feeding centre (TFC) in Menongue.

In Kuanza Norte Province, preliminary results from a nutritional screening during the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs in Samba Caju indicated a serious nutritional situation for more than 760 newly arrived IDPs, with moderate and severe malnutrition reported as 10 and 7.9 percent, respectively. The assessment team reported ten percent moderate malnutrition in Camabatela.

In Malanje Province, attendance at therapeutic feeding centres increased as a result of the arrival of new displaced persons in poor nutritional condition. TFCs remain over-crowded, despite the construction of two new centres in Malanje town.

In Moxico Province, overall attendance at the supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres increased by more than 70 percent. During the second and third week of April, the number of patients admitted to the TFCs increased from 248 to 305, with an average of 87 new admissions per week. As a result of overcrowded conditions in the existing TFC, new patients were admitted to a new centre still under construction. During the last two weeks of April, approximately 90 percent of the children receiving therapeutic feeding were displaced and humanitarian partners remain concerned about increasing cases of malnutrition among new arrivals.

In Uíge Province, nutritional screenings during the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs in Sanza Pombo indicated emergency levels of malnutrition. Among newly displaced populations, global and severe malnutrition rates were recorded at 77 and 56.5 percent, respectively. Resident populations appear to be more stable, with severe and moderate malnutrition rates of 3.5 and 7.5 percent, respectively. Humanitarian partners are making plans to urgently distribute food assistance. Partners reported that the nutritional situation at the Uíge SFC has gradually improved during the past few months. In Negage, the capacity of the SFC continues to be strained, primarily due to influxes of malnourished persons from Sanza Pombo." (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002)

### **Displacement remains one of the primary causes of food insecurity (November 2001)**

- One tenth of all Angolans rely on external food assistance
- The majority of displaced populations do not have access to sufficient quantities of quality agricultural land

"One tenth of all Angolans depend on external food assistance to survive and an estimated 30 percent of the population is expected to experience food insecurity and hunger during the coming year. Instability, displacement, failed harvests and dysfunctional market systems remain the primary causes of food insecurity. In addition, limitations on the free movement of personnel and goods continue to raise the costs of basic commodities and reduce the amount of food available for sale. The situation is most acute in locations where persistent insecurity undermines livelihood strategies and where coping strategies are under severe stress or have collapsed.

Although efforts have been made to promote self-reliance, the majority of displaced populations still do not have access to sufficient quantities of quality agricultural land. In addition, adverse climatic conditions in 2001, including late rains and irregular or excessive rainfall, reduced overall productivity in some areas. Poor soil fertility lowered yields of key crops including maize, beans, peanuts, millet and sorghum. As a result, post-harvest food stocks are insufficient to meet requirements until the next harvest and large numbers of families in hard-hit areas have already been forced to reduce consumption to one meal per day." (UN November 2001)

### **Recurrent pellagra epidemic in Kuito (2001)**

- Pellagra is a disease caused by poor diet, that contributes to death from other illnesses
- The population of Kuito is in nutritional crisis, with a continued high mortality rate for over three years

"Pellagra is a disease caused by consumption of a diet of low quality. There are no other causal factors involved except dietary deficiency of niacin, pyridoxine, riboflavin and tryptophan. For the past three years, there has been an annual epidemic of pellagra in the Kuito area of Angola.

The prevalence of pellagra is about 10% in the IDP camps around Kuito and about 30% in Camacupa. There do not appear to be substantial numbers of people with niacin deficient diarrhoea or nervous system complaints without skin lesions in Kuito, although the signs are more advanced in Camacupa where diarrhoea seems to be a feature. It is unlikely that the pellagra is a dominant attributable and direct cause of mortality, although it almost certainly contributes to mortality ascribed to other illnesses.

The pellagra patients are of normal weight or are overweight. This is because the nutrients involved give rise to a type I deficiency which is not associated with loss of body weight (wasting) rather than a type II deficiency which is characterised by stunting and wasting.

The population is in nutritional crisis with a continued high mortality rate for over three years; this has recently increased to crisis proportions. Although nutritional deficiencies underlie this mortality it is not reflected in the rate of wasting (global malnutrition rate) as the dominant type of micronutrient deficiency does not directly give rise to wasting: it does, however, cause severe illness including both pellagra and kwashiorkor, immunoincompetence and death; including death, rather than recovery from, infectious disease.

A major proportion of the population is entirely dependent upon humanitarian aid. Almost 60% of the population receives humanitarian aid and over two fifths of all food eaten in the area is flown in by WFP. Without this sustained effort the population would starve.

The widespread deficiencies reached a peak several months after gaps in the WFP pipeline that led to the food actually distributed having a niacin content lower than that known to cause overt clinical pellagra in otherwise healthy experimental subjects. The choice of foodstuffs to fly into Kuito has been increasingly confined to maize cereal. This coincided with the increased mortality, severe malnutrition becoming the major cause of death and kwashiorkor being the dominant form of severe malnutrition. It is critical to take steps to improve the quality of the diet that is eaten in Kuito and surrounding area." (Professor Michael Holden, FANTA project, August 2001)

## **Health**

---

## **High morbidity and mortality rates particularly in areas with influxes of IDPs (April 2002)**

- All locations assessed following April 2002 ceasefire urgently require basic health care assistance
- Main causes of death include water-borne disease, malaria, diarrhoea and measles
- Aid agencies fear increase of tuberculosis patients among IDPs referred to nutritional centres

"Morbidity and mortality rates remained high in most provinces, particularly in areas receiving influxes of IDPs. Initial findings from the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs indicate that all locations assessed urgently require basic health care assistance, including medical supplies, essential medicines, staff and repaired infrastructure.

In Benguela Province, humanitarian partners in Canjala, approximately 90 km north of Lobito, reported an increase in the number of deaths from 3-4 to 7-8 per day, particularly among malnourished IDP children and elderly. The main cause of death is water-borne disease. Provincial authorities and agencies will provide essential medicines and reinforce the two existing community kitchens.

In Bié Province, an assessment conducted in mid April in Chitembo indicated that mortality levels are high, with crude and under five mortality rates recorded at 5.1 deaths per 10,000 persons per day and 5.5 deaths per 10,000 children per day, respectively.<sup>2</sup> Less than 45 percent of the screened children under five have been vaccinated against measles. Health facilities lack basic medical supplies and medicines, personnel and water and sanitation.

In Cunene Province, provincial authorities report that morbidity and mortality rates remain high, with malaria and diarrhoea reported as the primary causes of death. The incidence of measles and meningitis has decreased due to recent vaccination campaigns in the most affected municipalities, including Cuvelai and Namacunde.

In Huambo Province, a survey conducted in Ekunha indicated crude and under five mortality rates of 0.5 deaths per 10,000 persons per day and 1.2 deaths per 10,000 children per day, respectively.<sup>3</sup> The primary causes of death among children include malaria and measles.

In Kuanza Norte Province, preliminary results from the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs indicated a crude mortality rate of 3.8 deaths per 10,000 persons per day among resident and displaced populations in Samba Caju.

In Kuanza Sul Province, humanitarian organisations report that new arrivals from Chimoma and Khimbungo locations are in poor health and nutritional state.

In Lunda Sul Province, IDPs arriving in Saurimo report that at least four persons are dying per day in Xassengue and Cucumbi communes in Cacolo Municipality, due to food insecurity and lack of assistance to soldiers and families moving to quartering areas.

In Moxico Province, mortality rates in Muacanhica and Muachimbo camps remain high, particularly among populations arriving from Lussi, due to the poor health status of new arrivals and insufficient capacity to respond to growing health needs. Humanitarian partners reported 33 deaths in Muacanhica camp during April and a crude mortality rate of 1.45 per 10,000 persons per day. The incidence of malnutrition and skin diseases is high among arrivals from Cangumbe, Bundas and Muangai. In Luena, three suspected cases of tuberculosis have been reported in the therapeutic feeding centre.

Organisations fear an increase of tuberculosis patients among displaced persons referred to nutritional centres and have recommended improved monitoring. Vaccination campaigns reached approximately

102,000 children in the municipality of Moxico, Leua, Camanongue, Cazombo, Lumbala Ngiumbo, Luau and Kuembo (Bié Province)." (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002)

### **WHO finds critical health and nutrition situation in Malange Province (April 2002)**

- Newly arrived populations in Malange in 'very critical' condition, with high incidence of kwashiorkor
- Large numbers of severely malnourished are still expected to arrive in Malange
- WHO reports that malaria and malnutrition are the main causes of death in the province

"Dr Pier Paolo Balladelli reported as very critical the conditions of newly arrived populations to Malange, after the peace agreement between FAA and UNITA was signed on 4 April 2002. Cases of 'Kwashiorkor', a syndrome due to acute malnutrition with bilateral edemas, are reported on a daily basis. The Nutritional Feeding Centre of Malange managed by MSF is now running at full capacity with 45 children assisted at present, the double, if compared to its target of 25 children. Another Centre was implemented by MSF in Cangandala.

'Many people with severe malnutrition – stressed the WHO Representative – are still in the way, coming from the previously held areas by UNITA. People are walking two days to reach Malange town seeking for assistance.'

[...]

Dr Balladelli in the meeting with the Governor, said that still Malaria and malnutrition were the killers number one, but HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, Vaccine Preventable Diseases, Sleeping Sickness and Respiratory diseases are also contributing to the tremendous burden of diseases assessed in the Malange Province. The high Maternal Mortality also needs to be addressed as a matter of priority." (WHO, 17 April 2002)

### **National health system unable to meet the needs of internally displaced persons and other at-risk populations (2001)**

- Health care non-existent or inaccessible for majority of population
- Potential for epidemics in urban areas and IDP camps remains high

"The health situation in Angola continues to worsen. Three decades of violence has destroyed water and sanitation systems throughout the country. Health care services are nonexistent or inaccessible for the majority of the population. IDPs are moving into already overcrowded urban and semi-urban areas without functioning health infrastructures. As a result, the potential for epidemics in urban areas and IDP camps remains high. Malaria, tuberculosis, measles, and diarrheal diseases are among the most common ailments of Angolans. In FY 2000, recurrent epidemics of polio and meningitis were reported. Immunization coverage is generally low in Angola." (USAID 2 April 2001)

"19. The [UN Inter-Agency] assessment [of April 2000] confirmed that the health system in Angola was unable to meet the needs of at-risk populations, including the displaced. None of the hospitals visited during the assessment had sufficient essential medicines. All were found to be understaffed, underfunded and in need of basic equipment. Throughout the country, there were shortages of both general and trained medical personnel and in several locations staff had not received salaries for a number of months. The conditions of hospitals and health posts varied. In some cases, buildings were adequate, while in others,

roofs were in need of repair. More than 50 per cent of the buildings lacked a regular supply of potable water and many had inadequate sanitary facilities.

20. Malaria, diarrhoea, tuberculosis and upper respiratory track infections were reported in the majority of locations visited. Measles and polio were reported in a few locations. Other diseases include meningitis and sleeping sickness. Suspected cases of HIV have been recorded, though it is suggested that this disease is significantly underreported. Tuberculosis and diarrhoea were prevalent in transit centres where severe overcrowding, appalling sanitation and extreme destitution had put the displaced at risk of infection. Skin diseases were also widespread.

21. Vaccinations were incomplete in many locations. Large numbers of children under five had received only one dose of a multi-dose vaccine or none at all. Coverage for children over five was even more limited. In all locations visited, delivery practices were rudimentary. Although problems with birthing are common, there were virtually no delivery or post-delivery facilities in either hospitals or health posts.

22. In some areas with a high concentration of mine victims, for example Andulo, Negage and Maquela do Zombo, the medical services were found to be inadequate. There were no appropriate evacuation methods and local health facilities lacked the necessary blood and surgical equipment to treat mine victims. Prostheses are available at only five centres in the country." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 19-22)

### **Displaced are particularly vulnerable to reproductive health and sexually transmitted diseases (2000-2001)**

- Maternal and infant mortality rates are the worst in Africa
- Internally displaced women at higher risk than others of dying from pregnancy-related causes
- HIV/STDs threaten the health of displaced women and children due to lack of protection and awareness
- International agencies lack the resources to improve the situation of reproductive health

"Angola falls under the category of a chronic emergency, yet even the most basic minimum standards for reproductive health (RH) services are not being met. Even the many NGOs and UN agencies that signed on to the Inter-Agency Field Manual for Reproductive Health in Emergency Situations [WHO, UNFPA, UNHCR] are not coming close to meeting the minimum standards they committed to by signing on to this document. This is due not so much to a lack of interest or concern, but a lack of resources. And in some cases this is due to the pervading attitude of international health agencies that reproductive health services fall outside of emergency lifesaving interventions.

Although the needs are great in both the IDP and local communities, we were told that IDPs did have special needs and considerations. In the four provinces that we visited, health workers said that awareness of reproductive health issues is lower among IDPs than in the local communities. We were also told that IDPs often wait too long to access services. The reasons for this are unclear. We did hear complaints that IDPs were not treated well at certain health facilities, and that they lack faith in the health system. We also heard that some health workers demand payment from patients as a way to supplement meager salaries, and that IDPs are less likely to be able to pay for the services. At some hospital maternities we visited, the IDPs were sleeping on the floor because they did not have sheets to put on the mattresses.

[...]

Angola has one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world, estimated at 1,500 per 100,000 compared to bordering Namibia at 370 per 100,000 and Canada at 5 per 100,000. This should not be surprising since fertility rates are high, use of family planning is low, ante-natal care is not widely

available, and many women do not have access to emergency obstetric services. UNFPA-Angola produced a report in June 1999 titled *The Demographic Profile and the Reproductive Health of the IDPs*. The findings of this report are based on interviews with 1,422 IDPs in Huila, Benguela, Malanje and Zaire provinces. This study reports that the average number of children per woman interviewed was 8.6. The infant mortality rate is 125 per 1,000 in Angola, whereas in Canada, for instance, it is 5.5 per 1,000." (Women's Commission February 2001, p. 8)

"Of serious concern is the growing prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. For example, the number of reported HIV/AIDS cases among pregnant women in Luanda city has increased four-fold in the last ten years from 0.9 percent in 1989 to 3.4 percent in 1999. National data indicates that HIV/AIDS is spreading at an alarming rate, affecting both women and men and jeopardising the rehabilitation of the country. Displaced populations are particularly vulnerable due to the lack of protection and HIV/AIDS awareness, poor health care services and limited opportunities to generate income." (UN November 2000, Humanitarian Context)

"Prevention of HIV/AIDS infection: HIV/AIDS cases are currently estimated as being low in Angola but are increasing due to uncontrolled migrations through borders with neighbouring countries, massive internal displacements and the presence of large groups of soldiers known to engage in risky sexual behaviour. Poverty is also leading to ever-greater numbers of occasional sexual workers. Furthermore, with promiscuity, poor standards of living, constant migration of husbands in the neighbouring countries (with extremely high rates), the risk of contracting STDs and HIV/AIDS is higher among women of [child bearing age] and adolescents.

[...]

The maternal and infant mortality rates are the worst in Africa, estimated in 1998 at 1,854/100,000 and 166/1,000 live births, respectively. The estimated national contraceptive prevalence rate is very low (3 percent), and only 19 percent of women have assisted deliveries. IDP women are known to be at higher risk of dying from pregnancy related causes due to lack of access to health services and life in stressful conditions. A survey conducted by UNFPA and the implementing agencies in 1999 with 710 men and women in IDP camps and periurban areas of Matala, Chibia, Lubango, Lobito, Baia Farta and Benguela indicated that there is: (1) very poor attendance of pregnant women; (2) a lack of knowledge about child spacing and sexuality issues, among men and women; (3) little use of family planning methods; (4) little knowledge about STDs/AIDS; and, (5) an overall expectation of large family size. With regard to questions about forced sex, 19 percent of women indicated they knew of women who were forced to have sex, while 11.4 percent of men affirmed that they knew of men who were forced to have sex." (UN 30 November 1999, pp. 42, 50)

*For a full report on reproductive health among IDPs in Angola with detailed information on the situations in Bie, Malanje, Moxico, Huambo and Luanda, see the Women's Commission assessment of February 2001 available from the Women's Commission or the Global IDP Project.*

### **Children are especially vulnerable to psychological stress from exposure to conflict (February 2001)**

"According to the Christian Children's Fund (CCF), Angola's children are especially vulnerable to psychological stress from exposure to ongoing violent conflict. CCF estimates that 82% of children in IDP camps have come under fire, more than 66% say they have seen people killed or tortured and 24% have lost a limb. Therefore, psychological trauma is a significant issue among IDP youth (and surely IDPs of all ages) and one requiring much greater attention." (Women's Commission February 2001, p. 13)

## **Water and sanitation**

---

### **Vast majority of displaced communities use contaminated water sources (November 2001)**

- 90 percent of displaced communities use contaminated water sources, resulting in potentially fatal water-borne diseases
- Problem is most acute in overcrowded camps and transit centres

"At least 60 percent of the general population and 90 percent of displaced communities use contaminated water sources. Water systems in provincial and municipal centres are over-loaded, and in many locations, no longer functional. Problems with water quality and quantity are most acute in areas where large numbers of displaced persons are living in overcrowded camps and transit centres. Lack of hygiene awareness is a major factor leading to persistently high levels of diarrhoea. Water-related diseases continue to be one of the most common causes of morbidity across the country and a frequent cause of under-five mortality. In the majority of IDP areas, the number of latrines is inadequate for population densities. An estimated 75 percent of latrines in these areas have reached capacity levels. The shortage and over-use of latrines, particularly in highly populated areas, continues to contaminate watercourses, contributing further to the pollution of community water sources." (UN November 2001)

### **Shelter and non-food items**

---

#### **More than 84,000 newly displaced persons in various locations are in urgent need of shelter and essential survival items (March 2002)**

"More than 84,000 newly displaced persons in Bocoio, Caconda, Camacupa, Cruzeiro, Huambo, Kuito, Luena, Matala and Wako Kungo are in urgent need of essential survival items and appropriate shelter. With the exception of IDPs in Kuito, where water and sanitation interventions are ongoing, these same populations lack access to basic water and sanitation. A direct correlation exists between inadequate shelter, contaminated water sources, unhygienic faecal disposal and high levels of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality in these areas. Urgent funding is required to reinforce the pipeline for non-food items. Support is also required to increase agency capacity for transporting essential non-food items, shelter materials and water and sanitation equipment to critical areas." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

#### **Thousands of IDPs remain in sub-standard transit centres (December 2001)**

- Approximately 17,500 IDPs continue to live in sub-standard conditions in 13 transit centres in nine provinces

"Since April 2000, 35 transit centres have been closed. Approximately 17,500 IDPs continue to live in sub-standard conditions in 13 transit centres in the Provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Huíla, Kuanza Sul, Luanda, Malanje and Uíge. During December, new transit centres were opened in Kuito (Bié Province) to accommodate the continuous influx of new IDPs. Despite attempts to close transit centres and warehouses in Benguela and Lobito (Benguela Province), Bongo and Longonjo (Huambo Province) and Caconda (Huíla Province) by the end of 2001, persistent insecurity, constant new arrivals and inadequate registration procedures have forced these centres to remain open." (UN OCHA 31 December 2001)

## **Life in tents or warehouses embarrassing for people accustomed to having their own homes (2001)**

*Excerpt taken from Andrade study conducted in 1996-1997:*

"Most respondents considered that adapting to the new physical environment had been difficult and slow. Previously respondents had been used to having their own houses and working their fields, thus guaranteeing subsistence for themselves and their families: after displacement many did not have access to their own houses and fields.

Life in tents or warehouses was embarrassing for people who were accustomed to having their own house: they had to live in a group and sleep alongside others. Some people built houses, but in Malanje city displaced people found it difficult to make bricks because they were used to living in houses of wattle and daub in rural areas. Some displaced people (most of them from Cuale, Malanje) rented houses, either from local residents or from displaced people who had come in previous decades. This contributed to the marked feeling of insecurity." (Andrade 2001, sect. 5.1)

*For more information on the feelings of IDPs during period of displacement, see Filomena Andrade report available from Development Workshop - Angola.*

## **Internally displaced persons live in crowded camps, in derelict buildings, and in and underneath train carriages (1998-2000)**

- Displaced populations generally live in crowded mud house shanty towns
- Huts are clustered together in areas of about 10,000 houses
- In transit centre in Caala, displaced living in and under train carriages
- Other displaced persons reside in derelict buildings

"During his [the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis M. Deng] visit to the province of Huambo, the Representative saw both the problems and prospects facing the internally displaced. In a transit centre in the town of Caala, the internally displaced were found to be living in appalling conditions, in a derelict building and in and underneath two train carriages. The Representative was struck by the overriding sense of despair and depression amongst the displaced." (UNHCHR 10 November 2000, para. 8)

"Q. It's estimated that some 2 million Angolans are displaced within the country, many of them living in camps for internally displaced people (IDPs). Describe an IDP camp.

A. There are thousands of predominantly mud houses spread all over once-cultivated hillsides. The houses are mostly arranged in lines and, as more IDPs arrive, they become burgeoning neighborhoods with little space. There are pathways. The houses have grass roofs, some are covered by plastic. They are one room and very close together – about four feet between houses. They are usually clustered, in areas of about 10,000 houses. The hillsides, which used to be all green with vegetation, are now covered with huts. From a distance, they look like the tops of igloos. All camps have open areas, all defoliated, for football, or where there are clinics and a meeting hall. Some people have been there for seven years, but most camps have been built since February 1999." (CARE 11 September 2000, Question 3)

"In the inland cities [in the areas controlled by the government,] many IDPs live in abandoned buildings or with friends or relatives. Many of the displaced on the coast live in shanties thrown up on the outskirts of towns, or in camps set up away from the cities themselves.

[...]



In the capital of Moxico province, Luena, a town of 150,000, some 60,000 people are estimated to be internally displaced from other areas of Angola. They have taken over several municipal buildings, including the old seminary, cinema, museum and railway station. The World Food Programme distributes some food and health care. The living conditions of the people are miserable, their motivation to return home poor; they remain socially isolated in ghettoized buildings in the town centre."(Vines 1998, p. 92)

# ACCESS TO EDUCATION

## General

---

### **Access to education is most difficult for displaced women and children (2001/ 2002)**

- More than 180,000 children and adolescents and 30,000 women in IDP camps are estimated not to have access to formal or informal education
- As little as 45 percent of Angola's school-age children attend school

"The most vulnerable populations in this sector are children and women in IDP settings. Agencies estimate that more than 180,000 school-aged children and adolescents and 30,000 women in IDP camps do not have access to formal or informal education. In addition, approximately one million displaced and vulnerable children living in resident communities or resettlement areas are not integrated into existing educational programmes. During 2002, partners will target approximately one-third of the most vulnerable children, adolescents and women in 54 accessible municipalities throughout the country. In addition, 8,000 teachers and educational promoters will benefit from technical training programmes and educational materials." (UN November 2001)

"As little as 45% of Angola's school age children attend school. Dropout rates remain high, particularly among girls - estimates show that as many as 65% of adolescent girls are illiterate. Virtually none of the children who are permanently or temporarily outside the formal school system have access to other educational opportunities, including non-formal education. Teaching is severely hampered by the lack of basic materials and high pupil-teacher ratios in almost all classrooms make it difficult for children to learn. In several provinces, schools have been forced to shut due to the lack or absence of teachers. Teacher training is often poor, affecting professional performance and leading to lower educational standards." (UNICEF 11 February 2002)

### **National education crisis highlighted by severe problems in Luanda (June 2001)**

- Luanda is only place in Angola where children stand a chance of getting an adequate education
- Teacher to pupil ration in Luanda is 1:80 in some cases
- Government unable to accommodate large number of war-displaced arriving in city
- Only 45 percent of school-age children attending school

"While some teaching at under-staffed and under-equipped schools takes place in the provinces, the only place in Angola where children stand a chance of getting an adequate education is Luanda, the capital. And even here, the constraints are immense. The government has not been able to accommodate the large number of war-displaced or starving families arriving in the city to live with extended families or to look for work.

[...]

An Oxfam report on primary education in Luanda found a severe lack of classroom space, high teacher/pupil ratios (1-80 in some cases), wastage because of high failure and drop-out rates, the lack of trained teaching staff (only 48 percent of primary school teachers in Luanda are adequately trained), and lack of learning and teaching materials (teachers and pupils have to buy their own). With an official global poverty rate of about 67 percent, not many parents can afford all the costs associated with sending their

children to school. By the end of 2000, official statistics indicated that only about 45 percent of Angola's children of school-going age were in class." (IRIN-SA 14 June 2001)

### **IDP parents are often unable to pay bribes or otherwise pay for schooling (2001)**

- Displaced parents cannot pay extra fees or bribes required by some school authorities
- Education for IDPs provided by external actors generally only available in camps
- Even in IDP camps, parents cannot afford to keep children in school since they need their labour to survive

"Although there is great awareness of the importance of education among the displaced, there is a long way to go before most displaced children receive even a basic education. Displaced parents often cannot pay the 'extra fees' or bribes, which the teachers and administrative staff at the schools demand to provide certificates of matriculation. (The request for 'extra fees' is not surprising: teachers' salaries average about US\$20 per month, and payment is often two to six months late.) Interestingly, this seems to be less of a problem in Huambo than in, for example, Luanda. A significant number of parents who were displaced from Huambo province to Luanda (that is, some of the families who fled in December 1998) sent their children to schools in Huambo, when the city became safe again, because they didn't have to pay as many bribes and the quality of the education was better than in Luanda.

Education provided by external actors, such as UNICEF, is concentrated in the IDP camps and urban areas. One displaced woman described how her children only got access to education when they moved to Kasseque III camp. They had first fled from Sambo do Kuando and later Escóla 113 (both of which were large IDP settlements, accommodating several thousand persons, that received minimal assistance from agencies). They arrived at Kasseque III one-and-a-half years after they first took flight. Even though Kasseque III is regarded as one of the best IDP camps and transit centres in Angola, most of the children living there do not get past the first year of school. Parents cannot afford to keep their children in school when they need their labour; and hunger and illness among the pupils and a lack of qualified teachers keeps children away. Because most children have either not finished their schooling or have never attended school before, the ages of those in the first grade can range from 6 to 14 years.

Some displaced persons we spoke with told how they had organised education for their children in transit centres by asking the teachers among them to teach their children in return for a small amount of food or cash. Later, some of these schemes were supported by outside agencies, such as UNICEF. In villages where the displaced have resettled and others are returning home, several schools and health centres are being built as part of food-for-work projects. ADRA-Angolana, together with the government and WFP, provide food for the workers and some construction material for school buildings. The agencies only become involved when the projects are initiated by the villagers." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, p. 43)

# ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

## Self-reliance

---

### **Displaced rarely become self-sufficient due to limited access to land and insufficient seed (July 2002)**

- About 1.4 million Angolans are in urgent need of food aid until 2003, according to WFP and FAO
- In most conflict areas, agriculture has fallen to an almost subsistence level with little or no surplus for trade
- About half of the 4 million people displaced since 1998 have been allocated land and no longer depend on food assistance

"About 1.4 million Angolans are urgently in need of food aid until April 2003, a joint UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and World Food Programme (WFP) report said on Monday.

[...]

'Peace came too late to have a significant impact' on agricultural production. 'In most of the conflict areas, agriculture had fallen to an almost subsistence level, with little or no marketable surplus and very limited trade activity. Self-sufficiency is seldom attained among displaced populations due to the limited access to land and insufficient seed,' the report said.

[...]

WFP plans to assist 1.24 million people, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) with insufficient or no access to land, the families of former rebel UNITA soldiers, the vulnerable populations in previously inaccessible areas and refugees returning to Angola. The remaining needy population would have to be supported by other humanitarian agencies.

Of the estimated four million people displaced from their homes since 1998, around two million have been allocated land and no longer depend on food assistance, said the report.

The mission found that some IDPs had already started to return to their homes to prepare land for the next season and to plant dry season crops in the wetland areas.

'Food assistance and agricultural inputs [such as seed and fertiliser] are urgently required for farmers returning to their home areas,' the agencies said." (IRIN, 1 July 2002)

### **Majority of IDPs are absorbed by overstretched host communities (2001-2002)**

- Resident populations have been forced to bear the social burdens caused by massive levels of displacement

"Virtually all newly displaced persons in Angola are destitute, having lost both individual and communal assets during displacement, as well as their normal means of livelihood. In the absence of sustained and effective Government services, resident populations have been forced to shoulder the social burden caused by the massive levels of displacement. The overwhelming majority of displaced persons continue to be absorbed into host communities, placing additional strains on the coping capacities of already-poor families

and intensifying competition for meagre resources, including land, employment and income-generating opportunities. Basic infrastructures in provincial and municipal centres remain weak or non-existent and most displaced and resident populations have only limited access to minimum services, including potable water, sanitation, health care and primary education. The majority of households lack survival items including soap, oil, sugar and salt, and in areas where coping mechanisms are collapsing and social roles are under stress, family and community violence is increasingly common." (UN November 2001)

### **Displacement has forced communities to find innovative coping strategies (2001)**

- Despite the strains, displaced groups usually stay intact under the leadership of traditional elders
- Church groups often fill in where basic social infrastructure and services have collapsed
- Various other social formations and networks are used to ensure cohesion and protect communities from further vulnerability

"Many populations in Angola face situations that appear beyond their control. With social structures under enormous and continuous strain, communities are forced to find innovative ways to cope, maintain cohesion, and preserve a sense of dignity. Despite the pressures created by prolonged warfare, many displaced groups remain in tact. With few exceptions, groups travel together until they reach safe haven under the leadership of their traditional elders. Once they arrive at a new location, elders assume responsibility for negotiating with local authorities and protecting the interests of the community.

[...]

Church groups provide a social support network that reaches communities on both sides of the conflict. In many locations, these groups fill in where basic social infrastructure and services have collapsed. Local churches help to educate children and care for the sick and the elderly. They also provide a forum for dialogue between host and displaced communities and help to support traditional elders during negotiations with local authorities. A variety of other social formations and networks are used to ensure cohesion and protect communities from further vulnerability. Consultative forums, sometimes held within *jangos*, are convened by community notables, and increasingly by other members, to discuss problems and agree on future courses of action. Women *kitandeiras* often form rotating credit and savings networks which function as important elements in the informal market sector. Kinship networks are used to redistribute resources and provide support and social security to extended family members. In provincial centres and municipal towns, political affiliations are sometimes rewarded with access to agricultural lands and other important resources, including household items." (UN November 2001)

### **Study in Huambo shows that IDPs work in many different ways to gain livelihood and protect themselves (2001)**

- Villagers establish civil defence groups to handle potential security threats in rural areas
- IDPs collect firewood, work for others and participate in petty trade to gain livelihood
- Stealing and food ration fraud are also means by which IDPs survive

*Below are excerpts from a study on self-reliance conducted in Huambo province. For the full report, please see Caught Between Borders available through NRC's Global IDP Project:*

"Given this insecurity, both displaced persons and the local population carry guns when they go into the fields. It is startling to note that the farther from the towns one goes, the more weapons one sees among the civilians. Civil defence groups, composed of both men and women, have been organised both by the local population and the authorities. Men carry the weapons, women patrol the paths and roads. Some members of the civil defence teams carry light weapons to protect settlements and markets. On the roads into towns,

members of the civil defence regularly check that people are not carrying weapons and bombs hidden in their bags and baskets. Sometimes, a small civil defence group is left to protect houses and crops in villages from which most of the population has already fled.

[...]

Collecting firewood is probably the most common survival strategy used by displaced persons, whether they live in or outside camps. There has been a shortage of energy throughout Huambo province for the past eight years. With infrastructure largely destroyed, very little fossil fuel (gas, diesel and gasoline) reaches the interior, thus prices have skyrocketed<sup>3</sup>. In addition, since the 1992-94 war, deforestation has taken place on a massive scale in the most populated areas, i.e., the corridor along the Benguela railway. The deforestation can be partly attributed to the lack of other energy sources, but mostly because firewood collection has been one of the best survival strategies for displaced and other vulnerable populations. Workers charge so little for their labour that even when road transport is functioning, consumers will opt for the cheaper firewood rather than other fuels.

[...]

Petty trading in streets and markets is most common in urban areas, but is occasionally also practiced in rural areas. Among the displaced in Huambo, it is mostly women who use petty trading as a source of income. Women who have access to some cash place themselves on the outskirts of markets or in markets, such as São Pedro, where they buy from local producers. A farmer may not have the experience or skill to sell his produce to consumers, so he may prefer to sell his goods in bulk to these trade women. The women do not make a great profit from their work: they may buy a wheelbarrow-load of cabbage to resell at the market, and make only enough to provide one or two meals for their families. Others sell fruits and vegetables in residential areas, or anything from used clothes and shoes to washing powder.

Informal trading also takes place inside the IDP camps and transit centres. Cigarettes, soap, matches, cooking oil and firewood are sold there in small quantities. Women dominate as sellers of low-priced goods. High-priced merchandise is generally sold by men, but few displaced men have the financial resources to enter that sector of the market.

[...]

There have been some instances of stealing among the displaced. In Ekunha, the local population reported an increase in produce stolen from their fields and yards and blamed the thievery on the desperate circumstances of the displaced persons living among them. In general, though, there has been little of this kind of activity, despite the poverty and desperation of the displaced. Displaced persons themselves said that only the most desperate, and those who had no social conscience, stole. They emphasised that these kinds of negative survival strategies were not accepted by the society.

Cheating with food ration cards, however, is not regarded as stealing, and is done more frequently. Families split up and go to different camps/transit centres to register, and thus benefit from multiple sources of food. Sometimes, families will build huts in different locations where NGOs and/or ICRC provide food rations and then travel back and forth to get double rations. Since food is given out on certain days in each location, it is not difficult to move between the camps at the appropriate times. The government and various NGOs tried to stop this practice by registering all displaced persons by name, but since most displaced persons have no identity cards, the system is often ineffective." (Birkeland and Gomes 2001, pp. 33-41)

### **Solidarity amongst IDPs can be lacking in peri-urban environments (May 2001)**

- Solidarity in peri-urban environments is fragile at best
- People must move to whichever barrios have space, meaning that communities do not necessarily stay together
- Social cohesion weak; networks few and fragile

*Excerpt taken from Paul Robson study of community structures in peri-urban Angola:*

"The study revealed that traditional institutions, including traditional institutions of solidarity, even in rural areas, had been transformed in the last 100 years mainly due to processes linked to colonial occupation, the growing influence of Christianity and the de-stabilisation of rural areas by low-intensity conflict in the last 25 years. This transformation was most marked in the west-central areas of the country, the areas of the Ambundu and Ovimbundu language groups, which have been most affected by colonisation and low-intensity conflict. These areas are also the ones that were the main origin of migratory flows to the cities included in this study. This means that a considerable part of the migrants to the cities brought with them institutions that probably were not as vigorous as had been thought at the start of the study.

Moreover, the social heterogeneity of a large part of peri-urban areas has not allowed traditional rites and institutions to continue among people living close to each other, given that these traditions were not shared by neighbours. People from the same area do not necessarily arrive in the city at the same time. While most migration is ultimately due to displacement because of war and insecurity, migratory flows to the cities are very complex. Migration takes place in times of (relative) peace as well as in times of war. Migration and displacement often take place in stages, and many displaced people have been forced to move a number of times. Not all migration is of large groups of people and, even when people set out as a group, the tendency is for the group to break up during the journey or at each stage.

Other factors explaining the social heterogeneity of these areas are the intense movements of people between *barrios*, particularly to adjust to rising rents and house prices, and the variable and constantly changing morphology of peri-urban areas. People say that 'where you manage to find a space is where you have to live' and thus 'the people are mixed together'. In all the three cities studied (Luanda, Huambo and Lubango) neighbors may be from different regions, from different towns or villages, of different economic levels and have lived in the *barrio* for a different length of time.

Social heterogeneity has consequences for the density and extension of social networks. Trusting social relations are not necessarily established with neighbours and relationships with neighbours are often loose, with the result that local social cohesion is weak and social networks are few and fragile. 'Neighbourliness is not usual.' Social networks exist, but usually they are not built on relations between neighbors." (Robson and Roque May 2001, Solidarity in peri-urban areas)

*For more information on social support in peri-urban areas, see Robson and Roque report entitled "Here in the city, everything has to be paid for: locating the community in peri-urban Angola" as well as Communities and Reconstruction in Angola – both available from the Development Workshop – Angola.*

### **Many IDPs rely on kinship and other informal networks to make ends meet (2000-2001)**

- Displaced persons living within resident communities are often hosted by members of the same kinship network
- Limited resources among host populations mean that aid to IDPs is not always forthcoming
- Assets, including humanitarian aid, are often sold or exchanged as part of coping strategies of displaced populations

*Excerpt taken Andrade study conducted in 1996-1997 regarding the perception of IDPs about the assistance they received from resident communities during initial periods of flight:*

"There are different opinions about the aid that others gave them, or might have given them, while they were fleeing. Some of the interviewees think that lack of support in circumstances like this should be seen in the context of the shortages from which the whole country suffers: it is not possible to give things you

do not have. But others consider that this was not always the real reason. In some cases this is linked to the double lives people have led, whereby communities, groups, and individuals were (and may still be) having to accommodate both parties to the conflict. For example, the Cuale Group was going from Massango towards the south of Malanje Province at a time when the war had not yet spread to the whole province. Many inhabitants of areas along the route did not want to 'compromise themselves' with people coming from an unknown place, for unknown reasons, and with an unknown destination. In certain cases (for example, the Tumbulo Group) displaced people decided to skirt round any kind of human settlement. The reasons were the same – they did not know who was there, who they were, or which 'side' they were on. It also happened that while some took this position, others used this situation to gain something for themselves; taking advantage of people who were already in difficult circumstances, and were easier to exploit." (Andrade 2001, sects. 4, 5.3)

"At the Damba Maria camp along this road [Benguela province], hundreds of formerly displaced people from the nearby town of Chongoroi live on untended ground, with little sign of agriculture nearby. Now settled for too long to qualify for food relief, these people rely on informal networks, fishing and distant and difficult agricultural or rural work to feed their families. Much of the land around them is owned by others, who have let it lie in fallow." (Reuters 28 December 2000)

"The massive level of internal displacement in Angola has intensified the degree of poverty at the same time that it has forced additional people into outright destitution. Displaced people living within resident communities are usually hosted by families from the same kinship network. With the majority of the Angolan population living at, or below, the poverty line, however, resources in most households are limited and can be extended very little without creating further hardship. During the past eight years, agencies estimate that a majority of host households have become destitute as scarce assets are shared among larger numbers of people. Although international assistance is provided to registered IDPs, most host families do not qualify for aid, unfortunately cut off from services that would help to sustain their households." (UN November 2000, p. 10)

"Although the pace of resettlement initiatives increased during the [reporting] period, the majority of displaced populations in the country, whether living in transit centres, camps or among resident communities, do not yet have access to adequate agricultural land. Most displaced persons continue to survive through a combination of kinship exchange, petty-commodity production, selling of charcoal and firewood, food preparation and brewing. Assets, including emergency items provided by aid agencies, are routinely exchanged or sold as part of the coping strategies of the populations." (UNSC 10 October 2000)

*For more information on coping strategies of internally displaced persons, see Filomena Andrade study in Communities and Reconstruction in Angola available from the Development Workshop - Angola.*

### **IDPs obliged to re-adapt skills to new income-generating activities (2001)**

- Agricultural and manual skills are less in demand
- IDPs in urban areas obliged to learn commercial skills such as selling firewood or doing domestic work for others
- Generally, one-third of money earned is saved as "reserve fund" for displaced families

"The displaced people who were interviewed had all arrived at their places of refuge with agricultural and manual skills, but these skills were less in demand in their new places of residence. All displaced people had to find new ways of making a living, even if it was painful, but 'there was no alternative' as they had to find a way to survive. Usually this meant a big change in the way they spent their time. If they had previously worked six to eight hours per day, they now had to work eight to eleven hours per day to guarantee subsistence for their families.



More in demand in urban areas are commercial skills. Some of the displaced learnt these skills more rapidly than others (even if they had never worked in this area before) and so adapted more rapidly to the urban environment and managed to acquire a status envied by their peers. In Cuale (Malanje), most of the interviewees had to stop farming and take up cutting and selling firewood or charcoal.

[...]

Many interviewees suffered when first they arrived at the place they currently live, because they did not know who to go to for assistance. Some only registered for assistance after a few days or (even) months, when they received advice from other displaced people. To survive and as a way of 'getting their lives sorted out', many did domestic work for others or worked in other people's fields (sowing, tilling, watering, and harvesting vegetables).

After they had settled into the new place, displaced people tended to find other sources of income. Some went into trade, some into farming (with or without NGO support), and others into producing and selling charcoal or firewood.

The income that displaced people manage to generate depends on a series of factors, many of which are outside their control. Climatic conditions determine the quantity and quality of what is cultivated, and influences the volume of their earnings and the amount consumed. Selling anything depends mainly on demand.

Displaced people use the money obtained from their work in three ways: part goes to replace the initial investment; some goes to buying food; the third part forms a 'reserve fund' (for days when there is no revenue). This division of funds is done every day." (Andrade 2001, sects. 4, 5.3)

***For more information on coping strategies of internally displaced persons, see Filomena Andrade report available from the Development Workshop - Angola.***

# DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

## Documentation

---

### **Lack of legal documentation leads to problems for displaced children (2001-2002)**

- Only 5 percent of children have had their births registered, according to government estimates
- Lack of documentation reduces access to education, health services and legal assistance, while increasing the risk for young boys of being recruited into the armed forces
- Children without documents are easy targets for abuse

"The Ministry of Justice estimates that only about 5% of children have had their births registered, which means that unregistered children do not legally exist and therefore cannot enrol in schools. It also becomes difficult for young boys to prove their age and have consequently greater risk of early recruitment into the armed forces. Displaced youths are particularly vulnerable, as they may not have the family or community support to protect them. In 2001, the Government approved a campaign led by the Ministry of Justice for the registration of three million children in 18 months." (UNICEF 11 February 2002)

"Children separated from their families, in particular following attacks and/or displacement, are of serious concern. Children who lack legal documentation, particularly those who have been forcibly displaced, suffer a lack of access to health services, schooling and even legal assistance when attempting to seek redress for violations of their rights. The numerous street children also face daily various hardships and dangers. Children are exploited as labourers and are subjected to sexual violence. Their lack of documentation leads to constant harassment by police officers. They are easy and silent targets for abuse." (UNSC 11 April 2001, para. 36)

### **Displaced persons who have lost personal identification documents are often subject to harassment (2000-2001)**

- Incidents of harassment of IDPs without documentation reported
- Lack of documents can endanger legal individual rights

"84. The [UN] Representative [on Internally Displaced Persons] was informed of incidents of harassment of displaced persons, in particular of those who have been displaced from UNITA-controlled areas, largely because they lack formal identity documents. It was noted that lack of such documents also limits access to education, health facilities and employment. The Government should take the necessary steps to issue to all internally displaced persons all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights. In particular, authorities should facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost in the course of displacement." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 84)

"Many Angolans have never had personal identification documents or have lost them during displacement. In order to ensure legal individual rights participants acknowledged the importance of making such documents available promptly and free of charge to the internally displaced. Furthermore, such effort could contribute to the establishment of improved mechanisms for establishing the whereabouts of displaced persons separated from their families." (NRC September 2000, Prevention and Protection)

## ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

### Family unity

---

#### **Up to 100,000 children are separated from their birth families – and the number is increasing (March 2002)**

- Approximately 4,650 separated children were registered in 17 provinces during the last six months of 2001

"The number of children who are separated from their families as a result of sudden and disorganised displacement is increasing markedly, most notably in the Provinces of Moxico, Bié, Huambo and Kuanza Sul. Approximately 4,650 separated children were registered in 17 provinces during the last six months of 2001. Partners estimate that more than 100,000 children are currently separated from their birth families throughout the country. The condition of separated children is critical in many areas, including Luena, where orphanages and feeding centres are overwhelmed by steady influxes of newly arrived youth, many of whom are malnourished. Support for family tracing and care for separated children remains inadequate." (UN OCHA 7 March 2002)

#### **Conscription means women often flee their homes with children but no men (November 2001)**

- Newly displaced women describe how as soon as government forces recapture a village from UNITA, men of all ages are targets for military recruitment

" 'Once you join the army, that's forever,' Pedro says. 'You die there.'"

Pedro, 26, is one of the many young Angolan men who are worried by a fresh initiative by the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to recruit new soldiers.

In the last few weeks, radio announcements have been instructing young men aged between 18 and 20 to report to military bases around the country to register for military service, as is normal at this time of year.

But the FAA also have the legal right to conscript men up to the age of 30 who have not previously served for two years. Many young men fear that even those who have served their time could still be forced to put on uniforms.

The army has recently stepped up its operations in the eastern province of Moxico, saying that the aim is to capture Jonas Savimbi and to destroy the last UNITA forces in a region where the rebels are well established. Young men who hear this worry that it will be a signal for the military to make a particular effort this year - after 26 years of war - to get more of them into the army.

Whether or not this is actually happening remains unclear. The conscription laws in Angola are never applied consistently.

Women arriving in highland cities such as Kuito, after fighting has forced them to flee their villages, have frequently made the journey with children but no men. They tell how as soon as the FAA recapture a village from UNITA, the men are seen as fair game for recruitment, however old they may be. UNITA are

also known to forcibly conscript, and have also seized children for military service." (IRIN 23 November 2001)

### **Displacement has changed traditional family roles (2001)**

- Following displacement, men remain the principal decision-makers, and undertake new income-generating activities
- Women often become the main agents of social and family cohesion, and assume numerous additional responsibilities
- Children are often withdrawn from school to help with domestic and agricultural work

"Communities have proven highly instrumental in reducing vulnerabilities by transforming social roles within the family. Although the role of men is often eclipsed in IDP settings, they remain the principal decision-makers. Men help with land and charcoal preparation and are responsible for constructing community buildings and tending livestock. Men also procure agricultural inputs. In addition, men brew and sell alcohol and where possible, fish and hunt. Following displacement, Angolan women assume additional responsibilities and often become the main agents of social and family cohesion. In most IDP settings, women are responsible for food procurement and preparation, water collection and shelter construction. Women care for the children and elderly and tend sick members of the family. Women help to prepare and maintain the land, collect firewood and also prepare charcoal. Women sell both food and non-food items (NFI) in the market and are responsible for procuring family assets, including clothing and cooking pots. Young girls are often withdrawn from school to assist their mothers and other women in the family and boys are sometimes sent to the fields, particularly during peak periods of planting and harvesting." (UN November 2001)

### **Displacement can have severe negative impact on individual and communal identity (2001)**

- Different age groups and sexes affected differently by displacement
- Difficult memories of flight create problems in adapting to new place of refuge
- IDPs express strong feelings of loss of identity, common kinship values and social function

#### ***Excerpt taken from Andrade study conducted in 1996-1997:***

"Displacement affected the different age groups and the sexes differently. Some young people were born at the places of refuge (the place or area to which displaced people fled), and some arrived there when very young, so do not remember the things that happened. Older people do remember and their memories are negative: deaths of immediate family members, hunger illness or rape. These recollections create difficulties in adapting to their places of refuge.

Men older than eighteen have quite detailed memories, and can talk about the reasons and conditions for their displacement and the decision to go. Women of this age group have more selective memories, and focus on the problems that their own families experienced. They follow the opinions and decisions of their families and other men in the family, normally the older ones. Old men and women are cautious about stating their opinions, but their memories are strongly marked by feelings of loss: cattle, goods, strength, values, power, dignity, and status. Their age means that they have little hope of reconstructing their lives before they die, and this forms part of their sense of loss.

Displaced people, particularly those older than thirty, are clearly disillusioned by the breakdown of stability which came after the 1992 elections, shattering the peace which had been created by the Bicesse Accord. They display pessimism about the future, and deep distrust. Most of them feel a betrayal of the confidence that they had placed in the institutions and in the peace process. They feel used and kicked around between interests that are not theirs, and which they cannot influence.

[...]

The people who left their places of origin under fire were completely disoriented – they had faced death in the most immediate sense possible. But death also took other forms: abandoning children during the journey, leaving the wounded, untended, unsuccessful births, and death from hunger. These had a large psychological impact, as people had to make absurd choices that left them feeling guilty. A factor that weighed heavily psychologically and caused grief was 'leaving the dead without even burying them'. Older people showed the greatest anguish about this, since they have a particular respect for ancestors and for death rituals. Younger people see this as less important than a birth when on the move (with the subsequent forced abandonment of the baby), or an attack in which many people died, or hunger and exhaustion.

Two kinds of loss were mentioned, and were the source of strong feelings. The first kind is the loss of material items that sustain people (a guarantee of the future) or show wealth (and confirm status). The second kind refers to the loss of places, meaning spaces where people were protected by the family, where there was a solid nucleus of common kinship values and where each person's social function was clearly defined and respected. Even if these values and functions were not always so easy and clear, their loss is keenly felt when they were abandoned unwillingly. This is true whether people moved during fighting or during more stable periods." (Andrade 2000, sect. 4)

*For more information on coping strategies of internally displaced persons, see Filomena Andrade study in Communities and Reconstruction in Angola as well as Robson and Roque report on social support in peri-urban environments, both available from the Development Workshop - Angola.*

## PROPERTY ISSUES

### General

---

#### **Insufficient land distribution for displaced families (2001-2002)**

- UN/ government report states that although more displaced families received land in the 2001-2002 agricultural campaign than in the previous one, the size and in some cases the quality of the land parcels were insufficient
- Recommendations for the next agricultural campaign include improving coordination of agricultural inputs to vulnerable families

"A preliminary report by FAO, WFP/VAM and MINADER on the results of the 2001 - 2002 Agricultural Campaign from September 2001 and March 2002 indicated that although more displaced families received land than during the last agricultural campaign, the size of the parcels was insufficient (.15 - .5 ha) and the quality of the land was poor in some cases. In addition, the number of families receiving agricultural inputs from humanitarian organisations and provincial MINADER delegations increased, although late distributions negatively affected the preparation of fields in some areas. The results of the study also indicated that insufficient rain during November and early December led to reduced harvests of peanuts, corn and beans in Uige and Kuanza Norte Provinces. In the central and southern regions of the country, crops planted during the first agricultural period are expected to produce satisfactory results. The report made several recommendations for the next agricultural campaign, including improving coordination in the distribution of agricultural inputs to vulnerable families and creating an emergency seed bank. The report also highlighted the importance of receiving funds in a timely manner to avoid delays in distribution and the need to coordinate and prioritise mine verification and de-mining activities to increase access to agricultural land." (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002)

#### **Valuable land remains in hands of powerful economic and military interest groups (December 2000)**

- Large and relatively secure coastal strip of land has fallen prey to economic and military interests linked to the oil industry
- These powerful interest groups are reluctant to lease the land to displaced persons for fear of future ownership claims
- Powerful landowners known to influence the location of displaced persons camps in order to acquire cheap labour pools near land plots

#### ***As reported by Reuters in late December 2000:***

"Though land tenure has been at the root of many squabbles for thousands of years, in Angola it has an unusual nature because of recent history and the tide of land-poor people fleeing war to urban centres.

[...]

Economic change swept Angola after Marxist-Leninism was officially abolished in 1989. In a series of so-called privatisations in the 1990s, powerful politicians obtained concessions for potentially lucrative property and land, although in theory these remain state property. In this chaotic liberalisation, ordinary people's rights to use land shrivelled and ownership has become unclear.

[...]

Many Angolans have fled violence in the countryside to government-held urban centres, often fed by the U.N. World Food Programme, Médecins sans Frontières, and others. Displaced people and residents grow what they can within the narrow security perimeters of these isolated towns and food finds its way into local markets by various routes.

The land is worth little in commercial terms, however, because of the insecurity.

In some places, such as the large and relatively secure coastal strip stretching from Lobito to Benguela and southwards for another 50 km to Dombe Grande, land has real commercial value and potential.

For this reason, it has fallen prey to powerful economic and even military interests linked to the oil-rich government. Many are reluctant even to lease the land to the displaced or other poor people, in case of future ownership claims.

People from Damba Maria, Dombe Grande and other areas sometimes work as labourers for big farmers in a system known by some here as 'chinyango.'

The standard of payment is one kilogram (two pounds) of fuba (maize meal) per day is not enough to feed a family but the alternative – unemployment – is worse.

And because of their weak links with local communities, displaced people are at the bottom of any pecking order.

'People with a lot of land are exploiting the weakness of deslocados so they can pay little. This is a generalised thing,' the U.N. official said. 'In Benguela, it is the big farmers. Inland, the farmers are smaller-scale, so the problem is not so bad.'

A diplomat in the capital Luanda also said powerful landowners in various parts of the country had influenced the location of some camps for deslocados, to provide pools of cheap labour for their farms. 'This is a real betrayal of the people,' she said.

The land issue is acquiring new urgency today. The economic changes and, to some extent, government military successes in the past year that have reduced risk levels in some parts of the country, have provoked a scramble for land by some senior officials." (Reuters 28 December 2000)

## PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

### General

---

#### **Sub-standard transit centres are overcrowded with IDPs waiting to be resettled (2002)**

- At the end of April 2002, more than 600,000 IDPs were living in temporary resettlement sites, with some 437,000 remaining in camps and overcrowded transit centres
- Continued IDP influxes and limited resources hampered the closure of sub-standard transit centres and warehouses, in fact making them even more crowded
- Report by Refugees International states that IDPs sent to the Centres have a 20-30 percent chance of dying there

#### **"Resettlement**

Of the approximately 1.4 million IDPs who have been confirmed for humanitarian assistance, 600,156 are living in temporary resettlement sites. More than 436,686 IDPs remain in camps and overcrowded transit centres, which continue to receive new arrivals. In a number of locations, including Luena and Waku Kungo, IDPs who arrived during the past few months continue living in sub-standard conditions without access to adequate shelter and basic services.

With the cessation of hostilities and the end of seasonal rains, provincial authorities and humanitarian partners have been discussing revised plans for resettlement. Only limited resettlement occurred during April due to the uncertain security situation.

[...]

#### **Transit Centres**

The number of IDPs living in sub-standard conditions in transit centres and warehouses grew during April due to on-going displacement and limited resettlement opportunities. More than 27,000 persons living in sub-standard conditions in at least 17 sites in nine provinces, including Benguela, Huambo, Huíla, Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Luanda, Malanje, Moxico and Uíge. In some locations, such as Moxico and Waku Kungo, upgraded reception and registration centres have been established in compliance with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) Dispatch on Standard Operating Procedures for Reception and Registration Centres. Despite these improvements, continued influxes and limited resources in provincial and municipal capitals have hampered the closure of sub-standard transit centres and warehouses." (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002)

"After more than 20 years of civil war, Angola is taking tentative steps towards peace as a result of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's death. Before the death of Savimbi, there were many Transit Centers housing displaced people who were selected for resettlement or return to their homes. The Centers are often located in large abandoned factories or warehouses where all people live together with no separate rooms for cooking, cleaning or bathing. People cook outside. Many women cook the food they receive that day from odd jobs they do for local residents. The men also try to find odd jobs around to make some money to supplement the limited food rations.

These Transit Centers have hundreds of people crowded into them with limited or no food assistance, water, sanitation, or blankets. The displaced sent to the Centers have a 20-30% chance of dying there. Conditions are so appalling that UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has appealed to the Government of Angola to close them and resettle people immediately. The Government has closed a few Centers but many remain. Indeed, as road travel becomes more secure, MINARS, the



Government ministry responsible for the internally displaced and for the Transit Centers, is bringing hundreds of people wishing to return to their home province to the Centers, where they wait to be resettled or transported to their home province. Thus, in the face of the overwhelming needs of the country after the end of the war, these Centers will continue to house people in horrendous conditions." (RI, 18 June 2002)

### **New impetus for IDPs to return home, but serious obstacles remain (2002)**

- Many spontaneous return movements of IDPs are reported after April 2002, with many IDPs wishing to prepare for the next agricultural season
- Government of Angola admits that necessary conditions for large-scale return are not in place, including a lack of shelter
- Humanitarian organizations estimate that up to 300,000 IDPs may relocate before the end of 2002
- Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations have been adapted to try to ensure minimum standards for resettlement and return
- Some NGOs, such as Refugees International, accuse the government of not paying enough attention to minimum conditions for return, including mine awareness and clearance

#### **"Return Movements**

Humanitarian partners reported spontaneous return movement from camps in at least six provinces. In some cases, the movements are apparently temporary, with family members returning to villages to gather information about the situation or to build shelters and prepare agricultural land while others remain in camps in provincial and municipal centres. Although it is difficult to confirm numbers due to the spontaneous nature of the movements, unofficial reports from provincial authorities, UN Agencies and NGOs indicate that return movements will accelerate in coming months." (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002)

"... some IDPs are returning home. Five thousand four hundred people have left the camps in Barra does Dande to return to Libongos. More than 1,000 people left camps around Kuito to return to their homes in Nharea, Chinguar, Cambandua, Belo Horizonte, Cangote, Chicala, Camacupa, Catabola and Cassingue. In Huambo province, people are returning to areas around Mungo, Bimbe and Bailundo.

On 25 April over a hundred people were flown from Viana, just outside Luanda, to Moxico province where they dispersed to their homes in Luau, Alto Zambeze and Lumbala Nguimbo.

On 30 April ANGOP reported that 2,000 IDPs at Amboim in Kwanza Sul province have recently asked government authorities to arrange for their return to their homes around Kibala. They have been hampered by the need to repair the bridge over the river Inha.

There have been many spontaneous movements of IDPs, as people wish to go home to plant their fields for the next agricultural season, rather than wait for an organised return." (ACTSA, 1 May 2002)

"Seven thousand displaced people, natives of Kibala municipality and now concentrated in Amboim, central Kwanza-sul province, on Monday expressed willingness to return to their lands of origin.

The local Social Welfare officer, Domingos Joao, said the displaced asked the authorities to make the arrangements for transportation, to allow the return to their zone of origin.

Domingos João said his institution is not provided with means of transport and is right now holding contacts with NGOs operating in the region, plus the Angolan Armed Forces with view to help take the displaced to Kibala municipality.

'We can not deny people their will to go back to their areas of origin, although we face lack of shelter to put up the population', he said, adding that, 'to satisfy this desire, there is need to create the minimum conditions for the resettlement of the displaced'.

He stressed the need for the acquisition of zinc sheets, working tools and seeds, to allow the returning displaced to build their houses and join the productive activity.

Kibala administration was restored last January and is 165 kms away from Sumbe, the capital of Kwanza-sul province." (Government of Angola, 20 May 2002)

"Government authorities in Angola`s central Bie province Sunday said the province was not ready yet for an immediate return of internally war displaced persons (IDPs) currently living in neighbouring Benguela province.

Vice-governor Antonio Gomes Gonçalves told journalists in Kuito city that conditions have not been created yet for an organised return of the displaced populations to their areas of origin.

Mr Goncalves was reacting to recent statements by Benguela director for social welfare Isabel Afonso Changuendela that IDP`s should start moving back to their homes this week.

The return of displaced populations from Benguela depends on creating the necessary conditions in order to avoid suffering, the vice-governor stressed.

Local government and some non government organisations operating in the region, last month approved a programme meant to secure the return of war displaced people to their areas of origin as soon as possible." (Government of Angola, 24 June 2002)

"Following the cessation of hostilities in April, the Government has indicated that closure of IDP camps and the settlement of displaced populations to their areas of origin is a major priority. Some IDP populations are already returning to their homes. Partners estimate that up to 300,000 internally displaced persons may relocate by the end of the year. In an effort to ensure that return movements are conducted on the basis of agreed standards, the regulamento for the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations have been adapted to ensure that appropriate conditions are in place at return sites. Provincial authorities, in conjunction with humanitarian partners, are developing Provincial Emergency Plans for Resettlement and Return (PEPARR) during June. The aim of the PEPARR process is to facilitate the return of IDPs currently living in camps and transit centres prior to the next agricultural campaign. Between June and August, as many IDPs as possible will be encouraged to return. While there is no immediate plan for a large-scale, organised repatriation of Angolan refugees, steps are being taken to ensure that the same minimum standards apply to their return and reintegration." (UN OCHA, 18 June 2002)

"After winning a long civil war, the Government of Angola faces a new problem: helping millions of displaced Angolans return home so they can rebuild their lives and their country. The government has adopted a set of legal protections for internally displaced people (IDPs). But the return process is complicated, and there are indications that the government is not paying enough attention to minimum conditions for return, including mine awareness and clearance. It is important that the Government of Angola and the international community work closely together to create safe conditions for returnees.

Earlier this year the government pushed 8,000 internally displaced persons out of a camp and forced them to return to their villages in an area that is littered with mines and inaccessible to food trucks. Although the push-back appears to have been a mistaken deviation from government policy, it does illustrate the risks of premature returns.

*Refugees International (RI)* visited the IDP camp on the outskirts of Kuito, the capital of Bie Province in Angola's central highlands. In late April, government officials gave IDPs a two-day warning to prepare to move back to their area of origin, Trumba, or they would have their rations cut off completely. IDPs were assured that the World Food Program (WFP) would deliver their next ration shipment, due that weekend, to their home areas. Since no food had been distributed for the month of April, this ration was particularly critical. Two days later, government authorities came to the area and forced the people back to their hometown 15 kilometers away without any resettlement supplies such as tools, seeds and food, or preparations for their arrival in their area of origin.

The Government of Angola is facing an enormous task in its plans to resettle hundreds of thousands of IDPs in the coming months. In an unprecedented act of commitment to IDPs during the war, the Government of Angola designed and adopted laws based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The resulting Norms on the Settlement of Internally Displaced Populations and its accompanying Regulamento, which is the application of these norms as law, in a post conflict setting, set minimum standards of return. These include voluntary return, the provision of land, tools, seeds, and preparations to the physical and social infrastructure in areas of return.

IDPs forced back to Trumba got none of the protections outlined in the Norms. They also never received the WFP food promised to them. To make matters worse, the Trumba area is known to have uncleared and unmarked minefields. Access to the area by WFP is hindered by a lack of safe roads, as well as sturdy bridges for trucks carrying food.

Clearly, the rights of these people have been violated. At this time returnees have extremely limited options for feeding themselves or ensuring a sustainable livelihood. Because there is no way to get food into Trumba at this time, many residents collect wood, braving the mined fields, and then make charcoal to sell in the Capital of Kuito." (RI, 2 July 2002)

### **Almost ½ million IDPs resettled in temporary areas between 1998 and end of 2001**

- Approximately 498,500 IDPs resettled in temporary areas in 16 provinces, over three years

"Between 1998, when hostilities resumed, and the end of December 2001, approximately 498,500 IDPs were resettled in temporary areas in the Provinces of Bengo, Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Huambo, Huíla, Kuando Kubango, Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Luanda, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malanje, Moxico, Namibe and Uíge. During December, resettlement activities slowed significantly as a result of seasonal rains and the continuous influx of new IDPs in provincial capitals and peri-urban centres. Minimum standards remained unmet at a number of resettlement sites." (UN OCHA, 31 December 2001)

"During 2001, approximately 177,000 IDPs were temporarily resettled in peri-urban areas with access to agricultural land [...]"

Fifty percent of all resettlement initiatives during the past 20 months have been conducted in compliance with the Norms. Most of the first resettlement activities were done outside the parameters of the Norms. During the last four-five months, however, compliance rates have increased to nearly 70 percent.

Resettlement areas continue to be targeted. Between May and December 2001, 63 security incidents occurred at or in close proximity to resettlement areas in 12 provinces." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

### **UN supported Angolan government in the planning and execution of resettlement programmes in 2000**

- OCHA and MINARS collaborated to develop minimal operational standards for return and resettlement
- OCHA has also worked with NGOs and local authorities to support the execution of resettlement programmes at the provincial level

***At the central level, OCHA worked in close collaboration with MINARS to draft minimum operational standards for return and resettlement:***

"In a major step forward, MINARS and OCHA worked closely together during May and June [2000] to develop minimum operational standards for resettlement and return. The draft norms were widely discussed by UN Agencies, NGOs, donors and Government representatives. The norms describe pre-conditions for resettlement as well as targets for post-relocation assistance and were formally approved by the Council of Ministers in mid-October." (UN November 2000, p. 5)

"During the discussion that followed the presentation of the results of the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs at the NHCG, the Government of Angola, UN Agencies and international organizations agreed on the need to define minimum operational standards for resettlement. A draft of the proposed minimum operational standards will be reviewed by the NHCG at the next monthly meeting." (OCHA 19 June 2000)

***The UN has also supported provincial governments like that of Huambo Province:***

"The United Nations will support Angolan the Central Huambo Province government in the execution of its program to resettle over 73,000 war-displaced victims. The U.N.-Angola Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid, Zoraida Mesa, said Friday [11 August 2000] that her organization is working to set basic conditions to improve the standards of the displaced people there. These war victims will be given seeds, foodstuffs and working tools at the first stage. According to Mesa, the United Nations will also support non-governmental organizations that will execute education, health, agriculture projects, and various other social projects in the camps. The Huambo government controls 311,000 war-displaced people and has implemented its resettling program on the outskirts cities of Caala, Huambo, and the Longonjo and Ekunha villages." (GOA 15 August 2000)

# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

## General

---

### **While humanitarian access improves following the April 2002 ceasefire agreement, logistical constraints continue (April 2002)**

- Since April 2002, the circulation of goods and people has increased greatly throughout the country
- However, continuing logistical constraints include the poor condition of roads and airstrips, broken bridges and land mines
- The governor of Malanje province, whom aid workers had accused of obstructionism, is to be replaced

"Following the signing of the 4 April Memorandum of Understanding, the circulation of goods and people increased markedly throughout the country. Few security incidents were reported and security assessments carried out during the Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs (RACN) expanded access to vulnerable populations throughout the country. Several important road corridors were cleared for humanitarian operations during the RACN, including Lobito-Sumbe-Luanda, Sumbe-Gabela-Quibala, Gabela-Waku Kungo, Caxito-Quibaxe, Uíge-Buengas, Uíge-Negage-Ndalatando, Luanda-Ndalatando-Malanje, Malanje-Calandula, Saurimo-Alto Chicapa, Luena-Dala, Menongue-Mavinga, Menongue-Savate, Lubango-Chipindo, Lubango-Huambo, Huambo-Katchiungo, Huambo-Bailundo, Huambo-Alto Hama-Balombo-Benguela, Kuito-Andulo, and Kuito-Chitembo. Several of these corridors had been closed for an extended period of time and their opening will facilitate the work of humanitarian operations, decrease air passenger and cargo expenses and increase the circulation of persons and commercial trade among provinces.

Despite improved access, the following logistical constraints hampered humanitarian operations during April:

In Benguela Province, the bridge over the Cavaco River collapsed due to heavy rains on 30 March, seriously affecting the movement of humanitarian personnel and goods between Lobito and Benguela. Partners were able to use the railway to transport assistance to flood-affected populations in Benguela and Dombe Grande. Heavy rains also destroyed a bridge on the road between Bocoio and Balombo on 20 April, delaying assistance to approximately 20,000 IDPs.

In Bié Province, the Kuito airport was closed to cargo flights on 26 April. Several closure periods are planned until the end of August.

In Huíla Province, road access between Lubango and Caluquembe, where a large IDP population is present, was temporarily suspended due to the poor condition of a bridge over the Cusse River.

In Malanje Province, fuel supplies for humanitarian operations continued to be insufficient and intermittent. De-mining activities were interrupted during one week due to lack of fuel.

In Uíge Province, a WFP passenger plane skidded into a patch of thick mud on the Maquela do Zombo airstrip. Provincial authorities and humanitarian partners worked together to repair the airstrip, avoiding the indefinite closure of the airstrip.

Mine surveys are still required in many areas before humanitarian operations can begin." (UN OCHA, 30 April 2002)

"Meanwhile, ahead of a donor conference to provide assistance for Angola's recovery, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos told a party rally that he was replacing Flavio Fernandes, the governor of Malanje province, who had been accused of obstructionism by aid workers.

[...]

... the pending replacement of Fernandes provides a glimmer of hope for the aid workers who leveled complaints against him, and Luis Paulinho dos Santos, governor of Bie province.

Earlier this year it was alleged they were not repairing air strips satisfactorily which was hampering aid deliveries, and were impounding aid workers' vehicles.

Erica Hazelaar, former programme manager for Oxfam in Malanje told IRIN that it was difficult to predict what impact a new governor would have but said: 'In past experiences, the governor wasn't really co-operative, maybe a little obstructionist. Not just to Oxfam but to other organisations too.'

Hazelaar said problems encountered were poor road and runway repairs, and poor support to the hospital which had no electricity and drugs. 'These are things that can be improved upon,' she said. (IRIN, 8 July 2002)

### **Humanitarian aid is severely hampered by insecurity and poor infrastructure (2002)**

- Humanitarian aid reaches only 10-15 percent of the country in limited areas
- As many as 500,000 people living in inaccessible areas are estimated to be in need of assistance

"Humanitarian aid reaches approximately 10 to 15 percent of the country in limited zones in and around the major provincial towns where security can be guaranteed. In UNITA-held areas, humanitarian access is virtually nonexistent. Humanitarian workers face extremely difficult, and even dangerous, working conditions. Armed attacks, acts of banditry, and landmines are a constant risk. The lack of access is exacerbated by the fact that Angola's infrastructure is almost entirely destroyed by fighting, looting, lack of maintenance, and landmines." (HRW 5 March 2002)

"International agencies currently have access to 60 percent of the 272 locations where IDPs are concentrated and only 73 percent of reported displaced populations. The rest of the areas where IDPs are concentrated are inaccessible to international agencies.

As many as 500,000 people living in inaccessible areas are estimated to be in need of assistance. Of these, 280,000 are thought to be in critical distress.

Due to insecurity and logistical constraints, more than 60 percent of all humanitarian aid is transported by air.

The Angolan humanitarian operation is one of the most expensive in the world due to exorbitantly high transport costs.

Four airstrips are currently under repair, including the airstrip at Kuito. Delivery of assistance in all of these critical locations – Uige, Luena, Negage and Kuito, is severely hampered. Seventeen airstrips in total require repair. Although the Government has recently repaired a handful of bridges on the key surface route between Huambo and Kuito, hundreds more are damaged or destroyed. Eighteen priority surface routes require either upgrading or repair.

Insecurity is rampant along surface routes, limiting the safe passage of convoys. During 2001, more than 75 convoys were attacked.

At least seven provinces, accounting for 40 percent of the entire countryside, are heavily mined, preventing the free movement of people and goods." (UN OCHA 8 February 2002)

### **Displaced in Bié, cut off from international aid, are dying of hunger, according to local authorities (December 2001)**

- Humanitarian situation in various parts of country, especially those inaccessible to international organisations, deteriorating with upsurge in military activity
- Local official reports that up to 80 people died from hunger and lack of medical care in Cuemba, Bié province, in the first two weeks of December 2001

"With a government offensive against UNITA in full swing, the humanitarian situation in some parts of Angola - particularly in areas to which aid organisations have no access - has been deteriorating. LUSA on Thursday quoted a local official as saying that nearly 80 people had died from hunger and a lack of medical care in Cuemba in Bie province in the first two weeks of December.

Cuemba, located about 160 km east of Kuito, lies outside areas targeted by international humanitarian agencies. With its bridges down and roads mined, the only aid reaching Cuemba has been ferried in by the Angolan air force, according to LUSA. Humanitarian, civic and church bodies have been appealing to the government to create safe corridors in areas like Cuemba for at least the past year so that much needed aid can be delivered to those affected by the war." (IRIN-SA 21 December 2001)

### **Plane accident in Kuito highlights constraints to delivery of humanitarian aid (November 2001)**

- Cargo plane damaged and grounded after hitting pothole on the runway of Kuito airstrip while landing
- Runway's state of disrepair has hindered delivery of humanitarian aid for more than two years
- In absence of other functioning infrastructure, Kuito airstrip is essential for delivery of more than 80 percent of all relief aid to Bié province

"Humanitarian officials in Angola expect a damaged Boeing 727 plane to be removed from the Kuito airstrip in Bie province by the end of the week, without affecting the delivery of food aid to the needy.

The Boeing, delivering cargo to businesses in the province, was damaged and grounded when it hit a pothole on the runway while landing. No one was injured, but the accident once again highlighted the dismal state of the airstrip in the provincial capital. The runway's state of disrepair has hindered the delivery of humanitarian aid and, for more than two years, been a bone of contention between relief organisations and the provincial government, which is responsible for ensuring its maintenance.

World Food Programme (WFP) deputy head of air operations in Luanda, Jose Fernandez, told IRIN that WFP had decided a while ago to use smaller craft to transport food to the airport because the runway could not accommodate bigger planes. Fernandez said the distribution of food to the needy would not be affected by the accident because even though WFP had to suspend its flights to Kuito until the runway was cleared, there was enough food aid in the city to last for about two months.

The state of Kuito's airport, through which more than 80 percent of all relief aid reaches Bie, has made headlines before. While Bie governor Paulino dos Santos told IRIN in May that a private company contracted to the government was responsible for the repairs, work has been sporadic. Only 150 metres of the 2 km runway has so far been rehabilitated and there are fears that the rainy season, which normally lasts until April, could prevent planes from landing there altogether.

[...]

The [UN and US-led] delegation which visited Kuito also raised the condition of the road between Kuito and Camacupa, about 80 km away, which was opened earlier this year, granting humanitarian workers access to thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing fighting between government and rebel UNITA troops. All aid to Camacupa has to be transported by road from Kuito. A bridge and a stretch of road in a state of disrepair near to Camacupa could cause the town to be cut off during the rainy season.

WFP Angola Representative, Ronald Sibanda, said during the visit that the ruined infrastructure could cause a 'logistical nightmare' during the rainy season. 'We are trying our best to pre-position stocks before the rains begin, but there is a limit to how much we can pre-position. It doesn't remove the need for improving the basic infrastructure, because this is a lifeline,' he said.

In another development, humanitarian officials confirmed to IRIN that the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) had begun delivering emergency food supplies to certain areas in the province which were under FAA control but were inaccessible to humanitarian workers. As an initiative of the FAA, the deliveries fall under the authority of the presidency and not the provincial government. IRIN was unable to obtain information on the volume or precise locations of the deliveries." (IRIN 6 November 2001)

### **Issue of "humanitarian corridors" in Angola revisited by UN Security Council (October 2001)**

- UNSC asked Angola's warring parties to permit access for humanitarian workers
- 500,000 Angolans in need of food and medicine cannot be reached
- UN may raise issue of "humanitarian corridors" with Angolan government by end of year

"The United Nations Security Council has asked Angola's warring parties to grant humanitarian workers access to at-risk communities, saying it is deeply concerned about humanitarian conditions in the country. UN statistics indicate at least 500,000 Angolans in desperate need of food and medicine cannot be reached.

Security Council President Richard Ryan said in a statement on Wednesday [18 October 2001] that the Council had received an extensive briefing from Ibrahim Gambari, the Secretary-General's special adviser on Africa, on the work of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA). 'Council members expressed deep concern about the humanitarian situation. They asked that access to the at-risk population be granted to humanitarian workers,' Ryan said.

The issue of getting to Angola's most vulnerable populations, who cannot access humanitarian assistance because of the ongoing civil war, was raised by the church and other civic bodies earlier this year, when they called on the government and UNITA to create conditions for the establishment of 'humanitarian corridors' in areas they control. Other international NGOs have also echoed the call. The UN has expressed support for the concept and could raise the issue with Angolan authorities, at least, by the end of the year, a source told IRIN.



However, UNITA spokesman Joffre Justino told IRIN that without a bilateral ceasefire, UNITA could not provide humanitarian workers with safety guarantees. He said it would be impossible since UNITA now operated as a guerrilla force and did not 'control' any part of the country. The responsibility for creating humanitarian corridors, he said, lay with the Angolan government. The Angolan military authorities, however, in spite of claiming to control 90 percent of the country, have had to reduce their security perimeters around many towns in recent months under increasing pressure from UNITA." (IRIN-SA 18 October 2001)

### **Humanitarian agencies targeted in May and June 2001**

- Sixteen World Vision staff members missing following rebel attack in Kwanza Norte
- Two WFP planes deliberately attacked while delivering food to Kuito, Bie

#### ***Attack of World Vision staff in Kwanza Norte in May 2001:***

"Sixteen World Vision staff members are missing after rebels Monday took over a northern Angola city more than 130 east of the capital city, Luanda. The rebel group known as UNITA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, captured the town of Golungo Alto in Kwanza Norte province. Four other World Vision staff reached the town of Ndalatando shortly after noon Monday, following a 27-mile trek.

The fighting forced the Christian humanitarian organization to suspend its \$1 million Golungo Alto program helping 60,000 people, including 9,700 from outlying areas displaced by fighting.

'We are concerned about our staff and are praying for their safety,' said Anne Mesopir, director of World Vision's work in Angola. 'We're also concerned about the people of Golungo Alto. We were due to distribute monthly food rations to more than 4,000 people today.'

World Vision is working with the United Nations and other aid agencies to establish a relief station for people displaced by this latest fighting. Ms. Mesopir has dispatched a truck to the area to transport staff as they are found, as well as women and children in need of assistance." (World Vision 21 May 2001)

#### ***Attack on WFP planes:***

"The World Food Programme and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, a.i. in Angola repudiate the second deliberate attack within the last week on two of its food aid aircraft.

A missile was fired on Friday at two WFP chartered cargo aircraft, 45 km from the central highlands city Kuito, capital of Bié Province. It exploded at some distance from the first Hercules airplane, but caused no damage.

The two aircraft, bearing 17 MTs of maize each, were forced to abort their humanitarian mission and return to the coastal airbase Catumbela.

WFP will temporarily suspend all cargo flights in Angola, pending a thorough investigation of the incident.

Failure to re-establish the food airlift into Kuito will result in dire consequences to at risk populations in the city and surrounding areas. With the highest proportion of internally displaced persons in the country and

record levels of malnutrition, Kuito has only five days of emergency food stocks to sustain a population of over 200,000 people.

The attack took place at approximately 1300 GMT. The aircraft, one of them painted white and clearly marked with WFP insignia on the side, were following a well-known flight route, and had the clearance of both Angolan air-traffic authorities and the military.

Pilots were careful to follow security procedures established to guard against such instances. WFP and the UN team are greatly relieved that there were no casualties or damage to the aircraft as a result of the attack." (WFP 15 June 2001)

### **Insecurity triggered international initiative to create humanitarian corridors in 1999**

- U.N. agencies lack access to fourteen out of eighteen provinces (September 1999)
- The Government first turns down UN appeals to negotiate the creation of humanitarian corridors because it does not want to "legitimise" UNITA
- It later softens its position after attacks on aid workers attempting to administer polio vaccinations in the provinces

"The most pressing priority for U.N. agencies in 1999 is to get unhindered access for relief efforts. According to the U.N. by April 1999, 1.6 million people have been displaced by the conflict, including 680,000 in 1998. The U.N. agencies do not presently have access to fourteen out of eighteen provinces. Ramiro da Silva and Martin Griffiths, the deputy to the under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs visited Luanda in March to have talks with the government on opening up humanitarian corridors and presented the government with a 'non-paper'-a formal document with no official status-on the issue. The government responded that it did not believe in any contact with UNITA as this would legitimize the rebels. On April 2 [1999] in London the World Food Program called upon the government and rebels to accept the creation of humanitarian corridors so that relief could be effectively distributed. The U.N. would also like to do a comprehensive humanitarian needs assessment in government and UNITA-controlled areas. However, on April 6 [1999] the Angolan government turned down this appeal saying the timing was not right and that the government would eventually open its own corridors. The urgency of safe humanitarian corridors was underscored on April 15 when six aid workers were killed in an ambush on a road south of Luanda between Lobito and Sumbe, when they were on their way to a meeting to discuss help for newly displaced people.

A second, similar attack occurred on June 12 [1999] when two humanitarian workers were killed and two injured near Barraca, Bengo province. The workers, of the NGO Instituto Portugues de Medicina Preventiva were ambushed by an armed group while they were carrying out a polio eradication campaign and driving in clearly identified vehicles. The attackers were reported to have taken some items and set fire to the vehicles. U.N. Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Sergio Vieira De Mello on June 16 [1999] issued a statement urging the Angolan government and UNITA rebels to take immediate measures to bring those responsible for the act to justice and to improve the security and protection for humanitarian workers. A further attack on an aid convoy occurred on July 20 [1999] between Lucala and Samba Caju, on the six hundred kilometer journey from Luanda to Uige. Many people were killed and about thirty vehicles destroyed, including a vehicle belonging to the Catholic aid agency Caritas International.

The government slightly softened its position in July over humanitarian assistance to areas controlled by UNITA. President dos Santos agreed to let the U.N. humanitarian assistance unit (UCAH) and the International Committee of the Red Cross contact UNITA about conducting a polio vaccination drive in rebel areas. On August 10 the government softened its position further and announced that it would

authorize the opening of 'humanitarian corridors' under the auspices of the ICRC to ease the transport of emergency aid to the war." (HRW 30 September 1999, chapter X, "Humanitarian Aid Corridors")

*For more on the establishment of humanitarian corridors, see report by Anna Richardson entitled "Negotiating humanitarian access in Angola: 1990-2000" [\[External link\]](#).*

### **Shooting down of UN planes underlines the level of insecurity in Angola in late 1998 and early 1999**

- Two United Nations aircraft with a total of 15 passengers and 8 crew members respectively shot down on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999
- In response to these developments, the UN limited air operations in Angola to the most essential medical and casualty evacuations; it withdrew all personnel from the provinces

"The negative public atmosphere created by the Angola media campaign against the United Nations has been compounded by incidents of harassment and non-cooperation with MONUA in several areas of the country, including Luanda. In view of the increased security threat, MONUA, in close coordination with the Secretariat, continued to review the deployment of its teams and decided, in December 1998, to relocate all United Nations team sites to safer areas.

The exposure of United Nations personnel in Angola to grave security risks was demonstrated by the apparent shooting down near Huambo of two United Nations aircraft, with a total of 15 passengers and 8 crew members, on 26 December 1998 and 2 January 1999 respectively. Both aircraft, chartered by MONUA, went down in areas of active military operations. The two Angolan parties denied any responsibility for those incidents. Despite strong and repeated appeals by me, my Special Representative and the Security Council, UNITA and the Government initially showed no inclination to cooperate with MONUA in the search and rescue operations or to cease hostilities in the areas where the aircraft had gone down. Attempts to survey the sites by using United Nations aircraft were not successful, since neither party gave consent to such an operation. In the meantime, the Government presented to the press a purported deserter who claimed that he was aware of several survivors of the first crash. This statement was repeated by some government officials.

[...]

In response to these developments, the United Nations decided to limit its air operations in Angola to the most essential medical and casualty evacuations and to expedite the withdrawal of all its personnel to Luanda, as also requested by the Government. The deployment and rotation of United Nations personnel to the mission area has been stopped." (UNSC 17 January 1999, paras. 7,8,11)

## NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

### Government response

---

#### **Government convenes provincial planning workshop in order to facilitate proper return and resettlement (June 2002)**

- Government-led workshop results in the development of provincial emergency plans for the resettlement and return of IDPs across the country
- Priority caseloads for resettlement and return include IDPs in sub-standard transit centres and overcrowded camps and IDPs without sustainable coping mechanisms
- Up to 500,000 IDPs may resettle or return before the end of 2002

"Following the cessation of hostilities in April, the Government has indicated that closure of IDP camps and the return of displaced populations to their areas of origin is a major priority. In an effort to ensure that return movements are conducted on the basis of agreed standards, the *regulamento* for the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations have been adapted. The revised *regulamento* aim to ensure that appropriate conditions are in place at return sites.

In light of these priorities, the Government's Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH), supported by OCHA, will convene the third annual Provincial Planning Workshop on 3-4 June. The 2002 Provincial Planning Workshop will include Government, UN and NGO representatives. The aim of the workshop is to familiarise participants with the new *regulamento* and provide direct training on drafting a Provincial Emergency Plan of Action for Resettlement and Return (PEPARR) in accordance with the Norms and related *regulamento*.

Following the Workshop, participants will be asked to prepare a PEPARR for their province and to submit final plans by the end of June. Each PEPARR will have two phases: the first phase will cover the IDPs that will resettle or return prior to the main 2002 agricultural season. The second phase will cover the IDPs that will resettle or return during 2003. On the basis of their PEPARR, provincial governments will begin the first phase in early July." (UN OCHA, 20 May 2002)

"Following the Provincial Emergency Plan of Action of Resettlement and Return (PEPARR) workshop in Luanda on 3 - 4 June, Government authorities and humanitarian partners have begun developing provincial plans aimed at facilitating the resettlement and return of populations before the beginning of the next agricultural campaign. PEPARRs for all 18 provinces will be completed by the end of June.

Priority caseloads for the first phase of resettlement and return activities include: 1) IDPs living in sub-standard transit centres and overcrowded camps and 2) IDPs without sustainable coping mechanisms. The criteria for selecting return and resettlement sites include: 1) areas without minefields or serious logistical constraints; 2) areas where State Administration is functioning; 3) areas that have sufficient quantities of quality land for agricultural activities; and 4) areas where basic social infrastructures are in fair condition. Preliminary information from Luanda, Huambo, Huila, Cunene and Bié Provinces indicate that more than 267,000 IDPs could resettle or return before the end of the year in these provinces alone. Partners estimate that the total number for all provinces could reach 500,000 persons." (UN OCHA, 24 June 2002)

### **President dos Santos considers the situation of internal displacement in the country as "serious" (November 2001)**

- President dos Santos admits the government need to reassess its strategies to resolve the problem of internal displacement in the country
- Government priorities to include increasing access, improving water supply, improving the education and health sectors, and launching resettlement campaigns

"The Angolan Head of State, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has recommended, in Luanda, the study of eventual sources of extraordinary or special funds to finance the execution of policies for the resolution of the displaced population's plight.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos made this remark when addressing the nation in the framework of the 26th anniversary of the independence, on November 11.

The statesman added that we have to know how to combine the preparation of huge plots of fertile lands with scheme of organization of the territories in the provinces, with the stimulation of the agricultural and cattle breeding activity with the rural trade and the boost of the staff training and employment.

He considered the situation of the nearly four million existing displaced persons as serious, underlining that they live on the international charity and solidarity of the government and other philanthropic organizations.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos said that following this situation, the unemployment rate reaches 60 per cent of the active population, plus the large number of demobilized and war veterans, that live in a very precarious situation.

The President also considered the people resettlement and reintegration in the communities as very slow.

He said that the normalization of the country's life implies that the government has to reassess its strategy for the resolution of the displaced population's problem and the sovereign bodies of all the society study together eventual sources of financing for the execution of policies following this strategy.

The Head of State recommended the government to have priority over the creation of ways of access, conditions for the supply of water, education and health and to launch resettlement campaigns, appealing to the national solidarity." (Government of Angola 12 November 2001)

### **GoA decrees Norms on the Resettlement on Internally Displaced Populations (January 2001)**

- GoA officially publishes decree on 5 January 2001
- In February 2001, a technical working group is formed to develop standard operating procedures for the implementation of Norms

#### ***Decree published on 5 January 2001:***

"The decree on norms on the resettlement of internally displaced populations was officially published by the Government of Angola on 5 January 2001. In late February 2001, a technical working group was formed under the leadership of the Ministry for Assistance and Social Resettlement to develop standard operating procedures for implementation of the norms. The aim of the technical working group, which includes 11 government ministries and departments, United Nations agencies and NGOs, is to produce a set

of legally binding procedures that guarantee the standardized application of the norms countrywide and identify benchmarks for monitoring the resettlement process." (UNSC 11 April 2001, para. 27)

***Planning already in progress for the implementation of the Norms at the provincial level via technical working group:***

"In February, under the leadership of MINARS, a technical working group was formed to develop standard operating procedures (regulamento) for the implementation of the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, approved by the Council of Ministers in October 2000. The key aim of the technical working group, which includes 11 Government ministries and departments, UN Agencies and NGOs, is to produce a set of legally binding procedures that guarantee the standardised application of the Norms countrywide and identify benchmarks for the monitoring of the resettlement process.

- Provincial Protection Plans

A key component of the IDP Humanitarian Principles Strategy, proposed by the Inter-Agency Protection Working Group in January, is the training of state and non-state actors at the provincial level on humanitarian principles and the development of provincial protection plans. The aim of the training programme is to sensitise key actors about humanitarian principles and the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, build momentum and consensus around the need to protect IDPs and develop a concrete action plan aimed at direct protection. Provincial workshops involve 30-40 participants, including representatives of Government ministries, Angolan Army and National Police liaison officers, civilian and military provincial attorneys, representatives of national and international NGOs, religious organisations and UN Agencies. Since December [2000], provincial workshops have been held in Uíge and Zaire Provinces. During February [2001], a similar workshop was conducted in Malanje Province. In each of the three provinces where provincial workshops have been held, provincial protection plans have been developed and submitted to the Provincial Governor for analysis, feedback and endorsement." (OCHA 28 February 2001)

"During March [2001], Provincial Protection Workshops were conducted in the Provinces of Benguela, Bié and Huambo. The aim of the workshops was to sensitise key actors about humanitarian principles and the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations, build momentum and consensus around the need to protect IDPs and develop a concrete plan of action aimed at direct protection. By the end of March, provincial protection plans had been developed in six provinces and presented to provincial Governors for review and endorsement. In Benguela, Bié, Huambo, Uíge and Zaire, partners have begun implementation of the plans. In Malanje, the provincial Governor approved the plan of action although no steps have been taken to implement its recommendations." (OCHA 18 April 2001)

"47. Pursuant to the norms, responsibility for resettlement and return is invested in provincial governments, which will oversee the process through the Provincial Humanitarian Coordination Group (PHCG) and the reactivated Sub-Group on Displaced Persons and Refugees. The norms specify preconditions for resettlement and targets for post-relocation assistance and as such address issues concerning the identification of resettlement sites, in terms of being verified as mine free, responsibility for which rests with the National Institute for the Removal of Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (INAROOE), and verified by the relevant defence and security organs as secure. The norms also provide for the voluntary nature of the resettlement process, involving all interested parties and beneficiaries in the planning and management of the relocation. State administration must be extended to resettlement or return sites, and health and education personnel will be supported, including through the provision of appropriate medical and teaching supplies, by the relevant government ministries. The authorities will work with humanitarian agencies to ensure the availability of water points in sufficient quantity and quality and to provide adequate sanitation. The displaced will be provided with seeds and tools and with food rations for a period to be determined. Preparation of resettlement sites will be supported through food-for-work projects. Finally, the PHCG will carry out regular assessments of the resettlement process.

[...]

51. The development of the norms was a fundamental component of a more appropriate response, to respect the safety and dignity of the displaced. Even before their formal adoption by the Council of Ministers in October 2000, the draft minimum standards [MINARS] were reportedly used as the de facto frame of reference by government officials and humanitarian organizations at the provincial level. They were also widely used in the preparation of the provincial Plans of Emergency Action in September [2000]. During 2001, the Government plans to relocate large numbers of displaced persons on the basis of the new norms. Estimates of the numbers involved range from 500,000 to up to 1 million. Whatever the eventual figure, effective implementation of the norms on resettlement, and monitoring, will be key to the whole process." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 47, 51)

*To study the Government decree of 5 January 2001 in detail, please consult the unofficial English translation available under sources below or the original document in Portuguese available by fax from the Global IDP Project.*

### **Prior to publication of Norms, GoA worked in collaboration with OCHA to develop minimum operational standards for resettlement and return (September-November 2000)**

- Norms describe pre-conditions for resettlement as well as targets for post-relocation assistance
- Norms developed around three themes: voluntariness, security and IDP participation

"In a major step forward, MINARS and OCHA worked closely together during May and June [2000] to develop minimum operational standards for resettlement and return. The draft norms were widely discussed by UN Agencies, NGOs, donors and Government representatives. The norms describe pre-conditions for resettlement as well as targets for post-relocation assistance and were formally approved by the Council of Ministers in mid-October." (UN November 2000, p. 5)

"In order to ensure safe and durable return and resettlement, the Angolan government, in close collaboration with OCHA, has drafted a set of Minimum Standards for Return and Resettlement (MINOPS). These draft standards were presented to the workshop by a representative of the Ministry of Social Affairs (MINARS). According to the representative of MINARS, these standards are developed around three key themes: Voluntariness, Security and IDP Participation. The MINOPS, consisting of nine points of concern, are divided up between conditions to be fulfilled before return/resettlement can be initiated and conditions to be fulfilled after return/resettlement has been completed. They cover issues such as security, presence and functioning of relevant State institutions, the role of the humanitarian community as well as the provision of land and basic social services." (NRC September 2000, Minimum Standards of Return and Resettlement)

### **Some commitment to humanitarian sectors shown by GoA with implementation of PNEAH (2000-2001)**

- US\$ 55 million PNEAH launched in October 1999
- National programme to provide humanitarian assistance to war-affected in two phases: Phase I focuses on humanitarian relief; Phase II focuses on land distribution, resettlement, and the rehabilitation of social infrastructure
- Effective implementation of programme questionable
- It is reported that as much as US\$ 34 million was unspent at end of Phase I

***PNEAH launched in 2000 to support humanitarian programming of Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS):***

"37. In July 1999, in a belated governmental effort to address the humanitarian situation, the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation was established, comprising MINARS, MINADER, MINSAs and also the Ministries of Planning, Territorial Administration, and Commerce. In October 1999, the Commission launched a US\$ 55 million National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) to be implemented in two phases. During the first phase (August 1999-March 2000), emergency assistance was to be provided to 'at-risk populations' in the provinces of Bengo, Malanje, Moxico, Huambo, Cuando Cubango, Uíge and Luan[da]. The second phase (April 2000-January 2001) was to focus on resettlement in the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Kwanza Norte and Huila." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 35-37)

"[T]he GoA has designed the National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) to complement the programmes of Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS). The management and implementation of the Programme are assured by the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Humanitarian Situation, integrating the ministries of Planning; Social Affairs and Reintegration; Territorial Administration; Health; Commerce; and Agriculture and Rural Development.

The Programme plans two phases of implementation. The first with a value calculated at US\$ 21,580,390 for the priority provinces of Huambo, Bié, Malanje, Moxico, kuando Kubango and Luanda, and the second phase calculated at US\$ 34,000,000 that will be extended to the provinces of Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul and Kwanza Norte.

PNEAH will provide humanitarian assistance to populations affected by the war and aid the process of reinstallation, thus possessing a character of emergency response while establishing the necessary linkages to ensure a perfect union with rehabilitation activities. In this manner, the global strategy of GoA humanitarian assistance should pass through three phases: emergency, rehabilitation, and development in coordination with programmes and projects that benefit from assistance from the international community.

PNEAH plans to shape the concept of assistance through an efficient management of resources that guarantees auto-sufficiency of populations. This will be achieved through close coordination with activities developed by the international humanitarian community and result in the elaboration of a common strategy, the elimination of duplication of interventions, and a clear distribution of responsibilities among programme implementers.

The principal objectives are founded primarily in the necessity to alleviate the needs of populations affected by the conflict and to promote initiatives of agricultural production for auto-sufficiency through resettlement projects for populations, the distribution of land and agricultural inputs, and the rehabilitation of basic community infrastructure.

The lines of strategic orientation will adhere to a coordination structure that will permit transparency of action and accountability to Government; logistical support and transport services to confront the emergency situation in priority provinces; a quick disbursement fund with ready access for commercial trade in rural areas with goods of primary necessity; and technical human resource competence and capacity.

For its implementation, PNEAH is divided into Sub-Programmes focused on assistance to the emergency, resettlement and rehabilitation and aid to the handicapped. It also includes projects that are related to sectors in the Consolidated Appeal, that will be complementary to the GoA Programme for Food Security and Nutrition, Health and Basic Sanitation, NFI, and Mine and Explosive Ordnance Awareness, with special attention given to children at risk." (UN 30 November 1999, pp. 10-11)

***Implementation of national programme has been on-going ever since:***



"In July 1999, the GRA allocated \$55 million to the National Program for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNEAH) for two phases of activity. Phase I focuses on humanitarian relief; Phase II focuses on land distribution, resettlement, and the rehabilitation of social infrastructure. Under Phase I, \$15 million has been spent, while \$23 million has been distributed to the governors directly in accordance with the government's decentralization policy under Phase II. The remaining \$17 million has been allocated to the governors. At this time, a more detailed breakdown of funds that have been spent is not available." (USAID 2 April 2001)

"A major development during the year has been the increasing commitment to humanitarian sectors demonstrated by the Government. Under the first phase of the Government's National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance (PNHEA), US\$ 55 million was allocated in July 1999 for assistance to hard-hit provinces. According to Government reports, by the end of August [2000], 14,430 metric tonnes (MTS) of emergency assistance, including food, agricultural inputs, medicines and relief items totaling US\$ 13 million, had been dispatched by the Inter-ministerial Commission for the Humanitarian Situation (CISH)...

In August [2000], the Government announced that US\$ 17 million would be allocated for the second phase of PNEAH, scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2000. The aim of the second phase is to promote sustainability of communities through land distribution, resettlement, agricultural inputs and rehabilitation of social infrastructures." (UN November 2000, 2000 in Review)

***Still, the commitment of the GoA to the programme has not been overwhelming:***

"65. Yet, the donors' desire to reduce the Government's reliance on the international community is understandable. The Government has in the past, and for reasons related to the collapse of consecutive peace agreements, tended to consider the responsibility of providing assistance to its displaced and war-affected population as resting with the United Nations. It has since shown an increased commitment to emergency assistance, starting with the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation in July 1999 and the elaboration by that Commission of the National Programme for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance. However, the inter-agency mission of March 2000 noted that the scale and scope of assistance delivered under the National Programme was yet to be clearly determined. More recent sources indicate that the US\$ 55 million allocated under the first phase of the National Programme was not spent and that in excess of US\$ 34 million remains, though only US\$ 17 million of this was rolled into the budget for 2000, making overall expenditure less than originally claimed." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 65)

**Angolan government has been heavily criticised for not taking greater action to support IDPs and other vulnerable populations (January - March 2001)**

- Angolan oil and diamond industries support one of fastest-growing economies in Africa
- Still, Angolan people are some of the poorest in the world
- Government attitude toward the displaced has been described as one of "neglect"
- Only 2.8% of GoA budget spent on national health

***Comments on the GoA from the UN Senior Inter-Agency Network following its mission to Angola in March 2001:***

"The GoA has undertaken a process of decentralisation of responsibilities to the provinces. This, however, has not been accompanied by devolution of necessary resources. The GoA is currently in the process of elaborating its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Addressing the issue of internal displacement is

a key condition for poverty reduction. Accordingly, there is a need for greater integration of humanitarian priorities, such as the delivery of basic services and the strengthening of the justice system." (OCHA 23 March 2001, Government Responsibility and Accountability)

***Comments on the GoA from the UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons following his visit to Angola in late 2000:***

"35. As emphasized in the Guiding Principles, the primary responsibility for meeting the protection and assistance needs of the internally displaced rests with the national authorities (Principle 3). In Angola, however, the Government's attitude to the displaced has, in the past, been described as one of neglect: 'The Government does very little for those people under its control, and most of the time it asks very little of them. They are left alone to sink or swim without the benefit of any social safety net ... Government structures such as MINARS [Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration], and the Ministries of Health and Education exist, but are so chronically underfunded as to be almost entirely ineffectual.' However, 'most Angolans have tended to prefer this form of neglect to UNITA's form of draconian social control'. Such an assessment gives particular cause for concern when one considers Angola's endowments of natural resources, in particular its oil reserves. Angola is the second largest oil exporter in sub-Saharan Africa, with the oil sector accounting for an estimated 53 per cent of gross domestic product between 1994 and 1998, and around 95 per cent of export receipts. In 1997, Angola exported crude oil to the value of over US\$ 4 billion."

[...]

66. Donors are said to feel strongly that the international community should not be expected to provide unlimited assistance and that the Government must assume greater responsibility by reallocating funds towards the social and emergency sectors. Such a view is increasingly convincing given high oil prices, from which the Government gains a substantial proportion of its revenues. Also, the changing military situation in the country, with a move away from conventional warfare to counter-insurgency strategies, should allow for reduced military spending and the redirection of funds to the humanitarian effort – though the Representative was informed by one senior government official that funds freed by any reductions in military spending would be used to expedite payments on debts accrued through government investment in the oil industry. The need to repay such debts notwithstanding, the Representative strongly recommends that the Government commit additional resources to the humanitarian effort, not least because a greater and more visible commitment on its part may prompt a similar response from donors." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 35, 66)

***Comments on the GoA in an Economist article published in January 2001:***

"IMAGINE two countries. The first, with one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa, will receive \$3.5 billion of investment from the international oil industry each year for the next ten years. By 2005 it will have become Africa's largest oil producer. The second is rated by the UN's Human Development Index a dismal 160th out of 174 countries. With a third of its children dying before their fifth birthday, and with two-fifths suffering from malnutrition, it is considered by Unicef to be "the worst place in the world to be a child". Both descriptions fit Angola, home to shocking juxtapositions.

After decades of civil war between the government and the UNITA rebels, most Angolans no longer wish for much more than to survive from one day to the next. Yet the offshore oil industry, and even the onshore diamond industry, continue to thrive, the revenue financing the war, on both sides, and fattening the pockets of the warlords. Most people get no benefit whatsoever from oil or diamonds; they are kept alive with the help of the hundreds of international aid agencies working in Angola.

But the agencies are growing weary with picking up the pieces left by the country's war, and some are voicing their frustrations in public. At the end of last year, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), which won the 1999 Nobel peace prize, released a strongly worded report; this followed on the heels of two other hard-hitting documents from World Vision and Save the Children. All three pin the blame on the Angolan

government and the Angolan rebels and international oil and diamond companies. They all point out that the country has the resources to look after its people, if it cared to do so.

The MSF report illustrates this argument with health statistics. In 1999, it says, only 2.8% of the budget was spent on health. In the city of Kuito, one of the areas worst hit by the war, only 1.2% of the central hospital's requirements is provided by the government. The shortfall has to be made up by aid agencies. "Oil production in the country is estimated at close to 800,000 barrels a day," writes MSF, "yet there is not a drop of diesel for the hospital generators, the only source of power in most large hospitals." This neglect, says MSF, is not, as the government claims, a consequence of the war but "the result of deliberate choices".

Donor fatigue is making it hard for the relief agencies to raise money for their Angolan operations. The UN has just launched an all-agency appeal for Angola for 2001. It is asking for \$202m but will, as in previous years, be lucky to raise half of that. Adding insult to injury, the Angolan government regularly complains that the relief groups are not doing enough. It also makes their work harder by not issuing work visas: MSF alone is wasting \$100,000 a year on flying its staff in and out of the country to renew their temporary visas.

Some aid workers have begun to ask themselves what they are doing. Clearly, they are helping to keep millions of people alive. Yet, by relieving the government of responsibility, are they too contributing to the continuation of the war?" (The Economist 11 January 2001 as found on MSF website)

*See also the OXFAM report entitled "Angola's Wealth: Stories of War and Neglect" for more information on the prosperity of the oil and diamond industries in Angola [\[External link\]](#).*

## Regional response

---

### Central African countries meet to coordinate policies and efforts on behalf of refugees and IDPs (November 2001)

- Meeting organised by the l'Association des Parlementaires Europeens pour l'Afrique (AWEPA) brings together representatives of five central African governments, including Angola, to attempt to synchronise policies and efforts related to refugees and IDPs
- One point of discussion was the possibility of expanding the mandate of UNHCR to increase its capacity to assist IDPs

"Representatives from the governments of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Republic of Congo, Gabon and Angola met last week in the DRC capital, Kinshasa, to synchronise their policies and efforts on behalf of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the region.

The meeting was organised by the l'Association des Parlementaires Europeens pour l'Afrique (AWEPA), in collaboration with the government of the DRC and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, from 24 to 26 Oct. AWEPA is an association of current and former members of national parliaments in Europe that works 'to support the functioning of parliaments in Africa and to keep Africa on the political agenda in Europe'.

Primary objectives of the conference included the promotion of human rights and in particular the rights of refugees, with special attention to women and children in light of their vulnerability; seeking long-term solutions to the problems of refugees and IDPs with a view to a safe return to their place of origin; and adoption in each country of national legislation and a national commission for refugees where no such thing already exists. Discussions were held regarding the possibilities of expanding the mandate of UNHCR to

increase their capacity to assist IDPs uprooted by war, and providing assistance to local populations that host refugees." (IRIN 1 November 2001)

## **International political response**

---

### **UN Secretary-General calls for an expanded UN mandate in Angola (July 2002)**

- UN-SG recommends expanded mandate of the UN Office in Angola in order to implement new tasks in support of peace consolidation
- New mission would be required, headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
- For military tasks, the new mission would require additional personnel, including 11 military liaison officers
- 16 additional UN human rights officers would be deployed to key provinces, to work in close coordination with humanitarian personnel on the ground
- Significant increase in donor support is required for the UN system to address the most urgent task in Angola, namely the delivery of humanitarian assistance to 3 million needy Angolans
- Recommendations follow on high-level assessment mission to Angola led by UN Special Adviser on Africa in June 2002

"To implement the new tasks described [in the report], the mandate of the United Nations Office in Angola, which is set out in Security Council resolution 1268 (1999), would need to be adjusted to include the following additional tasks:

To liaise with the parties through the Joint Military Commission and the Technical Group.

To provide advice to and general observation of the quartering, demobilization and reintegration process, if so requested by the Government of Angola.

To chair the Joint Commission, once it has been established, and promote reconciliation through good offices.

To assist in the development of strategies and programmes to consolidate peace.

In the area of human rights, to provide assistance for the building of institutions in support of the rule of law and to assist the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of national reconciliation and democratization.

48. This expanded mandate would require a new mission to succeed the United Nations Office in Angola, headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General who would lead the United Nations system in Angola and ensure coordination and integration in support of the consolidation of peace. In this connection, the Special Representative would assume the lead on the provision of United Nations support for the political and military functions envisaged in the first and second phases of the peace process, and help to conclude the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. He or she would also promote, in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding, the coordination of quartering, demobilization and reintegration and other activities between the United Nations and the World Bank.

49. For military tasks the new mission would require an increase in personnel, including 11 military liaison officers who would liaise with both FAA and military or former military components of UNITA. In my letter of 25 June 2002, I requested that the Security Council urgently approve the deployment of these personnel in connection with the immediate tasks of the United Nations in this area, and I am grateful for the Council's positive response. I wish to report that, to date, 7 of these United Nations military personnel have already been deployed in Angola.

50. As provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding, the military personnel would take part in the work of the Joint Military Commission, the Central Technical Group established in Luanda and, as needed and as logistical and security conditions permit, in the regional technical groups. In addition, they would provide military advice to the Head of Mission. They will be based in Luanda and will visit locations in the provinces if and when required.

51. To assist the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in chairing the Joint Commission, a few political affairs officers would be required for assignment to the Commission's secretariat when it is re-established. The actual number of officers will be determined when the scope of political tasks is clearer. Some modest interpretation facilities may also be required. In order to promote enhanced coordination within the United Nations system, some of those officers would perform liaison functions with the World Bank.

52. Assistance in the promotion and protection of human rights would require the deployment of 16 additional United Nations human rights officers to key provinces, in close coordination with humanitarian personnel already on the ground in those locations. This deployment would enable the United Nations to extend the reach of its programmes to more effectively support institution-building and national reconciliation, and to assist in the promotion and protection of the human rights of refugees, internally displaced persons, ex-combatants and their families. In view of the magnitude of the problems associated with rehabilitation of children and the needs of youth, the deployment of a Child Protection Adviser would also be considered.

53. The logistical and administrative capacity of the United Nations Office in Angola would also need to be augmented to adequately support the new mission. There would be a requirement for some additional vehicles, offices, communications equipment and support personnel. In this regard, I trust that the Government of Angola will make the necessary additional accommodation and other essential premises available to the new mission. Furthermore, the deployment of one light aircraft and one long-range helicopter would be required to ensure the necessary mobility of the military liaison and observer personnel.

54. Meanwhile, the most urgent task of the United Nations system with regard to the consolidation of peace in Angola remains the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the 3 million Angolans in need. Key priorities in this regard will be rapid delivery of food assistance to prevent hunger, support for resettlement and return, the provision of health packages and improved access to health care, an expansion of access to safe water and adequate sanitation systems, and the promotion of education and mine action. For the present, the United Nations humanitarian agencies will try to face these tasks with the current level of personnel deployed on the ground. However, significant additional resources will be urgently required from donors if the humanitarian organizations are to address the needs of vulnerable populations in an adequate manner. For the economic and recovery and development tasks, UNDP and other United Nations agencies would need to formulate mid-term and longterm programmes." (UN Security Council, 26 July 2002)

"Senior United Nations officials have completed a multi-agency assessment mission to Angola in an effort to clarify the UN's future role in the country.

Speaking to reporters prior to leaving the capital, Luanda, the UN's Special Adviser on Africa, Ibrahim Gambari, said that he will soon brief Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Secretariat as to how the UN can best organize itself in Angola and advise the Security Council on the mandate necessary to best assist the country to consolidate peace, promote national reconciliation and national reconstruction.

Meanwhile yesterday, a senior UN relief official who participated in the just-concluded mission said that the purpose of the visit was also to see what the UN could do to reinforce humanitarian action in Angola.

Ross Mountain, the UN's Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, told a press briefing in Geneva that the UN has been dealing with key aspects of relief assistance for the nearly 1.9 million people.

'But we are wanting to focus on the quartering areas where the UNITA troops have been regrouped,' he added, referring to the some 80,000 former rebel fighters of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola and about 230,000 of their dependents who have been gathered in 34 centres around the country.

Aside from those disarmed combatants, another area of focus for the UN was internally displaced people, many of whom were seeking to return to their homes now that peace has settled in Angola, Mr. Mountain said." (UN News Service, 19 June 2002)

### **Refugees International calls upon US government to continue to support IDPs in Angola (March 2002)**

- Refugees International (RI) argues that US should continue to fund UNHCR's IDP program in Angola, as it believes UNHCR is the UN agency best able to help displaced people
- The US would be inconsistent if it supports UNHCR's work with IDPs in Afghanistan but withdraws from such support in Africa, charges RI

"For the last two years, the United States has supported an important and successful effort to protect internally displaced people in Angola. That program, run by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, has dramatically improved conditions for displaced people near Luanda and in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire.

[...]

Although the UNHCR's program for internally displaced people (IDPs) deals directly with only 200,000 of Angola's 3.4 million IDPs, its impact is far broader. Angola was the first nation to adopt as law a set of protections for IDPs based on work done by Roberta Cohen and Francis Deng at the Brookings Institution. Conditions for many IDPs remain deplorable, but the standards are causing the government to pay more attention to the internal victims of Angola's long civil war.

The expansion of services for internally displaced people, who suffer many of the same problems as refugees but lack the same legal protections, is an important humanitarian development, one that is encouraging the international community to focus on helping IDPs around the world.

[...]

The IDP work in Angola has succeeded in part because the UNHCR, the UN agency best able to help displaced people, has run the program with U.S. support. However, I understand, that the U.S. funding is about to end. One reason is that the U.S. doesn't believe that the UNHCR is the appropriate agency to assist IDPs. If this is correct, it would be a step backwards. It would reverse an increasing and significant U.S. commitment to the protection of IDPs, and it would weaken the UNHCR's ability and interest in providing such protection.

Although it may be possible for the European Union and other donors to fund a portion of this program, I hope that the U.S. will not bail out of an effort that it helped inspire, thereby signaling a declining interest in IDP protection. It seems inconsistent for the U.S. to support the UNHCR's work with IDPs in Afghanistan while backing away from similar protections in Africa.

I hope that the U.S. will continue to work to help bring the protections for IDPs up to the level received by refugees." (RI 1 March 2002)

### **Widespread agreement that the United Nations could play a more proactive role in Angola (December 2001)**

- UN USG Ibrahim Gambari tells the Security Council that the Angolan government would not object to facilitating contacts with UNITA through the UN
- Issues on which the government wished to begin immediate cooperation include the resettlement of IDPs
- Security Council members expressed widespread support for the idea of the UN becoming more proactive in Angola

"A convergence of opinion was emerging for the first time that the United Nations should play a more proactive role in the Angolan peace process, Ibrahim Gambari, Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor of the Secretary-General for Special Assignments in Africa told the Security Council this morning.

Briefing Council members on his recent mission to Angola, he said the Angolan Government would not object to a church role in facilitating contacts with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) through the United Nations. Issues on which the Government wished to begin immediate cooperation included management of the Fund for Peace and Reconciliation; pilot projects for demobilized soldiers and resettled internally displaced persons; and assistance in the electoral process.

Among the issues that the Government felt required further consideration, he said, were modalities for disarming UNITA combatants and weapons collection; direct contacts with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi; and the possibility of establishing humanitarian corridors. While ruling out any attempts to resolve the Angolan conflict outside the Lusaka Protocol framework or to renegotiate the Protocol, the Government recognized the need for some adjustments to take account of the changed realities on the ground.

He said the position of UNITA parliamentarians was that the Lusaka Protocol should be implemented with adjustments indicated in the 12-point peace plan that UNITA had communicated to the United Nations. While reiterating their commitment to dialogue within the Lusaka Protocol, they cautioned that the Protocol should not be used simply as a platform to obtain Mr. Savimbi's surrender. Although the parliamentary group could largely convey UNITA's position, the final decision lay with Mr. Savimbi.

Following Mr. Gambari's briefing, Council members expressed widespread support for the idea of the United Nations becoming more proactive in Angola. Many saw the Government's willingness to engage the Organization as an opportunity to be seized and one that would definitely enhance the peace process. Speakers also urged the Angolan church and civil society organizations to continue efforts aimed at national reconciliation and called on Mr. Savimbi and UNITA to return to the negotiating table and dialogue." (UN SC 21 December 2001)

### **International sanctions against UNITA remain in force (December 2000-October 2001)**

- UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, established in April 2000
- Mechanism released report in December 2000 and addendum in April 2001
- Committee emphasizes the need to deprive UNITA of its diamond income
- Supplementary report submitted in October 2001 and mandate extended

***Most recent extension of mandate:***

"The Security Council this afternoon decided to extend the mandate of the monitoring mechanism on sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) for six months, ending on 19 April 2002." (UNSC 19 October 2001)

***Following the release of the April 2001 addendum:***

"The Mechanism's overall assessment is that 'sanctions continue to play an important part in efforts to resolve the Angolan conflict. With no fixed arms supply lines and diminishing revenue from diamonds, UNITA's military capacity has been significantly reduced'.

The addendum gives further information about arms smuggling to UNITA, and concludes that 'the central role played by the identified brokering companies in the procurement of arms by UNITA is overwhelming and cannot be overemphasised.' It stresses that, 'the need to tighten the regulations governing the activities and operations of arms-brokering companies has become urgent. Similarly, the establishment of an international register of the dubious companies involved in sanctions-busting should be given due consideration'.

[...]

The Mechanism did not find evidence that any major changes in UNITA structures in Africa have taken place. Burkina Faso and Togo continue to be important countries of residence for senior UNITA officials and their family members.

However, the Mechanism stated that 'there are indications that some of the countries of importance to UNITA are re-examining their policies'. Information received by the Mechanism suggests a significant move by Cote d'Ivoire to deny UNITA officials passports.

[...]

UNITA's income from diamonds did drop dramatically from 1999, when it was estimated to be at least \$300 million. However, the Mechanism's findings point out that the drop was due to UNITA's more limited capacity to mine rather than the imposition of sanctions.

The addendum points out that there was an increase in non-UNITA smuggling during 2000, "which clearly means that illicit Angolan diamonds are reaching diamond markets regardless of the certificate of origin system and which also makes the tracing of UNITA diamonds more problematic". It continues that "diamond smuggling from Angola has been estimated to have increased to \$250 million in 2000 according to industry sources". (Action for Southern Africa 25 April 2001)

***Following the release of the initial December 2000 report:***

"New recommendations to prevent violations of the sanctions against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) were published today [28 December 2000] in a report released at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

The report of the Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions, which was set up by the Council in April, points out that "in order for the measures against UNITA to be taken seriously, the Security Council should consider applying sanctions against any Government found to be intentionally violating them." Among its



recommendations, the report calls for the implementation of a "certificate of origin" scheme aimed at clarifying where diamonds come from. "This will both protect the legitimate industry and begin to clarify the problem of illicit diamonds," the report notes.

While concluding that UNITA's capacity to produce diamonds has been hampered by the military advances of government forces, the report emphasizes the need to continue to deprive the rebel group of its diamond income. "As UNITA's traditional allies and arms suppliers and conduits become more hesitant, as a result of publicity and the 'name and shame' campaign, we expect UNITA to seek new and unexpected friends and to explore more subtle and refined ways of evading the sanctions," the report states.

The report provides an array of information on the underground trade in arms and diamonds to Angola, naming those responsible and tracing their business dealings in other parts of Africa and around the world. It notes that stemming the problem in Angola will have wider implications for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Sierra Leone.

'We have to take into account that there are many common elements in terms of arms, diamond dealers and air transport carriers involved in these conflicts,' the authors write. 'It would not be a surprise to see emerging the same names, companies and activities related to the organized crime profiting from death, destruction and greed. Those elements have no nationality or loyalty of any kind and can be found today in Angola and tomorrow somewhere else,' they warn.

The Monitoring Mechanism was established by the Security Council on 18 April [2000] to collect information on violations of the sanctions against UNITA and recommend ways to improve their implementation. Its members were Ambassador Juan Larrain of Chile (Chairman), Ambassador Lena Sundh of Sweden, Ms. Christine Gordon of the United Kingdom, Mr. James Manzou of Zimbabwe and Mr. Ismaila Seck of Senegal." (DPI 28 December 2000)

*For a full copy of the 21 December report, please refer to original document [\[External link\]](#). Also of importance is the Mechanism's Supplementary Report to the UN Security Council dated October 2001 [\[External link\]](#). Further information about the Monitoring Mechanism can be found at "UN Monitoring Mechanism on Angola Sanctions established to prevent violations by UNITA" [\[Internal link\]](#).*

### **Angolan peace process Troika re-activates activities with the opening of the UN Office in Angola (September 2000)**

- Troika of observers composed of the U.S., Portugal and Russia has decided to reactivate activities
- Troika says that mechanisms of sanctions against UNITA must be reinforced

"The Angolan peace process Troika of observers composed of the U.S., Portugal and Russia has decided to re-activate its activities with the opening of the United Nations Office to Angola (UNOA) in Luanda. The decision is contained in a declaration issued on Friday in New York after a meeting of the Troika member countries, held alongside the UN General Assembly summit. The Troika says that the mechanisms of sanctions imposed on Jonas Savimbi's organization must be reinforced as a necessary instrument to coerce the rebel group to give up its military option. The document adds that this measure aims to compel UNITA rebels to abandon bellicose actions and join the Angolan democratic society, as a political partner to contest for power through elections." (GOA 19 September 2000)

## **International humanitarian response**

---

## **UN USG for Humanitarian Affairs describes situation in Angola as 'dire' following visit (July 2002)**

- UN USG for Humanitarian Affairs visits Angola and cites the return and resettlement of IDPs as one of the major challenges facing the country
- UN USG Oshima highlighted the need for a significant increase in donor support to Angola

"Briefing the Council on the latest developments in the humanitarian situation in Angola, Kenzo Oshima, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, said that Angola, the United Nations and its partners had a unique opportunity to create a new partnership to address both humanitarian needs and reconstruction and development issues.

It was important, he continued, to seize that opportunity with renewed effort and commitment, developing an appropriate framework for the partnership. Mr. Oshima had just returned from a mission to Angola and southern Africa, where he visited three of the six countries affected by the looming hunger crisis -- Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia. The mission followed an earlier, broad-based mission led by Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa Ibrahim Gambari.

The purpose of the latest mission, he said, was to assess the situation on the ground, ensure that effective aid coordination was in place, and discuss a set of key issues with the Government of Angola. Despite positive political developments since the signing of the ceasefire in April, the humanitarian situation in the country remained dire. Among the major challenges were the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), including the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) combatants and their families, and demining.

Significant step-up of donor support was needed to immediately carry out those activities, he continued. The 2002 Consolidated Appeal for Angola had requested \$233 million. To date, just \$81 million (35 per cent of the funds requested) had been granted. In the light of the changed circumstances and additional needs, there was a need to revise the Consolidated Appeal for Angola." (UN Security Council, 17 July 2002)

## **Four NGOs give rare oral briefing to the UN Security Council on the humanitarian and human rights situation in Angola (March 2002)**

*Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam and Save the Children testified before the Security Council in an Arria Formula briefing (an informal meeting of the members of the Security Council rather than of the Security Council per se)*

**Human Rights Watch** charged that the UN and the government of Angola are failing to protect the rights of millions of people displaced by the country's civil war. For the full briefing [click here](#).

**Médecins Sans Frontières** focused on the lack of access to vulnerable civilians and the forced displacement of populations. For the full briefing [click here](#).

**Oxfam** warned that Angola is at a crossroads between peace and a descent into fresh bloodshed. For the news release [click here](#).

*(Save the Children did not publish a briefing paper)*

## **UN Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement conducts mission to Angola in March 2001**

- UN Special Coordinator, together with representatives from FAO, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and NGO community, undertook mission to Angola in March 2001
- Objectives of mission were to assess the needs of the displaced and the capacity of humanitarian actors to respond to such needs

"The Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement, led by the UN Special Coordinator on Internal Displacement, together with representatives of FAO, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, the Office of the Representative of the Secretary General on IDPs, and the NGO community, undertook a mission to Angola from 12 to 17 March. The main objectives of the mission were to: assess the nature and magnitude of the assistance and protection needs of internally displaced persons, particularly with regard to women and children; to review the operational capacity of UN agencies and other humanitarian actors on the ground to respond to such needs, with a view of identifying any gaps in the humanitarian response; to review existing institutional arrangements within and between the UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement, NGOs and the Government, and to make recommendations to concerned agencies, organisations and the Government for future action. The Mission also set out to assess the extent of implementation of the recommendations stemming from the visit to Angola of the RSG on IDPs in November 2000.

The mission met with Government officials as well as representatives of United Nations, the Red Cross Movement, other international organizations, civil society and non-governmental organisations, and members of the diplomatic community. The delegation travelled to the Provinces of Bié and Huambo and visited Viana in Luanda." (OCHA 23 March 2001, Background)

*For full details and recommendations from the Senior Network mission, please refer to the report published in March 2001 [\[External link\]](#).*

## **UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons visited Angola in November 2000**

- Dr. Francis M. Deng visits Angola from 31 to 9 October 2000
- Overall, the Representative finds a marked improvement in the situation of the internally displaced
- Despite improvements, insecurity and problems of access continue to make the situation for internally displaced persons extremely difficult
- Recommendations made by the Representative in the January 2001 addendum to his mission report

"At the invitation of the Government of Angola, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis M. Deng, undertook an official visit to Angola from 31 October to 9 November.

The objectives of the Representative's visit were to study the situation of internal displacement in the country and to dialogue with the Government, international agencies, non-governmental organizations and other relevant actors towards ensuring effective responses to the current conditions of the internally displaced in Angola.

[...]

The Representative's visit to Angola should be seen in the context of other international missions to the country this year, beginning with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke and the subsequent inter-agency mission in March, led by the Emergency Relief Coordinator a.i., Carolyn

McAskie. Both these visits drew international attention to the plight of the internally displaced and raised serious concerns as to the extent to which their needs were being met by the Government and the international community. The Representative's visit provided an opportunity to assess the extent of progress which has been made, the extent to which the needs of the displaced are being addressed, what gaps exist and how these might be filled.

[...]

Overall, the Representative found a marked improvement in the situation of the internally displaced and in terms of the national and international response to their plight. Emphasising the primary responsibility of the State for meeting the needs of its internally displaced population, the Representative was encouraged to learn that the Government has taken important steps to improve institutional arrangements at the national and provincial levels and its coordination with the international community, in particular United Nations agencies. In addition, the Representative noted with appreciation the development by the Government, in cooperation with United Nations agencies, of a legal framework spelling out minimum standards for the return and resettlement of the internally displaced, incorporating the standards contained in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement . . .

[...]

Such developments notwithstanding, the Representative's visits to the field revealed that a number of problems remain. Humanitarian action is constrained by the prevailing climate of insecurity, characterised by armed attacks on civilians, banditry, and the extensive presence and continued use of landmines, giving rise to problems of access, which is generally limited to provincial capitals and certain towns. There are also severe logistical constraints. Much of the infrastructure is destroyed and road access throughout the country is limited by insecurity. In the absence of effective surface distribution of assistance, there is an increased reliance on air transport which is costly. In addition, airstrips in places such as Kuito, which is entirely dependent on air support, are in urgent need of repair. Because of the increased insecurity of the war and in order to discourage reliance on the international community to provide assistance to the displaced, donor countries are reducing funding for humanitarian operations." (UNHCHR 10 November 2000, paras. 1,2,4,5,6)

***The following list of recommendations was made by the Representative in his full January 2001 report:***

"113. Some tangible improvements have been made in regard to the situation of the internally displaced and in the national and international response to the problem. The Representative is encouraged by the steps taken by the Government to improve institutional arrangements at the national and provincial levels and its coordination with the international community, in particular United Nations agencies. The Representative notes with appreciation the development by the Government, in cooperation with United Nations agencies, of the norms for the resettlement of internally displaced persons, based on the Guiding Principles. The Representative also welcomes the progress made by the Humanitarian Coordinator, the United Nations Country Team and NGOs in improving the international humanitarian response, which has resulted in the stabilization of displaced populations, demonstrated most visibly by the resettlement of the majority of vulnerable displaced populations previously residing in deplorable conditions in transit centres.

114. Such developments notwithstanding, the Representative's visits to the field revealed that coordination often is not effective on the ground and that a number of serious humanitarian and protection concerns remain which must be addressed. In particular, the Representative is concerned at the lack of effective protection accorded to the physical security and human rights of the displaced and the civilian population. In the light of such concerns, a number of recommendations, already introduced in appropriate contexts in the previous sections, are summarized in this concluding section.

**Development of standard operational procedures to ensure the uniform implementation of the norms on resettlement and the involvement of humanitarian organizations in security assessments**

115. Given the increasing emphasis on resettlement of displaced populations, the Representative encourages MINARS, in cooperation with international agencies, to draft standard operating procedures to ensure implementation of the technical provisions provided in the MINOPS. The Representative also

encourages MINARS to ensure the involvement of humanitarian agencies in security assessments of prospective resettlement sites and to provide mechanisms for resolving conflicting security assessments of specific sites between the authorities and humanitarian organizations.

#### **Full implementation of the norms on resettlement within security perimeters**

116. The Representative stresses the fundamental need to ensure the safety and security of the displaced. To the extent to which resettlement is required, it must be undertaken within the security perimeters of towns and cities and in full accordance with the norms on resettlement and applicable human rights standards.

#### **Increase d engagement of the Government and donors in the humanitarian response**

117. While acknowledging the increasing efforts of the Government to respond to the humanitarian situation, the Representative strongly recommends that the Government commit additional resources to the humanitarian effort, not least because a greater and more visible commitment on the part of the Government might prompt a similar response from donors. Angola is one of the richest countries in Africa in oil and other resources and should be able to shoulder a larger part of the humanitarian burden.

#### **More effective coordination within the Government and with the United Nations and NGOs, and reinvigoration of the Humanitarian Coordination Group**

118. While some improvements have been noted, problems remain at the national level between different ministries which impede the efforts of the United Nations to advocate policies effectively with the Government. In an effort to address these problems, the Representative urges the reinvigoration of the national Humanitarian Coordination Group, which should bring all relevant governmental and international actors together on a monthly basis. Similarly, emphasis should be placed on ensuring more effective coordination at the field level through the active participation of all relevant actors in provincial coordination structures, including monitoring the implementation of humanitarian assistance.

#### **Agreed criteria for targeting food distributions**

119. The Representative, noting the existence of the Vulnerability and Assessment Working Group, underlines the importance of ensuring that there is a consensus among humanitarian partners on the criteria on which targeted food distributions are based, so as to ensure that all vulnerable groups receive food distributions on which, for lack of alternatives, they depend. In this connection, the Representative reiterates his concerns that reductions in general food distributions have been forced on WFP by donors at a time of significant increases in admissions of moderately malnourished displaced and resident children to supplementary feeding centres.

#### **Increased access to populations in need**

120. Given the security constraints in areas that are not under government control, the Representative recommends that international agencies and NGOs cooperate more fully with church groups and national and local NGOs which are able to operate in insecure areas and have access to the displaced.

#### **Adequate maintenance and repair of airstrips and provision of logistical capacity**

121. Given the humanitarian operation's continued dependency on air transportation, the relevant authorities should ensure that airstrips such as that at Kuito are repaired as soon as possible and adequately maintained thereafter. Requests by WFP for additional aircraft should be responded to positively, so as to ensure that existing levels of access are maintained if not increased.

#### **Extension of vaccination coverage**

122. In view of the prevalence of polio and other diseases amongst displaced populations, especially children, the Representative suggests that the Government consider the possibility of allowing international agencies to extend vaccination coverage to UNITA-held areas, assuming that adequate security guarantees can be obtained.

#### **Provision of primary and also secondary education**

123. The Government should take steps, beginning with an increase in the allocation of resources to the Ministry of Education, to ensure that displaced children and children in general have access to primary and secondary education. Failure to invest sufficiently in education may have serious consequences for the future development of the country.

#### **Increased awareness of abuses against children**

124. The Representative was particularly alarmed by reports that children are being abducted and traded by UNITA for use as forced labour. Local NGOs and church groups which may have access to the areas concerned are encouraged to collect additional and more detailed information, which should be brought to the attention of the national authorities and the international community.

#### **A more focused and active approach to protection by the Government in particular and also by the international community**

125. Given that the primary responsibility for the protection of the displaced rests with the Government, the Representative suggests a number of courses of action which could be taken by the authorities:

(a) National legislation on internally displaced persons . The Government is encouraged, in cooperation with the international community, to develop and adopt national legislation which clearly articulates the rights of the displaced and the obligations towards them of the national authorities and other actors, such as UNITA.

(b) Dissemination of the Guiding Principles . Efforts should be undertaken to raise awareness among the displaced of their human rights as restated in the Guiding Principles. To this end, wide dissemination of the Principles among local NGOs, church groups and displaced communities is essential.

(c) Training of military and police personnel . Greater efforts should be taken to train the military and police on the human rights of the internally displaced and the civilian population, so as to enhance protection and help prevent arbitrary displacement. The Representative welcomes the efforts which are being taken to this end by the Human Rights Division of UNOA and by ICRC and recommends that such efforts be expanded.

(d) Timely receipt of salaries and supplies by military personnel . In an effort to prevent looting by government troops and the harassment, violence and displacement associated with it, the Representative suggests that the Government take the necessary measures to ensure that military personnel receive salaries and supplies in a timely manner.

(e) Accountability of police and military personnel . The Government must take suitable measures to ensure that its military and police personnel are held accountable for human rights violations against the displaced and civilian population. The Ministry of Justice's proposed policy to ensure accountability of police and military personnel should be finalized as soon as possible and the requisite human and financial resources provided to make it effective on the ground. The Attorney-General is requested to instruct his provincial-level staff to visit the displaced, collect testimony and information on human rights violations, and instigate criminal proceedings against the perpetrators.

(f) Issuance of personal documentation . Given the problems of harassment experienced by the displaced, the Representative recommends that the Government take the necessary steps to issue to all internally displaced persons all documents necessary for the enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights. In particular, the authorities should facilitate the issuance of new documents or the replacement of documents lost in the course of displacement.

(g) Judicial capacity building and accountability . Serious efforts need to be undertaken to build the national and provincial capacity to prevent and address protection problems. The Representative proposes that the Human Rights Division of UNOA and UNICEF, in cooperation with the Government, consider seeking funds for the proposed project on strengthening the judiciary at the municipal level within the framework of a technical cooperation project with OHCHR.

(h) Enhanced protection role for the international community . In the absence of effective national and provincial capacity to address and prevent protection problems, it is imperative that the international community enhances its role in regard to protection. A number of measures are suggested in this regard:

i. Convening of a brainstorming session on protection , for all relevant members of the humanitarian community, using the IASC protection policy paper as the basis for discussions and strategy formulation;

ii. Despatch of an inter-agency mission to the country to assist in a thorough review of protection issues and to identify appropriate response and preventive strategies; in this regard, the Representative strongly recommends that the forthcoming mission to Angola by the Senior Inter-Agency Network give due focus to protection issues and strategies for response and prevention, including by ensuring that members of the mission have sufficient expertise in protection work;

iii. Enhancement of the international protection presence in the provinces to ensure effective monitoring, reporting and follow-up on violations of the rights of the internally displaced, including training of field-based staff in identifying and raising protection concerns, either directly or through other actors at the national, regional or international levels; revision, if necessary, of the design, placement and content of relief activities, so as to deter human rights abuses; expansion of the UNOA Human Rights Division's capacity and presence throughout the country; establishment of a protection working group within each province; and the establishment of a small protection strategy team in Luanda to support the provincial-level protection working groups. In addition, given its comparative advantage in protection, UNHCR is encouraged to examine further possibilities for an enhanced presence and the development of nationwide inter-agency protection strategies in regard to internally displaced persons.

## **Landmines**

126. Given the catastrophic landmine situation throughout the country and the problems it gives rise to in terms of security, access and resettlement, the Government is strongly encouraged to implement the Ottawa Convention without delay. Adequate donor response to the 2001 CAP is necessary to ensure a comprehensive approach to mine action, which the donors themselves favour.

## **Comprehensive peace and national reconciliation**

127. Although the Government claims to control over 90 per cent of the country, UNITA is still able to effectively employ guerrilla tactics which are exacting a heavy price on the displaced and civilian population. Moreover, the ongoing state of insecurity is a major constraint on the humanitarian response and undermines the long-term development prospects for the country and the possibility of durable solutions for the internally displaced. As such, vigorous efforts must be pursued by all relevant actors towards the achievement of a sustainable political solution to the conflict, and national reconciliation.

128. In the space of seven months, from April to November 2000, the Government and the international community have taken significant steps to improve the conditions of the internally displaced in Angola.

And they have done so in very difficult circumstances, characterized by ongoing insecurity, problems of access, logistical difficulties and reduced donor support. Such developments and constraints notwithstanding, further substantial efforts are required to address effectively the ongoing humanitarian and, especially, protection problems identified in this report. The international community has a clear role to play in addressing these problems. However, its efforts should not be substituted for those of the Government but should support the Government, which, in turn, should seek to consolidate its leadership role and fully assume its responsibility for the displaced, including by providing increased financial resources to the humanitarian effort." (CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 113-128)

*For the full details of the visit and its findings, please consult the initial release of the UNHCHR about his visit [\[External link\]](#) as well as the full report of the Special Representative [\[External link\]](#).*

## **International coordination**

---

### **Problems noted by UN Representative on Internally Displaced Persons with regard to effective implementation of existing coordination mechanisms (January 2001)**

- The Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration (MINARS) is increasingly marginalized, receiving fewer funds and forced to send all emergency legislation through the Inter-Ministerial Commission
- Coordination between MINARS, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Territorial Administration has been complicated and uneven
- Coordination with international partners is also lacking – Humanitarian Coordination Group has met only once since April 2000

"69. While coordination mechanisms exist at the national and provincial levels, there appear to be problems with their effective implementation which may have direct and indirect repercussions for the internally displaced. At the national level, concerns were raised pertaining to coordination problems within the Government. Although the establishment of the Inter-Ministerial Commission on the Humanitarian Situation was a welcome step demonstrating increased governmental commitment to addressing the humanitarian situation, it has not been without its problems. Concerns were expressed over the increasingly unclear role of MINARS, which should be the focal point for the coordination of the humanitarian response. The Representative was informed that MINARS had been increasingly marginalized, receiving fewer funds and forced to send all emergency legislation through the Inter-Ministerial Commission. This is further complicated by the appointment of the Minister of Planning as the chair of the Inter-Ministerial Commission and the apparent reluctance of her Ministry to assume full responsibility for emergency assistance. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Territorial Administration is seeking an increased role in resettlement, given the role of the provincial governors in the process. Coordination between these three ministries had been described as complicated and uneven and as giving rise to problems for the United Nations in being able to advocate policies effectively with the Government. There is an obvious need for effective coordination within the Government and with the United Nations and NGOs. To this end, the Representative urges the reinvigoration of the national Humanitarian Coordination Group, which is supposed to bring all relevant governmental and international actors together on a monthly basis but which has seemingly met only once since April 2000." (CHR 25 January 2001, para. 69)

### **New information format introduced to improve work of Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG) (February 2001)**



- New information format will be used by both the Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UTCAH) and OCHA to compile standardized information on a monthly basis
- Information format will be used to monitor the progress of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
- The creation of a database is being discussed to cover key trends and indicators in the humanitarian sector

"To ensure that the humanitarian assistance activities are integrated across sectors and coordinated between partners, key indicators including displacement rates, nutrition rates and disease outbreaks will be monitored on a regular basis. A first and important step in this direction was the introduction in January 2001 of an information format for the Humanitarian Coordination Group (HCG). The new format, which covers a wide-range of humanitarian sectors, will be used jointly by UTCAH and OCHA to compile information on a monthly basis. The secretariat for the HCG will collect the information in the standardised format from the 18 provinces and create a series of charts and maps showing important developments and trends for each sector. This information will be presented to key policy-makers, including Vice-Ministers, Heads of Agencies and Ambassadors, who attend the monthly HCG. The format will be used to monitor the progress of the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal and adjust the overall humanitarian operation at the national level as required. The first meeting of the HCG is tentatively scheduled for the beginning of April [2001].

#### Integrated Information

In an effort to standardise the process of information management, the Inter-Agency Technical Team has begun to discuss the development of an integrated multi-sectoral database. The database would cover key trends and indicators and would be introduced and maintained in each province. Currently, at least four different agency databases are operational in the field and virtually every Government ministry operates some form of data-tracking mechanism.

An information task force composed of representatives from appropriate Government departments, UN Agencies and NGOs will be formed shortly to conduct an inventory of these systems, identifying areas of overlap and information gaps. During coming months, the taskforce will aim to design a simple, robust, integrated database that can be introduced into the provinces by the end of the year. The taskforce will build on existing systems while taking into consideration the sensitive issues of data credibility and data collection." (OCHA 28 February 2001)

#### **US Ambassador to the UN makes criticism of UN coordination in Angola following his visit to the country in July 2000**

- Ambassador Holbrooke is highly critical of UN coordination in his report to ECOSOC
- Following his criticism, the GoA requests UNHCR to assist with internally displaced persons
- A UNHCR assessment mission for expanded programming follows in late May 2000

"The UN debate on internal displacement focused on internally displaced persons in Angola. Ambassador Holbrooke had recently visited Angola, where WFP was the coordinating UN agency for displaced persons, and was highly critical of what he saw, telling ECOSOC, 'Anyone in this room who's been in Angola knows full well that the UN response is inadequate to the problem. Anyone who's been in Luanda knows that the UN agencies there are passing the buck.'

Shortly after Holbrooke's Security Council speech, the Angolan government requested UNHCR to assist with internally displaced people. In April, UNHCR sent an assessment mission, followed in late May, by a mission conducted by 12 senior staff, paving the way for an expanded field operation in the northern provinces of Uige and Zaire.

At the ECOSOC meeting, Holbrooke pledged \$2 million from the United States for UNHCR to expand its assistance program in northern Angola 'to cover emergency relief and protection needs of internal refugees.' But, in the absence of a lead agency approach, Holbrooke warned, 'Let's see if the UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, and all the other organizations really do work together in the future. It's easy to talk about in this room. I find it unlikely that it will happen in the most difficult conditions—in a place like Luanda, where the agencies are in different buildings, where they don't have phone communications, when they work under the most difficult of circumstances—but let's give it a shot. The world will be watching.'" (USCR July 2000)

### **Different coordination structures established over the years to assist internally displaced populations (1998-2000)**

- TWG, made up of representatives from the GoA, UN Agencies, donors, national and international NGOs, established and scheduled to meet every two weeks to discuss technical aspects of the humanitarian challenges in Angola
- UCAH, through its IDP monitor, acts as a focal point for IDPs
- Activities conducted on behalf of IDPs include: definition of guidelines, coordination of assistance projects, advocacy of humanitarian principles, negotiation of access, maintenance of an IDP database and reporting

#### ***Technical UN-GoA Working Group for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (TWG):***

"The Technical Working Group for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (TWG) met for the first time on 8 June [2000]. Composed of high-level technical representatives from the Government, UN Agencies, donors, national and international NGOs and sub-groups of the NHCG, the TWG has been formed to analyze, discuss and offer technical recommendations to the National Humanitarian Coordination Group (NHCG) and the Inter-Ministerial Commission for the Humanitarian Situation regarding operating procedures for humanitarian assistance programs. The TWG is scheduled to meet every two weeks under the chairmanship of MINARS." (OCHA 19 June 2000)

#### ***International coordination: The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) (1998-1999)***

"UCAH has been facilitating the coordination of humanitarian operations since May 1993 in Angola. The UCAH Field Coordination Unit will continue [in year 2000] to monitor the evolution of the overall humanitarian situation and provide appropriate information to humanitarian actors at central and provincial levels.

UCAH Field Advisors are present in provinces where the humanitarian condition is particularly critical and assistance is being delivered. The Field Coordination Unit based in Luanda supports these Field Advisors. This Unit ensures the appropriate follow-up and analysis of all issues reported by the field and maintains contact with humanitarian operators in Luanda.

In addition to its main responsibilities as facilitator of the coordination of effective implementation of humanitarian assistance programmes, OCHA was entrusted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the UN with a specific mandate related to IDPs. Therefore, UCAH will continue to monitor and report on displacements and war-affected populations throughout the country.

Field Advisors play an essential role in the evaluation of proposals submitted to the Emergency Response Fund. These proposals are most often generated in the field with input from an UCAH Field Advisor, where present." (UN 30 November 1999, p. 96)

## International donor response (2001-2002)

---

### UN launches 'bridging request' for US\$ 142 million to support humanitarian operations in Angola (June 2002)

#### Total Funding Requirements

Sector Requirements	
Food Security	66,077,615
Nutrition	3,309,000
Health	25,468,000
Water and Sanitation	5,337,000
Education	5,413,000
Protection	4,206,000
Mine Action	2,362,000
Emergency Response	4,316,000
Resettlement and Return	5,927,000
Refugees	1,913,085
Coordination	5,851,310
Security and Communications	2,308,000
Logistics	9,408,128
<b>Total</b>	<b>141,896,138</b>

Agency Requirements	
FAO	2,750,000
OCHA	5,363,310
UNDP	2,280,000
UNFPA	1,500,000
UNHCR	1,870,085
UNICEF	22,600,000
WFP	71,092,743
WHO	9,200,000
NGOs	25,240,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>141,896,138</b>

(UN OCHA, 18 June 2002)

For full document, [click here](#)

### **US Government has provided significant support to programmes benefitting IDPs in Angola (June 2002)**

- USAID/ OFAD supports various programmes benefitting more than 2.2 million vulnerable IDPs in Angola
- As of June 2002, the US government had - in that fiscal year - provided more than US\$ 75 million in humanitarian assistance to Angola

"The GRA [Government of the Republic of Angola] estimates that more than 4.0 million Angolans have been affected by the civil war. To date, the United States Government (USG) has provided more than \$75.1 million in emergency assistance to those affected by war in Angola in FY 2002, channeled through the United States Agency for International Development's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP), and Africa Bureau (USAID/AFR), as well as the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). Since 1990, the USG has contributed nearly \$750 million in emergency assistance to affected populations in Angola.

[...]

Total FY 2002 USAID/OFDA Humanitarian Assistance to Angola1: \$20,331,802

Total FY 2002 USG Humanitarian Assistance to Angola1: \$75,121,802

[...]

USAID/OFDA supports a variety of humanitarian assistance programs directly targeted at more than 2.2 million vulnerable IDPs, the majority of which are women and children." (USAID, 12 June 2002)

*For full report, [click here](#)*

### **IDPs are main beneficiaries of European Commission's Euro 125 million action plan for Angola (May 2002)**

- EC package includes Euro 10 million to be channelled through ECHO, mainly for nutrition and health programmes; almost Euro 32 million for operations run by WFP and various NGOs; and Euro 83 million for humanitarian interventions including demining, as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction activities

"The European Commission has drawn up an action plan to support the people of Angola following the recent signing on 4 April of the peace agreement between the Government and UNITA. A total of €125 million has been identified from the Community budget and the European Development Fund for a wide range of actions including emergency relief, food aid and food security, support for displaced people and returnees, and de-mining operations. Commenting on the action plan, Poul Nielson, the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, underlined the European Union's long-standing commitment to the victims of 'this often neglected crisis'. He continued: 'At last, peace is being given a chance. The Commission fully supports the peace process and is offering substantial and practical assistance to tackle the continuing suffering and help in the huge task of reconstruction.'

Now that the fighting has ended, enormous needs have been identified among the displaced populations in previously inaccessible areas. It is estimated that there are more than 4 million internally displaced people in the country. Significant humanitarian support will be required for the foreseeable future together with rehabilitation and longer term development assistance, to assist the most vulnerable sections of the population and consolidate the peace process.

The €125 million package is made up of three major components:

The Action Plan includes €10 million for emergency actions funded through the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). This €10 million is made up of the 2002 Global Plan plus a recently adopted new decision for €2 million concentrating on nutrition and health actions. A number of nutritional emergencies have become apparent and urgent action is needed to avoid loss of life, especially amongst children. ECHO will work with established partners in the nutritional field.

Almost €2 million is being targeted by the Commission's food security unit in the EuropeAid Co-operation Office for operations run by the World Food Programme and various Non Governmental Organisations.

Resources from the seventh and eighth European Development Funds (EDF) totalling €3 million are also being deployed for humanitarian interventions including essential de-mining activities, as well as for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities." (EC, 29 May 2002)

### **IDP children, among others, to benefit from OPEC boost to the education sector (May 2002)**

- OPEC Fund for International Development signs US\$ 9.39 million loan agreement with Angolan government, aimed at reforming the country's education system
- Project will target four of the most seriously affected provinces, where there are large concentrations of IDPs
- Activities will include the construction, rehabilitation, refurbishment and equipment of educational facilities, as well as teacher training and job skills training

"The OPEC Fund for International Development today signed a US\$9.39 million loan agreement with the Republic of Angola to help finance a scheme to reform the country's education system, placing a special emphasis on boosting the quality of learning and providing job skills training for youth and adolescents.

After years of civil unrest, Angola has placed a high priority on meeting its educational needs, particularly along the country's western coast, which is home to some four million displaced people. Refugee children's access to schools is limited, as camps are often situated far from population centers. Existing schools are overcrowded and in poor condition, instruction materials and textbooks virtually non-existent and many teachers are inadequately trained. In addition, older children often drop out of school to work and help support their families, adding to the rising number of unskilled workers.

In order to address these shortfalls, the project will target four of the most seriously affected provinces, namely, Luanda, Kwanza Sul, Benguela and Namibe. Works will include the construction of 244 primary school classrooms and rehabilitation of 122 existing ones. The Skills Training Center in Luanda, which provides technical and vocational training in the higher grades, in addition to adult literacy programs, will be refurbished and equipped accordingly. All schools will be fitted out with new furniture, computer and audio-visual equipment, and around 30,000 students will be supplied with learning materials. Over 7,000 teachers, school directors and other personnel will attend in-service training workshops and programs in new course curriculum. A special job skills training program will also be developed for in/out-of-school youth, particularly girls and street children.

Once underway, not only will learning conditions in primary schools be substantially improved, but out-of-school older children, who are less likely than their younger counterparts to return to the regular educational system, will have the chance to partake in skills training programs to help them find good jobs." (OPEC FID, 22 May 2002)

## **UN requests US\$ 232,768,666 in 2002 CAP - but response is slow (November 2001)**

*Up-to-date summaries of CAP requirements and contributions can be accessed on the financial tracking system of the UN OCHA ReliefWeb [\[external link\]](#)*

"In a positive step forward, the Government and humanitarian partners are adopting a rights-based strategy in the 2002 Appeal to ensure that assistance is provided in accordance with core principles contained in the Angolan constitution and on the basis of international standards. Through the new partnership targets, humanitarian actors will be moving systematically during the next several years towards the gradual attainment of the rights expressed in Angolan law. Recognising that conditions are highly variable, the operation will continue to be focused, cost-effective, pragmatic and flexible enough to cover rapid onset emergencies, prolonged emergencies and resettlement initiatives.

The overall direction of the operation will remain the same, with agencies continuing to integrate programmes through coordination structures at the national and provincial levels. On the basis of assessments, food agencies will shift from general distributions to targeted assistance for the most vulnerable groups and will promote self-reliance through food-for-work. Populations living in transit centres and displaced camps will be relocated in accordance with the Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Populations and food security increased as a result of integrated agricultural programmes. Major efforts will be made to lower morbidity and mortality through targeted programmes in water and sanitation, nutrition, polio eradication, and mother and child healthcare. Learning opportunities will be boosted by expanding access to both formal and nonformal education systems and mine action will be integrated into the humanitarian operation. Agencies will support campaigns to provide proof of identity to Angolan citizens and will help to address protection issues by implementing Provincial Protection Plans.

The Government will continue to coordinate the humanitarian operation with support from the United Nations and is expected to significantly increase resources for emergency programmes and humanitarian sectors. The Government will also ensure that humanitarian activities are linked to strategies for poverty alleviation and national reconciliation. To cover their part of the humanitarian operation, UN Agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGO) are requesting **US\$ 232,768,666** for 130 projects in 13 sectors. Projects have been included in the Appeal on the basis of clear priorities. To ensure the success of the integrated approach, adequate funding is required for all aspects of the operation." (UN November 2001)

## **Selected activities of UN agencies (2002)**

---

### **Inter-agency teams carry out assessments in newly accessible areas (April 2002)**

- Following April 2002 ceasefire, joint teams proceed to carry out rapid assessments of critical needs in 36 areas in 13 provinces
- Most of these areas had been without humanitarian assistance for a long period of time
- UN estimates that up to 500,000 people in these locations may need some kind of emergency, life-saving assistance

"The United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr Erick de Mul, announced the launching on 18 April of a rapid assessment of critical needs. During the next three weeks, joint teams will assess conditions in 36 areas in 13 provinces. These areas have been inaccessible during the past several years to humanitarian agencies due to insecurity and logistical constraints. The aim of the assessment is to identify the most acute

humanitarian needs of at-risk populations and the concrete actions that are urgently required to stabilise vulnerable populations.

The 36 areas were chosen on the basis of information received from local administrations, churches and humanitarian agencies. According to Mr de Mul, 'Most of these areas have been without humanitarian assistance for a prolonged period of time. We estimate that as many as 500,000 people in these locations may require some kind of emergency, life-saving assistance.'

The assessments will be coordinated under the leadership of the Inter-sectoral Commission for the Peace Process, with support from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Reintegration and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Assessment teams will be composed of Government representatives, UN Agencies and NGO partners. The teams will assess critical needs in food security, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, shelter, non-food items and education in each location. A standardised assessment report and plan of integrated action will be drafted for each location. The integrated plans will identify the roles of the Government, UN Agencies and NGOs in each sector. A consolidated final report will help to prioritise emergency interventions and will serve as the basis for the mid-term review of the 2002 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola.

'The humanitarian situation in Angola remains critical. Once we have identified the most acute needs in the 36 locations, it will be crucial that the Government takes the lead in providing humanitarian assistance. UN Agencies, donor and NGOs are willing and ready to support the Government's activities to assist vulnerable Angolans,' said Mr de Mul." (UN OCHA, 19 April 2002)

### **UN's humanitarian strategy based on pragmatism, constrained by logistics and funding (May 2002)**

- Most agencies were already working at full capacity at the beginning of 2002
- 'Significant and rapid increase in funding' is required before further expansion of humanitarian programmes can take place
- Approximately 800,000 vulnerable people in newly accessible areas need emergency aid

"The aim of the UN's humanitarian strategy is to continue providing assistance in areas where programmes are already underway and to initiate life-saving operations for vulnerable populations in newly accessible locations as well as in family areas established under the 4 April Memorandum of Understanding. Operations will be extended in a pragmatic manner within current logistical and funding constraints. In addition, humanitarian partners are working in close collaboration with Government authorities to accelerate resettlement and return on the basis of minimum standards specified in Angolan law." (UN OCHA, 20 May 2002)

"The ability of humanitarian organisations to address the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and newly accessible populations is strained. Most agencies were already operating at full capacity in January, particularly in areas receiving large influxes of IDPs, including Kuito, Camacupa, Caála and Luena. Although major efforts have been made since March to extend existing programmes, further expansion is dependent on a significant and rapid increase in funding. Only 30 percent of the amount requested in the 2002 Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal has been funded. In light of the enormous needs in the country, agencies are working closely together to identify the highest priorities until the end of the year.

*New Areas:* In a major effort to reach populations in critical distress in newly accessible areas, provincial and national teams composed of Government, UN Agencies and NGOs conducted rapid assessments in 28 locations in 12 provinces during April and May. The assessment confirmed that 800,000 people are living in these areas and that the most critical humanitarian conditions exist in areas where insecurity was

persistent and agricultural fields were destroyed during military operations, resulting in large-scale displacement and extreme vulnerability. Malnutrition rates among IDPs and residents have reached alarming levels in more than half of the assessed locations. Morbidity and mortality rates are also high in most locations, particularly where large numbers of IDPs are concentrated in locations without adequate access to water and basic sanitation." (UN OCHA, 18 June 2002)

"Humanitarian partners continue to respond to the life-saving emergency needs of highly vulnerable people while supporting the return of as many internally displaced persons (IDP) as possible before the next agricultural season. During the next six months, humanitarian activities will focus on:

meeting the emergency needs of 1.9 million vulnerable people, including newly arrived IDPs, in areas where there were operations prior to the 4 April 2002 Memorandum of Understanding;

meeting the emergency needs of approximately 800,000 vulnerable people in newly accessible areas;

meeting the emergency needs of approximately 250,000 people in family areas;

providing support for the first phase of resettlement, repatriation and return." (UN OCHA, 24 June 2002)

### **WFP faces dwindling stocks as food needs soar in newly accessible areas (May 2002)**

- WFP reports that large numbers of hungry and malnourished IDPs are flocking to relief centres where WFP food aid is available
- WFP food supplies for some 1 million people currently being fed in Angola are running out, with stocks reaching dangerously low levels
- Food rations have to be reduced in order to feed the most desperate
- WFP appeals for a rapid response by donors to its expanded food aid distribution programme

"The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has started distributing food aid to thousands of severely malnourished people who are being discovered in areas of Angola now open to aid workers after last month's peace agreement was signed between the Government and UNITA.

Last week, a frantic crowd of more than 10,000 people in the remote village of Bunjei, Huila Province, greeted the arrival of 15 WFP trucks carrying food rations which are supposed to last for one month. The vehicles, loaded with maize, corn soya blend, vegetable oil, salt and sugar, travelled 130 kilometers from Huambo along precarious roads.

This is the first aid that the desperate people, mostly women and children, have received. To avoid the fighting, they have been hiding in the countryside for the past four years, and many were dying of hunger-related diseases.

'We are finding people suffering extreme hunger and malnutrition in the interior of the country,' said Ronald Sibanda, WFP Country Director for Angola. 'WFP is already making arrangements to start feeding programmes in new areas.' These areas include Chipindo, Huila Province, and Sanza Pombo, Uige Province.

Since the recent improvement in security in Angola, WFP is gaining access to a greater number of hungry and malnourished people who have been cut off from help - until now. Each day, WFP emergency teams witness large numbers of internally displaced people flocking to relief centres where WFP food aid is available.



However WFP food supplies for some one million people currently being fed in Angola are running out, with stocks reaching dangerously low levels. This comes at a critical time, just when the number of hungry people is soaring.

'We have no choice but to reduce rations for some groups of people to make sure we can feed others who are more desperate,' said Sibanda. 'It is absolutely vital that new donations are made urgently.'

WFP requires US\$ 52 million in order to cope with both the current and extra caseloads for the next six months. With the present stock levels, some essential food commodities will start to run out in June and July, and by September, there will be no food available." (WFP, 8 May 2002)

"Over recent weeks, WFP has started feeding an extra 120,000 desperately hungry people who were until recently completely cut off from aid due to the war, including families of former UNITA soldiers being demobilized across the country in some 34 so-called quartering areas. While WFP feeds the children, women, elderly and physically disabled, the government took the responsibility of giving aid to the former soldiers themselves.

The food basket normally consists of maize, pulses, enriched corn soya blend, vegetable oil, salt and sugar, totaling 15 kilograms per month per person. WFP expects to provide food to about 220,000 beneficiaries in the quartering areas alone.

WFP today urged for rapid response to its expanded food aid operation, due to start in July. The agency will need US\$241 million to feed up to 1.5 million people over the next 18 months. Despite WFP's growing activities in Angola, pledges from international donors have been sporadic.

WFP food aid distributions are also being quickly expanded as a result of assessment missions carried out in 28 locations between April and May to identify the immediate needs of the population.

However WFP expressed concern that as it continues to locate tens of thousands of new beneficiaries, it may not be able to feed them all unless it receives urgently needed supplies. It also warned that significant logistical hurdles must be overcome." (WFP, 26 June 2002)

[Click here](#) to access *WFP's Protracted relief and recovery operation for Angola (July 2002)*

### **Wide-ranging UNICEF programme benefits displaced children in newly accessible areas, among others (2002)**

- Displaced children, among others, benefit from UNICEF projects in health and nutrition, water and environmental sanitation, education and protection

**"Immunization:** To fight child mortality in newly accessible and quartering areas, children need to immediately be immunized against measles. As most of them have never been vaccinated before, they also need to be immunized against BCG, DPT, polio, and yellow fever. Their immune status also needs to be reinforced through the intake of vitamin A. Measles remains one of the most important causes of child mortality, particularly among displaced children, and outbreaks are likely. UNICEF has begun a round of emergency measles vaccination campaigns in 28 high-risk municipalities where IDPs are concentrated, in Uige, Malanje, Huambo, Bie, Benguela, and Kwanza Sul provinces with the aim to vaccinate 170,000 displaced children by the end of June. Campaigns in quartering areas have also started through implementing partners. The needs to reinforce and expand the routine immunization infrastructure are also enormous. [...] routine immunization services are operating in only 91

municipalities (of 164), illustrating the state of decay of the public health system and the geographical scope of the work that needs to be done. This year, UNICEF has already provided the national Expanded Programme of Immunization (PAV) with 7.7 million doses of polio vaccine, 1 million doses of measles vaccine, 1.2 million doses of TT vaccine, cold chain and vaccination materials, and training for PAV staff.

[...]

**Malaria and Essential Drugs:** UNICEF will seek to assist the Government and NGOs in covering the essential drugs needs in the quartering areas and newly accessible areas. UNICEF presently has a contingency stock of essential drugs that can cover the needs of 2 million people for 6 months. As essential drug kits are sent to various parts of the country, UNICEF will require additional financial support to replenish its stock. Essential drugs are crucial to address malaria episodes and treat diarrheal diseases and respiratory infections - the leading 3 causes of mortality among Angolan children. Within the minimum health package proposed for newly accessible and quartering areas, UNICEF has included the distribution of mosquito nets to protect some 8,000 pregnant women against malaria.

**Nutrition:** Findings of rapid assessments conducted by MSF in April in Chilembô (Huambo province) and Chitembo (Bie province) found a Global Acute Malnutrition rate of 42% and 25.9%, respectively. The number of children admitted into Therapeutic Feeding Centres (TFCs) throughout the country is rapidly increasing. There are today 20 TFCs operating throughout the country at maximum capacity. Additionally, 50,000 children and lactating mothers are already receiving supplementary food. UNICEF has supported in February, March, and April MSF-France and MSF-Spain to face the sudden increase of children admitted in TFCs in Huambo and Huila provinces and provided 27 metric tons of therapeutic milk to assist 2,700 severely malnourished children. In addition to the current caseload, at least 6,000 severely malnourished children and 24,000 moderately malnourished children and pregnant/lactating mothers require immediate nutrition rehabilitation interventions, either in newly accessible areas, quartering sites, or provincial and municipal capitals where displaced population continue to arrive. UNICEF is therefore requesting additional funding for life-saving nutritional interventions. These funds will be used to immediately procure therapeutic food for the treatment of 6,000 children and establish a network of 20 Supplementary Feeding Centres (SFCs) to benefit 24,000 children and pregnant/lactating mothers. At this moment, general food distribution and focus on supplementary feeding are critical interventions required to avoid additional children

falling into severe malnutrition.

**Polio Eradication:** Following 3 polio cases reported among Angolan refugees in Zambia at the end of 2001, UNICEF and WHO supported in March and April a massive polio campaign in Moxico province, during which 86,000 children under 5 years of age were vaccinated. The Angolan Army also contributed in the campaign and vaccinated children in remote municipalities. From 10 to 12 May, sub-National Immunization Days (sub-NIDs) were conducted in Luanda province and 25 municipalities in another 9 provinces. Preliminary reports indicate that 2.2 million children received a dose of polio vaccine. With improved accessibility, polio eradication in Angola should now be within reach. The next rounds of NIDs will take place in June, July, and August. Strong multi-year donor support for polio eradication will be required until 2005.

**HIV/AIDS:** According to the recently released MICS data only 8% of women have sufficient knowledge regarding the transmission and prevention of HIV. It is also apparent that HIV/AIDS is spreading rapidly: a recent study conducted by the National Public Health Institute and UNICEF demonstrates a 250% increase in the sero-prevalence of women attending antenatal clinics in Luanda (from 3.6% to 8.4%). UNICEF is using a two-pronged strategy to reach populations in newly accessible and quartering areas. Firstly, prevention and transmission messages are integrated into activities undertaken by UNICEF child protection, health, and education programmes. Secondly, groups of 350 peer-to-peer educators will be created and responsible for spreading messages, materials in national languages, and conducting events in the newly accessible and quartering areas.

**Water and Environmental Sanitation:** At least 60% of the general population and 90% of the displaced communities use contaminated water. Problems with water quality and quantity are most acute in areas

where large numbers of IDPs are living in overcrowded camps. This year, UNICEF is supporting several water construction and rehabilitation works to benefit 80,000 vulnerable people, in Uíge, Kuando Kubango, Huambo, Moxico, and Huíla provinces. In addition, the Ministry of Water and Energy and UNICEF brought to the country a considerable stock of water equipment and materials to deal with emergencies and prepare an emergency drilling unit ready to intervene whenever required. Activities will now have to expand to newly recently accessible areas where the humanitarian situation is more critical and where safe water has to be provided together with minimum promotion of sanitation and hygiene.

**Education:** Findings of rapid assessments conducted in previously inaccessible areas revealed that 7 of 10 children have no access to learning opportunities. Of those, about 60% do not speak Portuguese. There is therefore an urgent need to offer these children alternative educational opportunities in order to prepare them for the new 2003 school year. UNICEF is seeking to implement a 'Peace and Life Education' programme that aims to immediately provide 150,000 children (5 to 14 years) with basic kits to learn as well as teach materials. In addition, children will be provided with materials for learning through playing. Groups of adolescents will be mobilized and trained in targeted areas to care for children educational and recreational needs and ensure basic skills among the communities such as communication, emotional development, and self-care. UNICEF supported programmes in education are severely under-funded at present, although it is now critical to focus on education, as it will play a key role in the successful reintegration of children and adolescents in Angolan society.

**Child Protection:** In April, UNICEF Angola released an independent study entitled "Children Living with UNITA". Conducted among recently arrived Angolan refugees in Zambia, the study depicts the living conditions of children that lived in areas previously controlled by UNITA. Of children interviewed, 81% had some experience of combat violence and 56% had had the horrific experience of watching someone trigger a landmine. It concludes that 'Perhaps more than any other Angolans, civilians living in UNITA territory have been robbed of the ability to control or improve their lives by the war and the culture of reprisals which predominates in Angola. All that they can do, is hope for peace while they try to stay alive'. With peace, it is now urgent to address the needs of these children. Through education and protection programmes in newly accessible and quartering areas, UNICEF proposes to bring back a sense of normality in the life of these children. Specifically, UNICEF is seeking additional funding for family tracing and reunification activities, monitoring and reporting of child's rights violations, birth registration (already 500,000 children have been registered throughout the country with UNICEF support), establishment of a network of Child Friendly Spaces, and training of FAA and police in key child protection issues. UNICEF has adopted a 2-phase strategy: firstly, focus on children and adolescents in quartering areas, and secondly accompany these children and adolescents in their re-integration into communities of origin." (UNICEF, 29 May 2002)

### **WHO and partners provide health assistance to 40,000 IDPs in Bengo province (2002)**

- WHO finds 'substantial improvement' in the standard of health services, sanitation and water supply in the IDP camp at Boa Esperanca, Bengo province
- According to WHO, improvement is partly due to strong coordination in the health sector between the government and international partners

"Health assistance to 40 thousand IDPs located in Boa Esperanca (Bengo), 40 km north of Luanda was evaluated last Wednesday by MoH, MINARS and WHO. The delegation, led by the Vice Minister of Health, Dr José Van Dunem, was composed by the Vice Minister of MINARS, the Vice Governor of Bengo Province, the WHO Representative, the UNICEF Representative and various delegates from implementing partners.

The visit was carried out to evaluate health assistance to the IDPs proceeding from Nambuanguo Municipality, that was given after the WHO Representative assessed the situation as alarming on 5 December 2001.

Since that visit, partnership and health assistance to IDPs has been substantially improved in the areas of health and nutrition services (MoH, WHO, ECHO/EU, HCR, UNICEF and COSV), Sanitation (WHO, GOAL, Swiss Cooperation), First Needs Kits (LWF, ECHO, HCR, UNICEF and MINARS); Water supply (DNA, Swiss Cooperation, InterSOS, UNICEF), Food distribution (WFP and German Agro Action). Other entities, that also have supported the actions, are the Provincial Government, MINARS, OCHA among others.

According to the Vice Minister of Health 'Partners have shown a great cohesion and this has led to substantial achievements'. 'Now - he stated - after the cease fire signed between the Angolan Armed Forces and UNITA military forces, conditions for return to Nambuanguo need to be created and good practices learnt while in the camp should be replicated and strengthened once back home'.

The WHO Representative, Dr Balladelli, pointed out: 'I am learning with satisfaction of the big improvement of health services, sanitation and water supply in the camp'. 'This results - he stressed - was achieved because of the strong coordination achieved in the health practices between the Government and the international partners: vaccinations against polio, measles and tetanus; malaria control; STD and HIV actions; fight to infection diseases; motherhood protection, sanitation are only some good example of how all partners involved have been able to work together in the camp for the well being of its population'.

In the camp, along with the local health technicians, a medical doctor and a laboratory technician supported by WHO, are currently working on a permanent basis. A small but very operational laboratory set is operational in the camp. A well equipped pharmacy is providing all essential drugs on a regular basis and without charges. Besides the vaccination to all children under five against polio, measles, tetanus and BCG, other 4,488 children with more than 5 years were vaccinated against measles; 5 laboratory technicians, 15 health technicians; and 15 traditional midwives have been trained in the first 4 months of 2002." (WHO, 10 April 2002)

### **With UNHCR's IDP programme in Angola under threat, assessment team recommends continuation until at least the end of 2003 (May 2002)**

- Since 2000, UNHCR's IDP programme in Angola has been aimed at addressing the immediate protection and assistance needs of IDPs in 3 provinces, and following up the emergency response with protection and assistance activities aimed at building local coping mechanisms
- Building upon previous evaluative studies, and considering various criteria to justify a UNHCR programme continuation, the EPAU/ DIP review recommended that the UNHCR Angola IDP operation be continued through at least 2003

"1. Although, with some 3.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), Angola has one of the largest IDP populations in the world, UNHCR's operations with IDPs there are relatively recent. Previous operations in Angola had focused on refugees and on preparations for an anticipated repatriation. In 2000, emanating from publicity regarding UNHCR and Angolan IDPs and pursuant to requests from both the government and the Security Council, UNHCR embarked on a geographically limited and time-bounded intervention on behalf of IDPs in Angola. The original goals of that operation were to:

- address immediate and acute protection and assistance needs of the IDP population in the provinces of Uige, Zaire and Luanda; and,
- follow the emergency response with carefully designed protection and assistance activities to promote some degree of self-reliance among the beneficiary population. The purpose was to build local coping mechanisms so that the communities would not slip back into a crisis situation when UNHCR phases out.

2. These activities have been implemented in the context of a tight inter-agency structure.

### **Mission objectives**

3. With the deadline for UNHCR's continued involvement with internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Angola fast approaching (31 December 2001), the Regional Directorate for Southern Africa requested that a joint Department of International Protection (DIP) and Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) team review the operation. The review was intended to assess the effectiveness of the programme to date, examine the consequences of an eventual UNHCR withdrawal or, if pertinent, explore the parameters of any possible future UNHCR involvement with IDPs in Angola. More specifically, the review was tasked with making a recommendation on one of the following possible actions for 2002:

- terminate the IDP programme as planned on 31 December 2001;
- extend the present programme until end March 2002 using available carryover funding;
- establish a new IDP programme for 2002 focused on protection of IDPs using the carryover from the 2001 programme and appealing for new funding during 2002.

4. The review was undertaken by Guillermo Bettocchi, Special Advisor, DIP, and Arafat Jamal, Operational Policy Officer, EPAU. In addition to ensuring that both protection and evaluation perspectives were incorporated, both mission members had undertaken previous missions to Angola, and were well acquainted with the programme. The mission travelled to the region and met with UNHCR, UN, government and NGO staff, donors and IDPs, in Luanda, Uige and Mbanza Kongo, and debriefed the Regional Directorate in Pretoria (31 October – 12 November 2001).

5. UNHCR's involvement with IDPs in Angola has been the subject of a number of evaluative studies, and the present review builds upon them. A UNHCR rapid appraisal undertaken in early 2000 recommended that 'UNHCR intervene immediately to assist IDPs and refugee returnees in the Zaire, Uige and Luanda provinces.' In June 2000, a DIP mission recommended, *inter alia*, that UNHCR develop concrete protection activities, ensure that international protection standards are adhered to, establish a systematic protection reporting system and identify areas where policy guidance and training might be needed.

6. In November 2000, a real-time assessment recommended that the IDP programme continue until end 2001, and that UNHCR bolster its protection function and commit itself to guaranteeing a stable staffing situation and an adequate financial one. A mission of the senior IDP network in March 2001 recommended the UN agencies to support the establishment of the Provincial Committees for the Protection of IDPs, which had been included as part of the UN strategy at UNHCR's initiative.

7. The present report has been prepared with the intention to facilitate decision-making by senior management and the Operational Review Board (ORB). Earlier versions of the report were presented and discussed with the UNHCR offices in Luanda and Pretoria, and comments from these sessions were incorporated. The report was then presented to the High Commissioner and other senior managers at a meeting held in Geneva on 22 November 2001. It was also used to assist the ORB in its deliberations on the issue (14 December 2001).

### **Recommendation**

Based on its findings and on the assessment of the current state of the UN programme with IDPs in Angola, the DIP/EPAU assessment team recommends that the UNHCR Angola IDP operation be continued at least through 2003.

8. The mission's decision to recommend a UNHCR programme continuation is based on the criteria for IDP involvement, the momentum that already exists, the impact of UNHCR activities to date, and the potential for the Angola experience to serve as a model for future IDP involvement." (UNHCR, EPAU/DIP, May 2002)

## **Selected activities of international NGOs and the Red Cross (2001-2002)**

---

### **ICRC assists and protects victims of Angolan conflict, including IDPs (2002)**

- ICRC in Angola provides assistance to IDPs, among others, in the fields of protection (tracing), agriculture and food security, health and nutrition, mine action, water and sanitation, non-food items and shelter, and preventive action (dissemination)
- ICRC covers all 18 provinces of Angola, and some activities are carried out in close co-operation with the national Red Cross Society

"The Angola delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) carries out a range of activities to assist and protect victims of armed conflict. Currently, the delegation employs 34 expatriate staff and 392 Angolan employees, working in the capital, Luanda, as well as in the sub-delegations in Huambo, Kuito, Lobito and offices in Lubango and Luena. All 18 provinces of Angola are covered by the ICRC, either through the sub-delegations or by field delegates travelling from Luanda on a regular basis. Some ICRC activities are carried out in close co-operation with the national Red Cross Society, the Cruz Vermelha de Angola (CVA).

The figures provided refer to the ICRC's activities in Angola in the months from January to June, 2002.

#### **Protection - Restoring Family Links**

Following the signing of the ceasefire agreement between the parties to the conflict on April 4th, the Tracing Agency of the ICRC has seen a substantial increase in its activities. Thus, in the first half of this year alone, 7'470 Red Cross messages have been collected and 8'330 distributed in the different provinces of Angola, including in formerly inaccessible areas. In order to provide a better service in the face of this increase, a large number of new tracing offices has been reestablished throughout the country.

485 families have opened tracing requests asking the ICRC for assistance in finding out the whereabouts of their loved ones. At the same time, 286 unaccompanied minors have been registered by the ICRC. Assisted by new software and digital cameras, the delegates strive to localize their family members. Since the beginning of this year, it was possible to reunite 19 children with their families. It is expected that another 28 pending reunifications will be possible shortly.

All these activities are carried out in close collaboration with the national Red Cross Society (CVA).

#### **Assistance to conflict victims - Agriculture and Food Security**

The ICRC's Agriculture and Food Security programmes are concentrated in the provinces of Bié and Huambo. In Huambo, food distributions are made to 38'000 beneficiaries on a regular basis, in the camps for displaced persons (IDPs) of Cruzeiro and Caala. The same number of beneficiaries is given seeds in order to achieve food autonomy over time. Furthermore, horticultural seeds are to be distributed to 10'000 families in the province of Bié and twice (for the nacas and lavras planting seasons) to 36'000 families in the province of Huambo. Tree seedlings, providing for 500'000 trees, are distributed by the ICRC in these same provinces.

Emergency food rations were distributed to 8'300 persons in Chilembó, south of Huambo, following the opening of formerly inaccessible areas after the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

#### **Health and Nutrition**

The ICRC in Angola works in close collaboration with the Ministry of Health, providing assistance in government hospitals. In this way, the ICRC supports the Surgical and the Paediatric Wards of the Central

Hospital in Huambo, for a range of 15'000 beneficiaries each. Furthermore, in the provinces of Huambo, Bié and Uige, the ICRC supports 12 Primary Health Care centers and promotes HIV/AIDS preventive action for a range of 300'000 beneficiaries, in collaboration with the national Red Cross Society (CVA) and the Ministry of Health.

#### **Mine Action**

The ICRC continues to support three Ministry of Health rehabilitation centers, located in Luanda, Huambo and Kuito, and provides support to a range of 3'000 disabled persons from 7 provinces. The assistance provided covers technical and financial support to these 3 orthopaedic centers, including the manufacture and fitting of prostheses, as well as the manufacture and distribution of wheelchairs and crutches. All these services, including physiotherapy, transport and accommodation, are provided free of charge.

#### **Water and Sanitation**

Well and spring protection is carried out by the ICRC in Kuito (Bié Province) for a range of 12'000 beneficiaries, and emergency sanitation programmes are provided to 28'000 persons. In collaboration with the national Red Cross Society (CVA), soap is distributed to 280'000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kuito and Huambo. In the Central Hospital in Huambo, the ICRC has supported the maintenance of the water and sewage system.

#### **Non-food Items and Shelter**

20'000 families of internally displaced persons (IDPs), mainly in Huambo and Bié provinces, were given non-food items, in collaboration with the national Red Cross Society (CVA).

#### **Preventive Action - Dissemination**

The ICRC actively promotes the dissemination of International Humanitarian Law and the principles of the Red Cross Movement to members of the armed forces, the police, traditional authorities and civilians, both through formal dissemination sessions (so far this year to close to 1'000 members of the security forces) and through more informal sessions and theater presentations (to close to 6'000 persons so far). Regular radio programmes in Luanda, Huambo and Kuito also contribute to the dissemination of these principles." (ICRC, 25 June 2002)

### **Red Cross Federation (IFRC) assesses needs in Angola (July 2002)**

- In cooperation with ICRC, IFRC assesses needs in camps and villages of Bié, Cuanza Sul and Huambo provinces - finding severe malnutrition, health problems, inadequate water/ sanitation and insufficient shelter
- IFRC will launch appeal on behalf of the cash-strapped Angola Red Cross to provide health, water/ sanitation and agriculture programmes for IDPs and returning refugees
- 

"Working in cooperation with the ICRC, an International Federation team is in Angola, visiting camps and villages in the provinces of Bie, Cuanza Sul and Huambo to assess the humanitarian situation in a country ravaged by 27 years of civil war. Severe malnutrition as well as many cases of diarrhoea, skin infections, acute respiratory infections and malaria have been observed, while the health structure of the country is almost inoperative. People lack access to clean water, food, medicine, clothes and shelter. Additionally, mines are causing severe problems for the population as well as for aid organisations. Over the past few months, intervention by aid agencies has improved the nutritional level of the most vulnerable people, but the Angola Red Cross fears the humanitarian situation will deteriorate if not addressed urgently.

According to conservative estimates, at least 1.3 million people have been internally displaced by the war in Angola. In addition, some 500,000 Angolans have sought refuge in Zambia, the Democratic Republic of

Congo and Namibia. Some have started to move back home. However, their houses have been destroyed, most people have lost their cattle, water and sanitation systems are not working and many people will not be able to plough or sow their fields due to the presence of landmines. In order to bring assistance to the most vulnerable, the Federation is planning to launch an appeal on behalf of the Angola Red Cross. Priority will be given to the provision of clean water, the reconstruction of health clinics, strengthening HIV/AIDS programmes and providing people with seeds and agricultural tools. The Angola Red Cross is currently distributing soap and food in displacement camps and managing some 20 health posts. But it has too few resources to expand - or even maintain - its humanitarian work in light of the immense needs in the country." (IFRC, 25 July 2002)

### **MSF maintains 44 feeding centres in 11 of Angola's 18 provinces (July 2002)**

- In July 2002, MSF said it expected Angola's severe malnutrition crisis to last for another six months to a year - Africa's worst malnutrition crisis in the past decade
- MSF is running 44 feeding centres in 11 of Angola's 18 provinces, feeding over 14,000 people at any one time
- Estimates are that up to 500,000 people throughout Angola are in varying states of malnutrition

"With the severe malnutrition crisis in Angola expected to be the situation for the next six months to a year, MSF has shipped over 280 tonnes of milk and food to the country. These supplies will allow MSF to maintain its feeding centres in Angola for another three months.

The last of the shipments arrived in Luanda, Angola on June 26 and shall be distributed to the various MSF operations throughout the country. Part of the nutritional supplies left from Antwerp harbour three weeks ago; shipments take about three weeks to reach Angola from Europe.

MSF is currently running 44 feeding centres across 11 of the 18 provinces of Angola, feeding over 14,000 people at any one time. Estimates are that some 500,000 people throughout Angola are in varying states of malnutrition.

The shipments include 92 tonnes of milk, 40 tonnes of plumpy nuts, 30 tonnes of high-protein biscuits and 120 tonnes of corn-soya blend. All supplies have been delivered to the main feeding centres in Luena, Kuito and Camacupa. From there the supplies will be distributed to the MSF feeding centers throughout the country.

MSF has over 190 expats and over 2,000 national staff members working at the emergency, which is considered the worst malnutrition crisis in Africa in the past decade. MSF is active in 11 of the country's 18 provinces." (MSF, 1 July 2002)

### **Action by Churches Together members upscale humanitarian programmes for IDPs and other vulnerable populations in Angola (July 2002)**

- New needs emerging after April 2002 ceasefire prompts ACT members, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the Evangelical Reformed Church of Angola (IERA) to revise their appeals
- LWF will, in addition to relief assistance, focus on on peace building programmes and assistance in the return of IDPs and refugees to their home areas
- IERA will continue to provide relief items and health facilities to IDPs in the camps and also provide assistance to the newly resettled populations



"The killing of the UNITA rebel leader, Jonathan Savimbi by government forces on 22 February 2002 brought to an end the 25-year brutal civil war that was responsible for the displacement of about 4 million people within the country and tens of thousands as refugees in the neighbouring countries. The end of the war further revealed the plight of hundreds of thousands of people that had been behind the UNITA military lines and could not be accessed by humanitarian organisations. The situation of these people was made worse by the government's scorched-earth policy in pursuit of the rebels - meaning that people were left with no food or personal belongings. These form part of the worst caseloads of people needing urgent humanitarian attention. The government working with the UN and non-governmental organisations has accessed some of the worst areas in trying to determine the numbers of people needing urgent humanitarian assistance. The number of people in critical need in these newly accessed areas has been found to be around 800,000. It should be mentioned though that some areas are still inaccessible due to the presence of land mines.

Among those in particular need are 250,000 family members of the rebel soldiers who came out of the bush and entered government quartering areas for demobilisation. The 420,000 people still in IDP camps also continue to need relief assistance.

The surfacing new needs has prompted ACT members the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) and the Evangelical Reformed Church of Angola (IERA) to revise their proposals in the original AFAO-21 Appeal in accordance with the current needs. For the LWF this revised appeal will, in addition to relief assistance, also focus on peace building programs and assistance in facilitating the return of IDPs and refugees to their home areas. IERA will continue to provide relief items and health facilities to IDPs in the camps and also provide assistance to the newly resettled populations.

Project Completion Date:

LWF 31 December 2002

IERA 31 December 2002

#### Summary of Appeal Targets, Pledges/Contributions Received and Balance Requested

	ACT Evaluation	LWF Angola	IERA	EASDA	Total US\$	Target
Total Appeal Target(s)	50,000	1,664,001	1,038,832	1,433,604	4,186,437	
Less: Pledges/Contr. Recd	0	665,422	151,350	9,728	826,500	
Balance Requested from ACT Network	50,000	998,579	887,482	1,423,876	3,359,937	

[...]

The Lutheran World Federation/Department for World Services (LWF/DWS) involvement in Angola dates back to 1985 when it initiated an emergency relief program in the Moxico Province for displaced people fleeing the civil war. The program focused on providing assistance to a destitute displaced population, returning refugees and other war affected people.

Since 2000 LWF has been the leading agency in a settlement program for the displaced people in the Moxico and Lunda Sul provinces with the view on one hand to stabilize their situation and on the other to enable them to become self sufficient in food. 15 settlements have been established for 80,000 people. They include a wide range of services from the basic in shelter, water and sanitation to construction of schools and health posts, food security, income generation, environmental protection, preventive health, promotion of mine awareness, human rights and peace building.

On 19 December 2001 an ACT appeal was launched to meet the humanitarian needs in Angola. It included the humanitarian work of both the Lutheran World Federation (LWF/DWS) and the Evangelical Reformed Church of Angola (IERA). The LWF/DWS budget was for 1,146,681 US\$. What is now presented is a revision of that same appeal, because since then the situation in the country has completely changed." (ACT, 26 July 2002)

### **CRS responds to increased needs of IDPs following the April 2002 ceasefire (May 2002)**

- CRS in Angola is working in the areas of health and nutrition, institutional strengthening of local partners, and agricultural recovery
- In Angola since 1989, CRS has five offices in the country

"Activities and accomplishments include:

#### **Emergency Nutrition**

In Benguela Province, the Emergency Nutrition Program, which is funded by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, has provided life-saving nutritional assistance to over 60,000 malnourished children. The goal of the program is to reduce mortality and morbidity among war-affected children by providing quality nutritional treatment and services, as well as adequate preventive feeding and regular nutritional surveillance. In April, the program was expanded to fully integrate curative and preventive feeding with surveillance and preventive education activities for another 12 months.

CRS has partnered with the National Nutrition Program and UNICEF to conduct training for nutrition center workers from five provinces.

CRS' Emergency Nutrition and Child Survival Programs have conducted a project to improve preventive education and to learn the root causes of malnutrition.

CRS in partnership with the UN World Food Program has assisted 3,030 IDP families (9,576 persons) in Ganda. Security permitting, CRS will help resettle these war-affected populations this year.

#### **Improving Children's Health**

The Child Survival Project reaches 8,217 children under the age of five in the communities of Cubal and Balombo. CRS trains community health activists who teach mothers about the most common health issues affecting children in the region. CRS Child Survival staff visit the families and the activists to monitor program activities, and Health Days are conducted bi-monthly to address health issues through role-plays, songs and poetry. These essential health education efforts will be expanded as previously inaccessible areas are secured.

#### **Polio Eradication Campaign**

As part of a coalition of five U.S.-based PVOs (private and voluntary organizations), supporting the Angola polio eradication effort, the CRS Polio team works with other local partners to build capacity of the provincial and municipal Ministry of Health authorities. CRS participates in National Immunization Days, trains community volunteers for Acute Flaccid Paralysis surveillance, and supports routine immunization activities by providing both material and human resources to the national effort of eradicating polio. In the first quarter of 2002, CRS trained 768 surveillance volunteers. Polio campaigns will be stepped up to include people in areas isolated by the war.

**Building Farmers' Capacity.** With 20,000 beneficiaries, the Agricultural Recovery Program provides important assistance to farmer associations (FAs) in the province of Benguela. Despite the massive

disruptions caused by the war, farmers are eager to enhance their knowledge and learn new techniques that will help them regain or maintain their ability to grow food in this harsh environment.

Working with local FAs, project staff are teaching farmers how to cultivate, select and conserve maize, beans, groundnuts and sorghum seeds.

The Agricultural Team introduced a new building technique for grain storage using local materials, and 43 of these structures are scheduled for completion in 2002. They are used by FAs to store the seeds that are distributed to their members.

The program is also promoting vegetable production and provides technical and material assistance for the rehabilitation of small-scale irrigation systems. Seven systems have been refurbished, providing improved water management capacities to over 800 farmers.

CRS is also collaborating with the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) to address the agricultural crisis created by the war by distributing seeds and tools to 6,000 IDP families. Plans are underway to include demobilized soldiers and their families in the next emergency distribution of agricultural supplies.

[...]

#### **Background**

Over the past few years, the violence and fighting in Angola have steadily increased, causing major population movements. Humanitarian assistance remains difficult due to limited road access and attacks that target civilian vehicles, putting both drivers and supplies at risk. Despite the challenges, CRS/Angola remains dedicated to helping the most vulnerable.

CRS began working in Angola in 1989 when it provided food assistance to war and drought-affected people. In early 1992, a semblance of peace returned to the country and the agency began to focus on rehabilitation and development activities. When war broke out again later that same year, CRS/Angola reverted to providing emergency relief.

CRS/Angola's work has since shifted towards rehabilitation and development in hopes of encouraging long-term solutions to Angola's key social and economic problems. CRS currently works in the areas of health care and nutrition, institutional strengthening of local partners, and agricultural recovery. The agency has five offices in Angola." (CRS, 22 May 2002)

#### **Action Against Hunger running five new programmes to assist IDPs (February 2002)**

- AAH has seven bases, two logistic bases and five new programmes to assist IDPs in Angola
- Programmes include nutritional and health assistance, as well as development activities with food security and water activities
- AAH is the only international organization present in some locations

"Action Against Hunger has been present in Angola since 1993. Specifically, AAH has seven bases, two logistic bases and five new programs to assist the many displaced victims in the civil war-torn country.

*Caconda base*, situated in the center of Plano Alto region (Huila Province) is one of the emergencies of the year 2001. In the last month alone, 5,000 displaced victims arrived and the global malnutrition rates are over 21%. Two programs give nutritional and health assistance to the population (resident and the displaced). Action Against Hunger is the only international organization present in this area. Due to security reasons we had to evacuate the base two weeks ago, but the team is back from a two week forced absence.

**Ganda base**, situated also in the Plano Alto region (Benguela Province) has been our emergency base since 1999. Today the nutritional situation is under control with one Therapeutic Feeding Center and three Supplementary Feeding Centers. AAH also supports the hospital with a capacity building and health program. We are the only international organization in the region with three expatriate fieldworkers who stay in Ganda Town due to the instable security situation.

**Matala Base** has a development program with food security and water activities. A team of three expatriates just arrived. The program started in January. In the next months the humanitarian situation could be worse due to the arrival of thousands displaced in the last months.

**Cuito Cunavale Base**, known as "the end of the world", has a nutritional and health program in a very difficult and lonely place. It will probably be one of the major emergencies for the next year due to the military operation in the east of Cuando Cubango Province. There is one expatriate fieldworker there today, maybe two next month.

**Lubango and Menongue bases:** Logistical bases to support the operation in Cuito Cunavale, Caconda and Matala.

**Luanda, Capital Base** has a coordination team residence and a nutritional program. Next year we hope to have a very strong Nutritional and Capacity Building program." (AAH 22 February 2002)

### **Mines Advisory Group running awareness project in Luena (December 2001)**

- Mines Advisory Group (MAG) informs community on how to minimise risks posed by mines in day-to-day life
- Two MAG emergency response teams clearing high-priority areas around Luena, in eastern Moxico province

"Thousands of people who have fled their homes because of the civil war in Angola have been forced on to land contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance.

The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is running a project designed to help displaced people in the Luena area in the east of the country to find land that is safe from mines.

MAG staff point out dangerous areas and provide information on how to minimise the risks posed by mines in the day-to-day life of the community. Two MAG emergency response teams have been clearing high-priority areas. They destroy landmines and unexploded ordnance found by the community, and assist mine victims.

Among the communities aided by MAG staff is the Vicky camp near Sacassange village, about five km from the town of Luena. The camp was set up a year ago for people who fled their own village.

'There was so much fighting, many people were killed. Too many to count. All our crops were destroyed. So, we came here' camp spokesman Jose Luige told the visitors. 'We will not go back until the fighting stops.'

MAG has worked in the territory extensively over the years and has good information about the location and position of mined areas.

It also helped select a safe area for the Vicky camp to be built. There is very little 'safe' land around Luena and inevitably there are minefields. There is a minefield only 500 metres from the edge of the camp." (AlertNet 12 December 2001)

## **References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**

---

### **Known references to the Guiding Principles (as of August 2002)**

- Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other references to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

### **References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation**

<p>Norms on the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons: The Guiding Principles first of all formed the basis for Minimum Operational Standards (MINOPS) for Resettlement and Return of internally displaced persons, developed by the Government in cooperation with UN agencies in the summer of 2000. In October 2000, these standards were approved by the Council of Ministers and published in a Government Decree (1/01) of 5 January 2001 as the Norms on the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons. The preamble to the Decree states that the Guiding Principles establish the general principles governing the treatment of internally displaced persons.</p>
--

Source: Government of Angola
------------------------------

Date: 5 January 2001
----------------------

Documents:
------------

Government Decree Number 1/ 01 [unofficial translation]
---

Original document in Portuguese available by fax from the Global IDP Project
--

### **Other references to the Guiding Principles**

<p>Commission on Human rights (58th session): In his briefing to the Commission on mass exoduses and displaced persons, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, made particular note of ongoing developments in Angola with regard to the protection of IDPs. Dr. Deng noted that since his last report to the Commission, in January 2001, significant steps have been taken by the Government and the UN in developing a national strategy for the protection of internally displaced persons, which includes efforts to promote and implement the Guiding Principles (see section below on training).</p>
--

Source: Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Dr. Francis Deng
---

Date: 16 January 2002
-----------------------

Documents:
------------

Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54; Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, 16 January 2002 (page 10) [Internet]
---

High-level advocacy of the Guiding Principles: During his visit to Angola in October-November 2000, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, welcomed the development by the Government, in cooperation with the UN, of the norms for the resettlement of internally displaced persons, based on the Guiding Principles. Notwithstanding this, Dr. Deng also called on the Government, inter alia, to develop and adopt national legislation on internally displaced persons; to ensure wide dissemination of the Guiding Principles; and to make greater efforts to train the military and police on the rights of IDPs and the civilian population.

Source: Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Dr. Francis Deng

Date: October-November 2000

Documents:

Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs to the Commission of Human Rights, Profiles in displacement, Angola, 25 January 2001[Internet]

### **Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages**

Following his visit to Angola in 2000, the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Dr. Francis Deng, stressed that while the Guiding Principles are available in Portuguese, it may also be useful to facilitate their translation into local languages such as Umbundu and Kimbundu. He encouraged local NGOs and church groups to undertake such efforts, with the assistance of the national authorities and/or international agencies and NGOs.

Date: 2000

Documents:

GP in Portuguese [Internet]

### **Training on the Guiding Principles**

Provincial Emergency Plan of Action for Resettlement and Return (PEPARR): In June 2002, the government, supported by OCHA, held a provincial planning workshop to familiarise participants with the revised regulamento for the Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations (derived from the Guiding Principles) and to provide direct training on drafting a PEPARR in accordance with the Norms and related regulamento. These regulamento were revised in light of the prospect of largescale return of IDPs following the cessation of hostilities in April 2002, to ensure that appropriate conditions are in place at return sites.

Sources: Government, UN and NGO representatives

Date: 2002-2003

Documents:

UN OCHA Angola Update on Humanitarian Activities, 20 May 2002 [external link]

UN OCHA Angola Update on Humanitarian Activities, 24 June 2002 [external link]

Government/ UN provincial protection plans: This involves a joint Government/ UN training group composed of representatives from the military, the judiciary, the Attorney-General's Office, the national police, the Ministry for Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS), UNHCR and UN OCHA. Participants identify problems specific to their province on the basis of the Guiding Principles, and the steps which need to be taken, and by whom, to address these problems. The resulting protection plan is monitored at provincial level by OCHA-led teams and at the national level by a joint technical group composed of UN agencies.

To support these efforts, the UN country team has established a system for collecting information and monitoring the conditions of IDPs at the provincial level. The system involves regular interviewing with displaced persons in camps by OCHA field advisers using a questionnaire based on the Norms on Resettlement and the Guiding Principles.

Documents:

Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54; Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, 16 January 2002 (page 10) [Internet]  
Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: Nov 2001, UN OCHA, 30 November 2001 [Internet]

UN training workshop: UNHCR, UN OCHA and the Human Rights Division (HRD) of the UN Office in Angola jointly conducted a 5-day workshop which provided training to senior officers and provincial humanitarian coordinators of the Government's Technical Unit for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH), as well as 10 OCHA national officers and 5 HRD national officers, on monitoring compliance at the field level with international and national human rights standards, including the Guiding Principles.

Date: November 2001

Documents:

Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54; Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons, 16 January 2002 (page 10) [Internet]

NRC training workshop: The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), in collaboration with the Angolan government, held a 3-day training workshop on the Guiding Principles in Luanda, Angola. The workshop was part of a global NRC effort to disseminate and explain the Guiding Principles to representatives of governments, NGOs, the UN agencies and the displaced themselves, in order to ensure better protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. Over forty participants worked in groups and discussed the Guiding Principles in relation to the specific situation of internal displacement in Angola.

Sources: Angolan government, national and international NGOs, UN agencies

Date: 29-31 August 2000

Documents:

Report of the Workshop on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, NRC, 29-31 August 2000 [Internal link]

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

---

ACF	Action contre la Faim
CISH	Inter-ministerial Commission for the Humanitarian Situation
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOSOC	UN Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FLEC	Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave
FAPLA	The People's Armed forces for the Liberation of Angola
GoA	Government of Angola
GURN	Government of Unity and National Reconciliation
HCG	Humanitarian Coordination Group
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
IASC	United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
INAROOE	National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Obstacles and Ordnance
MINARS	Ministry of Social Affairs and Re-Integration
MINOPS	Minimum Standards of Return and Resettlement
MONUA	United Nations Angola Observation Mission
MPLA	Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola
MSF	Médecins Sans Frontières
MT	Metric Tonne
NFI	Non-food items
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NHCG	National Humanitarian Coordination Group
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNEAH	National Emergency Programme for Humanitarian Assistance
SCF	Save the Children Fund
STD	Sexually Transmitted Disease
TB	Tuberculosis
UCAH	Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOA	United Nations Office in Angola
USD	United States Dollars
UTCAH	Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs



UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

## LIST OF SOURCES USED

(alphabetical order)

**Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA)**, 22 February 2002, Angola mission update 22 Feb 2002

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/d0b0712dbc989e6c85256b6f005c2d0d?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 April 2002

**Action by Churches Together (ACT)**, 18 December 2001, ACT appeal Angola: Relief for internally displaced AFAO-11 (Rev. 2)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/8e10c3014d83796dc1256b2600576997?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 April 2002

**Action by Churches Together (ACT)**, 26 July 2002, ACT Appeal Angola: Relief & Rehabilitation for IDPs – AFAO-21 (Rev 2)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/0757cf6c565e9c0385256c02005e4838?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 August 2002

**Action by Churches Together (ACT)**, 8 February 2001, ACT Appeal Angola: Relief for Internally Displaced AFAO-11

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/f6ece795c01698d4c12569ee004ec582?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

**Action contre la Faim (ACF)**, 2001, Action Against Hunger: Angola Mission

Internet : [http://www.aah-uk.org/missions\\_anglais/misang.html](http://www.aah-uk.org/missions_anglais/misang.html) , accessed 10 July 2002

**Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)**, May 2002, Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 8, Vol. VIII

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/86aa8446927e591685256bac0069d3c5?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

**Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)**, 25 April 2001, Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 8, Vol. VII

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/551aaaa0192d8c385256a390063bebb?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

**Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)**, 28 March 2001, Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 7, Vol. VII

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/9eab08de197b834e85256a1d00692a59?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

**Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)**, 5 January 2001, Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 4, Vol VII  
Internet : <http://www.actsa.org/Angola/apm/apm0704.htm> , accessed 17 July 2002

**Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)**, 5 October 2001, Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 1, Vol. VII  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/4a3a6f318d8cb3cdc1256adf003807e1?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)**, 5 September 2001, Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 12, Vol. VII  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/c9b1e38015fa51c585256abe00679188?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)**, 7 June 2001, Angola Peace Monitor Issue No. 9, Vol. VII  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/064937fca8d292d085256a6400669d3d?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 20 April 2001, 9,500 displaced by floods in Angola: UN  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/0ffaca70bbd3d4a1c1256a340059836e?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 20 November 2000, Aid agencies help war-weary Angolans back to work  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/2c447c2c31fd927dc125699d003dbe94?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 27 November 2000, Official Body Reports 6 ot 8 Million Mines Planted in Angola  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/7de06ffd83ed6a1fc12569ab003b95dc?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 6 July 2001, 11,000 Angolan families refuse to leave shantytown

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/a6d7a12d584df622c1256a81005a4fdb?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Agence France-Presse (AFP)**, 9 November 2000, Angola's 25 years of civil war  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/6b3f5b0f3d627b8bc1256992005b5939?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**AlertNet**, 12 December 2001, MAG: how to live in a lethal environment – Angola  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/d3ae6725a39ea6bac1256b22005e8a48?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 April 2002

**Amnesty International (AI)**, February 1999, Angola Human Rights - The Gateway to Peace, AFR 12/01/99  
Internet : <http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR120011999> , accessed 10 July 2002

**Andrade, Filomena**, 2001, "A Life of Improvisation - Displaced People in Malanje and Benguela" in Communities and Reconstruction in Angola, Editor Paul Robson

**Birkeland, Nina M. and Gomes, Alberta Umbo**, 2001, "Angola: Deslocados in the Province of Huambo" in Caught Between Borders, Editors Marc Vincent and Birgitte Refslund Sorensen

**CARE**, 11 September 2000, Life in Angola: A conversation with Pat Buckley, country director, CARE-Angola  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/a9015631ee7379cf85256957005cd379?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Catholic Relief Services**, 12 October 2000, Angola Emergency Update October 2000  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/9dc59cca3e463b49c125697600513a77?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Catholic Relief Services**, 22 May 2002, War in Angola updated Spring 2002  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/62ddcf22b9612ec985256bc1006a0ece?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 August 2002

**Church World Service (CWS)**, 10 January 2002, CWS/ERP Emergency appeal: Angola relief and rehabilitation for internally displaced persons (IDPs)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/4fe0f38b316d927085256b3d007c4b4c?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 April 2002

**Church World Service (CWS)**, 15 June 2001, NCC/CWS News Briefs: CWS seeking aid for internally displaced in Angola, drought relief in Zimbabwe  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/7fec0e637b69a3a985256a6c0059ab35?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Deng, Dr. Francis M.**, November 2000, Summary Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons on his Mission to Angola: 31 October-9 November 2000

**Dubois, Marc**, September 2001, Beyond the classic humanitarian response: MSF's advocacy in Angola (MSF Practice Notes)

**European Commission**, 29 May 2002, Euro 125 million action plan for Angola to support the peace process  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/fdc23feebd6d8733c1256bc80045a01c?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

**European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)**, 11 February 2002, Commission earmarks euro 8 million in humanitarian aid for victims of the war in Angola  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/ac85d03d43a6da35c1256b5d0063bf5a?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 April 2002

**European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)**, 26 October 2000, Afghanistan, Somalia, Angola, Sierra Leone: Commission approves humanitarian aid worth euro 11 million  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/1c40a91941f04a35c125698500539fd2?OpenDocument> , accessed 4 January 2001

**European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO)**, 29 March 2001, Commission earmarks 9 million in humanitarian aid for victims of the war in Angola  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/ac2ab907330b4ffbc1256a1e0042f342?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

**Government of Angola**, 15 August 2000, U.N. to Support Projects on Resettlement

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/f9da553e39fee80ec125693d005616da?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Government of Angola**, 17 November 2000, Angola/Italy: Cooperation Protocol on Food Security

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/acc182752ffcda9cc12569a60053800e?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Government of Angola**, 19 September 2000, Angola - UN: Peace Process Troika Re-activated

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/10d8f306ff1d5244c1256961005091f5?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Government of Angola**, 20 May 2002, Kwanza-Sul: Displaced people from Kibala want to go back home

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/5dc2091f9b2a391cc1256bc300528f49?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

**Government of Angola**, 24 June 2002, Bié not ready to host the displaced – Government

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/baba53f1835b924685256be300597f33?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

**Government of Angola**, 5 January 2001, Decree of the Norms on the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Populations

**Government of Japan**, 26 December 2000, Emergency Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons in Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/f9d97d5a57ab8f4ec12569c3005221ec?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 3 July 2002, The War is Over: The Crisis of Angola's Internally Displaced Continues

Internet : <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/angola/2002/angola-idps.pdf> accessed 31 July 2002

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 30 September 1999, Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process

Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/> , accessed 7 December 1999

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, 5 March 2002, Angola briefing under the Arria formula to the United Nations Security Council  
Internet : <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/angola/2002/angola060302.pdf> , accessed 27 March 2002

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**, December 2000, World Report 2001: Angola  
Internet : <http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/angola.html> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 14 June 2001, Angola: IRIN Focus on children of war  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/12b60f22bf3aaac585256a6b004e0d78?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 17 August 2000, Angola: IDP transit centres in central highlands closed  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/95c30d2fb566a674c125693f003149f5?OpenDocument> , accessed 4 January 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 18 October 2001, Angola: Ceasefire before 'humanitarian corridors'  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/ade85e4de068358d85256aea004670d2?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 21 December 2001, IRIN-SA Weekly Round-up 50 covering the period 15 – 21 Dec 2001  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/6d3a9bdcd1ef075085256b2900715188?OpenDocument> , accessed 27 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 21 February 2001, Angola: Humanitarian Update  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/b639d6562a35bd31852569fa006d6013?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 24 August 2001, Angola: Dos Santos to bow out  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/3793d47c6080fa6085256ab2004da141?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 27 July 2001, Angola: IRIN Focus report on Camacupa's IDP camps

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/e6b9b11f12b8ed33c1256a99002e1050?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Network for Southern Africa (IRIN-SA)**, 4 June 2001, Angola: Facing the reality of war

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/d231c7f0c6c62cb285256a630050fdfe?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 10 December 2001, Angola: IRIN Focus on Moxico conflict

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/9e50532eaf281f3c85256b1e005416b8?OpenDocument> , accessed 10 July 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 14 May 1999, "Angola: More displaced amid growing insecurity"

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/sa/countrystories/angola/19990514a.htm> , accessed 20 July 1999

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 22 March 2002, Angola: Talks continue, IDPs flee fighting

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/008073da32aa20d985256b84006fc5c6?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 23 November 2001, Angola: Fear over military call-up

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/0d0d8dc5b881a0ed85256b0d00750ad0?OpenDocument> , accessed 27 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 24 February 2002, Savimbi's death new impetus to peace process

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/1853481dbf00ef7949256b6b001bcb63?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 28 February 2002, Calls for peace, but fighting continues

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/292cb152cb8cf76b49256b6f000c754e?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002



**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 3 April 2002, Angola: Aid delivery improving as road opens

Internet

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/2a4ff84c5a6386d749256b910027b9aa?OpenDocument> , accessed 4 April 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 30 January 2002, Angola: Aid workers fear influx of IDPs, fighting continues

Internet

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/66b54d715cbc33d385256b5100766dc8?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 30 July 2002, Angola: Landmines serious threat to returning IDPs

Internet

[http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=29097&SelectRegion=Southern\\_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=29097&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA) , accessed 31 July 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 31 October 2001, Angola: IDPs increase, UNITA commander is killed

Internet

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/8851b04b0f097cc385256af7005759f7?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 6 November 2001, Angola: Potholed runway grounds plane, halts aid delivery

Internet

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/158b62d110953d3d85256afd00531c62?OpenDocument> , accessed 27 March 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, 8 July 2002, Angola: Situation in Angola is dire: Oshima

Internet

[http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28704&SelectRegion=Southern\\_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28704&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA) , accessed 7 August 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, April 2002, Peace brings fresh humanitarian challenges

Internet

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/b72290c83c23ab4149256b8f000749bc?OpenDocument> , accessed 3 April 2002

**Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)**, July 2002, Angola: Nearly 1.5 million need aid

Internet :  
[http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28589&SelectRegion=Southern\\_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28589&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ANGOLA) , accessed 7 August 2002

Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), November 2001, Central Africa: Countries meet to coordinate policies and efforts  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/fea0e993b26e4a4785256af8005c8180?OpenDocument> , accessed 27 March 2002

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 25 June 2002, ICRC activities in Angola – January to June 2002,  
Internet :  
[http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5BJDGG?OpenDocument&style=custo\\_final](http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5BJDGG?OpenDocument&style=custo_final) , accessed 8 August 2002

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 26 October 2000, Angola: ICRC steps up water and sanitation programme on Planalto  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/b04d8b47764474d5c1256984004b7d79?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), 25 July 2002, Assessing needs in Angola  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/d85ce99d3fc65ed385256c0100692919?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 August 2002

Mail and Guardian, 20 August 2001, Forced on a trail of tears  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/5f2002601e2e0f91c1256aaf0038f61e?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), 11 January 2001, "Oil, diamonds and danger in Angola" (article published by the Economist as found on MSF website)  
Internet : <http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=EFD72641-E65D-11D4-B2010060084A6370> , accessed 10 July 2002

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), 18 December 2000, Plan for a new MSF programme in northern Angola  
Internet :  
<http://www.msf.org/projects/africa/angola/reports/2000/12/newprogram/index.htm> , accessed 16 January 2001

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), 2 July 2001, Angola: Negligence by warring parties contributes significantly to humanitarian emergencies

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/source/downloads/2001/angola.doc> , accessed 26 March 2002

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 24 April 2002, Enormous humanitarian needs in newly-accessible areas of Angola – 'A dying population'

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=7D01BA52-61FC-41B7-A854A23736D650C9> , accessed 31 July 2002

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 26 July 2000, Médecins Sans Frontières Expresses Concern Over Fate of IDPs in Angola

Internet : <http://wwwwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/995fdcc9a69e37bb85256928006fea27?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 27 June 2002, Death rates in Angola confirm emergency situation

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=E9FF945A-ECBD-485B-BB592F2E5526BF22> , accessed 31 July 2002

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 5 March 2002, MSF briefing to UN Security Council: The humanitarian situation in Angola

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=DEDEBCD5-2FCE-4AEA-B2E0579B1C8B24D8> , accessed 25 March 2002

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, 9 May 2001, Severe food crisis in Camacupa, Angola

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=7BA8552D-564F-4D38-AF884F95D7E533F4> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)**, July 2002, Over 280 tonnes of food shipped to Angola to maintain MSF feeding centres

Internet : <http://www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=3E8A416F-4EE8-4BF3-91419E587DFAFC19> , accessed 8 August 2002

**Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)**, September 2000, Workshop on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Luanda, Angola 29-31 August 2000

Internet : [http://www.idpproject.org/training/reports/Luanda\\_workshop\\_2000.pdf](http://www.idpproject.org/training/reports/Luanda_workshop_2000.pdf) , accessed 4 January 2001

**OPEC Fund for International Development (OPEC FID)**, 22 May 2002, Angola's education sector receives boost with US\$9.39 million loan from OPEC fund

Internet : <http://wwwwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/bb1deebb12dfaae3c1256be5003ae1a3?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

**Oxfam**, 6 March 2002, Angola at the crossroads

Internet : <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/whatnew/press/angola060302.html> , accessed 27 March 2002

**Oxfam**, September 2001, Angola's Wealth: Stories of War and Neglect, Oxfam Briefing Paper

Internet : [http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/oxfam\\_ang\\_26sep.pdf](http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/oxfam_ang_26sep.pdf) , accessed 18 October 2001

**Pan African News Agency**, 14 October 2001, US supports resettlement of demobilised Angolan soldiers

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/87ec1f437f7c2c0c85256ae60064bfba?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**Pan African News Agency**, 29 December 2000, Water Supply is Luanda Governor's Priority for 2001

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/8b8cdaebbbd84ecc852569c4005659f0?OpenDocument> , accessed 11 July 2002

**Pan African News Agency**, 30 June 2000, US grants three million dollars for demining in Angola

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/405a6dc48975542d8525690e00726aa0?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**Professor Michael Golden, FANTA Project**, August 2001, Report of a visit to investigate recurrent epidemics of Pellagra in Kuito, Angola

**Refugees International**, 16 April 2001, In Angola, UNHCR improves support for internally displaced

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/104ae5bde11375be85256a3200723532?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

**Refugees International**, 18 June 2002, Notes from the Field: Transit Centers for IDPs – Huambo, Angola

Internet : <http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/ri/note?nc=00129> , accessed 7 August 2002

**Refugees International**, 2 July 2002, Government of Angola Faces Challenges in Upcoming IDP Resettlement

Internet : <http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/ri/bulletin?bc=00425> , accessed 7 August 2002

**Refugees International**, 25 April 2001, Angola: UNHCR succeeds in helping internally displaced

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/4530f5259e69511b85256a39005975a7?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

Refugees International, March 2002, U.S. should continue to support internally displaced people in Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/82572d354436f1c985256b6f005a7ef2?OpenDocument> , accessed 27 March 2002

Reuters, 13 November 2001, Angolan war displaced remain poor in diamond town

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/4479e0e096e6506b85256b03007bf824?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002

Reuters, 28 December 2000, Land squabbles add to problems of Angola's war displaced

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/31ac9e5f48b91943852569c3005ef165?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

Robson, Paul, 30 January 2001, Email from Paul Robson (Development Workshop - Angola) to NRC Geneva

Robson, Paul and Roque, Sandra, May 2001, "Here in the city, everything has to be paid for: Locating the community in peri-urban Angola" (preliminary summary of research carried out for ADRA and Development Workshop Angola

Save the Children Fund (SCF), 13 August 2001, Food security assessment : Kuito, Bie province Angola, 14-23 July 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/d339da7b7b44f842c1256aa800444d28?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

Save the Children Fund (SCF), 22 June 1999, Angola Emergency Bulletin Four

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/7cf8b2a1aca37f6bc125679800567b88?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 February 2000

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 13 February 2002, USG Kenzo Oshima – Briefing to the UN Security Council on Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/2fc8ff224293a07985256b5f007a74fa?OpenDocument> , accessed 27 March 2002

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 13 July 2001, OCHA Special Humanitarian Situation Report on Bie Province

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/7ec9571b9a6c8d62c1256a880051f4c8?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 15 April 2000, Report on Rapid Assessment of Critical Needs

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 July 2000, 2000 Mid-Term Review of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola (Jan-Jun 2000)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/f88b251f66429630c125691f0049a9bc?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 17 July 2002, Briefing by Kenzo Oshima, USG for Humanitarian Affairs to the Security Council on Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/a2f5313b741af6a485256bfa006fc81c?OpenDocument> , accessed 8 August 2002

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 18 April 2001, Humanitarian Situation in Angola: Monthly Analysis Mar 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/2dda3adf2b2d823385256a320064a444?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 18 June 2002, United Nations bridging request: Humanitarian operations in Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/22e1fa6e2788422ec1256bdd0047c0e0?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 19 April 2002, Assessments underway in newly accessible areas

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/dd02a18b43024dee85256ba00066fd0a?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 19 June 2000, Humanitarian situation in Angola: Reporting period 05 -11 Jun

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/ac8ec854f09d6b7585256903006d33ff?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 June 2000

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 20 May 2002, OCHA Angola Update on Humanitarian Activities as of 20 May 2002](#)  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/6dd2e17363d87090c1256bc00045df2a?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 2000, OCHA Senior Advisor on IDPs, Internal Displacement in the Angola: A Review of UN Strategic Coordination](#)

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 22 May 2001, Mid-Year Review of the 2001 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola \(January-May 2001\)](#)  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/853745350d0d11f1c1256a5400491538?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 23 March 2001, Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internal Displacement - Mission to Angola 12-17 March 2001: Findings and Recommendations](#)  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/UNID/F20354DD8F472067C1256A220031E549?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 24 January 2002, Humanitarian Crisis in Bié Province Situation Report](#)  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/679aac21f24d5f4585256b51005df602?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 March 2002

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 24 June 2002, OCHA Angola Update on Humanitarian Activities as of 24 June 2002](#)  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/f2d4ed0d1456cb9ec1256be30055748c?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 27 August 2000, Humanitarian situation in Angola: Reporting period 21-27 August 2000](#)  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/590af28d8078c5408525695700685676?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 28 February 2001, Humanitarian Situation in Angola: Monthly Analysis Feb 2001](#)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/b41ea3e40f5e5b6985256a14006b1654?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 April 2001, First Quarter Update on Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2001 (Jan-Mar 2001)  
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/ocha-ang-30apr.pdf> , accessed 2 May 2001

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 April 2002, Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis April 2002  
Internet :  
<http://wwwwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/276f5a1bc2f042aac1256bd00036fdc0?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 July 2002

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 June 2001, Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: June 2001  
Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/777d00efcdf15626c1256a99002a6544?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 30 November 2001, Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: Nov 2001  
Internet :  
<http://wwwwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/0b84097e63ae5a3fc1256b2c003990a6?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 April 2002

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 August 2001, Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: August 2001  
Internet :  
<http://wwwwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/562ca907652cf99bc1256adb00310d97?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 December 2001, Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: Dec 2001  
Internet :  
<http://wwwwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/79d8ba543f7ebd27c1256b4a003a9d9d?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 March 2002

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 31 January 2002, Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: January 2002  
Internet :  
<http://wwwwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/5dca52c78a936849c1256b6c0039f859?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002



[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 31 July 2001, Humanitarian situation in Angola monthly analysis: July 2001](#)

[Internet](#) :

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/012ba953105e4c7dc1256ab900460b61?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 4 March 1999, Humanitarian Situation in Angola Reporting Period 26 February to 4 March 1999](#)

[Internet](#) :

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/c852bca12aab1512c125672a004aac0d?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 February 2000

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 7 March 2002, Humanitarian Situation in Angola: Special Report](#)

[Internet](#) :

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/e7f00a821ed5274b85256b750060248c?OpenDocument> , accessed 25 March 2002

[UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \(UN OCHA\), 8 February 2002, The Humanitarian Situation in Angola](#)

[UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Unit & Department of International Protection \(UNHCR EPAU/ DIP\), May 2002, UNHCR and internally displaced persons in Angola: A programme continuation review](#)

[Internet](#) :

<http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+KwwBmeyq+vswwwwwwwwwwwwwwmFqo20IOE2glhFqo20IOE2glTfqqGn5nwGqrAFqo20IOE2glcFqbuNlg2awDmaoDBnGDwccOamo5pcwqnmavnG5dD5a0DaEDtdcwDzmxwwwwww/opendoc.pdf> , accessed 8 August 2002

[United Nations, 30 November 1999, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola, January - December 2000, \(New York and Geneva\)](#)

[Internet](#) :

<http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/files/rwdomino.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/be1a6d749de2d2c9c125681d004d53b2?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 December 1999

[United Nations, February 1998, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola, January - December 1998 \(New York and Geneva\)](#)

[Internet](#) :

<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/1c7ba9d10e034800c12565ae003c578a?OpenDocument> , accessed 17 July 2002

[United Nations, November 2000, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2001: Angola](#)

[Internet](#) : <http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/2001/ang01.pdf> , accessed 16 January 2001

[United Nations, November 2001, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal 2002: Angola](#)

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/2002/files/ang02.pdf> , accessed 13 December 2001

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 11 February 2002, UNICEF humanitarian appeal for children and women Jan – Dec 2002

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/516282c7f469687a85256b5f00537ff2?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 March 2002

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 16 October 2001, UNICEF and the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Angola strongly condemn abduction of children and call for their immediate release

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/c0766432c91d96dfc1256ae8002c1e1f?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 2001, UNICEF 2001 Appeal for Children and Women

Internet : <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/AngolaCAP.pdf> , accessed 1 May 2001

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 21 June 2001, UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Angola Donor Update 12 June 2001

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/36c179b6c585b8dc85256a73006c269a?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 22 September 2000, UNICEF Emergency Programmes: Angola Donor Update

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/038dc2226674bdf88525696700595bcd?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 29 May 2002, UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Angola Programme Donor Update

Internet : <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/Country/Angola/020529.PDF> , accessed 31 July 2002

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 29 May 2002, UNICEF Humanitarian Action: Angola Programme Donor Update

Internet : <http://www.unicef.org/emerg/Country/Angola/020529.PDF> , accessed 7 August 2002

**United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)**, 31 March 2001, UNICEF Angola Situation Report Mar 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/34f42482fd77b2ca85256a2c00639ee9?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR), 25 January 2001, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/53: Profiles in displacement: Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/36c1b69d88068b4dc1256a3800443208?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

United Nations Department of Public Information (UN DPI), 28 December 2000, New UN report proposes measures to enforce sanctions against UNITA in Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/UNID/AF0212DF1CADB3EA852569C3007665C2?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN HCHR), 10 November 2000, Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons concludes visit to Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/f0d884625f45c0ebc1256996006115f1?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 31 May 2001, UNHCR Angola News in Brief 31 May 2001

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/a53a6705a4ec330685256a6b00699d35?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), April 2000, Report of the UNHCR Rapid Assessment Team to Angola, Luanda, Uige and Zaire Provinces 8-20 April

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), May 2001, UNHCR's Programme for Internally Displaced People in Angola (A Joint Danida/UNHCR Review)

Internet : <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/taxis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3b13a0f91&page=research> , accessed 24 October 2001

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), November 2000, Angola 2000: A real-time assessment of UNHCR's IDP intervention

Internet : <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/taxis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=RESEARCH&id=3b0a29e84&page=research> , accessed 1 October 2001

[United Nations News Service, 19 June 2002, Team completes assessment of UN's future role in Angola](#)

[Internet](#) :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/43e40613109ddc7885256bdd006ffb5c?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

[United Nations News Service, April 2002, UN welcomes ceasefire agreement between Angolan government, UNITA](#)

[Internet](#) :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/23a3f3a0d633101185256b8e006a548e?OpenDocument> , accessed 2 April 2002

[United Nations Security Council \(UN SC\), 10 October 2000, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola \(S/2000/977\)](#)

[Internet](#) :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/02cddbba955cfe2c125697600303c36?OpenDocument> , accessed 16 January 2001

[United Nations Security Council \(UN SC\), 11 April 2001, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Angola](#)

[Internet](#) :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/6bd6c7c500e8c0ce85256a3000652f97?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 April 2001

[United Nations Security Council \(UN SC\), 17 January 1999, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola \(MONUA\), S/1999/49](#)

[Internet](#) : <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/s199949.htm> , accessed 10 June 1999

[United Nations Security Council \(UN SC\), 17 July 2002, Response to Angola's serious humanitarian crisis must be shared by international community, Angola authorities, Under-Secretary-General tells Council](#)

[Internet](#) :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/b2266b93d159c49e85256bf9006b2cd5?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

[United Nations Security Council \(UN SC\), 18 April 2002, Security Council, welcoming Angola ceasefire, extends mandate of sanctions monitoring mechanism until 19 October: Resolution 1404 \(2002\)](#)

[Internet](#) :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/4e380585fd66abe485256b9f0070f7e8?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 July 2002

[United Nations Security Council \(UN SC\), 19 October 2001, Security Council extends for six months mandate of sanctions monitoring mechanism against Angola rebel group - adopted resolution 1374 \(2001\)](#)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/UNID/0277AB8469A76C7385256AED005CFDFD?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 20 May 2002, Security Council committee informs of suspension of travel restrictions on UNITA

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/00d749d6e4936d0085256bc0004ca555?OpenDocument> , accessed 30 July 2002

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 21 December 2001, Opinion emerging for more active United Nations role in Angola peace process, says Under-Secretary-General during briefing of Security Council

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/12f1069e2820e7e485256b2900789e4f?OpenDocument> , accessed 27 March 2002

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), 26 July 2002, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Angola

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vID/C40A3942BA74C5A685256C080071E675?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

United Nations Security Council (UN SC), October 2001, Supplementary Report of the UN Monitoring Mechanism on Sanctions against UNITA (S/2001/966)

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/unsc-ang-12oct.pdf> , accessed 11 October 2001

United Nations Sub-Committee on Nutrition (ACC/SCN), 31 July 2001, Report on the Nutrition Situation of Refugees and Displaced Populations - Issue No. 34

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2001/rnis34.pdf> , accessed 3 October 2001

US Agency for International Development (USAID), 12 June 2002, Angola Complex Emergency Situation Report #2 (FY 2002)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/0ba831be4789132749256bd70009903b?OpenDocument> , accessed 7 August 2002

US Agency for International Development (USAID), 2 April 2001, Angola Complex Emergency Situation Report #1 (FY 2001)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/27b7d975b4a025fc85256a2200673b30?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

**U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR)**, 19 June 2001, **USCR Country Report Angola: Statistics on refugees and other uprooted people, June 2001**  
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/4c164c85776c631f85256a76004e6b6b?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR)**, 1998, **World Refugee Survey 1998 (Washington, D.C.)**  
Internet : <http://www.refugees.org> , accessed 9 June 2002

**U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR)**, August 2000, **Angola: Awaiting Victory or Negotiations**  
Internet : [http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/angola\\_rr00\\_7.htm](http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/angola_rr00_7.htm) , accessed 16 January 2001

**U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR)**, July 2000, **The Spark for the Debate: Internal Displacement in Angola**  
Internet : [http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/spark\\_rr00\\_6.htm](http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/spark_rr00_6.htm) , accessed 16 January 2001

**Vines, Alex**, 1998, "Angola", in Janie Hampton, (ed.), **Internally Displaced People: A Global Survey**, (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.)

**Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children (Women's Commission)**, February 2001, **Reproductive Health for Refugees Consortium Assessment of Reproductive Health for IDPs Angola (February 15-28 2001)**

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 12 July 2001, **Caught in the crossfire: Plight of Angola's "single-parent mothers"**  
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/bf8e3a0dda5ec591c1256a8b0044d929?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 15 June 2001, **WFP Angola aircraft is targeted a second time, endangering humanitarian aid**  
Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/bd69113994eb336685256a6c00732a32?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 21 February 2001, **WFP approves new relief and recovery strategy for Angola**  
Internet : <http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/subsections/year.asp?section=13&year=2001> , accessed 17 July 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 26 June 2002, **Food assistance threatened for rising numbers of hungry Angolans**

Internet : <http://www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=2> , accessed 7 August 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 3 November 2000, WFP Emergency Report No. 44 of 2000

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 30 March 2001, WFP Emergency Report No. 13 of 2001

Internet : [http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/subsections/emergencies\\_report.asp?id=16#626](http://www.wfp.org/newsroom/subsections/emergencies_report.asp?id=16#626) accessed 17 July 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 4 December 2001, Self-reliance strategy for WFP food aid beneficiaries

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/25941948c0f3e19a85256b22006aabd8?OpenDocument> , , accessed 2 April 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 8 May 2002, WFP finds severe hunger in new areas of Angola as food stocks run out

Internet : <http://www.wfp.org/index.asp?section=2> , accessed 7 August 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, 9 September 1999, Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation - Angola 6159.00 - Assistance to War-affected People, WFP/EB.3/99/7-B/5, (Rome)

Internet : [http://www.wfp.org/country\\_brief/projects/615900.pdf](http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/projects/615900.pdf) , accessed 17 July 2002

**World Food Programme (WFP)**, March 2002, WFP Emergency Report No. 09 of 2002

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/a67ae951a8f8666285256b6f006b2844?OpenDocument> , accessed 26 March 2002

**World Health Organisation (WHO)**, 10 April 2002, Assistance to 40,000 IDPs improved thanks to partnership in health

Internet : <http://www.who.int/disasters/country.cfm?countryID=3&DocTypeID=6&archive=no> , accessed 8 August 2002

**World Health Organisation (WHO)**, 17 April 2002, WHO Representative assessed health and nutrition in the Malange Province on 15-16 April

Internet : <http://www.who.int/disasters/country.cfm?countryID=3&doctypeID=6> , accessed 31 July 2002

**World Health Organisation (WHO)**, 30 August 2001, WHO Angola Update August 2001

Internet : <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/0eac2dce5264911c85256ac6006f899f?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

[World Health Organisation \(WHO\), 4 October 2001, Angola: Government of Angola delivers 7 million USD in medical supplies](#)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/47e44f018302ca05c1256adf00587303?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

[World Vision, 19 April 2001, Therapeutic feeding is saving lives in Angola](#)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/97a0177003fac33e85256a33005b22a7?OpenDocument> , accessed 1 May 2001

[World Vision, 21 May 2001, UNITA takeover of Golungo Alto forces suspension of \\$1 million program](#)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b16d2074285256830007fb33f/a1b8128e26720601c1256a54002a851f?OpenDocument> , accessed 23 October 2001

[Xinhua News Agency, 26 November 2001, About 10,000 Angolans displaced by recent fighting](#)

Internet :  
<http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/9116fbdfea2adea85256b1000696fd8?OpenDocument> , accessed 9 January 2002